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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is intended to serve two objectives: The first objective is to discuss 
the various responses that can be taken against terrorism which range from the 
criminalization of some terrorist acts by the international community to the practical 
measures States in the real world are taking against terrorism on one hand and from 
peaceful measures and coercive ones on the other hand. The question then will be 
whether these responses are effective in deterring terrorism. Had these different types 
of responses worked properly and if the answer is negative why not? In other words, 
a critical evaluation of these responses will be provided by this thesis. 
The second objective will be concerned with Kuwait's perspective on 
terrorism. However, the discussion this time will be narrower. It will be concerned 
with some of the regional measures Kuwait and other States in the region resorted to, 
to counter terrorism. Questions like: what are these measures; how effective they are 
in suppressing terrorism; and is there any noticeable difference between these 
measures and those taken at the global level will be researched. Moreover, discussion 
about the approach Kuwait had used at the national level against terrorism will be 
considered. 
It must be mentioned that until the moment of this writing there is not any 
major study that discusses Kuwait's ways of dealing with terrorism. More 
significantly, as an Islamic and Arabic country Kuwait may hold a position or an 
understanding with respect to the issue of terrorism different from other countries, 
especially those from the West. Thus, this thesis will discern such a position and an 
understanding that may not be well known to many people. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
'With advanced technology and a smaller world of porous borders, the ability to 
unleash mass sickness, death and destruction today has reached a far greater 
order of magnitude. A lone madman or a nest of fanatics with a bottle of 
chemicals, a batch of plague-including bacteria, or a crude nuclear bomb can 
threaten to kill tens of thousands of people in a single act of malevolence. 
These are not far-off or far-fetched scenarios. They are real - here and now'. 
(William Cohen -US Former Secretary of Defense Department- Proliferation: Threat and ResPOnse, 
Nov. 1997). 
'We.. have the ability to make and use chemicals and poisonous gas. And these 
gases and poisons are made from the simplest ingredients, which are available 
in the pharmacies and we could, as well, smuggle them from one country to 
another if needed. And this is for use against vital institutions and residential 
populations and drinking water sources and others'. 
(Rarnzi Ahmed Yousef -a convicted terrorist- (US v. Rarnzi Ahmed Yousef, Government Exhibit 528- 
T) -26 Aug. 1998). 
'The threat of terrorism, both international and domestic, lies beyond its 
objective impact in numbers of people killed or injured or property damaged. 
Terrorism, among all forms of violent crime, is a peculiar evil, since it inspires 
fear and creates disruption far beyond the direct casualties it inflicts. 
Traditionally, that has been the essence of terrorism and the, goal of terrorists - 
to create feae. 
(Philip Wilcox, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US State Department- Statement given to House 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee- 25 Jan. 2000). 
I 
From time immemorial terrorism or terrorist crimes are still among the few 
words that can be heard on the news on an almost daily basis. The manifestations that 
terrorism has taken are changing from time to time reflecting changes in the world. 
Whenever a new technology that advances the world material state is invented a new 
form of terrorism appears. For example, the great prosperity and evolution that 
accompanied the use of airlines was faced by a great revolution in hijacking. 
Moreover, in response to the extraordinary development in computer science a new 
form of cyber-terrorism, as some may call it, is now dominating the world 
In an attempt to underestimate terrorism as a great threat to the world, some 
argue that war is the only enormous threat to the world because in a war hundred 
thousands, if not millions of people may be killed in a very short time. Therefore, 
they maintain, all resources and studies should be channeled to address war and 
prevent the existence of any hostility between States that might lead to it. 
Although, it is true that war is a great danger to international peace and 
security and must not be allowed to happen, that does not mean terrorism is a 
worthless subject and should be ignored. The following are some of the differences 
between war and terrorism that illustrate the fact that terrorism, if not more important 
than war, is, at least, of equal significance: 
Firstly, in war there is a beginning and an end, whereas in terrorism the 
beginning cannot be easily identified and can be endless. Secondly, in war only 
belligerent States, are exposed to danger and neutrals may, usually, not be targeted, 
whereas in terrorism, violence can spillover all countries and does not confine itself to 
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particular States, this is because terrorism recognizes no international boundaries and 
the whole world could be its theatre. Thirdly, in war, in all cases the number of 
belligerent States will be limited, whereas in terrorism this number could be equal to 
millions of people. This is because in war those who have the capability to declare it 
are from the two hundred States existing on the globe, whereas in terrorism 1here are 
hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals who can turn into a terrorist. This, also, 
implies that in war a peaceful end could be reached if the few policyrnakers who are 
engaged in war decided to stop it, whereas with terrorism such a peaceful end would 
have to be agreed by too many people. Fourthly, war is a very expensive tactic and 
only few States who can afford it may wage it against others, whereas terrorism is 
very cheap and basically easily affordable to any person in the world. Fifthly and 
finally, although war is a destructive act, its parties must, however, abide by all of its 
international governing bodies of law and will, generally, be held responsible if they 
fail to do so, whereas terrorists abide by no laws. 
Others, also for the purpose of undervaluing the danger of terrorism, say that 
car accidents are even more serious than terrorism because the number of people who 
die in road accidents is higher than those who die as a result of terrorist attacks. For 
example, in Kuwait it had been reported that in the year 2000 more than 300 people 
were killed by car accidents in this very small country with a population of nearly two 
million, whereas not a single person is died in a terrorist attack. 
This argument, as the previous one, focuses only on numbers of victims and 
omits an important fact, that terrorism victimizes all people at the same time, not only 
its immediate victims, by making them feel insecure any where and at any time 
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whether they are driving, flying, working, sitting, or even sleeping and whether they 
are at home or abroad. This reality about terrorism is the most distinctive component 
of terrorism that makes it a considerable threat to the whole world which must be 
prevented before mushrooming. 
However, if terrorism emerged a long time ago, as stated earlier, certainly 
since the conclusion of the United Nations Charter until this time, and if terrorism is 
so grave that it could threaten world stability, one may simply ask why is it so 
persistent and is there any effective remedy to such an act? Did the international 
community take any action to confront terrorism and prevent its perils? 
In answering this crucial inquiry, this paper will, as its first objective, study 
most of the prominent responses, especially international ones that have been taken or 
can be taken to counter international terrorism. Some of the questions that will be 
answered in this study are: what are these responses; how lawful; how effective they 
are in preventing terrorism or how well they are in combating terrorism; and what are 
the practical difficulties, if there are any, that preclude these responses from achieving 
their desired goals? 
Nonetheless, it must be mentioned that not all aspects of law and terrorism 
will be addressed by this study because such an endeavor will be far-reaching, 
therefore could not be appropriately covered in one thesis. Instead, this study will be 
concerned about those responses that are now in use by States and have been 
controversial in their success in dealing with terrorism. 
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Of equal importance, this study will, as its second objective, examine, but this 
time more narrowly, Kuwait's perception of terrorism and that will include the stand, 
if there is any, Kuwait took in the various types of membership it has in many 
international, regional, or sub-regional organizations that have dealt with the issue of 
terrorism. Also, how Kuwait has dealt with terrorism at the national level will be 
addressed. 
The reason for studying Kuwait 's ways of dealing with the issue of terrorism 
is the fact that until the moment of writing this thesis there is not any major study of 
this country in relation to terrorism, therefore its position with respect to this issue 
may not be well known to many people. Moreover, as an Islamic and Arabic country 
Kuwait may provide a good example of how a State, not from the West, is dealing 
with terrorism at the regional and national level. And more importantly is the 
question of whether Kuwait's handling of the problem of terrorism at these levels 
differs from the global one. 
Logically this study will begin searching for any definition of terrorism that is 
accepteý, by the international community. Then, this study will demonstrate the 
reasons and causes that give rise to this phenomenon. The final part of this chapter 
will be devoted to the typologies and classifications and this will include explaining 
the relation between States and terrorism. 
Next, some of the international responses that had been taken against terrorism 
include the criminalization of some aspects of terrorism by the international 
community which manifested itself in the adoption of many conventions or treaties in 
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order to combat terrorism, whether these conventions or treaties were concluded 
directly under the auspice of the United Nations or under any of its specialized 
agencies. After highlighting some of the important provisions of these anti-terrorism 
conventions, the question then will be how effective these instruments are in deterring 
terrorism. Also, extradition as a criminal process that can be taken against fugitive 
terrorists will be included in this chapter. Moreover, the idea of furnishing the 
International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over terrorism will be considered. 
Subsequently, some of the common practical responses that States can take 
against terrorism will be discussed. However, since practical responses can be 
coercive or peaceful, this chapter will be concerned with the peaceful responses and 
these will include: firstly, discussion will be about restricting the rules of asylum in 
order to prevent terrorists from abusing this legitimate right; secondly, the issue of 
tackling terrorism by drying up their financial sources will also be talked about in this 
chapter; and thirdly, the importance of the exchange of information as a practical 
measure against terrorism will be studied and whether such an exchange of 
information on terrorism is required by international law. 
In addition, the use of military force against terrorism, which is considered to 
be one of the most controversial themes in international law, will be included in this 
discussion. The question, then, will be when such an action can legitimately be taken 
by a State against terrorists or terrorist organizations based in another State? The use 
of military force by the United States against Sudan and Afghanistan will be the 
subsequent case study of that chapter. In the final part of this chapter the subject will 
be whether such an armed action prevents terrorism from reoccurring? The reason 
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why the last part will be included in this chapter, though it is more political in nature 
than legal, is because of the seriousness of such a response which proves to be very 
contentious Thus, this section is meant to search the effectiveness of such a response 
even in situations where it is legally justified. 
Needless to say the discussion of most of these responses will be applicable to 
all States, including Kuwait, because of these responses' international nature and 
because international law obligations are applicable to all States. Therefore, when 
talking about Kuwait's perspective on terrorism, there will be no need to reiterate the 
discussion about these responses unless it is necessary for better understanding. 
Discussion about Kuwait's position with respect to terrorism will be divided 
into two parts: the first part will include the following: firstly, Kuwaif s attitude in the 
United Nations when facing the issue of terrorism; secondly, as a member of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, Kuwait and other members may have their 
own understanding of what constitutes terrorism. Also, measures that have been 
taken by this regional organization against terrorism will be considered; thirdly, 
another regional organization, that is the Arab League in which Kuwait is member 
will be included in this discussion as well; fourthly and finally, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council which is the smallest regional organization consisting only of six members in 
which Kuwait is party will also be studied. 
The second part will be concerned about the approach Kuwait used when 
dealing with terrorism but this time from a local point of view. Firstly, how did 
Kuwait regulate terrorism at the national level will be pointed out in this chapter; and 
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secondly, some of the terrorist attacks that had been committed against Kuwait and 
the measures it resorted to in response is another important issue that will be 
addressed. However, it should be noted that access to the transcripts of the trials of 
these terrorist attacks in order to know how the law has been applied and interpreted 
by the national courts is not possible. Hence, these cases of terrorist attacks will be 
obtained form foreign sources such as Keesing Record of World Events. 
It is hoped that this study will provide the readers with a critical evaluation of 
the various responses States may contemplate when confronting terrorism. More 
importantly, this study will be the first to discuss Kuwait's perspective on terrorism. 
New documents, like the Organization of the Islamic Conference Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism and Arab Convention for the Suppression of terrorism, are 
among those instruments that will be discussed in this study for the first time. 
8 
CHAPTER 2. TERRORISM: DEFINITION, CAUSES, AND 
TYPOLOGIES 
As an introduction this Chapter will start by discussing a basic question, that 
is, what is meant by terrorism? Thus the search will begin to find if there is any 
definition accepted by the international community before talking about the various 
responses that have been taken against terrorism. And if there is no such definition, 
examples will be mentioned of the definitions that are popular, to a certain extent, 
among many writers, which if they do not cover all of the terrorism's aspects, 
would at least cover most of them. Then in Section 2, attention will be given to the 
causes that give, in general, the appearance of such a phenomenon. This is a very 
important and inevitable part in any discussion about terrorism. What triggers this 
phenomenon before searching for an effective remedy? Finally, in Section 3, 
discussion will be about the typologies or classifications of terrorism and this with 
include discussion of State involvement in terrorism and the types of such 
involvement will be identified. This last section will explain, as will be discussed 
later, why a State that had been victin-dzed by terrorism took an action against 
another State because of its involvement in terrorism. 
2.1. DEFINITION OF TERRORISM 
Currently the concept of terrorism had become so elastic that there seems to 
be no limit to what could be described as terrorism. Here are some examples of the 
unlimited uses of this term. When criminals tried to extort money from the food 
manufactures by threatening to put broken glass, tacks, or any other harmful objects 
in the baby food jars in the supermarket, it was labelled by the media as "consumer 
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terrorism". ' Also, the phenomenon of anonymous obscene phone-calls has been 
described as "telephone terrorisnes, 2 especially in the United States. An academic 
text analysed rape as a "terrorist institution". 3 "Economic terrorism" was the term 
used to describe the speculation against the currency of the country that financed 
the Argentinean presidential election in 1989. The Iraqi ambassador to the United 
States also used it in October 1990 when he accused Kuwait of sabotaging his 
country's economy. 5 This expanding use of the term led Brian Jenkins (one of the 
prominent specialists in terrorism) to declare that 'terrorism can mean just what 
those who use the term (not the terrorists) want it to mean, almost any violent act by 
any opponent'. 6 
In practice, the terms 'terrorism and terrorists' have been used by politicians 
as a label to pin on their enemies, and this is one of the reasons that makes people's 
judgement of what constitutes terrorism vary from time to time and from one 
country to another, what is terrorism today will be heroism (Freedom Fighters) 
tomorrow. As Richard Baxter, professor of law at Harvard University and Judge in 
the International Court of Justice, pointed out 'we have cause to regret that a legal 
concept of terrorism was ever inflicted upon us, the term is imprecise, it is 
ambiguous, and above all, it serves no operative legal purpose'. 7 
Before starting the search for an accepted definition, one might ask why it is 
A. Guelke, The Age of Terrorism and International Political System, (Tauris Academic Studies, 
1995), 1. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 W. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, (Weldenfeld & Nocolson, 1987), 1. 7 J. F. Murphy, State Support of International terrorism: Legal, Political and Economic Dimensions, 
(Mansell, 1989), 3. 
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important to define terrorism. In other words, is the existence of such a definition 
necessary? Boaz Ganor answered this question by surnmarising the benefits that 
can be obtained by defining terrorism, 8 which are the following: 
1) Legislation and Punishment: 
No laws or regulations can be enacted to combat terrorism and the type of 
punishment of the individuals involved in this act, or things used by them, unless 
there is a clear definition of terrorism that distinguished it from other crimes. 
2) International Co-operation: 
In order to formulate and ratify a new convention dealing with terrorism, an 
internationally accepted definition of terrorism is required, otherwise the 
controversies will continue, and States will continue def ining terrorism according 
to their own understanding, which could be wrong in some cases and more 
significantly this different understanding may cause conflict between these States. 
This is very important and it explains the reason why the international community 
had adopted many anti-terrorism conventions instead of one, as will discussed 
later. In other words, how could one combat something one does not know? 
3) State Sponsoring Terrorism: 
Some States sponsor terrorist organizations for many reasons (this issue will be 
discussed later in section 5 of this chapter) and will continue doing this. 
Therefore, unless the actions of these States have been proscribed by a broad 
definition of terrorism accepted by the international community, no measures 
without the support of the international community can be taken against such 
States. 
4) Offensive Action: 
To ensure international support for States struggling against terrorism - which 
should retain the initiative in combating terrorism -, and perhaps even for a joint 
offensive, an internationally accepted definition of terrorism is required, to 
8 B. Ganor, 'Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom 
Fighter? '<http: //www. ict. org. il/articles/define. htm. >(Visited Feb. 23,1999). 
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prevent the defensive State from enjoying sympathy from other States and to 
prevent the countries that are conducting actions (offensive States) from being 
criticised by others. Therefore, the offensive States will be considered as 
aggressive ones in the eyes of many States and people. 
5) Attitudes of the Population Supporting Terrorism: 
People supporting terrorism because they do not know that these acts should be 
called terrorist acts for whatever reasons, will change their attitudes, if there is a 
clear definition of terrorism and this will risk any terrorist organization that 
depends on the assistance (recruitment resource) of a sympathetic civilian 
population from losing its legitimacy in the eyes of this population. 
6) Public Relation: 
The public relations between States have been at risk many times because of 
controversy over what constitutes a terrorist act. For example, the US and the 
Arab countries over the activities of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation 
Organization). 9 This point as well as the others implies the urgent need for a 
criterion that distinguishes terrorism from people's armed struggle for self- 
determination. As in the example above the Arab countries consider the activities 
of the Palestinian liberation movements as lawful acts of self-determination, 
whereas the US in concert with Israel considers these acts as acts of terrorism. 
Thus, this could, as will be discussed later in more details, cause the public 
relations between these States to become very fragile and strained as a result of 
their different interpretations of what constitutes terrorism. 
At the beginning, it would be helpful to trace the terrn, i. e., terrorism, back to 
its first use without delving too deeply into all terrorist incidents, because searching 
the history of violence, is searching the history of human beings. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary (OED), the terms terrorism and terrorists were first used in 
the English Language in 1795, in response to the "Reign of Terroil' in past 
Ibid. 
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0 revolutionary France' , and this is the reason that until recent times some governments 
confmed the definition of terrorism to State actions. Terror and actions by individuals 
that today would be described as terrorism were subsumed under different labels; e. g., 
'assassination' of (the head of State) which only recently has been treated as a 
terrorist act 
Moreover, in the Wh century, the terms were applied to the violence of the 
agrarian agitation against landlords and their agents in Ireland. However, by the 
end of that century, the term had been linked to the strategy of political 
assassination employed by Narodnaya Volya "people's will" against Tsarist regime, 
particularly the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in March 188 1.11 
Nevertheless, most specialists in terrorism emphasised that the use of the 
terms terrorists and terrorism, as applied to individuals, became more frequent since 
what they called "the age of terrorism", 12 which started in the late 1960s, and they 
linked the onset of terrorism with specific events during that time, most particularly 
the defeat of Arab States by Israel in the Six-Day war of June 1967, the death of 
Che Guevara in October 1967, and the student revolt in France in May 1968. 
However, Andrian Guelke argued that two events should be. added to this list; the 
clash between police and civil rights demonstrators in Londonderry in October 
1968, that marked the start of Northern Ireland's most recent troubles, and perhaps 
somewhat less satisfactorily, the failure of the National Democratic Party (NPD) to 
'0 This had been known as the Jacobin " Reign of Terror " in 18 th century in France, in which 300,000 
people were arrested, about 17,000 people were officially executed and many others died in prison 
without trials. 
11 See, Guelke, note I at 3. 
12 Ibid. at 52. 
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gain parliamentary representation in the West German Federal Election of 1969 
after its earlier success at State level. 13 
There have been hundreds of efforts exerted at all levels to find an accepted 
definition to this phenomenon in order to prevent its occurrence and to punish its 
perpetrators, which can not be done without finding a definition that all States, or at 
least most of them, agree about. Seeking this objective, there have been global, 
regional, national, and academic efforts, which will be discussed in sequence: 
2.1.1. Global Efforts 
Urged by the assassination at Marseilles on October 9,1934, of King 
Alexander of Yugoslavia and Louis Barthou, Foreign Minister of the French 
Republic, the League of Nations seriously seized the matter and drafted the 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. This Convention 
broadly defined terrorism to include, 'all criminal acts directed against a State and 
intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, 
or group of persons or the general public'. 14 
However, this definition is very wide on one hand and very narrow on the 
other. It is very wide because it speaks of all criminal acts without requiring that 
the committing of such acts to be terrorism when they were committed for political 
objectives and satisfied the other elements of this definition. 
On the other hand, this definition is very narrow because; firstly, it only 
13 Ibid. 
14 Murphy, note 7 at 5. 
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applies to the actions committed by people, but does not apply to actions committed 
by the State against its own people. This is because not only individuals who can 
commit acts of terrorism but State can do so even in more severe and anxious ways 
than those of individual terrorists. States can, and they already did, commit acts of 
terrorism against their own people, whether the entire population or a certain 
segment thereof (such as a minority community or political opposition or the 
population of an occupied country). States can do that by means such as torture, 
mass killing, and arrest, etc. 
Describing these acts by States as acts of terrorism is consistent with the 
international community's depiction of what constitutes an act of terrorism, which 
is not confmed only to those acts committed by individuals but to States' actions as 
well. An example of this view by the international community is the United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 44/29 (1989), which stated, in part, that the 
General Assembly is 'deeply disturbed by the world-wide persistence of acts of 
international terrorism in all its forms, including those in which States are directly 
or indirectly involved, which endanger or take innocent lives.. '. ' 5 
An example of such an act of terrorism committed by a State was the 
unprecedented mass murder of thousands of Kurdish people by the Iraqi regime in 
the northern part of Iraq in the late 1980s by the using for the first time in history 
chemical and biological weapons on an indiscriminate manners killing all people 
who were in the reach of those weapons. These acts of terrorism against the Kurds 
were meant to silence those people from claiming their rights of political 
expression. 
15 UNGA Res. 44/29 (72"' plenary meeting 4 December 1989). 
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Secondly, this definition requires such criminal acts to be intended or 
calculated to create a state of terror, thus it does not apply to actions that terrify 
without intention, i. e., the terror and fear was a by-product of such acts but not 
intended. Apart from any criticism that Convention never came into force because 
of the outbreak of the World War II. 
Although reaching an agreement at that time would have been relatively 
easier than doing so at this time because the number of the States who were 
members of the League of Nations was very small compared to the number of 
members of the United Nations now. At that time most of the member States were 
from Europe, but now the majority are from continents other than Europe with 
different traditions and understanding with respect to terrorism. In any event, since 
that Convention was not listed among the treaties and conventions for which the 
League was a depository and with respect to which the United Nations had taken 
any responsibility, the convention does not exist anymore. 
After that, the United Nations made no attempt to replace it with one of its 
own. However, in 1954 the International Law Commission broadly approached the 
problem in its Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
and added the concept of State sponsorship of terrorism, which will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
In 1972 the United States, trying to alleviate the concern of some member 
States that the convention it is proposing was directed against wars of national 
liberation, introduced a Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
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Certain Acts of International Terrorism. 16 The coverage of this Draft Convention 
was limited to 'any person who unlawfully kills, causes serious bodily harm or 
kidnaps another person', providing that these acts met four separate conditions 
before the provisions of the convention applied: firstly, the act had to be committed 
or take effect outside the territory of a State of which an alleged offender was a 
national. Secondly, the act had to be committed or take effect outside the State 
against which the act was directed, unless such acts were knowingly directed 
against a non-national of that State, (accordingly an armed attack in the passenger 
lounge of an international airport would be covered. ) Thirdly, the act must not be 
committed either by or against a member of the armed forces of a State in the 
course of military hostilities. And fourthly, the act had to be intended to damage 
the interest of or obtain concessions from a State or an international organization! 7 
However, some member States criticised this Draft Convention, especially 
the broad loophole in the first condition about the identity of the alleged offender's 
State. Because this provision will exclude from the scope of the Convention most 
terrorist attacks in Latin America and elsewhere against business personnel and 
facilities. 
Instead of the desired outcome, the first and the second condition stated 
above may exclude a clear act of terrorism from the coverage of this convention. 
For example, when nationals of one State committed acts of violence against their 
16 This Draft Convention came after the kidnapping and killing of Munich on September 6,1972, of 
eleven Israeli Olympic competitors by members of Black September (Palestinian Organisation), for fall 
text see II LLM. 1972 at 1182. 
17 Murphy, note 7 at 6. 
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own government in the territory of the latter. These acts will, according to these 
conditions, not be considered acts of terrorism. 
Furthermore, it was also criticised by giving the States apprehending the 
offender of terrorist acts the sole discretion to make a decision either to prosecute or 
to extradite. 18 This criticism is also said with regard to the other multilateral anti- 
terrorism conventions as will be discussed later. 
Nonetheless, instead of adopting the US Draft Convention, the General 
Assembly on Dec. 1972 adopted Resolution 3034, which came to it by the Sixth 
Committee of the General Assembly by the initiative of Algeria. The Resolution 
expressed a deep concern over the proliferation of international terrorism and called 
upon all States to co-operate and to take national measures to eliminate it. 
However, the Resolution's primary focus was on finding just and peaceful 
solutions to the underlying causes which give rise to such acts of violence. 19 Also, 
it emphasised the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all 
people under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination, and 
upheld the legitimacy of their struggle. 20 
Despite the fact that the US Draft Convention was the last attempt to define 
international tefforism into a binding international legal instrument, nations have 
achieved a modest degree of co-operation in dealing with certain aspects of the 
problem. For example, most nations have signed and generally abided by the 
various international conventions against hijacking and sabotage of aircraft, or of 
18 Ibid. 
19 UNGA. Res. 3034 (Dec. 1972). 
20 Ibid. 
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airports serving international civil aviation, and have signed the convention on the 
prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, 
taking of hostages, theft of nuclear materials, and unlawful acts against the safety of 
maritime navigation. All of these conventions criminalized any act that violated 
any provision, regardless of its description (whether it could be described as 
terrorist act or not), its motives (either political motive or not), and they obliged the 
State apprehending an alleged offender in its territory either to extradite him or 
submit the case to its own authority for the purpose of prosecution. (More details 
on these anti-terrorism conventions will be covered on the next chapter). 
An important development with respect to the finding of a definition of 
terrorism was reached by the General Assembly on December 9,1985, by a 
resolution that had been described by the US Ambassador to the United Nations, as 
'a symbol of a new time' .21 The resolution defined terrorism as acts 'which 
endanger or take innocent human lives, jeopardize fundamental freedoms, and 
seriously impair the dignity of human beings'. It 'unequivocally condemns, as 
criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever 
committed, those which jeopardize friendly relations among States and their 
security'. 22 The resolution also called upon all States to take all appropriate 
measures and harmonize their domestic legislations within the existing international 
conventions, fulfil their obligations, prevent the preparation and organization in 
their respective territories of acts directed against other States, and to refrain from 
organizing, instigating or participating in terrorist acts in other states, or 
acquiescing in activities within their territory directed towards the commission of 
21 Murphy, note 7 at 8. 
22 UNGA. Res. 40/61 (1985). 
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such acts, inviting all States to become party to the existing antkerrorism 
conventions and co-operate with one another by the exchanging of information 
related to such acts and the apprehension, and prosecution or extradition of the 
perpetrators ?3 It also provided that the struggle of national liberation movement 
must be conducted in accordance with the purposes and principle of the Charter and 
of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations. 24 
The reasons for not reaching a generic definition of international terrorism 
at the United Nations had been summarised by Levitt as: one reason is that there 
were many States that were about to become targets of national liberation 
movements, hence they wanted to subscribe to a definition of terrorism that would 
criminalize broad areas of conduct usually resorted to by such movements. Another 
reason is that those governments at the same time were reluctant to subscribe to a 
definition that would criminalize their own use of force in response to these 
movements. 25 
These reasons are very important and must be kept in mind at all times. 
Some States want to criminalize all the acts of violence committed against them 
either by their own people, who are not happy with their policies, or by others who 
are foreign to these States, which occupied their territories or hanned them in any 
way. Therefore, these States are desperate for any definition that would criminalize 
these acts and classify them as acts of terrorism. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 G. Levitt, 'Is Terrorism Worth Defining? ', 97 Ohio Northern Law Review (1986), 109. 
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However, these States are in fear that such a definition would, if they 
subscribed to it, criminalizc their own actions which they took against those people, 
either their own people or foreigners as mentioned above. Thus, these States prefer 
the situation to stay as it is in which they can take action regardless of its gravity or 
means against the perpetrators of these violent acts against them. 
Also, a significant reason, not mentioned by Levitt, is the fact that some 
States fear that if they subscribe to an accepted definition of terrorism, they may 
outlaw their own conduct, indirectly taken in certain situations. For example, the 
acts they took in support of groups or movements they believed fought for self- 
determination, especially if these groups or movements used terrorist tactics in their 
operations. 
Moreover, Jenkins also pointed to another reason why, especially Third 
World governments, did not want to outlaw terrorism by not agreeing with most of 
the definitions that have been advanced. He stated that these governments did not 
want to outlaw these irregular methods of warfare, because they lacked the tools for 
conventional warfare and because most of the leaders of these countries used to be 
insurgent chiefs, therefore they wanted to exclude the means they had once 
employed, or are being now employed by others on their behalf for causes they 
support, from the definition. 26 
Although the first reasoning by Jenkins makes sense, the other may not. 
This is because those leaders, conversely, want and are willing to outlaw any action 
26 B. M. Jenkins, 'International Terrorism: The Other World War', in C. W. Kelgley (ed. ), 
International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, (Macmillan, 1990), 27,3 1. 
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or method, even if they had been used before, if they feel insecure about groups 
using these actions or methods which may cause them to lose their power. 
Therefore, they prefer to eliminate these actions and methods in order to protect 
their seats. 
2.1.2. Regional Efforts 
On the regional level there have been many conventions that were adopted 
in order to combat international terrorism. These include the Convention to Prevent 
and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and 
Related Extortion that Are of International Significance (OAS Convention), 27 the 
Europe Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (European Convention), 28 and 
the Agreement on the Application of the European Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorism (Dublin Agreement). 29 
However, none of these conventions attempted to define international 
terrorism, rather, like the other anti-terrorism conventions concluded under the 
auspices of the United Nations and its specialised agencies, which will be discussed 
later; these conventions focused on particular actions and the protection of 
particular targets from attack. This fact is very significant because it shows how 
complicated it is even at the regional level to reach an agreement on a broad 
definition of terrorism. Therefore, not as suggested by many writers, the failure of 
the international community to come to an accepted definition of terrorism was the 
27 Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons 
and Related Extortion That Are of International Significance, Feb. 2,1971. IOLL. M. 1971. 28 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977), 15 I. L. M 1272 (1977). 29 Agreement Concerning the Application of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 
Among the Member States, Dec. 4,1979,19 I. L. M. 325 (1980). 
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result of the position taken by developing countries. Even European countries 
could not solve this issue among themselves. 
Nonetheless, the League of Arab Nations, represented by the Arab Interior 
Ministers had in their meeting in Tunis in 1989 arrived at the following definition: 
'Terrorism is a very organized act of violence or threatening by violence that causes 
terror and fear, such as killing, assassination, kidnapping of hostages, airlines or 
ships, and the use of bombing, aimed at achieving political objectives'. 30 This 
definition, by stating that terrorism is an organized act of violence, excludes any act 
of violence that is of immediate reaction. That means, although most of the 
terrorist acts are organized acts in term of the time to attack, and the real targets of 
their attacks, those who carry out these attacks, and even more importantly the 
objectives they seek to achieve, terrorism can be just an immediate action to a 
specific event. For example, if the result of an important election was just declared 
and some people were not happy with such a result and they immediately, 
afterward, violently attacked the supporters of the result, such an act would not be 
terrorism according to this definition because it was not an organized crime rather a 
spontaneous one, though such an action may in future turn into organized attacks if 
continued. Nonetheless, it should be noted that this definition was not part of a 
legally binding document, rather it was part of a resolution adopted by the Arab 
League. There is, however, a legally binding instrument that includes such a 
definition of terrorism, which will be discussed more fully in Chapter 6. 
30 R. Paz, 'The Arab Ministers of Interior on terrorism' 
<http: //www. ict. org. iUarticles/arab. _accord2. htm>(visited 3 March, 1999). 
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2.1.3. National Efforts 
It could be said that what applies to global and regional efforts could apply 
to national efforts. Most States refrained from defming terrorism in their criminal 
statutes, instead prosecuting terrorist crimes under statutes covering murder, 
kidnapping, explosives, and so on. The reason for not doing so even at the national 
level, especially in States of totalitarian regimes in which such a definition of 
terrorism can be imposed with no debate over it, is perhaps due to the complexity of 
the subject. 
More importantly, some States are hesitant to define terrorism in such a 
broad manner because they fear that such a definition would outlaw their own 
conduct in certain situations. Or they fear that such a broad definition of terrorism 
would criminalize the activities of some movements or groups whom these States 
support. 
Also, some States, e. g., San Marino, do not regulate terrorism because they 
have not been subject to any terrorist attack. Thus, they believe that there is no 
need to regulate an act or adopt measures against it. This argumert cannot be 
accepted for the following reasons: 
First of all, whether to take national measures, including the adoption of 
domestic law prohibiting certain types of terrorist activities, or not is not an option 
for States anymore. All States are obliged to do so in order to implement an 
international duty imposed the customary international law to combat international 
terrorism. Such an international duty had manifested itself more clearly in the post- 
September 11,2001, Security Council resolutions. For example, in the Resolution 
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1373 (2001), the Security Council stressed that acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, i. e., must be observed and implemented by all States even by States not 
member to the UN. In the pertinent part, the Resolution asserted that all States 
shall: 
(a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts; 
(b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or 
indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the 
intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are 
to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts; 
(c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic 
resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or 
participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities 
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of 
persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such 
persons and entities, including funds derived or generated from property 
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and 
associated persons and entities; 
(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories 
from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or 
financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the 
benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or 
participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and 
entities acting on behalf of or at. the direction of persons; 
2. Decides also that all States shall: 
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities 
or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing 
recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of 
weapons to terrorists; 
(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, 
including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of 
information; 
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(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist 
acts, or provide safe havens; 
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from 
using their respective territories for those purposes against other States 
or their citizens; 
(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, 
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts 
is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures 
against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal 
offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly 
reflect the seriousness of such terrorist acts; (emphasis added) 
(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with 
criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing 
or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in 
their possession necessary for the proceedings; 
(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective 
border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel 
documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery 
or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents? ' 
The second reason is that not being yet victimized by terrorism does not 
mean you are immune from it the future. Finally, terrorists, in many cases, commit 
their crimes in one country and flee to another. Thus these States will find * 
themselves without any effective means of dealing with terrorists in their territory. 
However, there are some exceptions, some States have tried to define 
terrorism. For example, in the United Kingdom, the British Prevention of 
Terrorism Act of 1974 stated that for the purpose of this legislation, terrorism is the 
'use of violence for political ends including the use of violence for the purpose of 
31 UNSC Res. 1373 (4385 th meeting, 28 September 200 1). 
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putting the public or any section of the public in fear. 32 Nonetheless, this 
definition is very wide and could apply to a great many other manifestations of 
violence other than terrorism, for example, mass violence in the form of riots, 
violent demonstrations, street battles or civil war ?3 Another criticism that has been 
directed to a similar definition is the fact that this definition is only concerned about 
the actual use of violence and does not give any consideration to the threat of 
violence. 34 Also, violence is not vital to terrorism in all cases, therefore all terrorist 
acts that depend on the use of chemical or biological substances, like the nerve gas 
and the anthrax, will be excluded from this definition because terrorism, according 
to this definition, is not presented unless terrorists committed an act of violence 
which does not include the above-mentioned examples. Moreover, this definition 
does not require that the use of violence is to be unlawful, thus it may apply to 
legitimate acts conducted by the State legal authority such as the punishment and 
deterrence of criminals. 35 
Another example that could be mentioned is the United States. The US is 
one of the countries that is expected to have much legislation that deals with 
terrorism, because, according to a CIA report in 1981,40 percent of all 
transnational terrorism occurred in Western Europe or North America and that 44 
percent involved the US . 
36 
In the United States there are many statutes that deal with terrorism at both 
32 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, Section 14(l). 33 Laqueur, note 6 at 145. 34 W. C. Mullins, A Sourcebook on Domestic and International Terrorism. An Analysis of Issues. 
Organizations, Tactics and Responses, (Charles Thomas, 1997), 13. 35 J. Teichman, 'How to Define Terrorism', in C. Gearty (ed. ), Terrorism, (Darthmouth, 1996), 7. 
36 Martin, 'The Media's Role in International Terrorism', in C. W. Kelgley (ed. ), International 
Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, (Macmillan, 1990), 158,160. 
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State and federal levels. An example of such a federal statute is the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which was enacted by Congress in 1978. In a 
pertinent part, it provides: 
International terrorism means activities that: 
(1) Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal 
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State. 
(2) Appear to be intended: 
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and 
(3) Occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms 
of the means by which they are accomplished, the person they appear intended to 
coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek 
asylum. 
37 
2.1.4. Academic Efforts 
In 1983, a study by Alex Schmid compiled 109 definitions of terrorism, 39 
thus one may say that now after many years of trying to resolve the dilemma of 
finding a comprehensive definition of terrorism, the number of definitions that have 
been proposed is probably so high as to make it almost impracticable to go through 
them all in order to discuss them one by one. 
Nonetheless, there seems to be a general agreement that terrorism involves 
the threat or use of violence, seeks to create a climate of fear, often relies on 
publicity, and has a political objective. Firstly, terrorism, in many cases, involves 
the threat or use violence. Terrorists try to employ violence as much as they can in 
37 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Section 10 1 (c). 38 J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law, (Grotius Publications Limited, 1990), 13. 
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order to put people in fear of them and cause the governments to become outraged 
and recourse to indiscriminate repressive measures, which may cause these 
governments to be seen by people as illegitimate as the terrorists alleged. 
Therefore, this would explain the reason why the use of violence by terrorists has 
been described as cruel and brutal. Secondly, terrorists seek to create a climate of 
fear, and this is what distinguishes terrorism from other violent actions. Terrorism 
is intended to terrorize when other actions just happened to terrify. For example, 
muggers may terrify the population of a large urban area, but they produce terror as 
a by-product of their crimes, their objectives are wallets and watches, not alarm? 9 
Thirdly, terrorists often rely on publicity to achieve their objectives. Unlike other 
crimes where criminals, most of the time, want to be anonymous, terrorists always 
leave letters or messages behind them claiming responsibility for the act. As a 
result they often claim responsibility, even for acts which they did not commit (a 
detailed discussion about publicity as a cause of terrorism will be given in Section 3 
of this chapter). Finally, terrorists seek to achieve political goals. Even though 
some might argue that in some cases, terrorism may be used for personal objectives. 
This is undoubtedly true in some cases, but the concern of this research is about 
terrorist acts that aim to achieve political goals, because it is the political nature of 
this act that endows it with a special quality of generalized menace. Other acts of 
violence for other reasons may cause fear. However, when such acts are conducted 
with a mindful defiance of the existing political structure in order to impose the 
terrorists' political agenda, they acquire an added sinister weight. Hence, it could 
be against anybody at anytime in any place. 
39 Jenkins, note 26 at 27,28 - 29. 
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In their never ending circle of efforts to find an accepted definition of 
terrorism, some scholars argue that the problem could be resolved by replacing the 
loaded term (terrorism) with more neutral phrases, such as political low-intensity 
conflict. However, this argument proved to be unacceptable since this term may 
include activities not normally regarded as terrorism and because it excludes one of 
the most important elements in terrorism, which is that it seeks to create a climate 
of fear. 40 
In addition to the reasons mentioned above on the international 
community's failure to come up to an accepted definition of terrorism, one may add 
the following dilemma, which is applicable to all the efforts discussed earlier to 
defi. ne terrorism. That is, whether such a definition of terrorism should exclude 
from its scope all acts, however violent, if committed to achieve a legitimate end, 
e. g., liberation from occupation. In other words, can the ends justify the means; in 
which case the actors cannot be called terrorists? 
The Afro-Asian States of the UN seem to answer this question in the 
affirmative, especially when such use of violence was for self-determination and 
independence. Hence, they continually stress the need to 'reaffinn the unalienable 
right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist 
regimes and other forms of alien domination and foreign occupatiolf and the 
importance of upholding the legitimacy of such struggles. Therefore, any attempt 
to define terrorism as politically motivated violence aiming to influence the policy 
40 Sic, 'The Political Underpinning of Terrorism', in C. W. Kelgley (ed. ), International Terrorism: 
Characteristics, Causes, Controls, (Macmillan, 1990), 51,53. 
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of a government by intimidation and/or coercion has had no chance of success in 
many States, 41 if such a definition outlaws such struggles. 
Such arguments led to the rise of clichds such as "One man's terrorist is 
another man's freedom fightee942 or "Terrorism is the poor man's atom bomb". 43 
These clichds imply that terrorism is either the only technique available or the only 
effective technique available for those who fight a rich and strong freedom 
oppressor, foreign occupier or alien dominant. 
However, such an argument is totally rejected by most Western countries, 
which maintain that legitimate ends can never justify the unlawful means. Such 
legitimate goals should and must only been pursued by lawful means. These two 
arguments represent the two trends dominating the UN when debating over the 
adoption of any anti-terrorism convention. Therefore, any attempt to find an 
accepted definition of terrorism should start consolidating these two trends by 
creating an atmosphere of common understanding between States on the issue of 
terrorism. 
Despite all of the uncertainties and disagreements between scholars and 
writers on this subject, there are some definitions of terrorism, which seem 
reasonable in some ways as they, to a certain extent, bridge the gap between the 
different points of views. One of these definitions is Schmid's definition, which 
defined terrorism as: 
0- 
41 P. Chalk, West European terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic, (Macmillan, 
1996), 10. 
42 p. Wilkinson, 'Pathways out of Terrorism for Domestic Societies', in P. Wilkinson & A. Stewart 
(eds. ), Contemporary Research on Terrorism, (Aberdeen University Press, 1987), 456. 
43 Teichman, note 35 at 13. 
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'A method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as 
instrumental targets of violence. These instrumental victims share group or 
class characteristics, which form the basis for their selection for victimisation. 
Through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence other 
members of that group or class are put in a state of chronic fear (terror). The 
group or class, whose members' sense of security is purposively undermined, is 
the target of terror. The victimisation of the target of violence is considered 
extra-normal by most observers from the witnessing audience on the basis of its 
atrocity; the time (e. g., peacetime) or place (not a battlefield) of victimisation or 
the disregard for rules of combat accepted in conventional warfare. The norin 
violation creates an attentive audience beyond the target of terror; sectors of this 
audience might in turn form the main object of manipulation. The purpose of 
this indirect method of combat is either to immobilize the target of terror in 
order to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary 
targets of demands (e. g., a government) or targets of attention (e. g., public 
opinion) to change the attitude or behaviour favouring the short or long-terrn 
interests of the users of this methods of combat'. 44 
Thus, according to this definition, the hijacking of an aircraft only for the 
sole purpose of getting to a destination other than the intended one, is not terrorism 
because according to this definition, there is not a "target of terror", i. e. the act of 
violence has a more immediate and direct purpose and does not intend to create a 
state of fear or panic. An example of the above hypothesis was the case of Ex Parte 
KoIczynki (1955) in which the British Court denied the extradition relying on the 
political offence exception (as will be discussed in Chapter 3 in more details) of 
seven Polish sailors who took control of their fishing boat by force, brought the 
ship to English port, and sought asylum claiming that they fled because of their fear 
of being punished for reasons of the political expression. 45 
44 Lambert, note 38 at 18. 45 EX Parte Kolcz)ynki, [ 1955] 1 Q. B. 540. 
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Moreover, the same could be said with regard to the assassination of a 
political figure only for the purpose of eliminating that person. Also, this definition 
does not mention the violence against things (e. g., property), as opposed to violence 
against people. However, this defmition is one of the best definitions and one of 
the reasons that many scholars prefer this definition to others, is that it objectively 
defmed terrorism by the quality of the act, but not by the identity of the perpetrators 
or the nature of their causes. Therefore, terrorists could be either individuals (or 
groups) or State actors no matter for what motives. Another reason is that this 
definition, by stating that terrorists when employing violence, have no regard for 
the rules of combat accepted in conventional warfare, is meant as a reply to the 
terrorists' claim that they are not criminal, but soldiers of war, who have a legal 
defence if they kill a soldier of a hostile State in battles otherwise their action will 
be considered as unlawful in accordance with the internal law of war which 
provided against the killing as an objective. 
In addition, another definition that has been described as comprehensive and 
simple is the one proposed by the US Department of State: it defined terrorism as 'a 
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against norý-combatant 
targets by sub-national groups or clandestine State agents, usually intended to 
, 16 influence an audience . Accordingly, there must be a political motivation, but it 
does not favour one political cause over another. Also, this definition applies either 
to individual terrorists or State terror. Nonetheless, by describing the perpetrators 
of State terror as clandestine State agents, it subjected this definition to a subjective 
judgement, which rendered it unclear. 
46 Pattem of Global Terrorism 2000, US Dept. of State, 
)00/index. cfin? d(nid=-2419>(-visited 25 March, 1999). 
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Nevertheless, this definition does not require a target of terror as Schmid's 
definition does, so the hijacking and assassination in the above-mentioned examples 
would constitute terrorist acts. Furthermore, by using norl-combatants as the 
description of the targets of terrorism, instead of civilians or innocents, as most of 
the definitions did, it would not be confined to terrorist acts perpetrated against 
civilians because non-combatant targets could be either civilians or unarmed 
military personnel, even more broadly those military personnel who are not on duty 
when attacked as the US Department of State affirmS. 47 Therefore, the attack on 
the USS Cole on the coast of Yemen, where seventeen US armed and on duty 
military personnel were killed, would be excluded from this definition because the 
victims were combatant targets as provided by this definition. However, in order 
cover such an incident as that one against the USS Cole as a terrorist act, the US 
Department of State amended its definition and adopted a new criterion. According 
to this criterion, it is a terrorist act even if committed against military installations 
or on armed military personnel when a state of conflict does not exist at the site 
where the attack took placeý8 
2.2. CAUSES OF TERRORISM 
Exploring the causes or reasons that give rise to terrorism is an integral part of 
any study of this phenomenon. Searching these causes of terrorism is helpful in two 
ways: first, it will help understanding of terrorism and second, it will help in 
addressing it. However, like the disagreement about the definition of terrorism, there 
is also a great disagreement about the causes of terrorism. Going through the 
controversies of terrorism's causes, it is possible to identify the most potent factors 
47 Ibid. (visited I February 200 1). 
48 Ibid. 
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that are responsible for the appearance of terrorism, (here in this section the 
discussion will be about the causes of terrorist acts committed by individuals (groups) 
as opposed to terrorist acts cornmitted by Statee agents or by States supporters, which 
will be discussed later in this chapter). 
The central issue to be answered here is whether terrorism emanated primary 
from influences internal or external to the State that is the target of it? There are two 
traditions, which stand in opposition with one another with respect to this issue. The 
first tradition is with the idea that terrorism is rooted primarily in conditions where the 
political oppression and the economic deprivation divested some people's means of 
meeting their basic needs, and this caused them to resort to terrorism because they 
believed that terrorism was the only way to change these circumstances. 
Consequently, the proponents of this tradition maintain that alleviating the frustration 
and despair experienced by the disadvantaged is the best control of terrorismý9 The 
United Nations' Secretariat Study had upheld this tradition in 1972 (The Origins and 
Fundamental Causes of International Terrorism), which concluded: 
It thus appears that the misery, frustration, grievance, and despair which lead to 
terrorism have many roots in international and national political, economic, and 
social situations affecting the terrorists, as well as in his personal 
circurnstances'. 50 
Scholars who follow this tradition maintained that aggression is always a 
consequence of fiustration, thus a healthy society would face no such problems, and 
the reason why developed countries are more stable than other countries is because 
these countries can satisfy the wants of their citizens. Nonetheless, this argument 
49 Kelgley, 'The Causes of Terrorism', in C. W. Kelgley (ed. ), International Terrorism: 
Characteristics, Causes, Controls, (Macmillan, 1990), 97,99. 
"Ibid. 
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can not be assumed true in all cases, stating that aggression is always a consequence 
of frustration is an assumption, which is by no means universally shared, does not 
apply to the greater aggression, wars in many cases occurred because fighting is a 
51 fundamental tendency of human beings. With respect to the other part of this 
argument, which stated that developed countries are more stable than others, 
because they can satisfy the wants of their citizens, has been proved to be untrue in 
many cases. A study of violence in eighty-four countries reached the conclusion 
that little repression increases instability whereas a great deal of it has the opposite 
effeCt. 52 Add to that the satisfaction of citizens" wants, which may have a negative 
feedback effect, increasing the drive for more satisfaction, thus adding to the sense 
of systemic frustration ý3 
On the other hand, are the opponents of the "root causes" theory who think, 
'Terro rism is a pathological contagion that can be best understood when placed in a 
broader political historical context'. 54 They believe that terrorism does not relate to 
the existence of either fortunate or unfortunate conditions because they think that 
terrorists are people who choose to step outside the boundaries of accepted norms 
for behaviour and decide to wage a campaign of violence outside the accepted rules 
of warfare. For them terrorism is very attractive because it abides by no rules, it 
avoids military targets, its victims are invariably unarmed, undefended, and unwary 
civilians. Accordingly, they think that it is a mistake to focus on conditions which 
motivate some people to engage in terrorism to express grievances, because many 
people throughout the world suffer intolerable conditions, but only a particular type 
51 Laqueur, note 6 at 158. 
52 Ibid. at 154. 53 ibid. 
54 Kelgley, note 49 at 99. 
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of person will turn to terrorism to vent this frustration and because terrorism has 
occurred in all kinds of conditions, in countries of economic prosperity and decline, 
in big cities and in small towns, and has affected people of various classes. For 
example, in Western societies, it is generally argued that there can be no 
justification for the use of violence within an effectively functioning liberal - 
democracy because other means are available to influence public policy and, 
periodically, the composition of the government. Margaret Thatcher declared in her 
address to the American Bar Association in 1985, that 'nor is terrorism confined to 
countries where lawlessness and anarchy prevail. Its followers abuse the very 
freedom of open society to do their evil work. 55 
Another set of causes that may or may not be related to the abovo- 
mentioned causes, were pointed out by Martha Grenshaw. She divided causes of 
terrorism to two categories, 56 the first one is what she called "preconditions", are 
factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run. The other category is 
"precipitants", are specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of 
terrorism. Preconditions can be enabling or permissive, providing opportunities for 
terrorism to happen or situations that directly inspire and motivates terrorist 
campaigns. Preconditions can be any of these factors: 
MODERNIZATION: modem technology has proved to be of significance as a 
permissive cause of terrorism. It enables tiny groups, or even one person to 
wield gigantic power of death and destruction. 57 
53 C. MacWillson, Hostage-Taking Terrorism, (Macmillan, 1992), 1. 56 M. Crenshaw, 'The Cause of Terrorisn, in C. W. Kelgley (ed. ), International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, ((Macmillan, 1990), 113. 57 E. G. O'Ballance, TERRORISM IN THE 1980s, (Arms and Armour, 1989), 9. 
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For example, the ready availability of weaponry, especially the ease with 
which small arms can be purchased in many parts of the world. Another example, is 
the air transportation systems, which have been an easy target for the aircraft 
hi ackers, it presents the terrorist hijackers with a perfectly insulated hostage group. 
One more aspect of modem technology that has played an important role in the cause 
of terrorism is the mass media. Most of the specialists in terrorism agree that seeking 
publicity is one of the main reasons for individuals (groups) to recourse to terrorism in 
order to attract the attention of the public to their cause and to appear as a force to be 
reckoned with. Mass media always plays into the hands of terrorists by dramaticizing 
their activities, because the media does not just mirror reality but they create it and 
thereby give air to terrorists. Terrorists know that the war that matters is the 
propaganda war, says Richard Dutterbuck 'the most powerful weapon in the terrorist 
war is the television camera', 58 so without mass media, terrorism would have a limited 
effect today. 
2- URBANIZATION: urban areas have been targeted by terrorism more than 
rural areas because terrorists can more easily hide themselves in the towns. It 
has been said that in big cities where a mobile population inhabits the 
apartments, people often have no idea of the identity of their next-door 
neighbours. 59 
3- SOCIAL HABITS AND HISTORICAL TRADITION: some societies have 
been known of their traditional use of violence by making it morally and 
58 Rapoport, 'Religion and Terror: Thugs, Assassins, and Zealots', in C. W. Kelgley (ed. ), International 
Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, ((Macmillan, 1990), 146,152. 
59 Guelke, The Age of Terrorism, 40. 
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politically justifiable. In Ireland, for example, the tradition of physical force dates 
from the eighteenth centuryý' 
4- GOVERNMENT'S INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS TO SUPPRESS 
TERRORISM: absence of preventative measures will aid the spread of the 
terrorist conspiracy! ' 
Precipitants or direct causes are: 
(1) THE EXISTENCE OF GRIEVENCES: (as discussed above). 
(2) LACK OF OPPORTUNITY FOR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: some 
maintain that people recourse to terrorism because paths to the legal expression of 
opposition are blocked. 62 This is a very important factor that must be 
comprehended. In some States people have no right of political expression, and if 
they try to claim to such right even by peaceful means, their government will 
crush them. In some cases, the government' s retaliation towards those people, 
goes far and beyond them to their families and relatives. Thus, how could such 
people regain their legitimate political rights from such a government without 
resorting to violence? In other words, is there any other way those oppressed 
people could recourse to other than violence in order to claim their rights? Can 
the international community secure these rights for such people, thus discouraging 
them not to use violence? 
60 Crenshaw, note 56 at 113. 
61 Ibid at 114. 62 Ibid. at 115. 
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More and more factors can be cited here as causes of terrorism: 
The desire for revenge plays a part in the making of terrorism. Perhaps the 
most striking case of all is the role that the unprovoked, and unpunished, killing of a 
student demonstrator by police during a visit of the Shah of Iran to West Germany in 
June 1967, which played a main role in the development of terrorism at that time. 63 
Another recent example is the torturing and killing of four American and four British 
tourists in Uganda by the Hutu terrorists in revenge to the American and British 
governments alleged support for Rwanda's new Tusti-led government against the 
ethnic Hutu majority. 64 
Impatience could also be a reason to recourse to terrorism, especially in cases 
where the historical moment seems to present a unique opportunity. For example, 
resistance groups facing a colonial power, when this power have been weakened by a 
foreign power. " 
Moreover, aiming at extraction of specific concession, such as the payment of 
ransom, the release of prisoners, or to improve their bargaining power by creating a 
dramatic hostage situation, has been cited as one of the main reasons to recourse to 
terrorism. For example, in September 1969, Marighella! s group kidnapped the US 
ambassador in Brazil and held him hostage until the Brazilian government gave in to 
their demands and released their friends who were in prison. 66 
63 Guelke, note I at 46. 
64 Tourists Raped and Butchered in Horrific Act of Revenge on Britain, The independent Newspaper, 
March 3,1999 at 1,3.. 
65 Crenshaw, note 56 t 118. 
66 C. Dobson & R. Payne, The Weapon of Terrorism: International Terrorism, ((Macmillan, 1979), 20. 
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In addition, terrorists may find terrorism a good strategy to discredit the 
government by the provoking of indiscriminate counter-reaction from the government 
which in return will increase the publicity of the terrorists! cause and demonstrate that 
criticism of the regime is well founded. Because some governments think that in 
order to defend themselves from this new and violent war, they are compelled to 
enforce exceptional laws. Consequently these governments are gradually becoming - 
if only temporarily - semi-authoritarian and freedom will be slowly eroded until an 
atmosphere of illegality makes democratic institutions less and less viable !7 This is 
in case where terrorists attacked liberal - democratic countries, let alone already 
authoritarian countries. 
Furthermore, some individuals may become terrorists for ideological reasons. 
Some terrorists were inspired by the writing of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky and are the 
exponents of revolution and war but since revolutions can be crushed by military 
force, the weak have to find another way'68 and this is the reason why some recourse 
to terrorism is seen as the best way to fight imperialism. 
Last but not least of causes that can be added to the list here, is the 
discrimination against minorities on the base of their religion, colour, ethic 
background, language, etc. This could cause such people to recourse to terrorism in 
order to prove themselves, especially if they have the support of a foreign State. 
67 G. J. Schamis, War and Terrorism in International Affairs, (Danielle Salti Trans., 1980), 72. 
68 O'Balance, note 57 at 9. 
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2.3. TYPOLOGIES OF TERRORISM 
Terrorism can be divided to many typologies, however, for the purpose of 
this research, terrorism can be divided into four types that allow a clear 
understanding of the nature of terrorism. These categories of terrorism include 
international and domestic terrorism on one hand and individual and State- 
sponsored terrorism on the other. 
2.3.1. International and Domestic Terrorism: terrorism is a phenomenon that can 
be both international and domestic in nature. International terrorism is, according 
to the US Department of State, "Terrorism involving citizens or territory Ofm ore 
than one countryý9.69 In most cases terrorist incidents transcend the national borders 
of one State to another. Even within the territory of the State in which those 
terrorists are operating, the victims or the targets they select often have connections 
to foreign States, e. g., diplomats, executives, foreign corporations, or even foreign 
citizens. 
Some writers, however, restrict international terrorism to actions of the 
above description only if a sovereign State controls the terrorists! o Otherwise, they 
referred to it as transnational terrorism, even though; the terrorists enjoy some 
degree of support from sympathetic States, as long as they are not controlled by it! ' 
" Pattern of Global Terrorism 2000, US Dept. of State 
<wN%v. state. gov/sý/cVrls/getr2t! 2000/l*ndex. cfm? docid=141 (visisted 12 April 1999). 
70 E. Mickolus, 'Trends in Transnational Terrorism', in Livingston et al, (eds. ), International Terrorism 
in the Contemporary World, (Greenwood Press, 1978), 45. 
71 Ibid. 
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Nonetheless, most writers are of the opinion that State control of terrorists is 
not a condition for international terrorism. 72 They both, whether State-sponsored or 
not should be called international terrorism as long as they involve any of the 
above-mentioned examples. They should be called so in order to avoid the already 
existing ambiguity on the issue of terrorism. Moreover, the establishment of State 
involvement in terrorism is very difficult and may, in some cases, be subjective; 
therefore the same act might be transnational for one State and international for the 
other with different consequences. Hence, whether State-sponsored or not, it is an 
act of international terrorism and it is precisely the type of terrorism that this 
research is concerned about. 
Also, an act of terrorism must be considered an act of international 
terrorism, even if it does not include nationals or territory of another State or even if 
there is not any type of State involvement in such an act, as long as this act is 
proscribed by any of the anti-terrorism conventions. In other words, even if this act 
is of a purely domestic nature, it should be considered as an act of international 
terrorism whenever any of the antimtefforism, conventions is applicable. This is in 
conformity with the purpose of the anti-terrorism conventions, which is to suppress 
these acts that are considered to be threat to the whole international community, but 
not only to the State where these acts took place. This is why Article 4 of the 
Montreal Convention, for example, stated that this Convention shall apply, 
'irrespective of whether the aircraft is engaged in an international or domestic 
flight.. '. 
72 R. J. Erickson, Legitimate Use of Military Force Against State-Sponsored International Terrorism, 
(Air University Press, 1989), 3 1. 
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In contrast, domestic terrorism is terrorist action that is directed against the 
citizens of one State, does not transcend the national border, is not sponsored by 
any State, and even more importantly, is not subject to the application of any of the 
anti-tefforism conventions. However, currently cases of purely domestic terrorism 
are very rare because there is always or nearly always an international element 
involved in such attack. 
2.3.2. Individual and State-Sponsored Terrorism: this category of terrorism is 
based on whether terrorist individuals or groups get support from a foreign State or 
not. If they have such support or sponsorship of any kind, it is State-sponsored or 
supported terrorism. But if individuals or groups have no connection whatever with 
any State, it is individual terrorism. 
Nonetheless, it is useful to discuss the relation between States and terrorism 
which will help to understand why in some cases, an action by a State was directed 
against another State because of the latter alleged involvement in terrorist attacks 
committed against the former. In other words, this relation will explain the reason 
why in some cases responses to terrorism, as will be discussed later, were 
channelled to other States. 
Some writers have used the term terrorism only to refer to terrorism from 
individuals and have ignored terrorism conducted by States. However, most writers 
are of the opinion that terrorism is a term that can be applied to both sub-State and 
State violence, as a scholar once stated that those who do not mention State 
terrorism must not speak or write about individual terrorism. 73 The United Nations 
73 Laqueur, note 6 at 2. 
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documents from the 1970s refer to the concept of State terrorism conducted by 
some nations as 'Terror inflicted on a large scale and with the most modem means 
on whole populations for purpose of domination or interference in their internal 
affairs, armed attack perpetrated under the pretext of reprisals or of preventative 
action by states against the sovereignty and integrity of third states, and the 
74 infiltration of terrorist groups or agents into the territory of other statee. 
Nevertheless, the concept or the scope of State terrorism, as some writers 
think, should not expand to include such activities as "coercive diplomacy , 
75 e. g., 
the US bombing of Hanoi in 1972 and nuclear deterrence, or as others expanded it 
to include military manoeuvres and war games in the vicinity of another State 
which presents a threat to that State, the transport of nuclear weapons through the 
territory of other States and international waters and the development, testing and 
deployment of nuclear and space-weapons systems. Because such expansion will 
make the term State terrorism so broad in scope as to make it unmanageable from 
an operational perspective! ' 
State terrorism can be divided to four categories: 
The first one is the traditional use of violence by the State (such as torture, 
killing, mass arrests, etc. ) against its own population, whether the entire population 
or a certain segment thereof (such as a minority community or political opposition) 
or the population of an occupied country. The latter has been the main cause that 
many developing countries maintain that this kind of State terrorism is the 
74 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, UN GAOR, 21ýh Sess., Supp. 28, para. 
24, UN DOC A/9027 (1973). 
7' Lambert, note 3 8at 16. 76 Ibid. 
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predominant cause of individual terrorism and should be dealt with as the first 
necessary step towards eliminating individual terrorism. An old example of this 
type of terrorism is the Jacobin "Reign of Terroe' in the 180' century in France, 
during which about 300,000 people were arrested, about 17,000 people were 
officially executed and many others died in prison without trials, 77 (note that at that 
time, as mentioned in the first section, the term terrorism was first used). Usually 
the purpose of this type of terrorism is to enforce the authority of power of the 
State. 
A recent example that can be cited here is Iraq in which Sadaam's regime 
subjected the Iraqi people to unprecedented persecution, even at the point of using 
nerve gas and chemical weapons against its own people in order to silence them and 
prevent them from practicing their political, economic, and social rights. The 
number of people who died because of this regime's atrocities is more than 500,000 
Iraqi citizens. This is in addition to those who are unaccounted for in jails in which 
torture was in common use. Millions of Iraqi people were also forced to leave their 
country for the sake of security and jobs. 
The second category of State terrorism is 'States perpetrating terrorism, 78 in 
which State perpetrates terrorist acts in foreign countries through its own official 
bodies - members of its security forces or its intelligence services, or their direct 
agents - against either national or foreign targets for political reasons, e. g., in 1985, 
French agents engaged in an act of terrorism in New Zealand territory by blowing 
77 Ibid. at 15. 
78 Ganor, note 8. 
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up the Rainbow Warrior, a ship owned by the environmental group "Greenpeacie' 
and involved in protesting French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. 79 
. 180 - The third category of State terrorism is 'States operating terrorism in 
which States initiate, direct and perform terrorist activities through groups outside 
their own institutions. That includes 'planning and guidance. Planning means that 
the State is directly involved in the development of programs of action (sets of 
objectives, assets to be used pursuing them and schedules) involving terrorism. 
These plans may be long-term (plans for terrorist campaigns or to develop a 
terrorist cadre in an insurgency situation) or short-term (plans for a single, 
immediate action). The distinguishing characteristic of planning is that it always 
involves specific combinations of missions, assets, and schedules. Guidance is 
more general and include information on how progress of action can be developed, 
it involves interaction between government agents and terrorists (probably terrorist 
leaders), but does not involve an obligation or expectation of action. 81 
This category includes for example the use of mercenaries by a State against 
other States. For instance, during the 1980s the racist regime of South Africa were 
officially accused of committing acts of terrorism against independent African 
States, in particular Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Seychelles and Zambia. Such 
a terrorist activity was conducted by the racist regime of South Africa against these 
States by, as in the words of LJNGA Res. 37/43 (1982), 'the establishment and use 
of armed terrorist groups by South Africa with a view to pitting them against the 
79 Lambert, note 38 at 2 1. 
so Ganor, note 8. 
81 Murphy, note 8 at 32. 
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national liberation movements and destabilizing the legitimate Governments of 
southern Africa.. '. 82 
The fourth category of State involvement in terrorism is 'States supporting 
terrorism'. 83 This category is the broadest one compared to the other three 
categories. The Defense System, Inc. (DSI) has identified twelve types of State 
involvement in terrorism, 84 the first two types are about States perpetrating and 
operating terrorism, which have been already mentioned above. Thus the 
discussion will be about the other ten types, which show how States can support 
terrorism. 
According to the DSI, States can support international terrorism by the 
following: 
. Intelligence Support to Terrorists, this is the provision of information, but 
unlike the provision of information mentioned above in the "States perpetrating 
terrorism", it implies no control over what the terrorists will do with the 
information provided. 
- Training given to terrorists and this can be divided into two categories 
according to the State's purpose to be achieved by the terrorists: Specialized 
Terrorist and Basic Military. The former includes training in intelligence 
gathering, infiltration, surveillance, and the use of sophisticated 
communications equipment, explosives, or weapons. The later consists of basic 
82 UNGA Res. 37/43 (3 December 1982). 
" Ganor, note 8. 
84 Defense System, Inc., is a consulting firm located in McLean, Virginia, U. S. that does extensive 
work on international terrorism. See Murphy, note 7 at 32. 
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infantry training with standard weapons including physical considerations, 
marksmanship, hand-to-hand combat, and small unit tactics. 
- Diplomatic Assets, includes providing passports, documents, and other forms of 
cover. In addition, it involves use of the privileges of extra-territoriality to fiu-ther 
the aims of terrorism, e. g., the use of embassy or consulate grounds for 
organization activities. 
- Provision of High Technology, including nuclear, biological, chemical, and exotic 
weapons, is the type of aid to terrorism where State involvement is extremely 
important and perhaps essential. 
- Provision of Weapons and Explosives (not high technology) is a frequent fonn of 
State involvement. Logistics support, including media equipment for 
communications and surveillance, may have a considerable impact on terrorist 
group capabilities. 
- Provision of Transportation, includes not only the actual turning over of vehicles, 
boats, and so forth to terrorists, but also allowing the use of national transportation 
agencies (airlines, and so forth) by terrorists. 
- Pennitting Terrorists the Use of its Territory, a country supporting terrorism 
knowingly allows terrorists to use or transit national territory to plan attacks, train, 
avoid extradition, and otherwise elude international legal processes. This does not 
include use of diplomatic facilities abroad (see Diplomatic Assets), nor does it 
imply provision of government resources to terrorists. 
- Financial Support may be direct or indirect. For example, this could include both 
the benefits accrued from direct government participation in the drug trade or 
those from allowing the terrorists to deal in drugs themselves. 
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- Tacit Support implies foreknowledge and failure to act. For example, failing to 
warn a target State that it is about to be attacked, or to take steps to prevent such 
an attack when it emanates from home territory. Refusal to co-operate with 
foreign intelligence and police is also a form of tacit support. 
- Rhetorical Support suggests specific statements or speeches by authoritative 
government figures that call for, express approval of, or endorse the use of 
terrorism. It also includes government facilitation or support of terrorist efforts to 
communicate with the target populations (propaganda); for example, printing 
materials for use abroad, use of government studios for producing propaganda 
films, broadcasting interviews with or polemic statements by terrorist leaders, and 
helping to forge materials intended to harm target governments' interests or smear 
individuals in highly visible positions. Rhetorical support also includes the use of 
government agents to suggest terrorism to dissident groups. 85 
Since the World War 11, and until the end of the Cold War, terrorism had 
become an instrument of foreign policy of the two Superpowers (United States and 
the former Soviet Union) !6 Their connections to terrorism assumed many forms; it 
took the form of support for groups using terrorism against friends or allies of the 
rival superpower or against that superpower direCtly! 7 This support have been 
channelled through a proxy or delivered by the superpower's own military and 
intelligence service. 88 Here are a few examples of the superpowers' involvement in 
international terrorism: examples with respect to the United States, were the US 
support to the Contras against the communist government in Nicaragua, or to the 
83 Ibid. 
86 D. M. Schlaghech, 'The Superpowers, Foreign Policy, And Terrorism' in C. W. Kelgley (ed. ), 
International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, ((Macmillan, 1990), 170. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
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Afghan warriors in their conflict with the USSFL Examples with respect to the 
former Soviet Union were its support to the Northern Vietnamese communists 
against the US, or its support to the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) 
against Israel. 
Most writers think that the recourse to such policy (supporting terrorism) by 
the superpowers was the result of three developments: 89 
(1) The World War II ended with many of the old, great powers left prostrate, 
Germany, France, and Great Britain. 
(2) The development of nuclear weapons with their destructive power provided the 
two superpowers with the capabilities of destroying most life on the planet. In 
order to avoid the risk of using these kinds of weapons, the US and the USSR 
sought to compete in more indirect ways, by conducting clandestine activities and 
covert operations against each other. In other words, they engaged in terrorism in 
order to promote their interests. 
(3) The emergence of the Third World (Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and 
Asia), which became the focus of the Soviet-America rivalry, terrorism came into 
its own as an instrument of foreign policy. 
Nowadays after the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and 
the development of international co-operation in condemning State sponsorship of 
terrorism and in bringing maximum pressure to bear against such a State, the 
involvement of the two superpowers came to an end, or at least became less clear than 
it used to be in the past. Still some States have been accused of supporting terrorism. 
8'lbid. 
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According to the US Department of State, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, 
Sudan, and Syria are the countries that still support international terrorism in the 
contemporary world. (Notice that these countries may or may not be considered as 
States sponsoring terrorism with respect to other countries because, as has been 
discussed earlier, of the non-existence of an accepted definition of terrorism by all 
States). 
In general, the reasons of why States support international terrorism can be 
one of the following: 
Firstly, for some States terrorism is a message of strength, a warning designed 
to intinUate, to ensure compliance or obedience without the need to use the armed 
forces. It is used as a signal that the next move will be more severe and may amount 
to a war. Therefore, the victim State will understand this message and change its 
unwelcome policy to the offensive State. 
Secondly, some States, especially minor States known as "rogue Slates"90 
involved in sponsoring or supporting terrorism because they are little concerned about 
their international standing and because they lack the tools for conventional warfare 
except against other minor States. Thus, they recourse to terrorism as a form of 
surrogate warfare or as some may call it low-intensity conflict. This will allow such 
States to strike at their enemies in a way that is relatively inexpensive financially and 
less risky militarily, especially in today's world of high technology. This suggests 
90 W. Laqueur, The New Terrorism, Fanaticism and The Arms of Mass Destruction, (Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 158. 
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that the best response to such justification of using terrorism by these States is to 
make such a use more expensive either in terms of cost or risk. 
Moreover, some States support terrorist organizations because they share their 
ideological values. Therefore, if such organizations assume power in the countries 
they engage in fighting with, they will spread such ideology to broad sections of the 
general public. 91 
Finally, the following reasons can also be added in order to explain such State 
involvement in international terrorism; to redress an international grievance they 
cannot redress by any other means, therefore having an effective international order 
should eliminate this source, to export revolution, to hunt down and eradicate exiled 
dissidents or to intimidate them into silence, and to weaken a strong adversary State ?2 
It should be noted that State-sponsored terrorism is always an international 
terrorism as a result of such State involvement, whereas individual terrorism can be 
either domestic or international terrorism. As it has been said earlier, the 
establishment of such State involvement in terrorism is very difficult to prove, thus 
most of the terrorist groups or organizations are considered as individual terrorists 
by many States. 
91 B. Gonor, 'Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism, ' 
<httl2: //www. ict. orL,. ii/articies/coLinter. htm>(visited I May 1999). 
92 p. Wilkinson, 'Support Mechanisms in International Terrorism', in Slater & Stohl (eds. ), Current 
Perspectives on International Terrorism, (Macmillan, 1988), 93. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALIZATION OF 
TERRORISM 
As has already been mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, the failure of the 
international community to find a universally accepted definition of international 
terrorism, leads the United Nations and some of its specialized agencies (ICAO, 
IMO, and IAEA) to resort to the "segmentation of the problem of terrorism"', i. e., 
adopted conventions that deal in a piecemeal fashion with a number of international 
offences favoured by terrorist groups. 
Currently, there are eleven major multilateral conventions- (note that all of 
these conventions have already entered into force except one, the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing) -related to States' 
responsibilities for combating terrorism. 
In Section I of this chapter, discussion about these conventions will include; 
explaining what has been done until this writing, the reasons for adopting these 
conventions, the debate that preceded the adoption of them, if it is useful for better 
understanding, the type of offences they cover, and any new innovation (provisions) 
in the conventions that comes after an earlier one. 
However, it should be noted that it is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
talk about all the details that are included in these conventions or the 
appropriateness of all articles provided for in them, what is important, is how the 
1 See, Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law: A Commentary on the Hostages 
Convention 1979, (Grotius Pub., 1990), 46. 
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international community dealt with the problem of the type of offences concerned, 
and the gradual coverage by these conventions of these offences. 
Next, in Section 2 the question of the effectiveness of the anti-terrorism 
conventions (their features and shortcomings) will be addressed. Are they effective 
in combating terrorism? Or are they only ink on paper devoid of any real effect? In 
other words, do they provide a coherent body of laws that deal effectively with 
terrorism? 
After that in Section 3 discussion will be about the use the extradition as a 
part of the criminal measures that can be taken against fugitive terrorists. Whether 
this process is working properly will be addressed in this section, and if not, why 
not? 
Lastly, Section 4 will be concerned with the idea of establishing an 
international criminal court vested with jurisdiction over international terrorism. 
The question there will be whether, if there is any need for such a court, and the 
argument for and against such an idea, and what has been done in this regard? 
3.1. ANTI-TERRORISM INSTRUMENTS 
This section will explain the international conventions adopted by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
the International Maritime Organization, and finally, those adopted by the United 
Nation General Assembly. 
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3.1.1. Conventions Adopted by International Civil Aviation Organization. (the 
ICAO): 
During the 1960s, acts endangering international civil aviation had become 
alarmingly more numerous and widespread. It has been reported that between 
January 1,1960 and June 30,1977, there were 487 hijackings of aircraft, 299 being 
successfully hijacked to a destination, foreign or domestic, other than the scheduled 
destination, and the remainder were unsuccessful. 2 These figures include the seizure 
of aircraft in flight as well as attacks on aircraft "in servW", i. e., in preparation for 
or upon completion of flight. 
Terrorist attacks against international civil aviation may take any of the 
following forms: hijacking, or the diversion of an aircraft from its scheduled 
destination by force or threat to another destination, sabotage of aircraft on the 
ground or in the air, forced flight or the demand that terrorists be flown to an 
asylum State from the State in which they have committed an act of terrorism, and 
any other attack against the aviation facilities, e. g., air terminals, cargo building% 
maintenance facilities, apron passenger vehicles, aprons, cargo areas, taxiways, 
runways, airport personnel, and any other related facilities that serve international 
civil aviation. 
Whatever the motive, an attack against civil aircraft and related facEties not 
only serves to produce fear, the distinguishing characteristic of terrorism, but it is 
2 See, A. E. Evans, 'Aircraft And Aviation Facilities', in A. E. Evans & J. F. Murphy (eds), Legal Aspects 
ofInternational Terrorism, (Lexington, 1978), 4. 
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also a peculiarly heinous crime because innocent persons dissociated entirely from 
the terrorist's personal or political environment are the victims of such act. 
The increasing number of such acts, urged the international community to 
respond, as a result, such acts have been the subject of concern to the UN General 
Assembly in its Resolutions 2551 (XXIV) and 2645 (XXV) and by the Security 
Council in its Resolution 268 (1970) and its Decision of June 20,1972. For 
understandable reasons, the development of conventions in this area (four 
conventions and one protocol) have taken place under the auspices of the ICAO, 
supported and encouraged by the UN regulations mentioned above? 
* Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft 
(Tokyo Convention, agreed 9/63). 4 
The provisions of this instrument are very modest, dealing primarily with 
gaps in jurisdictions which exist, or which did exist, with respect to crimes 
committed on board civil (i. e., not military, customs, or police) aircraft. In 
particular, the Convention requires States Parties to take such measures as are 
necessary to establish their jurisdictions over crimes committed on board aircraft 
registered by them. It also provides that offences committed on board aircraft shall 
be treated, for the purposes of extradition, as if they were committed not only in the 
place where they occurred, but also in the territory of the registefing State. 
3 See, S. M. Finger, 'International Terrorism and The United Nations', in Y. Alexander (ed. ), 
International Terrorism: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives, (Praeger Pub., 1976), 327. 4 This Convention entered into force on 4 December 1969, and it had been ratified Or acceded by 177 
nations, status as at I May 200 1. 
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In addition, it authorizes the aircraft commander to impose reasonable 
measures, including restraint, on any person he or she has reason to believe has 
committed or is about to commit any act that will affect the safety of the aircraft in- 
flight. Other provisions concern such matters as the taking of offenders into 
custody, restoring control of the aircraft to the commander and the continuation of 
the aircraft's journey. 5 
However, the Tokyo Convention has been criticized as an inadequate 
measure for the prevention and suppression of international terrorism with respect 
to international civil aviation because it neither defines nor lists any offence, which 
States Parties are required to suppress. In other word, it does not have any 
definition of the corpa delicti, 6 it composes no obligations regarding the extradition 
or prosecution of the offender or alleged offender, i. e., an absence of the principle 
7 
of inescapable punishment (aut dedere aut judicare). It also excludes from the 
Convention's scope of domestic airlines (except airlines passing over the high seas 
but linking cities of the State of registration). Nevertheless, the Tokyo Convention 
was the start of the international efforts to deal with terrorism despite the 
divergence between nations with respect to the question of what constitutes a 
terrorist act as already mentioned in Chapter 2. 
5 For Full Text, See 0. Elegab, International Law Documents relating to Terrorism, (Cavendish, 1995), 
324. 
6 1. Blishchenko& N. Zhdanov, Terrorism And International Law, (Progress, 1984), 97. 
7 lbid. 
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9 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague 
Convention, agreed 12/70). 8 
Considering the rising incidence of acts of unlawful interference with the 
operation of air services as well as the deficient provisions of the Tokyo 
Convention, the General Assembly of the ICAO passed Resolution A 16-B7 asking 
the ICAO Council to consider other measures which could be taken towards 
resolving the problem of unlawful seizure of aircrafts. Consequently with the UN 
General Assembly support, especially in its Resolution 2551, the ICAO adopted 
this Convention. 
Article I of this Convention defines the offences falling under it (unlike the 
Tokyo Convention). It states that 'Any person who on board aircraft in flight: 
(a) Unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, 
seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act, 
or; 
(b) Is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any such act, 
Commits an offence'. 
The Hague Convention obliges States Parties to make such offences 
punishable by severe penalties (Art. 2). Article 7 obliges the State Party in the 
territory of which the alleged offender is found, if it does not extradite him, to submit 
the case 'without exception whatsoever' to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution (no such provision was provided for in the Tokyo Convention). The 
8 This Convention entered into force on 14 October 1971, and it had been ratified or acceded by 173 
nations, status as at I May 200 1. 
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system of extradition established by the Convention is dealt with in Art. 8, which 
states that the unlawful seizure of aircraft is 'deemed to be included' in any 
extradition treaty existing between States Parties and which also obliges States Parties 
to include the offence as an extraditable offence in every extradition treaty to be 
concluded between them. Lastly, the Convention contains provisions obliging States 
Parties to afford one another judicial assistance in any criminal proceedings brought 
about under this Convention and to report to the Council of the ICAO any relevant 
information in their possession. 9 
The major distinguishing feature of the Hague Convention, is that it deals with 
nothing but the problem of hijacking of aircraft as such. It is (like the Tokyo 
Convention) designed to protect only an aircraft in flight; moreover, it protects an 
aircraft in flight only in the event of it being the object of an act of seizure; besides, 
this act is qualified as an offence only when committed by a person on board this 
particular aircraft. Consequently, the Convention excludes from its scope all acts in 
other categories, which could produce a similar threat to the operation of civil 
aviation. 10 
9 For full text, see Elegab note 5 at 330. 
10 Blishchenko & Zhdanov, note 6 at 100. 
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9 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation (Montreal Convention, agreed 9n 1). 11 
In order to deal with other types of violence against civil aviation, the ICAO 
adopted the Montreal Convention, which provides that a person commits an 
offence, if he 'unlawfully and intentionally' does any of a number of listed things, 
namely, 'performs an act of violence against person on board an aircraft in flight, ' 2 
if that act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft', 'destroys an aircraft in 
service 13 or causes damage to such an aircraft which renders it incapable of flight or 
which is likely to endanger its safety', 'places or causes to be placed on an aircraft 
in service .... a 
device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to 
cause damage to itý which renders it incapable of flight', or 'endangers its safety', 
'destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation, if 
such act is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight' or 'communicates 
information, which he/she knows to be false, thereby endangering safety of aircraft 
in flight', Art. 1. Other provisions parallel the provisions of the Hague 
Convention. 14 
The difference between this Convention and the Hague Convention is that 
the latter is concerned with the aircraft itself when it is in flight and when a person 
" This Convention entered into force on 26 January 1973, and it had been ratified or acceded by 174 
nations, status as at I May 2001. 12 An aircraft is considered to be in flight at any time from the moment when all its external doors are 
closed following embarkation until the moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation; in 
the case of a forced landing, the flight shall be deemed to continue until the competent authorities take 
over the responsibility for the aircraft and for persons and property on board, Art. 2, Paragraph (a). 13 An aircraft is considered to be in service from the beginning of the pre-flight preparation of the 
aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew for a specific flight until twenty-four hours after any 
landing; the period of service shall, in any event, extend for the entire period during which the aircraft 
is in flight, as defined in Paragraph 'V' of Art. 2, Art. 2, Paragraph (b). 14 For full text, see Elegab note 5 at 335. 
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on board the aircraft commits the offence, but the Montreal Convention is more 
comprehensive. It covers this act and other series of acts, mostly committed on the 
ground, which are likely to cause the destruction of the aircraft or otherwise 
endangers the safety of aircraft flight. It also includes a special provision requiring 
that 'Contracting States shall, in accordance with international and national law, 
endeavor to take all practicable measures for the purpose of preventing the offences 
mentioned', Art. 10. 
However, one of the great deficiencies of this Convention is the absence of 
provisions that make punishable the acts of violence against the airport ground 
personnel; aircraft not in service; or against airports serving international civil 
aviation and related facilities. 
* Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation (agreed 2\88, extends and supplements Montreal 
Convention). 15 
This Protocol extends the provisions of the Montreal Convention by adding 
to the list of offences provided for in the Montreal Convention: the use 'of any 
device, substance, or weapon' to perform 'an act of violence against a person at an 
airport serving international civil aviation which causes or is likely to cause serious 
injury or death' and the use of any such 'device, substance, or weapon' which 
destroys or seriously damages the facilities of an airport serving international civil 
15 This Protocol entered into force on 6 August 1989 and it had been ratified or acceded by 107 nations, 
status as at I May 200 1. 
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aviation or aircraft not in service located therein or disrupts the services of the 
airport, if such an act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that airport. 16 
9 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Identification 
(agreed 3/9 1)17 
This Convention, negotiated in the aftermath of the Pan Am 103 bombing, 18 
is the latest convention adopted by the ICAO that deals with international terrorism. 
It consists of two parts: the Convention itself, and a Technical Annex, which is an 
integral part of the Convention. This Convention is mainly designed to control and 
limit the used of unmarked and undetectable plastic explosives; States Parties are 
obliged in their respective territories to ensure effective control over "unmarked' 
plastic explosives, i. e., those that do not contain one of the detection agents 
described in the Technical Annex. 
Generally speaking, each Party to the convention must, among other things: 
take necessary and effective measures to prohibit and prevent the manufacture of 
unmarked plastic explosives; take necessary and effective measures to prevent the 
movement of unmarked plastic explosives into or out of its territory; take necessary 
measures to exercise strict and effective control over possession and transfer of 
unmarked explosives made or imported prior to the entry-into-force of the 
16 For full text, see Elegab note 5 at 340. 
" This Convention entered into force on 21 June 1998 and it had been ratified or acceded by 66 
nations, status as at I May 200 1. 
" On the evening of December 21,1988, Pan American night 103 exploded out of the sky and on the 
town of Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 passengers and crew on board and a further II local 
residents on the ground. Two Libyans were named as the planter of the bomb that caused the 
explosion. For more details, see J. P. Grant and R. E. Dickinson, 'The Lockerbie Stalemate: Is An 
International Criminal Court The Answer? ', Juridical Review (1996), 250. 
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Convention; take necessary measures to ensure that all stocks of such unmarked 
explosives not held by the military or police are destroyed or consumed, marked, or 
rendered permanently ineffective within three years; take necessary measures to 
ensure that unmarked plastic explosives held by the military or police, are destroyed 
or consumed, marked, or rendered permanently ineffective within fifteen years; and 
take necessary measures to ensure the destruction, as soon as possible, of any 
unmarked explosives manufactured after the date-of-entry into force of the 
Convention for that State. 19 
Even though this Convention does not in itself create new offences that 
would be subject to a prosecution or extradition regime, all States Parties to this 
Convention are required to ensure that provisions provided for therein, are 
complied with within their territories. 
It is clear from the above-mentioned conventions how the ICAO adopted 
these conventions in a piecemeal fashion. It started with crimes committed on 
board civil aircraft without defining or listing such crimes, then it started dealing 
with the crime of seizure of the aircraft and the unlawful interference with its 
operation, after that it broadened its concern with crimes committed against the 
civil aircraft whether in flight or in service, next, it provided coverage for acts 
committed against the airport personal, facilities, and aircraft on the ground, finally, 
it obliged States Parties to mark plastic explosives in order to identify them and 
prevent them from being used for terrorist acts against civil aviation. 
19 For full text, see Elcgab note 5 at 343. 
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3.1.2. Convention Adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency. (The 
IAEA). 
The concerns of this agency used to be of three types? o 
- Prevention of nuclear war between the superpowers; 
- Prevention of the ftuther spread of nuclear weapons; 
- Prevention of catastrophic nuclear accidents. 
However, currently a fourth type of concern came into existence: 
- Prevention of nuclear terrorism. 
The range of threat posed by nuclear-related terrorism embraces at one 
extreme the hoax -that is a bluff by terrorists to use nuclear material they do not 
actually have- and at the other extreme the detonation of a nuclear weapon. 
Between these extremes are numerous permutations, which pose serious potential 
risks to public health and safety, including sabotage of nuclear power plants, theft 
of a nuclear weapon or of special nuclear materials with which to fabricate such a 
weapon and dispersal of radioactive materials? ' 
Although no known act of nuclear-related terrorism has produced a 
radiological hazard to the public or has pennitted unauthorized individuals or 
groups to obtain special nuclear materials. Terrorists might go nuclear at any time 
for any of the following reasons: 
20 See, Report of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, in Y. Alexander 
(ed. ), International Terrorism: Political and Legal Document, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), 579. 21 See, H. H. Brown, 'Nuclear Facilities and Materials', in A. E. Evans & J. F. Murphy (eds), Legal 
Aspects ofInternational Terrorism, (Lexington, 1978), 152. 
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Firstly, to gain a strong bargaining position with which the government is 
forced to deal. This reason is very probable because terrorists do not hesitate to 
achieve their goals by any means. Whatever means they possess they will use, 
especially if what they have is so great a power that it will make the government 
they want to attack on its highest degree of fear when it is believed that the terrorist 
do have such access. 
Secondly, terrorists may use nuclear weapons in order to dramatize their 
political cause and capture wider publicity for it. Obviously, the use of nuclear 
weapons in this situation is the best means to attracting media attention that will be 
happy to cover such a great event and therefore aid terrorists to convey their 
message to the whole world. 
Moreover, threatening to use such a weapon will help terrorists to paralyze 
society with an extremely dangerous threat to frighten the public and gain support 
through intimidation. 
In addition, those who seek recourse to terrorism for the purpose of anarchy 
or of creating chaos the use of nuclear weapons will be the best means to do so. 
Because using such weapons will destroy people and property randomly and create 
civic and political anarchy, 22 
Last but not least, one more reason that can be added to this list is the 
22 lbid, at 159. 
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evidence of State involvement in terrorism because, even though it might be hard 
and difficult for individuals to obtain nuclear materials, it will not be the same for 
governments to obtain such materials. 
Taking the above mentioned reasons into account the IAEA adopted the: 
* Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Nuclear Materials 
Convention, agreed 10/79ý 3 
This Convention contains an annex, which establishes general levels of 
physical security to be provided during the shipments of nuclear material used for 
peaceful purposes. According to this Convention, States Parties have to cooperate 
in the recovery and return of stolen materials. They are also required to enact 
legislation that makes criminal certain acts such as the theft or any other 
unauthorized transfer of nuclear materials, attempts to obtain them by force and 
threats to use them to cause serious harm to people or property. 
The fact that before the adoption of this Convention, there has been a 
dramatic worldwide commercial development of nuclear energy which has 
manifested itself through the high increase of commercial nuclear facilities and the 
flow of nuclear materials among nations, explains the reason why the drafters of 
this Convention were concerned more about the international shipments of nuclear 
materials between States in order to prevent them from being stolen by terrorists but 
it does not regulate shipments and programs of nuclear materials domestically, 
which has always been resisted by States as an intrusion into their sovereignties. 
23 This Convention entered into force on 8 February 1987, and it had been ratified or acceded by 69 
nations, status as at 25 April 200 1. 
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However, the Convention does have other requirements that apply 
domestically, including obligations placed on each State Party to adopt national 
statutes defining such crimes as theft of nuclear materials and threats to use stolen 
materials, to cause serious harm as indicated above. Furthermore, there are 
provisions on prosecution or extradition of individuals who engage in criminal acts 
against domestic storage, use or transport? 4 
In addition, this Convention is limited to nuclear materials for peaceful uses 
and does not cover nuclear materials of a military nature. Even more significantly, 
this Convention does not distinguish acts of nuclear terrorism from other criminal 
acts involving nuclear materiaIS? 5 Also, this Convention is only concerned about 
the physical protection of the nuclear materials but does not give any consideration 
to the spread of the knowledge upon which the manufacture of these materials is 
based. Such knowledge may constitute a serious contribution to the capabilities of 
terrorists to go nuclear, especially after the rise of the so-called "rogue scientists 9s26 
who had been previously employed in the Former Soviet Union but who might 
have moved to another State for high pay. 
Nonetheless, this Convention may play an important role in preventing 
terrorists from obtaining nuclear materials on the black market, the principle 
sources of which are the States of the Fortner Soviet Union. This is after the break- 
up of the Soviet Union in 199 1, which resulted in a break down of the accounting, 
24 For full text see Elegab note 5 at 9. 25 N. GuRR and B. Cole, The Now Face of Terrorism; Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
(I. B. Tauris, 2000), 227. 
26 Ibid. at 4. 
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control and physical protective measures for effective management and security of 
nuclear material of the nearly 100 sites that hold enriched uranium or plutonium 
and the facilities which hold other nuclear materials, 27 which this convention is 
concemed about. 
3.1.3. Conventions Adopted by the International Maritime Organization. (The 
IMO) 
Before the 1980s, ships were not generally regarded as a high-risk terrorist 
targets, this was not because of the high standard of security that States had in their 
ports, but because terrorists preferred aircraft as relatively more vulnerable and 
easier targets than ships, however, this has changed as it will be discussed later. 
The international community first started considering ships as potential 
targets of terrorist attacks after the Achille Lauro incident, 28 which underlined the 
possibility of ftu-ther serious attack against ships and led to a rapid international 
response, which took two forms: the negotiation, following an American initiative 
27 Ibid. at 57. 
28 On October 7,1985, four armed men claiming to represent the Palestine Liberation Front took 
control of the Italian-flag cruise liner Achille Laura on the high seas about thirty miles off Port Said 
(Egypt) and held the crew and passengers hostages. They had boarded her in port in Geneo posing as 
legitimate passengers. They demand the release of fifty Palestinian prisoners held in Israel and 
threatened to blow up the ship if intervention were attempted, and to start to kill the passengers if the 
demands were not met. Subsequently a Jewish American passenger, Mr. Klinghoffer, was shot dead 
and his body thrown overboard. Several days later the four men gave themselves up to the Egyptian 
authorities, following negotiation between them, with the aid of an intermediary, while the ship was 
lying off Port Said. These negotiations resulted in an offer to the terrorists of a safe conduct to Tunisia 
in return of their leaving the ship without further violence. However, on October 11, an Egyptian 
civilian aircraft was intercepted by US military aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea and instructed to 
land at an air force base in Sicily. Four Palestinian on board were detained by the Italian authorities 
and subsequently indicted and convicted in Genoa for offences related to hijacking of the ship and the 
death of Mr. Klighoffer. Italy, which had apparently not been consulted about the interception 
operation, refused a request from the US for their extradition. The President of the UN Security 
Council condemned the attack in a statement on behalf of all its members. See, G. Plant, 'Legal 
Aspects of Terrorism at Sea', in R. Higgins & M. Flory (eds. ), Terrorism and International Law, 
(Routledge, 1997), 68. 
69 
in the IMO, and adoption in September 1986 of set of global standards for port 
security- the Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers and Crews on 
Board Shipsý29, and the negotiation, once the measures were in place, of a dedere 
autjudicare-type convention to cover ships and that resulted in the IMO adoption 
of-. 
* Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (Rome Convention, agreed 3/88)30 
This Convention defmes ships to which this applies as 'a vessel of any type 
whatsoever not permanently attached to the sea-bed, including dynamically 
supported craft, submersibles, or any other floating craft', warships are excluded 
from the application of the Convention, as well as ships 'owned or operated by a 
State when being used as a naval auxiliary or for customs or police purposes' and 
ships which have 'been withdrawn from navigation or laid up, Art. 1. 
Consequently, government ships operated for commercial purposes, or government 
ships not operated for commercial purposes such as research ships or icebreakers, 
are included in the scope of the Convention? ' 
The Rome Convention applies to all cases of navigation, actual or 
scheduled, except cases of short-range or local cabotage, that is, when a ship is 
2' These measures were regarded by some countries as more important than the Convention (Rome 
Convention) itself because it deals with measures that should be taken in ports in which it will be most 
easy to prevent attacks against ships rather than measures that should be taken on board ships at sea and 
because it is more practical that the Convention which have a more symbolic than practical role. See 
ibid. at 69. 
30 This Convention entered into force on I March 1992 and it had been ratified and acceded by 52 
nations, status as at 30 April 2001. 
31 See, T. Treves, 'The Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation', in N. Ronzitti (ed. ), Maritime Terrorism and International Law, (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1990), 73. 
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navigating or scheduled to navigate only within the internal waters or territorial sea 
(or both) of a single State, whether the flag State or another State. However, even 
in cases within this exception, the Convention applies, if the offender or the alleged 
offender is found in the territory of a State other than the State in whose waters the 
cabotage was taldng place, Art. 4. 
It also establishes a legal regime applicable to acts committed against 
international maritime navigation that is similar to the regimes established against 
international civil aviation (especially the Hague and the Montreal Conventions). 
Nevertheless, this Convention adds three more offences to be covered by it, which 
had not been provided for in the precedent conventions (e. g., Hague and Montreal 
Convention). These offences are the following: 
- The act of the person who 'injures or kills, any person, in connection with the 
commission or the attempted commission of any of the offences set forth in 
Subparagraph 'a' to T, Art. 3. 
. The act of the person who abets- (not only attempts or participates in) -the 
commission of these offences, Art. 3 (1) (b). 
- The act of the person who 'threatens, with or without a condition, as is provided 
for under national law, aimed at compelling a physical or juridical person to do 
or abstain from doing any act', Art. 3 (2). 
Consequently, it adds three more bases for discretionary jurisdiction to 
States Parties over the offender or the alleged offender; two of them corresponding 
to the above-mentioned additional offences: 
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In the first four basis of mandatory jurisdiction, it followed the precedents 
(especially the Montreal Convention), in which it obliges State Party to establish its 
jurisdiction when 
- The offence is committed against or on board of ship flying the 
flag of that state; 
- The offence is committed in the territory of that State; 
- The alleged offender is a national of that State; or 
- The alleged offender is found in that State and it does not extradite hirn/her. Art. 6 
(a) 
After that it provides that a State Party may also establish its jurisdiction 
over any such offence when: 
(a) It is committed by a Stateless person whose habitual residence is in that State; 
(b) During its commission a national of that State is seized, threatened, injured or 
killed; or 
(c) It is committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from doing 
any act. Art. 6 (2). 32 
9 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (agreed 3/88ý 3 
34 
The fact that there are over 5000 off-shore platforms around the world , 
employed for extracting oil or natural gas, and the fear that they can become the 
32 For full text, see Elegab note 5 at 477. 
33 This Protocol entered into force on I March 1992, and it had been ratified or acceded by 48 nations, 
status as at 30 April 2001. 
34 See, N. Ronzitti, 'The Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Against Fixed Platforms on the 
Continental Shelf, in N. Ronzitti (ed. ), Maritime Terrorism and International Law, (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1990), 91. 
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targets of terrorist attacks, which will not only endanger the life of people on board, 
but can also cause severe pollution, damaging the environment, urged some States 
(especially Spain and the US) to propose to the IMO Committee at the same time of 
drafting the Rome Convention, to draft a Protocol aimed at protecting the Safety of 
fixed platforms located on the continental shelf. 
In the adoption of this Protocol, the drafters very closely followed the 
pattern of the Convention. It applies to parallel offences- as provided for in the 
Convention, Art. 3-on board or against a platform (this includes artificial islands, 
and installations or structures permanently attached to the sea-bed for the purpose 
of exploration or exploitation of resources or for other economic purposes, Art. I 
(1) located on the continental shelf of a State Party. Art. 2. 
In addition, Article 3 of the Protocol is identical mutatis mutandis to Article 
6 of the Convention, except that the separate grounds for establishing obligatory 
jurisdiction based on registry of the ship and location within a State's territory are 
replaced with a single ground for such jurisdiction, based on the location of a 
platform on a State's Continental Shelf. Moreover, it applies to all offences against 
or on board installations in a State's Continental Shelf, and to offences against or on 
board installations in a State's territorial sea or internal waters when the offender 
escapes abroad. Art. 1 (2ý5 
Finally, the Protocol is open for ratification or accession solely to those 
35 For full tcxt sce 27 LLM. (1988), 685-690. 
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States, which are Parties to the Convention, and it will enter into force only after the 
entry-into-force of the Convention. This solution has been chosen for fear that 
States which have fixed platforms on their continental shelf would have ratified the 
Protocol, but not the Convention, whereas those States which do not have fixed 
platforms would have ratified the Convention and not the Protocol. In effect, the 
two instruments are complementary to each other, and both need to be ratified in 
order to avoid loopholes. This is particularly true for those structures the legal 
nature of which is uncertain, so if a structure cannot be considered a "ship", thus 
falling under the scope of the Convention, it shall be deemed a "fixed platform" to 
which the Protocol applieS? 6 
3.1.4. Conventions Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. 
Now the discussion will be about the other international conventions that 
had been adopted directly by the UN General Assembly: 
9 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against International 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (New York Convention, agreed 
12/73)37 
Diplomatic inviolability is considered to be one of the most ancient and 
accepted principles in international law, although there has been less agreement on 
the basis of this principle. Among many theories that have been advanced to justify 
the extension of a special protection to diplomats, three are prominent? 8 
36 See, Natalino note 31 at 95. 3' This Convention entered into force on 20 February 1977, and it had been ratified or acceded by 107 
nations, status as at 13 June 2001. 39 See, J. F. Murphy, 'Protected Persons and Diplomatic Facilities', in A. E. Evans & J. F. Murphy (eds), 
Legal Aspects ofInternational Terrorism, (Lexington, 1978), 278. 
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The first of which, is the theory of personal representation, which stated that 
the diplomat is the personification of his ruler or of a sovereign State and an attack 
on him is equal to an attack on his ruler or the sovereignty of his State. However, 
as the concept that the ultimate sovereignty resides in the people not the rulers 
grows more and more, this theory is losing much of its logic and support. 
The second theory, is the theory of extraterritoriality, which based on two 
separate but closely related legal fictions: the concept of residence, which 
according to it, the diplomat is not subject to local law because he does not reside in 
the host State; and the concept of territory, which according to it, the diplomatic 
premises are considered to be the same as foreign territory. However, this theory 
has lost much of the support that it used to have in the past, and most modem jurists 
have largely abandoned it. 
The third and the most accepted theory, is the theory of functional necessity, 
which based on the premise that the interdependence between States requires 
freedom of communication and freedom of movement for the diplomats in order 
that States may carry on international intercourse. This theory is especially useful 
to explain the extension of privileges and immunities to international organizations 
and their personnel, since such organizations are without territory or 
representational status. 
Whatever its theoretical basis, the principle of diplomatic inviolability has 
now been codified in a number of international conventions: Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; the Convention 
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on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN; the Convention on Special Missions; 
and Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations with 
International Organizations of a Universal Character. 
The existence of the principle of diplomatic inviolability in both customary 
and conventional international law may raise the question of the need for a new 
convention, since they already provide protection for diplomats from violent 
attacks. The answer to this question is threefold: 39 firstly, under traditional law and 
practice, the range of persons entitled to special protection is unclear (especially 
with respect to officials of international organizations, or ad hoc diplomats). 
Secondly, traditional international law has been ambiguous about the measures that 
should be taken to ensure diplomatic inviolability, especially in cases when a State 
apprehends the offender or the alleged offender, or in cases when the attack against 
a diplomat was committed in one State and the offender fled to another State 
seeking safe haven. Finally, traditional international legal measures have lacked 
established procedures for international cooperation in preventing and punishing 
violations of diplomatic inviolability. 
Attacks on diplomats have increased in number and in the level of violence 
employed; between 1973 and 1974, there were 34 incidents of violent attacks on 
diplomats or diplomatic personnel. 40 The reason of the growing of such attacks are 
that the threat and the use of force against diplomats has become an integral part of 
the terrorists' strategy. In most cases, terrorists considered the diplomat as an 
39 See, ibid. at 299. 
40 Ibid. at 280. 
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instrumental target, i. e., he may be viewed merely as the instrument the attackers 
use to induce certain behavior, especially concessions, from target governments 
(note that the target government might be the government of the receiving State, the 
government of the country the diplomat represents, or the government of some third 
party). However, in a few other cases, a diplomat may be considered as a primary 
target of the terrorist attack, i. e., he may be attacked for crimes he allegedly 
personally committed. 
In contrast with the failure of the General Assembly to adopt the draft 
convention on suppression and prevention of international terrorism, which was 
proposed by the US in its 27" session as has been mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, it 
succeeded in its 2e session in adopting this Convention (New York Convention). 
With respect to the range of persons covered by its provisions, this 
Convention introduces a new concept into international law jurisprudence: the 
"internationally protected persons". Under Article 1 (1), the internationally 
protected person is defined as, a head of State, a minister for foreign affairs, a 
representative or official of a State or of an international organization who is 
entitled to special protection from attack under international law at the time when, 
and in, the place where the crime is committed. 
This Convention also requires each Party to criminalize and make 
punishable 'by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature the 
intentional murder, kidnapping, or other attacks upon the person or liberty of an 
internationally protected person, a violent attack upon the official premises, the 
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private accommodations, or the means of transport of such a person; a threat or 
attempt to commit such an attack; and an act 'constituting participation as an 
accomplice'. Art. 2. 
In addition, it obliges each State Party to establish its jurisdiction over the 
crimes set forth in Art. 2 in any of the following cases: 
- When the crime is committed in its territory or on a ship or aircraft registered in 
it; 
- When the offender is one of its nationals; 
- When the diplomat subject to the violent attack was acting on its behalf, 
- When the offender is presented in its territory and it did not extradite him. Art. 3 
(1) '2'. 
Other provisions require the State Party that has custody over the offender 
to either extradite him or submit the case to its competent authority for the purpose 
of prosecution. It also requires States Parties to assist each other in connection with 
criminal proceedings brought under the Convention! ' 
It should be noted here that during the negotiation of this Convention, many 
States (especially Arab and African Countries) introduced an amendment to this 
Convention. They proposed that the Convention should not apply to people 
struggling against colonialism, alien domination, foreign occupation, racial 
For full text, see Elegab note 5 at 572. 
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discrimination, and apartheid in the exercise of their legitimate rights of self- 
determination and independence. However, a compromise was reached between 
those States and others, in which they all agreed that this exception will not be 
provided for in the Convention itself but in a resolution which will be 
simultaneously adopted with the Convention and which related to it . 
42 
e International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention, 
agreed 12/79ý 3 
This Convention was negotiated for the first time in the General Assembly 
on September 1976 in the wake of the Israeli operation to rescue its nationals held 
hostage at Entebbe, and following the successful conclusion of the previously 
mentioned international conventions dealing with particular types of terrorist 
offences. 
During the negotiation of this Convention, there has been a great 
controversy over the definition of hostage taking and the scope of the Convention. 44 
Some argued that the term hostage-taking should not only include the seizure or 
detention of a person, but should also include that of masses under colonial, racist 
or foreign domination, in a way that threatens him or them with death or severe 
injury or deprives them of freedom. Another argument was that the definition of 
hostage taking should be drafted in such a way as to prohibit only the taking of 
"innocenf' hostages, suggesting that "guilty" individuals, i. e., those connected with 
42 See, Finger note 3 at 342. 43 This Convention entered into force on 3 June 1983, and it had bee ratified or acceded by 95 nations. 
status as at 13 June 2001. " See, Lambert note I at 62. 
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colonialism or foreign domination, could be taken hostages. Other argued that this 
Convention should not be applied to people struggling against colonial rule, racist 
and foreign regimes. However, no exception based on the motive of the offender or 
the identity of the victim was drafted into the Hostage Convention. 
It should be noted here, that during the time of negotiation this Convention, 
which took about three years from proposing this Convention on September 1976, 
until its adoption on December 1979- a number of dramatic and well publicized 
incidents of hostage taking and subsequent rescue operations by non-territorial 
States had taken place-. 45 the 1977 hijacking of a Lufthansa aircraft and holding of 
hostages at Mogadishu, Somalia, which precipitated a rescue operation by 
commandoes from the Federal Republic of Germany; and the 1978 hijacking of an 
Egyptian aircraft and the holding of hostages at Lamaca, Cyprus, which resulted in 
a raid by Egyptian commandoes. Moreover, the US hostages in Iran were seized 
only one month before the General Assembly's consensus adoption of the 
Convention. 
Article I of this Convention provides that a person commits a hostage- 
taking offence when he 'seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to 
continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party, namely a State, 
an international intergovemmental organization, or a natural or juridical person, a 
group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit 
condition for the release of the hostages' and includes also any attempt or 
45 Ibid. at 65. 
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participation as an accomplice. Hence, the act must be directed against a third 
party, but not against the victim himself, which according to Article I will not be 
considered as an act of hostage taking. 
The Convention also makes it imperative for the States Parties to prosecute 
under criminal law or extradite any person committing an act of hostage-taking, 
Art. 8, and take appropriate measures of punishment, considering the grave 
character of such an offence. Art. 2. 
Moreover, it requires each State Party to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offences set forth in Article I in any of the following cases: 
- When the offence is committed in its territory; 
When the offence is committed on board a ship or aircraft registered in that 
State; 
When the offence is committed by its national or if that State considers it 
appropriate, by those Stateless persons who have their habitual residence in its 
territory; 
- When the offence is committed in order to compel that State to do or abstain 
from doing any act; or 
- When the offence is committed against a national (the hostage) of that State, if 
that State considers it appropriate. 
Also a State Party may establish its jurisdiction when the offender presents in 
its territory and it does not extradite him. Art. 5. 
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Other provisions require States Parties in the territory of which the hostage 
is held, to take appropriate measures to ease the situation, and required States 
Parties to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings brought under 
the Convention. 46 
9 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (agreed 
12/97ý7 
The US initiated the negotiation of this Convention in the aftermath of the 
deadly truck bombing attack on US military personnel in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 
on June 25,1996. That attack and other similar attacks, 48 i. e., attacks by bombs, 
made clear that, although there were many important counter terrorism conventions 
as mentioned earlier, none of these conventions has dealt with the problem of 
attacks by terrorists in public places such as the Dhahran Bombing. 
The Convention is structurally based on prior counter terrorism conventions 
adopted by the UN and its specialized agencies. 49 It includes a requirement that 
States Parties criminalize certain conduct, submit for prosecution or extradite 
persons found in their territory suspect of the proscribed offences, and cooperate in 
the investigation and prosecution of the offences. Likes its predecessors, the 
Convention does not attempt to define 'terrorism' but, instead, defines particular 
46 For full text see Elegab note 5 at 5 18. 
47 This Convention is not yet in force, it had been ratified or acceded by 24 nations, status as at 13 June 
2001. 
4' These include the poison attacks in Tokyo's subways, see U. S. Dept. of State, Pub. No. 10,321, 
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995, at 5 (1996); a bombing in Colombo, Sri Lanka, see U. S. Dept. of 
State, Pub. No. 10,433, Pattern of Global Terrorism: 1996, at 28 (1997); and a bombing in Manchester, 
England, see ibid. at 32. 
41 See, S. M. Witten, ' Current Developments: The International Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings', 92 (4) American Journal ofInternational Law, (October 1998), 775. 
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conduct that, regardless of its motivation, is condemned internationally and 
therefore is an appropriate subject of international law enforcement cooperation. 
Under Article 2 (1), a person commits an offence within the meaning of this 
Convention, if he "unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or 
detonates an explosive or other lethal device5oin, into or against a place of public 
use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, or an 
infrastructure facility: 51 (a) with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system, 
where such destruction results in, or is likely to result, in major economic loss. 
Article 2 also provides that an attempt or participation as accomplice is 
considered as an offence under the Convention. In addition, it adds to the list of 
ancillary offences, the act of organizing or directing others to commit such an 
offence, or in any other way that contributes to the commission of one or more such 
" Paragraph 3 of Article I defines "explosive or lethal device" as including not only conventional 
explosive or other incendiary devices, but also toxic chemicals, biological agents or toxins or similar 
substances, and radiation or radioactive materials. The Convention will thus address not only attacks 
with conventional explosives such as attack on U. S. personnel in Dhahran, but will also include attacks 
with chemical materials such as these used in the 1995 episodes on the Tokyo subway system. 
51 Article I defines these four categories as follows: 
(a) "State or government facilitiee' includes any permanent or temporary facility or conveyance that is 
used or occupied by representatives of a State, members of Government, the legislature or the 
judiciary or by officials or employees of a State or any other public authority or entity or by 
employees or officials of an intergovernmental organization in connection with their official 
duties. 
(b) "Infrastructure facility" means any publicly or privately owned facility providing or distributing 
services for the benefit of the public, such as water, sewage, energy, fuel or communications. 
(c) "Place of public use" means those parts of any building, land, street, waterway or other location 
that are accessible or open to members of the public, whether continuously, periodically or 
occasionally, and encompasses any commercial, business, cultural, historical, educational, 
religious, governmental, entertainment, recreational or similar place that is so accessible or open to 
the public. 
(d) "Public transportation system" means all facilities, conveyances and instrumentalities, whether 
publicly or privately owned, that are used in or for publicly available services for the transportation 
of persons or cargo. 
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offence by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. This makes this 
Convention more comprehensive that the other conventions. 
Moreover, it requires States Parties to adopt any measures that may be 
necessary to ensure that criminal acts, within the scope of this Convention, in 
particular where they are intended or calculated to create a state of terror, are not 
justifiable by considerations of political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, 
religious or other similar nature and are punished by penalties consistent with their 
52 grave nature. 
With respect to the basis of criminal jurisdiction, it provides that each State 
Party is required to establish its jurisdiction (mandatory jurisdiction) over the 
offences set forth in Article 2 when: 
- The offence is committed in its territory; 
- The offence is committed on board a vessel flying the flag of that State or an 
aircraft which is registered under the law of that State at the time the offence is 
committed; or 
- The offence is conunitted by one of its nationals. Art. 6. 
It also provides that a State Party may establish its jurisdiction 
(discretionary jurisdiction) over these offences when: 
52 There is no parallel to this article in the prior counter terrorism conventions. This provision was 
added during the negotiations primarily because some delegations thought it important to include the 
concept that conduct described in the Convention can instil "terror" in the public (although the word is 
not defined and it is not an element of the offences in Article 2) and to emphasize that the offences 
outlined in Article 2 should be universally condemned and criminalized regardless of the motivations 
of the perpetrators. 
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- The offence is committed against its national; 
- The offence is committed against a State or government facility of that State 
abroad, including an embassy or other diplomatic or consular premises of that 
State; 
- The offence is committed by a Stateless person who has his habitual residence 
in the territory of that State; or 
- The offence is committed on board aircraft, which is operated by the 
govemment of that State. Art. 6 (2). 
Add to that, Article 6 (4), which requires a State Party to establish its 
jurisdiction when the alleged offender is in its territory and is not extradited to any 
of the States with jurisdiction under the Convention. 
Another unprecedented provision in this Convention with respect to the 
other anti-terrorism conventions, is Article 8 (2), which provides that the State 
Party can discharge itself from the obligation imposed by the Convention to 
extradite the alleged offender or submit the case to its competent authority for the 
purpose of prosecution by the temporary transfer of its nationals for trial, if that 
State could not otherwise extradite its nationals, provided that both Parties agree to 
such arrangements. 53 
It should be noted here that this Convention applies neither to the activities 
of armed forces during armed conflicts nor all the activities undertaken by military 
53 For full text, see 37 (1) I. L. M., (1998), 25 1. 
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forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, because these activities are 
already comprehensively governed by other international instruments relating to the 
law of war, the international law of state responsibility, and the international 
humanitarian law. 
Even though, this Convention is not yet in force, this Convention is very 
important because it broadens and strengthens international law enforcement and 
cooperation in cases of international terrorism, and as the use of explosives and 
other lethal devices become more frequent than they used to be and more 
destructive. 
3.2. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM CONVENTIONS 
The conclusion of an international treaty that deals with a problem of 
international concern is the inevitable step towards the solution and prevention of 
such a problem. However, not every treaty accomplished what it was expected to 
accomplish, some treaties are affected with defects that render them ineffective. 
This section will discuss the features and the shortcomings of the anti-terrorism 
conventions. 
3.2.1. The Features of the Anti-Terrorism Conventions 
Before start talking about the features of the anti-terrorism treaties, it is 
worth mentioning here that despite the decrease of some terrorist acts e. g., 
hijacking, in the early 1970s, it is impossible to conclude that the decrease was the 
result solely of the adoption of these treaties, because there were other factors that 
might also have played a part in the decline of hijacking at that time. States were 
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taking a firm stand against that crime i. e., hijacking, and applying advance airport 
security measures which made it very difficult for the would-be hijacker to carry 
out his action. Nonetheless, there are so many other contributions made by these 
conventions in combating terrorism, which could also play an effective role in the 
deterrence of terrorism. 
An important feature of these conventions along with other related UN 
resolutions- (for instance, the General Assembly Declaration on Principle of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations which was adopted in 1970)-is the 
reinforcement of the principle of the non-use of territory of one State for terrorist acts 
against another State. According to this obligation as the Declaration in its 9ýh 
Paragraph states 'every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, 
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or 
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the 
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the piesent paragraph, involve a 
threat or use of force'. 
This obligation is very important in the war against terrorism, since in many 
cases of terrorism, the terrorists emanated from or operated in the territory of 
another State either with or without the knowledge of the territorial States. 
However, the provision of such an obligation in these conventions is not 
sufficient to guarantee adherence from States Parties unless these States are forced 
to do so. In other words, despite the provision of such an obligation, States Parties 
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may violate it by allowing terrorists to operate from their territories in order to 
commit terrorist attacks against other States. They can do so without being 
punished by any enforcement action. 
The only type of measures mentioned in the conventions is extradition or 
prosecution and obviously none of these actions could be applied to States when 
they become accomplices in any act of terrorism in violation of the relevant anti- 
terrorism convention to which they are party. 
Nonetheless, one may say the Security Council of the UN may take actions 
in such cases, as in the Lockerbie incident by imposing economic sanctions. 
Although this may be true in some cases, it is not in all cases. For example, in the 
Rainbow Warrior Incident the Security Council had not even contemplated the 
imposition of any type of sanctions against France. Instead, the Security Council 
asked the Secretary General of the UN to settle this dispute kindly by his good 
office. Consequently, New Zealand received a monetary compensation from 
France and the French officers who committed terrorism were sent to spend their 
sentences on a French Island. 
Another important contribution made by these instruments, as pointed out 
by Armith is that some of the provisions that have been provided for in these anti- 
terronsm conventions enhanced or at least reflected a greater acceptance of the 
Principle of Universality. 54 
`4 A. R. Perera, International Terrorism, (Vikas Pub., 1997), 196. 
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First, all anti-terrorism conventions require States Parties to make the 
offences specified therein as prohibited conduct under their domestic laws. A 
typical article is Article 2 of the New York Convention, which states 'every State 
Party shall make the offences set forth in Article I punishable by appropriate 
penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offencee. This 
requirement will help in creating a high degree of uniformity of legislations of 
States Parties by making these acts crimes, and this has the effect of the 
"standardization of offences! '55, which is an essential pre-requisite of the acceptance 
of the principle of universality of jurisdiction and will also satisfy the requirement 
of dual criminality for the purpose of extradition. 
The second and the foremost contribution of these instruments to the 
development of the principle of universality and the fight against terrorism is the 
central obligation contained in all of the anti-terrorism conventions that of aut 
dedere autjudicare, i. e., the State Party in whose territory the alleged is present 
shall, if it does not extradite him, 'without exception whatsoever, and 'without 
undue delay', submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution. An example of such an obligation is Article 7 of the Hague 
Convention which, (notice that this article, if not identical to the correspondent 
articles in other anti-terrorism conventions is remarkably similar to them), provides 
that 'the Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found 
shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever, to 
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecutioW. 
55 Ibid. 
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Thus, unlike the case of conventional principles of jurisdiction, i. e., 
territorial principle, which according to it, a State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, 
is competent to prosecute all crimes committed within its territory, irrespective of 
the offender's nationality, and active nationality principle, which according to it, 
the State has the jurisdiction to prosecute and punish nationals who have committed 
crimes abroad, irrespective of the fact that the crime has had no effect upon the 
state of nationality of the criminal offender. As well as the less conventional 
principles of jurisdiction such as the passive nationality principle, which according 
to it, the State may have jurisdiction to prosecute and punish criminal offenders 
who committed crimes abroad against its nationals. However, this principle is not 
widely accepted as the above-mentioned principles, and the protective principle, 
which according to it, the State has the right to prosecute and punish criminal 
offenders who committed crimes abroad, which were prejudicial to its vital 
interests, irrespective of the territory where the crimes took place or the nationality 
either of the offender or the- victim. However, like the passive nationality principle, 
this principle is less traditional than the first two principles. Therefore all the above 
mentioned principles require for any State to establish its jurisdiction to have a 
connection with the crime, this principle, i. e., aut dedere aut judicare, does not 
require more than the mere presence of the alleged offender in the territory of the 
State Party. The idea behind this principle is that the offender should not go 
unpunished, therefore if the holding State refused extradition for any reason, e. g., 
political offence exception, which in many cases results in giving the accused 
criminal a de facto immunity from prosecution and sanctioning the crimes 
committed abroad based on the criminal's motivation, the application of this 
principle would alleviate this problem while still respecting the doctrinal basis for 
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the political offence exception itself. Also if the holding State refused extradition 
because of fear of unfair trial for the accused criminal in the requesting State's 
national courts, it should not have such fear or doubts about its own national courts. 
56 
By and large applying this principle will assure that justice will still be served. 
It is also worth noting here that this principle differs from the law relating to 
traditional crimes like piracy, which provided only for an "optional" universal 
jurisdiction. In other words, Sates are free to seize pirates on the high sea and 
prosecute them. However, in the case of terrorism these instruments make it 
compulsory for States Parties to establish their jurisdiction when the alleged 
offender appeared in their territories. Giving the fact that some of these treaties had 
been ratified by a large number of Sates, e. g., the Hague Convention 173 and the 
Montreal Convention 174, the grant of such jurisdiction would approximate the 
principle of universal jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, these conventions provide for fair treatment to the alleged 
offender which will not only serve laudable human rights, it may also encourage 
States Parties to extradite the requested suspect to the requesting Stateý 7 Moreover, 
some non-Sates Parties which have a lot of concerns about the treatment of the 
offenders because they considered them as political offenders, will have the 
incentive to become party to these conventions. Therefore, this will result in having 
more States Parties to reach the point of universal acceptance by all States, upon 
5' See, P, S. Phillips, 'The Political Offence Exception and Terrorism: Its Place in the Current 
Extradition Scheme and Proposal for Its Future', 5 Dickinson Journal of International Law, (winter 
97), 358. 
57 See Perem, note 54 at 187. 
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which the effectiveness of the treaty depends. Also this will help in bridging the 
gaps that may exist if some States refused to sip these conventions, thus they may 
become save havens for terrorists. 
However, as has been said earlier with regard to the provision of the non- 
use of territory of one State for terrorist activities against another State, there is no 
guarantee that in practice the requesting State will treat the requested alleged 
offender fairly when such request was granted and he was extradited. 
Finally, another result achieved by these conventions was the revision of 
some extradition treaties to exclude certain terrorist acts from the category of 
political offences, thereby making them extraditable and treating them as ordinary 
crimes in domestic legislations of States Parties, when deciding to prosecute them. 
Therefore preventing the alleged offender from the favoured treatment of political 
criminal, e. g., Article 11 of the Bombing Convention, which states; 'None of the 
offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded, for the purpose of extradition or 
mutual legal assistance, as a political offence or as an offence connected with a 
political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. Accordingly, a 
request for extradition or for mutual legal assistance based on such an offence may 
not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a political offence or an offence 
connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives'. 
The above-mentioned features of the anti-terrorism conventions have 
inspired David Lioyed to say that the result of the adoption of these conventions 
'has been the development of a coherent body of treaty law coordinating inter-State 
92 
action against international terrorism in a most effective manner and commanding 
58 
the support and active participation of a large number of States. 
3.2.2. The Shortcomings of the Anti-Terrorism Conventions. 
On the other extreme, some commentators think that these conventions are 
powerless and do not have the real effect that required to suppress international 
terrorism, because of the following problems: 
The first problem, is that not all nations of the world are party to these 
conventions and that might cause any of the non-States parties to become a safe 
haven for terrorists who escape to it, because such a State considers itself to be 
under no obligation to extradite or prosecute them. An example of this was the 
1988 hijacking of Kuwaiti airways, which ended up in Algeria, 59 which was not a 
party to the relevant treaties at that time. Accordingly it could not be compelled to 
extradite or punish the hijackers, thus these terrorists went unpunished. 
This is a serious defect and the effectiveness of these conventions might be 
undermined because one or two States are not party to the relevant antkerrorism 
convention. However, one may argue that some of these anti-terrorism 
conventions, like the Hague, Montreal, Hostages, and New York conventions, 
58 Ibid. at 195. 
59 In 1988, a Kuwaiti airplane was hijacked during a flight to the United Arab Emirate coming from 
Bangkok (Thailand). The hijackers (who were believed to be extreme Shiite) forced the airplane to fly 
to Mashed in Iran and spent three nights, then to Lamaca for four days, and finally to Algeria where the 
captors released the hostages after seven days of intensive negotiation and in return of providing a safe 
conduct to the hijackers. Two Kuwaiti persons were killed in that event. For more details see, R. E. 
Hill, 'Terrorist Hijacking and the inadequacies of International Law: A Case Study of the Kuwaiti 
Airways Flight 422 Incident', in Y. Alexander (ed. ), Middle East Terrorism: Current Threats and 
Future Prospects, (Dartmouth. 1994), 466-474. 
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because of their large members, have become part of the customary international 
law just like the Geneva conventions on the law of war. Therefore, even States 
which are not party to some of the anti-terrorism conventions like the ones above- 
mentioned are required to observe the general rules included in these conventions. 
The second problem posed by these conventions, is that these instruments 
rely on the municipal laws of States Parties for the punishment of terrorists by 
penalties which the conventions describe as "appropriate penalties" in some of 
them and "severe penalties" in the others, without any specification of their 
meanings and this might cause substantial differences between national laws of 
States Parties that regulate the same offence. For example, some States still apply 
the death penalty while the others have abolished it, 60 because these States regard 
the death penalty as a breach of human rights. Thus, many argue that these 
conventions should set forth a uniform range of penalties that should be applied to 
the listed offences therein .61 However, 
it seems unlikely that States will accept 
such an obligation. 
Thirdly, even though the principle of aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or 
prosecute) might appear to be applied automatically by the custodial State, this 
principle in reality has a lot of ambiguities and the State concerned often has a good 
measure of discretion, which might render it ineffective. 
60 See, L. Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski, 'Essential Features of an International Criminal Court', in M. H. 
Livingston et al (eds. ), International Terrorism in the Contemporary World, (Greenwood Press, 1978), 
335. 
61 See Lambert, note I at 102. 
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With respect to the first option of this principle aut dedere (i. e., extradite), 
there are some gaps that have not been properly addressed by the drafters of these 
conventions whether they were made intentionally or mistakenly. There is no 
obligation or guarantee that the State requesting extradition of the alleged offender 
will prosecute him, if the extradition request was granted by the requested State, 
therefore a State may demand extradition without intending to prosecute, if the 
demand is met. 62 
More significantly, these conventions are silent in the case where one of the 
States that established its jurisdiction and requested the extradition of the alleged 
terrorist was an accomplice in the terrorist act committed by the requested person. 
Can the requested States grant the request for extradition to such a State even 
though it knows about its involvement in terrorism? And if it does so, can it be 
held responsible in any way according to these conventions? 
In addition, the anti-terrorism conventions are silent in the case of there 
being many requests for extradition by several States for the same alleged offender, 
as is often the case, terrorists might be wanted in many countries because of their 
involvement in various incidents. 63 Thus, the holding State might find itself in a 
very difficult situation, and then the question should be, what is the criterion that 
can be used here? Which country has the priority over the others? Is it the territorial 
State where the crime took place? the country of which the offender is a national?, 
the country of which the victim is a national, and what if there are many victims 
62 R. D. Crelinsten, Terrorism And Criminal Justice, (Lcxington, 1978), 42. 
63 Ibid. 
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from different States?, or does the country whose interest has been most injured, 
have priority over the others? And so forth. 
However, in practice many States give priority to requests from States with 
territorial connection with the offence for which the fugitive terrorist is requested. 
This is because the territorial States where the crime took place usually have the 
needed evidence for prosecuting such a crime. 
Furthermore, although there is no expressed political offence exception to 
the obligation to extradite (aut dedere), this option is made subject to the national 
law of the requested State. Thus the request for extradition may be refused because 
of the political offence exception which is followed by a large number of States and 
because terrorism has always been inspired by political motivations !4 As a result of 
this, statistics show, for example, that between January 1960 and June 1976,65 
twenty States requested the extradition of 78 hijackers, but requests were granted 
only in five cases, although 42 of the offenders were prosecuted by the recipient 
StateS. 66 
Also, with respect to aut judicare the other part of this principle, i. e., to 
submit the case to the competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. 
Though such a submission of the case for prosecution is enough to satisfy this 
6' See, W. A. Salf, 'International Terrorism in Armed Conflict', in H. H Han (ed. ), Terrorism, Political 
Violence and World Order, (University Press of America, 1984), 462. 
65 It should be noted that this statistics is 25 years old; therefore it may not be truly representative of 
today's States practice. However, this statistics had been used in this study because no other recent 
statistics has been found. 
66 P. Wilkinson, Terrorism And The Liberal State, (New York University Press, 1986), 288. 
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obligation, it would not necessary result in trial and punishment. Moreover, as has 
been mentioned earlier, prosecution under States' national laws may cause a 
substantial difference in sentences where the States concerned decide to try the 
alleged offender. 
Finally, another practical problem posed by this principle (aut dedere aut 
judicare) is that the holding State may not have any real connection with the crime 
other than the mere presence of the alleged offender in its territory, hence if no 
State requested the extradition of the alleged offender, the former has to bear the 
burden of prosecution, and this may cause it to become a potential target of 
terrorists' retaliation. However, this burden is outweighed by the need to ensure 
that no safe haven exists. 67 
The fourth shortcoming of these conventions is that there are no effective 
enforcement provisions that can secure compliance by States parties in case they do 
not fulfill their obligations. Hence, even if all nations are party to these 
conventions, there is no assurance that they will live up to their commitments 
incurred there under. This was the sole reason of adopting the Bonn Declaration in 
1 68 978 , under which the six largest industrial democracies (the US, Britain, West 
Germany, Japan, Canada, and Italy) agreed to halt air flights to or from any country 
that gave asylum to hijackers, or refused to return the hijacked aircraft or the 
hostages. 
6' Lambert, note I at 197. 
68 A. C. MacWillson, Hostage- Taking Terrorism: Incident-Response Strategy, (Macmillan, 1992), 186. 
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However, mention should be made here that, if an enforcement clause were 
provided for, many, if not all, of the present parties to these instruments would 
withdraw their support. Thus many think that it is better to have an accord which at 
least sets out some requirements, albeit unenforceable, than no such agreement at 
a09 But for others, as pointed out by Grant Wardlaw, these instruments are 'no 
more than collections of high statements of principle devoid of any real impact. It 
is quite obvious that political terrorists have not been deterred by the existence of 
these conventions. They have not been deterred because they reasonably believe 
that their actions will not be subject to the written restrictione. 70 
3.2.3. Enumerative Vs. Eliminative 
Some conunentators have criticized the segmentation of the problem of 
international terrorism, i. e., adopting many treaties, each one of them dealing with a 
specified act of terrorism. Schmid, for instance, in his criticism of the enumerative 
methods adopted by the European convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. 
(this convention lists those acts, which are not to be subject to the political offence 
exception to extradition) -on grounds that are equally applicable to the international 
anti-terrorism conventions, argued that those violent acts listed in the convention 
are not terrorist acts themselves, whether these acts are terrorist or not depends on 
the "intention and circumstances7'. He pointed out that a hijacker, for example, may 
simply be looking to get to a destination other than the intended one of the aircraft 
in which case there will not be a "target of terror", i. e., not meant to cause fear to 
the target government or population, according to his definition of terrorism 
69 See, G. Wardlaw, Political Terrorism; Theory, Tactics. and Counter-Measures, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 116. 
'0 Ibid. 
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(discussed earlier in Chapter 2). Also he stated that this method, i. e., enumerative 
method, can 'place a hijacker who is attempting to escape from a terrorist regime in 
the same category as a real ... terrorist'. 
71 As in KoIczynki case as will be discussed 
in the next section. 
However, as observed by Lambert that this act (hijacking) is reprehensible 
and must be suppressed whether the hijacker intended to instill terror or not. 
Beside, such act can rarely be committed without causing terror or fear. Also with 
respect to the other part of Schmid's criticism, that the hijacking was committed by 
an oppressed person to escape from a repressive or terrorist regime cannot be 
accepted. Such a person (oppressed person) can not be given the right to hijack a 
civil aircraft in order to gain his freedom, also deciding what State is a terrorist 
State is very subjective and will be different from one State to another. 72 
For some, international legal responses to international terrorism should be 
as comprehensive as is the problem of international terrorism, i. e., adopting one 
comprehensive treaty that deals with the threat or the use of violence for political 
goals of international dimension (e. g., involve citizens or territories of other States, 
etc), instead of adopting too many conventions which take a long time to negotiate, 
ratify, and enter into force as responses to different types of terrorism that arise 
each time, for example, the Tokyo Convention was adopted in 1963 and the 
Bombing Convention, which was recently adopted in 1997 (not yet in force), hence 
it took the international community about 34 years between the adopting of the 
71 Schmid, A. P., Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts. Theories, Data Bases and 
Literature, (Book Publishing Co., 1983), 103. 
72 Lamber4 note I at 50. 
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former which came as a response to this rise of terrorist attacks against civil 
aircraft, and the latter as a response to the alarming increase in the use of bombings 
against civilians. 
Also, another criticism with regard to this approach, i. e., enumerative 
approach, is that it does not cover all of the terrorist offences. For example, 
biological and chemical terrorism are not covered by any of these conventions. 
More importantly, even those major actions like the recruitment of individuals to 
become terrorists is not considered a terrorist offence in any of these anti-terrorism 
conventions. 
In addition, all of these anti-terrorism conventions came into existence to 
cover past terrorist offences when such offences caused human and economic loss. 
Therefore, to have a comprehensive convention that covers either past offences or 
those that have not yet occurred would be ideal. However, experience showed that 
this type of convention as proposed by the US in 1972 was unacceptable, 
accordingly insisting on such a type of treaty would be resisted and only a few 
States will ratify. 
The advantages of adopting many conventions, each of which deals with a 
particular category of terrorism, was that these conventions obviated the need for an 
agreement or a general definition of terrorism, which was unattainable as discussed 
earlier in Chapter 2. Also, States were not obliged to accept that this or that type of 
offence, provided for in the conventions, was an act of terrorism, but merely that it 
should be prohibited. This was an important consideration for States fearful that 
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describing a particular type of action as a terrorist act would be used to legitimize 
intervention in the name of counter-terrorism. 73 
3.3. THE USE OF EXTRADITION IN THE CONTEXT OF TERRORISM 
Often terrorists commit crimes in one country and escape to another in order 
to elude their capture. In other words, terrorists do not recognize national 
boundaries, as national security forces have to do. Thus to bring them to justice and 
make sure that such criminals who committed serious offences should not go 
unpunished, States in most cases recourse to extradition. 
Extradition is defined as 'a legal process whereby, under treaty or upon any 
other basis of reciprocity, one State surrenders to another State, at the request of the 
latter, a person accused or convicted of a criminal offence committed against the laws 
of the requesting State'. 74 
Therefore, concluding an extradition treaty as it is always the case, can be an 
effective weapon in the war against terrorism in many ways: firstly, it will reduce the 
number of safe haven States since these States are obliged to extradite suspected 
terrorists in compliance with the relevant treaty, thus extradition will eliminate the 
usual alternatives for terrorists who committed or are about to commit an attack by 
simply leaving the State with jurisdiction over the crimes they committed or will 
73 See. Guelke, Ile Age of Terrorism and International Political System, (Tauris Acadenic Studies, 
1995), 165. 
74 Perera, note 54 at 206. 
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commit in future; secondly and more importantly it will assure that terrorists will be 
prosecuted and punished, if convicted. 
75 
However, such an ideal situation is of rare occurrence, as it will be discussed 
later in this section, even if the request for extradition of suspected terrorists is 
consistent with requirements of the law of the requested State. Usually when an 
authority of one State has made an extradition request to another, such request 
becomes a matter for the domestic law of the latter. 
By and large, there are four requirements for that request to be accepted: 
Firstly, most countries, especially those of common law system, do not entertain such 
a request unless there is a treaty linkage with the requesting State, nevertheless some 
civil law countries do not require such a prerequisite. The second requirement is the 
offence for which the suspected offender has been accused or convicted, must be an 
"extraditable offence", that is, it must be an offence covered by the extradition laws of 
both the requested and requesting States. While some States require that for an 
offence to be extraditable, it must be punishable by an agreed degree of penalty, other 
States (like the UK) require that such an offence must be listed in a treaty with the 
requesting States in order to become an extraditable offence. Thirdly, there is also a 
requirement of dual criminality, i. e., the extraditable offence must be a crime under 
whatever names in both the requesting and requested States. Finally, there is also the 
so-called speciality principle under which the requested person, if extradited, must not 
be tried for any other offences other than the specific offence or offences for which 
" Petersen, 'Extradition and The Political Offence Exception in The Suppression of Terrorism', 67 
Indiana Law Journal, (Summer 1992), 772. 
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commit in future; secondly and more importantly it will assure that terrorists will be 
prosecuted and punished, if convicted. 75 
However, such an ideal situation is of rare occurrence, as it will be discussed 
later in this section, even if the request for extradition of suspected terrorists is 
consistent with requirements of the law of the requested State. Usually when an 
authority of one State has made an extradition request to another, such request 
becomes a matter for the domestic law of the latter. 
By and large, there are four requirements for that request to be accepted: 
Firstly, most countries, especially those of common law system, do not entertain such 
a request unless there is a treaty linkage with the requesting State, nevertheless some 
civil law countries do not require such a prerequisite. The second requirement is the 
offence for which the suspected offender has been accused or convicted, must be an 
"extraditable offence", that is, it must be an offence covered by the extradition laws of 
both the requested and requesting States. While some States require that for an 
offence to be extraditable, it must be punishable by an agreed degree of penalty, other 
States (like the UK) require that such an offence must be listed in a treaty with the 
requesting States in order to become an extraditable offence. Thirdly, there is also a 
requirement of dual criminality, i. e., the extraditable offence must be a crime under 
whatever names in both the requesting and requested States. Finally, there is also the 
so-called speciality principle under which the requested person, if extradited, must not 
be tried for any other offences other than the specific offence or offences for which 
75 Petersen, 'Extradition and The Political Offence Exception in The Suppression of Terrorism', 67 
Indiana Law Journal, (Surnmer 1992), 772. 
102 
his or her extradition was granted, and any trial in breach of this principle will usually 
be considered as a breach of the extradition treaty obligations 
!6 
Nonetheless, the satisfaction of these requirements does not always guarantee 
extradition, as can be seen. Statistics show that in cases of aircraft hijacking, for 
which data is available, that 970 individuals between January 1,1960 and June 1, 
1976 successfully hijacked or attempted to hijack 468 aircraft around the world. 
Around thirty-five percent of those offenders have been apprehended and submitted to 
prosecution. This percentage includes a few individuals who have been charged with 
aircraft sabotage and attacks upon aviation facilities. With respect the recovery of 
those offenders, an examination of the practice of forty States shows that twenty 
States have requested the extradition of seventy-eight offenders. Extradition was 
granted only in five cases. Twenty-two requests for sixty-six offenders were denied; 
however, the requested States in conformity with the aut dedere autjudicare principle 
prosecuted forty-two of those offenders. 77 
Moreover, Since the extradition process may affect the rights of private 
individuals within the requested State as well as its sovereign powers to surrender 
such individuals, States always reserve a large amount of discretion in deciding 
whether to extradite or not, and recognize a number of exceptions which reflect the 
exercise of such sovereign discretion. These exceptions in many cases hamper the 
effectiveness of extradition vis-A-vis terrorism can be any of the following: 
76 Freestone, 'International Cooperation Against Terrorism And The Development of International Law 
Principles of Jurisdiction', in Higgins & Flory (eds. ), Terrorism And International Law, (Routledge. 
1997), 45. 
77 Evans, 'The Reality of Extradition And Prosecution', in Alexander & Maxwell (eds. ), Terrorism: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, (McGraw-Hill, 1977), 130. 
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A) Political offence exception; 
B) Humanitarian exception; 
Q Nationality exception; 
D) Death penalty exception; and 
E) Health and Age exception. 
3.3.1. Political Offence Exception 
Historically extradition was only meant for political criminals (i. e., those who 
commit crimes against the State or its sovereign, such as treason, espionage, or 
sedition) not common criminals (i. e., those who commit kidnapping, robbery, or 
assault, etc). However, since the French Revolution and the growth of liberal thinking 
that came after, the purpose of extradition had changed 180 degrees, 78 it became 
concerned only with the so called common criminals, but not the political offenders. 
Since that time the non-extradition of political offenders has become a universal and a 
well-established principle . 
7' As the late British Sir Hersch Lauterpatch observed that 
'In the late legislation of modem States, there are few principles so universally 
adopted as that of non-extradition of political offenders'. 80 
According to this principle, extradition may be refused even if the request has 
been in compliance with the substantive requirements of the extradition law of the 
" Toensing, 'Terrorism: A History of the Rule of Law', in Flood (ed. ), International Terrorism: Policy 
Implications, (Chicago, 1991), 98. 
79 It should be noted that the development of such principle had also been influenced by the so called 
Belgian practice and its legislative initiative of 1833 which known as the Extradition Law of 1833, 
Article VI of that law provided that "it shall be expressly provided in the treaties that a foreigner may 
not be prosecuted or punishedfor any political offence committed before extradition norfor any crime 
of offence not contemplated by the present law.. ". Ibid. 
go R. Phillips, 'The Political Offence Exception and Terrorism: Its Place in the Current Extradition 
Scheme and Proposal for Its Future', 15 (2) Dickinson Journal Of International Law (Winter 1997), 
340. 
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requested State, if evidence or circumstances suggest that such a request has been 
made for a fugitive offender accused or convicted of a "political offence". 
The rationale behind this exception (i. e., the political offence exception) can 
be referred to any of the following situations: 
Firstly, the protection of the accused from an unfair and biased trial that he or 
she might face, if extradited, in the requesting State because of his or her political 
dissention. Secondly, the avoidance of one country (requested State) from taking a 
side in the internal affairs in another country (requesting State). This is because 
deciding whether to extradite or not, may involve an inquiry into the political conflict 
that may exist in the requesting country and therefore may involve a rendering of a 
value judgment with respect to such conflict, thus it is better not to grant such 
extradition in the first place. Finally, political crimes do not violate international 
public order; they only violate the law of the requesting State. Therefore, as a result 
of their domestic characters, other States do not have a mutual interest (i. e., the 
protection of international public order) to suppress such crimes! ' 
Nonetheless, this argument cannot be always taken for granted, because of the 
fact that political offenders will not always be subjected to unfair and biased trial. 
There are some States which are known of having justice systems built on fairness 
and impartiality. Also the non-extradition of political offenders is not usually 
considered by some States as an act of neutrality, but the opposite, it has been 
considered as a violation of such a principle. 82 In other words, refusing the extradition 
" Perera, note 54 at 217. 
82 lbid at 218. 
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of a person who is at odds with the requesting State is equivalent to taking sides with 
the requested person by admitting his cause as a legitimate one against such a State. 
Finally, currently most political crimes have an international dimension since they, in 
most cases, involve many States. For example, terrorism, which is still for many 
States considered to be a political crime, can rarely be of only a domestic character. 
Despite the lack of an international definition of what constitutes a political 
offence, most commentators admitted to the fact that there are two types of political 
offence: 
I- Pure Political Offence: actions, which are directed solely at the State and do 
not affect civilians and are not accompanied by the commission of a common 
crime -(treason, sedition, conspiracy to overthrow the government, and 
espionage)_83 there is no problem with respect to this type and most countries 
denied extradition of a fugitive accused or convicted of committing a crime of 
this description. 
2- Relative Political Offence: crimes, which have a hybrid nature, that is, they 
involve either a combination of a common crime with a pure political offence, 
or more often, a common crime, which is perpetrated pursuant to a political 
agenda. 84 This type of political offence is the most problematic one and Statee 
practices vary widely on the test or the criteria that should be used in deciding 
whether an act is of such character (e. g., terrorism) is a political offence, and 
therefore entails the non-extradition of the alleged offender. 
93 Phillips, note 80 at 341 
" Ibid. 
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3.3.1.1. States' Judicial Practices of What Constitutes a Political Offence Vis-h- 
Vis Acts of Terrorism. 
Judicial practices among States on the question of what constitutes a political 
offence vary from one country to another. Countries that share the same legal 
tradition, like common law countries, have different criteria, in deciding whether a 
fugitive sought by another country is a political offender or common criminal, from 
countries that have a different legal tradition, i. e., civil law countries. Moreover, even 
among countries that have the same legal tradition, e. g., the UK and the US, each has 
its own criteria that may or may not be the same criteria used by other similar 
countries. 
3.3.1.1.1. UnitedKingdom (UA) 
The UK requires that for a crime to be classified as a political offence, it must 
have been "incidental to and formed part of political disturbance! '. The landmark 
case, which gave rise to such criteria, was In re Castioni, 18905 In that case, the 
Queen's Bench reversed a decision of the magistrate to grant extradition of Angelo 
Castioni to Switzerland. Castioni, who fled to England, was accused of killing of 
Luigi Rossi, a State Councillor. The killing occurred in the midst of a demonstration 
against the government of a Swiss Canton because of its refusal to submit its new 
constitution to a popular vote. In denying Castioni's extradition, the court held that it 
was "clear that the offence with which the prisoner is charged is an offence of a 
political character .. ", because, the court ruled, it was incidental to, and part of a 
political disturbance. The court also added that even if an act is "cruel and against all 
85 In re Castioni, [ 1890] 1 Q. B. 149. 
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reasons", its perpetrator is protected, if he or she acted "for the purpose of furthering 
and in furtherance of a political uprising! '. 
However, that test (i. e., uprising test) was ffirther qualified in the case of In re 
86 Meunier, 1894 . Theophile Meunier was a French anarchist who 
fled to England after 
causing explosions at a cafd (where two people were killed) and at certain barracks in 
France. In granting his extradition to France upon a request from the latter authority, 
the court held that in order for a crime to be considered as an offence of a political 
character, 'there must be two or more parties in the State, each seeking to impose the 
government of their own choice on the othee. 
87 On the contrary, in 1955, in the case of Ex Parte Kolczynki, the court 
showed a clear departure from the above-mentioned strict application of the "uprising 
lese' enunciated in the Castioni, and qualified later in Re Meunier. In this case, seven 
Polish sailors took control of their fishing boat by force, brought the ship to an 
English port, and sought political asylum claiming that they fled because of the fear of 
being punished for reasons of their political expression. In denying their extradition 
to Poland, Lord Goddard CJ. Stated: 
'The revolt of the crew was to prevent themselves being prosecuted for a 
political offence and in my opinion, therefore, the offence had a political 
character The evidence as to the law prevalent in the Republic of Poland 
today shows that it is necessary, if only for reasons of humanity, to give a wide 
or more generous meaning to the words we are now construing, which we can 
do without in any way encouraging the idea that ordinary crimes which have no 
political significance will be thereby excused'. 
'61n 
re Meunier, [ 1894] 1 Q. B. 415. " Ex Parte Kolczynki, [1955] IQ. B. 540. 
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That decision was a reflection of the court's attitude to regimes, which were 
considered to be totalitarian and oppressive which had emerged in Eastern Europe in 
the post-war period. 88 
After a number of years the court, in cases of Ex Parte Schtraks of 1964,89 in 
which Israel sought the extradition of Schtraks, claiming that he had kidnapped his 
nephew in order to ensure that the boy would be raised in an orthodox Jew and has 
denied under oath that he knew where the child was. The Israeli government' s 
decision to seek his extradition was politically controversial because Orthodox 
Judaism is the state religion of Israel. So as result Schtarks argued that his offences 
were political and. Also in the case of Ex Parte Tzu-Tsai Cheng of 1973,90 in which 
the United States sought the extradition of Cheng after he had been convicted in New 
York of attempted murder and fled the country while on bail. Cheng was a member 
of World United Formasons for Independence, which was protesting the visit to New 
York of the country's vice-president. During the course of a scuffle with New York 
police a shot was fired by a fellow demonstrator. The court in both cases, although it 
returned to its traditional "uprising test', added one more requirement, it stated that 
the fugitive must be at odds with the government that sought his extradition. The 
opinion of Viscount Radcliff in the case of Schtraks, which may apply also to the case 
of Cheng is of worth quoting at length. He stated that: 
'In my opinion the idea that lies behind the phrase 'offence of a political 
character' is that the fugitive is at odds with the state that applies for his 
extradition on some issues connected with the political control or government of 
the country ... There may, for instance, be all sorts of contending political 
88 Perera, note 54 at 250. 89. Ex Parte Schiraks, [ 1964] H. L. 555. 90 Ex Parte Tzu-Tsai Cheng, [ 19731 Q. B. 93 1. 
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organizations or forces in a country and members of them may commit all sorts 
of infractions of the criminal law in the belief that by so doing they will further 
their political ends: but if the central government stands apart and is concerned 
only to enforce the criminal law that has been violated by these contestants, I 
see no reason why fugitives should be protected by this country from its 
extradition on the ground that they are political offenders. 
3.3.1.1. Z United States (US) 
In the same year the UK court decided the Munier case, a US court in the case 
of In re Ezata, 1894, " refused to extradite high officials of El Salvador accused of 
committing murders in their unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the government 
therein. Applying the "uprising tese' founded in Castioni, the court held that all acts 
connected with an uprising were of political character. In deciding the case, the court 
stated that such protection should be extended equally to democrats or dictators. The 
court also explicitly rejected the argument that the killing of civilians should 
disqualify the alleged offenders from the court's protection. During disturbances and 
hostilities, said the court, 'crimes may have been committed by the contending forces 
of the most atrocious and inhuman character, and still the perpetrators of such crimes 
escape punishment as fugitives beyond the reach of extradition'. 
In other cases of Jiminez v. Arisligueita etat, In re Gonzalez, Artukovic, In re 
Mcmullin, and In re Machin, the US courts have been known for their rigid adherence 
to the traditional British "uprising test'. In all of these cases, the US courts used a 
mere mechanical application of the uprising test. In other words, if the crime was 
committed during a violent uprising or insurrection, it was political and vice versa, 
" In re E. -ata, [ 1894162 F. 2d 972 (N. D. Cal. ). 
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irrespective of the consequent result of such an application. Such mechanical 
application of the uprising test had been criticized as an over inclusive solution in 
some cases, i. e., all acts committed during uprising are treated as political and under 
inclusive in other cases, i. e., all acts which are not contemporaneous with an uprising 
are not political, without paying any regard to the nature of the offences themselves. 92 
However, such an attitude had been changed in the case of In re Abu Eain, 
198 1,93 in this case the District Court refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus to Abu 
Eain to prevent his extradition to Israel. Abu Eain was a member of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO), who was accused by Israel of setting off a bomb in 
the city of Tiberius, which killed and injured many civilian people. Abu Eain 
appealed the District Court's decision to the Circuit Court claiming, among several 
other grounds, that the bombing was politically motivated and it was incidental to the 
war against Israel. The court, in rejecting this argument, laid more emphasis on the 
target victims of the violence. Accordingly the court refused to shield the accused 
from extradition even though the bombing had a political objective and was connected 
to an armed struggle because the bombing involved an unauthorized and 
indiscriminate attack on a civilian population. Such an act, the court ruled, was 
essentially an act of anarchism, and therefore cannot be provided the protection of the 
political offence exception. This holding constitutes what came to be known later as 
the "wanton crimes exception". 94 
92 Perera, note 54 at 25 1. 
93 Eainv. Wflkes, [ 19811641 F. 2d504(7'hCirc. )cert. Denied 454 U. S. 894(1981). 
94 Pyle, 'The Political Offence Exception', in Bassiouni (ed. ), Legal Responses to International 
Terrorism, US Procedural Aspects, (Martinus NijhofT, 1988), 188. 
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In the same manner, the court decided the case of In re Doherty, 1984.95 
Doherty was a member of the PIRA, who was accused by the UK of killing of a 
British army official. In refusing his extradition the court, relying on Abu Eain, made 
a clear distinction between violent acts directed against military targels which would 
be regarded as being within the "uprising test' as does this case, thus came within the 
scope of political offence exception and violent acts indiscriminately directed against 
innocent civilians which would be regarded as outside the "uprising test". 
Finally, in the case of Quinn v. Robinson, 1985,96 the court, however, shifted 
the emphasis from the target victims as it did in the cases of Abu Eain and Doherty to 
the nature of the uprising as the determining factor of the political character. In this 
case, the UK sought the extradition of William Quinn, a US citizen and an alleged 
member of the IRA, for the murder of British constable Tibble and of conspiring to 
send a letter bomb to a Catholic Bishop, a railroad station and two restaurants. Two 
bombs had exploded causing severe injuries. The District Court in refusing his 
extradition did not follow Abu Eain and Doherty by looking at the target victims who 
were in this case of two types: military (British constable) and civilians in public 
places. But instead the District Court applied the "incidentar' or "uprising test', and 
held that all the acts charged constituted political offences since they were "incidental 
to the political goals ofseeking an end the British rule in Northern Ireland'. 
However, the Court of Appeal reversed the findings of the District Court that 
the offences alleged to have been committed by Quinn were offences of a political 
9' In re Doherty, [ 1984] 599 F. Supp. 270 (S. D. N. Y). 
96 Quinn v. Robinson, [ 1985] 783 F. 2d 776 (9'h Circ. ). 
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nature. In its decision, the court held that the political offence exception protects 
'those engaged in internal or domestic struggles over the form or composition of their 
own government, including, of course, struggles to displace an occupying power. It 
was not designed to protect international political coercion or blackmail or the 
exportation of violence and strife to other locations even to the homeland of the 
oppressor nation'. Accordingly, to decide whether the political offence exception 
should be applied or not to shield extradition, the court should discern the nature of 
the uprising that the requested person was involved in, and if his acts occurred outside 
the country or territory in which the uprising is taking place, he, the court ruled, 
should be excluded from the coverage of the political offence exception. Thus by 
implication all acts of terrorism of international character or acts of terrorism, which 
have transboundary effects should be also excluded from such coverage. 97 
3.3.1.1.3. Switzerland 
The Swiss courts use what has been called the "predominance or 
preponderance approach". 98 According to this approach, the political element of an 
act should predominate or outweigh the common crime element in order to come 
within the scope of the political offence exception. This can be ascertained by a 
rigorous examination of the proportionality between the asserted political goal and the 
means used to achieve that goal. 
One of the early cases in this regard was Wassilieff case, 1908.99 In that case 
Russia sought the extradition of Victor Wassilieff after accusing him of murdering a 
Perera, note 54 at 256. 
See Phillips, note 80 at 345. 
99 lbid at 346. 
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local police chief. Wassilieff claimed that the killing was carried out at the behest of 
the Russian Revolutionary Socialist Party in their attempt to overthrow the Tsarist 
regime, thus it was politically motivated and he should be exempted from extradition. 
In rejecting his argument, the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that extradition should be 
granted unless three criteria were presented to prevent such extradition: 'first, the act 
must have been committed appurtenant to a purely political offence; second, the act 
must constitute a truly efficient mean to reach the purpose; and third, the element of 
common criminality must be proportional to the political goal'. 100 
Therefore, under the Swiss approach, there must be more than a mere 
connection to a political party or the act was related to a political goal. But in 
practice the crime must be shown as a necessary means to reach such a political 
goal. In other words, such act must be the last resort. 
Moreover, in the Watin case, 101 in which France sought the extradition of 
Watin, who was a member of the Algerian Organization Armde Secrke, because of 
his attempt to assassin the French Prime Minister De Gaulle in order to gain Algeria! s 
independence from France. In refusing his extradition the court held 1hat such an 
attempt (i. e., assassination) when examined from Watin's standpoint seemed to be the 
last [viable] option. 
'0' Ibid at 347. 
101 Ibid. 
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3.3.1.1.4. France 
The French used a "mixed approach"' 02 in dealing with terrorists requested for 
extradition. In the past, the court applied a motivation test under which extradition 
was denied as long as the act had a political motive. A leading case, which illustrates 
this subjective approach of the French court, was the case of In re Holder and 
Kerkow. 103 In this case, the French court refused to extradite to the US two American 
citizens accused of hijacking an aircraft in 1971, kidnapping, and extortion of 
$500,000 ransom from the airline company. The denial of extradition was a result of 
the fact that during the kidnapping one of the hijackers had demanded that the plane to 
be diverted and flown to North Vietnam, which was under the communist rule at that 
time. That demand was considered by the court as constituting a sufficient political 
motive to fall within the political offence exception, despite the fact that that demand 
was later dropped by the hijackers. 
However, in the last two decades, France has moved to a mixed approach 
under which the offender's motive is weighed against the seriousness of the crime 
committed. The more serious the crime, the more trends towards the granting of 
extradition. 
In the case of Croissant, 104 whose extradition was sought by the then Federal 
Republic of Germany, because he was accused of being an accomplice of the Baader- 
Meinhoff group by helping its members to carrying out attacks. The Court of Appeals 
102 Ibid at 348. 103 PeTera, note 54 at 257. "4 Ibid. 
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of Paris rejected Croissant's claim that his act was a political crime and held that this 
group (i. e., Baader-Meinhoof) despite its admitted political motivation, its actions 
were 'characterized by ... contempt towards the life of [innocent] victims .. and 
towards the property of other persons'. Thus the court in granting the extradition of 
Croissant concluded that his group's motivation 'could not ... constitute an obstacle 
to the extradition'. 
3.3.1.2. Treaty Practice 
Since international law does not obligate States to extradite, most States 
recourse to treaties as instruments to deal with such a subject. Treaties in this respect 
can be divided into three types: A) multilateral treaties; B) regional treaties; and 
bilateral treaties. 
3.3.1.2.1. Multilateral Treaties 
As it has already been discussed earlier in this Chapter the anti-terrorism 
conventions call for neither mandatory extradition nor compulsory prosecution. 
Although, there are no expressed political offence exception to the obligation to 
extradite (aut dedere), which is provided for in most of these conventions, this option 
(aut dedere) is made subject to the national law of the requested State which in most 
cases provides for such an exception. 
However, these anti-terrorism conventions have recognized the importance of 
extradition as a means to combat terrorism. Most of these conventions include 
elaborate provisions on extradition, which supplement existing extradition 
arrangements between Contracting States. In terms, of these provisions: 
116 
The offences covered by the conventions are deemed to be included as 
extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between 
Contracting States; 
Contracting States undertake to include such offences as extraditable 
offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them; 
A Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on the existence 
of a treaty, may, as an option, if it receives a request for extradition from 
another Contracting State with which it has no extradition treaty, consider 
the convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences 
covered by the convention; and 
(iv) Contracting States, which do not make extradition conditional on the 
existence of a treaty, are required to recognize the offences covered by the 
convention, as extraditable offences among them. 
3.3.1.2.2. Regional Treaties 
One of the regional treaties, which is considered by many commentators as the 
landmark treaty in the movement towards the exclusion of acts of terrorism from the 
political offence exception, is the European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism! 05 
Since the 1970s and even before Europe became a main target of violent 
attacks, which were, unlike what had been known in the lVh century, inflicted on 
many innocent civilians unconnected with the political struggle. As a result Europe 
decided to take collective initiatives to re-examine the concept of political asylum and 
the principle of non-extradition of political offenders or the "political offence 
exception". 
105 Ibid at 230. 
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In January 24,1974, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
adopted a Resolution in International Terrorism on which the European Convention 
on Suppression of Terrorism was built upon. The preamble paragraph of that 
Resolution provided that 'the political motive alleged by the authors of certain acts of 
terrorism should not have as a result, that they are neither extradited nor 
punished.. '. 106 
To this end (i. e., combating terrorism by the extradition of its actors who must 
be excluded from the protection of the political offence exception) Article I of the 
European Convention provides that none of the following acts shall be regarded as 
political offences or as an offence connected with a political offence or an offence 
inspired by political motives: 
(a) An offence covered by the Hague Convention; 
(b) An offence covered by the Montreal Convention; 
(c) A serious offence involving an attack against the life, physical integrity or 
liberty of internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents; 
(d) An offence involving kidnapping, the taking of a hostage, or serious unlawful 
detention; 
(e) An offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm or 
letter or parcel bomb, if this use endangers persons; and 
(f) An attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or participation as an 
accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offence. 
In addition, according to Article 2 the extradition regime can be extended, at 
the option of the Contracting States, to any serious offence involving violence against 
'0' For full text see ELEGAB, note 5. 
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life, physical integrity, or liberty of a person, or against property if the offence creates 
a collective danger for persons. 
If that being the case, one might argue that any Contracting Party is under a 
legal obligation to extradite any fugitive accused of committing any of the listed 
offences in Article 1, if another Contracting Party requested such extradition because 
the Convention deprives the accused of such defences, of the opportunity of using the 
political offence exception to preclude his or her extradition. 
Nonetheless, there are two other provisions in the Convention restrict such 
argument: the first of which is Article 13, which permits any State party to enter a 
reservation which allows it to reject a request for extradition on the grounds that it is a 
political offence, an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired 
by political motives. 
Until the moment of this writing five out of the fourteen parties have used 
such a reservation. "' Such a permission to enter a reservation even if it encourages 
participation and flexibility, is in effect reducing the real level of participation. ' 08 
Nevertheless, the reservation itself is subject to two restrictions: 
I- The requirement of reciprocity in Article 13 (3); 
2- The obligation on a reserving State when evaluating the character of the 
offence in order to decide whether to invoke its reservation to take into due 
consideration of the following factors: 
'07 Freestone, note 76 at 54. log C. Harding, 'The International and European Control of Crime', in C. Harding & C. L. Lim (eds. ), 
Essays And Commentary on 7he European And Conceptual Foundations Of Modern International 
Law, (Kluwer Law International, 1999), 202. 
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- That it created a collective danger to the life, physical 
integrity or liberty of 
persons; 
That it affected persons foreign to the motives behind it; or 
That cruel or vicious means have been used in the commission of the offence. 
Article 3 (1) 
The second provision which also in some cases restricts the extradition of the 
alleged offender, despite the fact that he or she has been accused or convicted of 
committing one or more of the Article I listed offences, is Article 5, which provides 
for the so called "humanitarian exception" which will be discussed later in more 
detail. 
3.3.1.2.3. Bilateral Treaties 
The growth of international terrorism in this century, accompanied by the 
failure of the international community to secure an international agreement on the 
subject of extradition of alleged terrorists, which proved to be extremely difficult even 
at the regional level, made States, especially Western States recourse to the relatively 
easy bilateral treaties in order to overcome the liberal application of the political 
offence exception applied by the national courts which resulted in most cases in 
precluding extradition of the fugitive terrorists to the requesting State. For example, 
the US has about 100 bilateral treaties with many nations on the subject of 
extradition. 109 Among these treaties is the US-UK Supplementary Treaty of 1986,110 
which was a response to the persistent denials of the US Federal Courts to requests by 
the UK Government for the extradition of fugitive offenders who were alleged to be 
members of the PIRA, and accused or convicted of committing serious acts of 
1`0 See Petersen, note 75 at 772. 
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violence, on the grounds that their offences were of political character (e. g., cases like 
McMullen, Makin, and Doherty). 
The purpose of this Supplementary Treaty was to bridge the gap that existed in 
the original US-UK Treaty by excluding serious crimes involving violence identified 
in the Supplementary Treaty from the application of the political offence exception, 
thereby limiting the role of the judiciary in the application of such an exception in the 
extradition hearing. 
Article I of the Supplementary Treaty contains five categories of the offences 
that must be excluded from the application of the political offence exception between 
the two countries. This includes: 
First, all offences listed in certain multilateral conventions where the two 
governments have undertaken an obligation to either 'extradite or prosecute' 
the offender; 
Second, serious violent crimes against the person, such as murder, voluntary 
manslaughter etc.; 
Third, any offence involving kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful 
detention, including taking of hostages; 
Fourth, any offence involving the use of bombs, grenades, rockets, firearms, 
letter or parcel bombs, or any other incendiary devise, if this use endangers 
even a single person; and 
Fifth, attempts to commit such offences and those who act as accomplices. 
For full text, see 26 I. L. M (1987) , 536. 
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The rationale behind using this approach, i. e., bilateral treaty, either by a 
concluding new treaty or revising an old one, as some may call it a "treaty-by-treav' 
approach, "' used, for example, by the US government to restrict the courfs 
application of the political offence exception vis-i-vis acts of terrorism, was explained 
by the US State Department's Legal Advisor during the Senate hearings on the US- 
UK Supplementary Treaty, as follows: 
'Unsuccessful attempts have been made to amend our extradition Statute. 
Those efforts differ significantly from the present one, in that they were based 
on changes in the political offence exception that would or could have been 
applied to any nations with which we have extradition relations, including some 
which have experienced political change or instability since establishment of 
those relations, and which may not permit opponents of the government in 
power any lawful means of political dissent. The present approach is more 
narrow and carefully drawn. It seeks to remedy the overload application of the 
political offence exception through a particular agreement with the United 
Kingdom. The rationale for this new Supplementary Treaty is simple: With 
respect to violent crimes, the political offence exception has no place in 
extradition treaties between stable democracies, in which the political system is 
available to redress legitimate grievances and the judicial process provides fair 
treatment'. 1 12 
Moreover, Senate Trible suggested another argument for the use of this 
approach, i. e. bilateral approach. He stated that such an approach would not only 
ensure that the US interpretation of what constitutes a political offence exception will 
be reformed, but it will also confirm that the other country party to the bilateral 
agreement has the same interpretation at the same time. He also pointed out that 
111 Hannay, 'The Legislative Approach To The Political Offence Exception', in Bassiouni (ed. ), Legal 
Responses to International Terrorism, US Procedural Aspects, (MartinusNijhoff, 1988), 118. 
... lbid at 120. 
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while the enactment of US domestic legislation will avoid mistakes by US courts, it 
does nothing to assure the US that other countries will avoid intentional or 
unintentional refusal to extradite terrorists sought by the US. 113 
3.3.1.3. Exceptions to the Exception 
Despite the fact that the non-extradition of political offenders is an exception 
to the general law of extradition, this exception is itself, however, not immune to 
exceptions. Treaty practice shows that certain exceptions to the political offence 
exception have become fairly standard treaty clauses: 
1) The "clause d'attentat" or the "Belgian clause' according to which 
specific crimes committed against Heads of States or members of their 
families are not to be considered political offences; 
2) International crimes, e. g., the 1948 Genocide Convention which 
provided in Article VII that 'Genocide and other acts enumerated in 
Article III shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of 
extradition; 114 
3) Crimes of anarchism, i. e., acts directed at governments, States or 
political systems in general, rather than against one particular regime. 
Such crimes are considered beyond the protection of the political offence 
exception. ' 15 
113 lbid at 125. 
114 V. Epps, 'Abolishing The Political Offence Exception', in Bassiouni (ed. ), Legal Responses to International Terrorism, US Procedural Aspects, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 209. "' Perera, note 54 at 222. 
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3.3.2. Humanitarian Exception 
Although this exception to extradition may, to a certain extent, overlap with 
the political offence exception, especially when extradition was refused for the 
protection of the fugitive's political opinion, which he or she was requested 
extradition for, this exception is even broader than the political offence exception. It 
is concerned with the question of why the person's extradition is being requested 
rather than the question of why the person committed the offence he is accused or 
convicted for. "' 
A clear example of such a humanitarian exception is Article 5 of the European 
Convention which permits a State to refuse extradition of an offender in relation to the 
listed offences, if the requested State has substantial grounds for believing that the 
request for extradition for an offence mentioned in Article I or 2 has been made for 
the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, 
nationality or political opinions, or that the person's position may be prejudiced for 
any of these reasons. 
However, despite its apparent importance as a safeguard against unfaithful 
requests for extradition, this exception is, in fact, of limited use because in most cases 
the courts of different States have practical difficulties in discerning a claim of this 
kind. Also making such a finding involves casting major aspersions on the objectivity 
and fairness of the criminal justice system of the requesting State and the bona fides 
of its government. 117 
116 See Toensing, note 78 at 100. 117 Freestone, note 76 at 47. 
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One of the rare cases of the use of this exception, in which the request for 
extradition was refused for humanitarian reasons, though in a wider sense, i. e., not 
only in fear of discrimination on the basis of race, religion, nationality or political 
opinion, was the Irish Supreme Court decision in 1990. On March 13,1990, the Irish 
Supreme Court decided not to allow the extradition of two wanted IRA terrorists, 
Dermont Fincane and Jame Clarke. Both men had been involved in the mass escape 
from the Maze Prison in Northern Ireland in September 1983 (in the escape one 
prison officer died, four others were stabbed, two men shot, and another thirteen were 
kicked and beaten). ' 18 
Both men were convicted terrorists who were rearrested in the Republic. 
Their extradition was sought by the Northern Ireland authorities to get them back to 
serve the sentences of eighteen years that both had received. The Court, in its 
judgment, gave two distinct reasons for not granting extradition. The relevant one 
that hit the news headlines, on which the five judges were unanimous, was that the 
two men faced the threat of physical retaliation from prison officers for their part in 
the violence that took place during the mass escape because evidence proved that such 
retaliation had been taken against the other prisoners. 119 
3.3.3. Nationality Exception 
Another exception to the extradition of terrorist fugitives to the requesting 
State is that if the requested person is one of the requested State's nationals. This 
exception is of broad use in most civil law countries, which claim extensive extra- 
"' New Law Joumal 747 (Aug. 3,1990). 
"9 Ibid. 
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territorial jurisdiction in accordance with the nationality principle over their nationals 
and have maintained a refusal of such extradition. 120 For example, Airticle 28 of the 
Kuwait Constitution, which states, 'No Kuwaiti may be deported [or extradited] from 
Kuwait or prevented from returning thereto'. 121 
Common law countries on the other hand, have not generally maintained 
such a position and have on occasion even waived the general rule of reciprocity in 
order to allow extradition of nationals to countries, which would not allow such 
extradition. 122 
3.3.4. Death Penalty Exception 
The death penalty exception fin-ffier complicates extradition jurisprudence. 
Many extradition treaties allow contracting States, in accordance with their national 
laws, to deny extradition of the alleged terrorist, if he or she might face the death 
penalty in the requesting State. An example of such a refusal is that of Ali Samadhi, 
who was apprehended and tried in then West Germany for killing Robert Stethem, an 
American sailor on a hijacked TWA flight in 1985. Bonn refused an extradition 
request sought by the US because of the fear that he might face a death sentence in the 
us. 123 
More recently Italy refused to extradite Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the 
Kurdistan Worker's Party (PPK) to Turkey when he was arrested in Italy in 
120 Ibid at 46. 
121 For English full text, see <hLtrýL/www. uni-Auer7bure. deýaw 0000 html>. 122 Freestone, note 76 at 46. 12' H. Vetter & G. Peristein, Perspectives on Terrorism, (Wadsworth, 1991), 203. 
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November 1998, following his expulsion from Syria. Italy's refusal to extradite him 
was based on the ground that a Turkish court could sentence him to death. 124 
3.3.5. Health and Age Exception 
Another reason that can be added to the above-mentioned reasons, which may 
result in refusing the extradition of the requested person, is the poor conditions in term 
of health and age of such a requested person. According to this health and age 
exception, the requested person will not be extradited to requested State because of 
his age and health conditions which make him unfit to stand the trial that will 
followed his extradition. 
This exception was clearly stipulated in the case of the Queen v. the Secretary 
of State, where Senator Pinochet, the former head of the State of Chile, was arrested 
in London on 16 October 1998 under a provisional warrant issued by a Bow Street 
Magistrate, pursuant to a warrant issued by the Central Court of Criminal 
Proceedings, N. 5, in Madrid. A second warrant was issued by the same Madrid 
court on 18 October 1998, and a further provisional warrant was issued by a Bow 
Street Magistrate on 22 October 1998 in respect of it. A formal request for the 
extradition of Senator Pinochet was received from the Kingdom of Spain on 11 
November 1998. The request was founded on the second Spanish warrant dated 18 
October 1998. It alleged that Senator Pinochet was concerned in a concerted course 
of conduct from II September 1973 involving a large number of serious offences of 
genocide, terrorism, hostage-taking and torture, for the purpose of achieving and 
maintaining power in Chile. The latest offence alleged in the request was said to 
"4 BBC Online News (Feb. 16,1999) 
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have been committed in March 1990. There was subsequently litigation before the 
Divisional Court and the House of Lords concerning the extent to which the Spanish 
extradition request disclosed extradition crimes and the extent of any State immunity 
in respect of those crimes. On 25 November 1998 the House of Lords held that 
Senator Pinochet was not entitled to immunity in respect of any of the crimes alleged 
against him. That decision was subsequently vacated and replaced by a fresh 
decision of the House of Lords on 24 March 1999. The effect of that decision was 
that (i) the offences alleged in the Spanish request were extradition crimes for the 
purposes of the Extradition Act 1989 only in so far as they were committed after 29 
September 1988, when torture outside the United Kingdom became an offence under 
English law and (ii) Senator Pinochet had no immunity in respect of extradition 
crimes committed after 8 December 1988, when the instrument ratifying the 
International Torture Convention was deposited by the United Kingdom. The effect 
was substantially to reduce the number of offences in which Senator Pinochet was 
alleged to have been concerned. The surviving allegations, although fewer in 
number, were nevertheless extremely grave. 125 
In this case the Queen's Bench Division approved the findings of the Secretary 
of State when he announced that he is minded to conclude that there is no purpose to 
be served by continuing the extradition proceedings in relation to Senator Pinochet 
and that he is minded to take a decision that he will not extradite him to Spain because 
of a medical examination on Senator Pinochet which concluded who age 81 was unfit 
to stand trials. 126 
125 The Queen v. the Secretary ofStaiefor the Home Department, 2000 WL 461 (QBD). 126 Ibid. 
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Consequently, the Secretary of State refused his extradition neither to Spain 
nor to Belgium. Instead, Senator Pinochet was set free and he went back to his 
country, Chile. This case may constitute precedent for other cases with similar 
circumstances. 
3.3.6. Extradition's Failure Possible Outcomes 
Failure to extradite terrorist suspects to other States that requested their 
extradition might result in any of the following outcomes: 
Firstly, in many cases prosecution of the alleged terrorists will take place if 
extradition was denied for any of the above-mentioned reasons. As it has been 
mentioned earlier, despite the refusal of requests for extradition sought by twenty 
States for seventy-eight offenders, granted in only five cases, forty-two of these 
offenders were prosecuted by the requested States. 127 This is in compliance with the 
principle of aut dedere autjudicare (extradite or prosecute), which constitutes the 
central obligation of the anti-terrorism conventions, which provides that if the 
requested person has not been extradited he must be submitted to the conipetent 
authority for the purpose of prosecution. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the number of the prosecuted offenders 
indicated above is illusive because there is no precise definition of the autjudicare 
obligation, i. e., to submit the case to the competent authority for the purpose of 
prosecution. Thus to acquit the offender after trying him for any reason, to convict 
127 Evans, note 77. 
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him or to sentence him either to the death penalty or to five months in prison, they all 
could be called prosecution, therefore actions in accordance with the anti-terrorism 
conventions. In other words, this obligation is limited by the submission of the case 
for prosecution and does not necessary result in trial and punishment. 
Secondly, in some cases, denial of extradition means that the alleged terrorist 
will be set free and face no trial, either because he or she is considered to be a political 
offender, in accordance with the political offence exception, and therefore will be 
granted political asylum, or because the requested State is in support of his or her 
political cause that motivated the committing of the crimes he or she has been 
requested for by the requesting State, thus being treated as a hero instead of a 
criminal. 
In addition, failure to extradite terrorist suspects because of the judicial finding 
that, for example, the fugitive is a political offender might be against the 
administration's desire in the requested State to secure such extradition. This may 
cause the government in this case to use deportation as a form of "disguised 
extradition" 128 with respect to foreign fugitives. This action, which is based on a 
State's right to exclude or expel undesirable aliens, is a civil as opposed to criminal 
proceeding, and that means it does not afford the individual the opportunities to 
present his or her own case as does before the court in criminal proceeding! 29 
Because it is quicker and cheaper compared to extradition, a study found that between 
January 1960 and June 1976, eighty-eight persons were returned by deportation to the 
128 P. Wilkinson,, Terrorism & The Liberal States, (New York University Press, 1986), 288. 
129 Ibid at 300. 
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States in which their offences had been committed. 130 That being so because 
deportation to a specified State in response to a prior request from that State is not 
contrary to the international law. ' 31 However, if deportation was to another State that 
did not request the extradition of the deportee, such a method merely shifts the 
problem of extradition to another State and does not ensure that a suspected terrorist is 
brought to justice. 132 
Finally, a fourth outcome which might result from the failure of extradition, is 
the use of abduction of the requested fugitive as an alternative. This method has 
proved to be very controversial since it involves a violation of the State victinf s 
sovereignty and it is against all reasons for having international treaties on extradition. 
Because if it is allowed for any country to abduct an accused person from another 
country on the claim of protecting the national security of the abducted State, there 
will be no reason for concluding extradition treaties among different States in the first 
place. An example of such abduction is the abduction of Alverez. Machain Alverez, a 
Mexican citizen, was accused by the US of participation in the torture and killing of a 
US drug agent. Consequently, the US Drug Agents abducted him from Mexico after 
failing to secure his extradition. Such action was faced by a severe protest from 
Mexico as a violation of its sovereign right over its territory and as a violation of the 
US-Mexico extradition treaty. However, the US Supreme Court tried Alverez and 
130 Evans, note 77 at 13 1. 131 D. Freestone, Legal Responses to Terrorism: Towards European Cooperation% in J. Lodge (ed. ), 
Terrorism: A Challenge to the State, (Martin Robertson, 1981), 204. 132 lbid. at 388. 
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claimed that his abduction is not provided for in the US-Mexico extradition treaty as 
illegal action. 133 
Although this case does not involve a terrorist suspect, it may apply to a 
terrorist situation. This US court decision may supply a needed precedent for any 
nation to carry out such action. A more recent example that involves a terrorist 
suspect is the abduction of Abdullah Ocalan (PKK7s Leader) from Nairobi, Kenya by 
the Turkish Secret Agents after he left the Greek Embassy while heading towards the 
airport where he thought he was flying to political asylum in Holland. Mr. Ocalan has 
been accused and convicted by Turkey of leading a terrorist campaign in Turkey for a 
long time. 134 
However, it should be mentioned that such an action taken by some States in 
order to obtain jurisdiction over the ftigitive offender in other States is of a rare 
occurrence and usually it is not an available option in most cases to most States of the 
world. 
3.4. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) 
One of the early efforts to establish an international criminal court in this 
century was the draft convention for the establishment of an international criminal 
court in 1937 135 in the League of Nations along with the draft convention for the 
133 B. Homring, 'Abduction as an Alternative to Extradition- A Method to Obtain Jurisdiction Over 
Criminal Defendants', 28 Wake Forest Law Review, (1993), 677. 
134 BBC Online News Feb. 20,1999. 
135 That Convention never came into force, but was signed by Belgium, Bulgaria, Spain, France (with 
the "colonial reservatioW'), Greece, the Netherlands, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Turkey, and 
Yugoslavia: there have been no ratification. 
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prevention and punishment of terrorism. However, none of these conventions ever 
came into force because of the outbreak of the World War 11.136 
In the United Nations em, the work in drafting a statute for an international 
criminal court started as early as 1953.137 However, on July 1998, in Rome, Italy, 
where the whole world had witnessed the conclusion and adoption of the statute of 
a Permanent International Criminal Court. 138 That event inspired the UN Secretary 
General Koft Annan, who announced that: 
'By adopting this statute, participants in the conference have overcome 
many legal and political problems, which kept this question on the United 
Nations agenda almost throughout the organization's history. No doubt, many 
of us would have liked a court vested with even more far-reaching powers, but 
that should not lead us to minimize the breakthrough you have achieved It 
is an achievement which, only a few years ago, nobody would have thought 
possible'. 139 
During the negotiation of the Statute, some States (e. g., Caribbean States, 
Egypt, Algeria, Turkey, and Sri Lanka) supported the inclusion of terrorism and 
drug trafficking among the crimes'40 for which the ICC has a jurisdiction over. 
These crimes: 
136 Blishchenko & Zhdanov, note 6 at 250. 
137 Zubkowski, note 60 at 333. 
138 The Statute was adopted by the UN sponsored Diplomatic Conference in Rome on 17 July 1998, by 
120 States voting in favour, 7 against, and 21 abstaining. 81 States have ratified the treaty which 
entered into force on I July 2002. See Rome Statute Signature and Ratification Chart 
<httl!: //www. ige. orcE! ice/rt)me, lbtmilratifv, htrni (visited in 16 October, 2002). 
13' D. Sarooshi, "The Statute of the International Criminal Courf', 8(2) International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, (April 1999), 3 87. 
"' See, P. Kirsch & J. Homles, 'The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The 
Negotiating Process', 93(l) American Journal ofInternational Law, (Jan. 1999), 4. 
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- The crimes of genocide, which include any of the following acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such: 
(a)- Killing members of the group; 
(b)- Causing serious bodily or mental harin to members of 
the group; 
(c)- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or 
in part; 
(d)- imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
(e)- forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group, Art. 6. 
- Crimes against humanity, which include, for example, any of the following 
acts when committed as part of a'widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: 
(a)- Murder; 
(b)- extermination; 
(c)- enslavement; 
(d)- Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
(e)- imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical 
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; 
(f)- Torture, etc. Art. 7(l). 
- War crimes, when committed as a part of a plan or policy or as a part of a 
large scale commission of such crimes; Art. 8, and 
- Crimes of aggression, which have not been defined by the Rome Statute, 
and the conditions under which the ICC is to exercise jurisdiction over such 
crimes must still be determined. 
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However, that proposed inclusion of terrorism among these crimes has been 
opposed by many States based on the facts that such crimes require a long-term 
investigation, planning, and infiltration into the organizations involved, which some 
times necessitates that immunity from prosecution be given to some individuals 
involved, thus these crimes are better suited for national prosecution. Also, and 
more importantly, there is no a generally acceptable definition of international 
terrorism. 141 
Nevertheless, the- conference adopted a resolution in which it has been 
recommended that there will be a review conferenCe142 for the purpose of arriving 
at an acceptable definition of terrorism and drug trafficking and their inclusion 
among the listed crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction. 143 
It is unfortunate, to say the least, to exclude terrorism from the jurisdiction 
of the ICC, because the ICC would be an ideal instrument that can be employed in 
the fight against terrorism for the following reasons: 
Firstly, if the basic goal of the ICC is to prosecute serious crimes that are of 
international concern as stated by Article I of Rome Statute, terrorism should have 
been one of these crimes because terrorism is a crime of such a nature. This can be 
inferred from the great amount of attention the international community has given 
to the problem of international terrorism even from the time of the League of 
"' M. Arsanioni, 'The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court', 93(l) American Journal of 
International Law, (Jan. 1999), 29. 
142 Note that the review procedure cannot begin until the expiry of seven years after the Statute's entry 
into force. 
143 Arsanjoni, note 161 at 30. 
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Nations until this time. Twelve anti-terrorism conventions and protocols have been 
adopted in this regard and this, if it is to prove something, proves how much 
concern the international community has expressed over this problem. 
Moreover, those who think that terrorism is not serious because the number 
of people who are killed by terrorists is relatively small compared to other 
international crimes, like war crimes, they should not forget that terrorism victimize 
only its immediate victims, but all people by making them feel insecure at all time. 
Nonetheless, even in term of the actual number of people who died as a result of 
terrorism, terrorism can cause a huge loss of human lives similar to the ones caused 
by other international crimes. The terrorist attack of September 11,2001, against 
the US is illustrative in this regard, where more than three thousand people were 
killed as a result of that attack. 
In addition, the possibility that terrorists may acquire nuclear, biological, or 
chemical weapons is sufficient to rethink terrorism in a more serious manner. 
Because if that happens, thousands of people will be killed by a single terrorist 
attack. 
Another reason that can be cited here is the fact that having the ICC with 
jurisdiction over terrorism means that it will apply a single and uniform law on 
terrorist crimes. Thus alleviating the substantial differences between States! 
national laws with respect to the offences listed in the various anti-terrorism 
conventions, which might result from their different interpretations of what 
constitutes an "appropriate penalties" or "severe penalties". In a survey of the 
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laws of seven States- (UY, US, Philippines, Sweden, Spain, New Zealand, and 
Federal Republic of Germany) -implementing "appropriate penalties" as provided 
for the in the Hostage Convention for the offences listed therein, 144 Lambert noticed 
that there is a significant difference among these nations with respect to the range 
of penalties that they considered to be appropriate for such acts. He found that such 
penalties ranged from a death penalty in Philippines and 14 years imprisonment in 
New Zealand. 145 
In addition, and more importantly are the problems raised by the principle 
aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute), which constitutes the central 
obligation of the anti-terrorism conventions, as it has been discussed earlier. The 
recent example of the imperfect application of this principle was the Lockerbie 
case, in which Libya on one hand refused to extradite its nationals, either to the US 
or England, because of the belief of the unfair trial its nationals might face in either 
of these countries and also because prosecution of the two suspects in its national 
courts is in accordance with the relevant treaty (Montreal Convention). The US and 
England on the other hand did not think that the Libyan Government would 
genuinely prosecute them, since evidence have shown that the accused are agents of 
the Libyan government. 146 The ICC will be the best solution for this dilemma 
because it is meant to complement national judicial system is situations like this, 
where national judicial system with jurisdiction is either unable or unwilling to 
carry out such an investigation or prosecution. 
'44 Article 2 of the Hostage Convention provides that "each State Party shall make the offences setforth 
in article I punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those 
offences". 
145 Lambert note I at 103-105. 
146 See, Grant & Dickinson, note 18. 
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Such concerns of bias and fairness for the accused are very significant. For 
example, the prosecution of members of Alqaeda, who are foreigners to the US and 
accused of committing the most horrific terrorist attack against the US. Such a 
prosecution in US national courts where the jury are too emotionally involved in the 
incident might raise the question of impartiality of the trial. This will be the 
common perception, even if the trial was fair as long as it was conducted in the 
victimized State. 
These concerns cannot be mounted against the ICC, which consists of 18 
judges elected by a two-thirds majority vote of member States, Art. 36 (6). This 
two-thirds majority requirement makes certain that the judges will have a broad 
appeal to the international world community. 147 
Last but not least, the deficient process of extradition, which is qualified 
with many exceptions, especially the political offence exception, which made it of 
little effect in countering terrorism as discussed above. All these shortcomings 
make many commentators contend that an international criminal court would be the 
ideal solution. 
It should be noted however, that despite of the explicit exclusion of 
terrorism from the ICC's jurisdiction, the Statute implicitly provides the Court with 
jurisdiction over such a crime when certain conditions are met, but under the name 
of crimes against humanity, which is one of the listed crimes. 
14' T. Sailer, 'The International Criminal Court: An Argument to Extend Its Jurisdiction to Terrorism 
and A Dismissal of U. S. Objections, 13 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, (Fall 99), 
330. 
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In setting out the criteria of which act constitutes a crime against humanity, 
the ICC's Statute stated that this act must be committed 'as a part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with the knowledge of 
the attack', Art. 7. Moreover, in order to define the meaning of the words 'attack 
directed against any civilian population, the Statute in Subparagraph 2(a) of the 
same article states that this would require 'multiple commission of acts ... pursuant 
to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attacks'. 
Therefore, crimes against humanity may be committed not only by or under the 
direction of State officials, but by organizations, this may include such groups as 
terrorist organizations and organizations of insurrectional or separatist 
movements. 148 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that cases of international terrorism can 
rarely, if not at all, satisfy the (widespread and systematic) criteria, because of 
terrorism's sporadic and isolated nature. 
"8 Arsanjoni, note 141 at 34. 
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CHAPTER 4. PEACEFUL AND PRACTICAL RESPONSES THAT 
CAN BE TAKEN AGAINST TERRORISM 
Unlike the previous chapter, which was mainly concerned with the 
international community's responses to international terrorism from a theoretical 
perspective, this chapter is concerned with such responses from a practical 
perspective. In other words, it is concerned about the actions States, in the real world, 
can take, or are taking against international terrorism. Nonetheless, since such 
responses may involve the use of force (next chapter), this chapter is only concerned 
about peaceful responses. Section I will be concerned about the issue of controlling 
terrorism by restricting the rules of asylum, borders and travel documents. In section 
2 the discussion will be about the controlling of terrorism funds raising, because 
without sufficient funds terrorists will not, in many cases, be able to carry out some of 
there attacks Finally, Section 3 will be about the significance of the exchange of 
information between States on terrorism. 
However, before going through these various responses to terrorism, it is 
worth mentioning here that the first and the most pressing response, especially by 
developing countries, is the elimination of the causes that give rise to terrorism. As it 
has been discussed earlier in Chapter 2 that, in many cases, terrorism has been the 
product of a particular political problem, such as social injustice, denial of equal 
participation in the political system, suppression of political expression, poverty, 
frustration, ... etc. 
According to many commentators, who are in favour of this solution, 
responses must be channelled to the underlining causes. They support the argument, 
which makes a comparison between terrorists and other criminals. They argue as 
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those of the 'environmental school of criminology' that terrorists, like other criminals 
are the product of their environment and that they have to recourse to violence 
because of the unavailability of other means to help them to express their frustration. 
According to them a successful treatment of the problem of terrorism is to destroy 
such an environment. I 
In a TV interview with one of the high ranking leaders of Hizb'allah (Party of 
God) in Lebanon (this group is considered by some States, e. g., US and Israel, as a 
terrorist organization), in answering a question which stated that you (i. e., the 
interviewed person) and other members of Hizb'allah organization have been accused 
and labelled as terrorists for the violent attacks you have committed against Israeli 
people, he replied that 'it does not matter what they are calling us, we will continue 
our fighting against Israel until the moment they withdraw from our land, then we will 
return to our normal life'. 2 
In agreement with such an argument the United Nations General Assembly 
urged States to take account of such causes. It states that: 
'States [should] .... contribute to the progressive elimination of the causes 
underlying international terrorism and to pay special attention to all situations, 
including, inter alia, colonialism, racism and situations involving mass and 
flagrant violations of human rights, and fundamental freedoms and those 
involving alien occupation, that may give rise to international terrorism and may 
endanger international peace and security'. 3 
I See, J. White, Terrorism: An Introduction, (Wadsworth, 1998), 246. 
2 Aijazeera TV Channel, (7 August 1999). 
3 See, UNGA. Res. 40/61, UN. GAOR, Para. 1 (1985). 
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This was also strongly highlighted by the Ghanaian Representative in the 
Security Council in a debate following the Israeli interception of the Libyan airplane 
in February 1980 He stated: 
'The international community, including the [Security] Council, must summon 
the necessary political will to delve into the reasons why the frustrations of the 
dispossessed are vented in this manner. A glib condemnation of terrorism 
alone, without a scientific and impartial study of its origins will not, we are 
afraid, eradicate the phenomenoif. 5 
Nonetheless, some writers take a different position with respect to this issue 
and argue that such efforts by governments to improve these conditions might be 
considered as a weakness on the part of governments and that might cause more 
violence for more 'concessions. 6 Laqueur, for example, highlighted the fact that a 
study of violence in eighty-four countries reached the conclusion that little repression 
increases instability whereas a great deal of it has the opposite effect. Add to that the 
fact that the satisfactions of people's wants may have unintended feedback effect and 
may increase the desire for more satisfactions, thus adding to the sense of systematic 
frustration! 
4 On February 4,1986, a Libyan executive jet carrying officials of the ruling Syrian Baath Party from 
Tripoli to Damascus was intercepted by Israeli fighter 75 km south-east of Cyprus and forced to land at 
a military airfield in northern Israel. The aircraft was allowed to proceed to Damascus after 
questioning all the 12 passengers and crew, who reportedly included Mr Abdullah al-Ahmer, the Baath 
Party assistant secretary-general, and two Lebanese leftist leaders. They were returning from a meeting 
at the Libyan-established "Pan-Arab Command", held in Tripoli on Feb. 24, which had also been 
attended by some PLO leaders. Israeli officials admitted that the interception had been staged in the 
hope of capturing PLO leaders, some of whom had apparently travelled back to Damascus on the same 
two aircraft of the same type as that intercepted. This interception came after the attacks on Rome and 
Vienna airports on Dec. 27,1985,20 people were killed, including four of the seven gunmen involved. 
Responsibility of the incidents was widely attached to the Palestinian Abu Nidul group. See, Kessingýs 
Record of World Events 34260-34264 (1986). 
5 Abeyratne, 'Some Recommendations for a New Legal and Regulatory Structure for the Management 
of the Offense of Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation', 25 (2) Transportation Law Journal, 
(1998), 121. 
6 See White, note I at 249. 7 See W. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, (Weildenfeld & Nocolson, 1987), 154. 
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Some other writers admitted Laqueur's argument only as a short-term 
consequence. They argued that such a response might bring a long-term solution. In 
other words, responding to the underlying causes may defuse potential sources of 
violence. 8 Citations have been made to the PLO, as a good example, in support of 
this argument by comparing the PLO's behaviour before and after the progress that 
had been achieved in the peace process? Since 1993, when the PLO and Israel signed 
the first agreement under which they both recognized the legitimacy of one another, 
and under which the PLO obliged itself to renounce the use of terrorism and other acts 
of violence and take the responsibility of such violent acts if committed by any of its 
members, since then no single act of terrorism has been directly attributed to the PLO. 
4.1. ASYLUM, BORDERS AND TRAVEL DOCUMENTS 
Currently the international movement of terrorists is still considered to be 
relatively easy. Terrorists can merge into the ever-increasing land, sea, air tourist 
traffic, or among the flow of refugees and illegal immigrants. " It is therefore highly 
desirable to take strong measures to prevent such movement. Strengthening border 
controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents can do this. Also, by 
granting police, immigration and customs officials a heightened power to check 
anyone's identity, anywhere, and at anytime, in order to detect impersonation, i. e., 
counterfeiting, forgery, or the use of false papers. 
In addition, while recognizing the legitimacy of the right of political asylum 
and right of admission of refugees, protection should be exerted to prevent the abuse 
White, note I at 246. 
P. Sederberg, 'Responses to Dissedent: From Myth to Maturity, in C. Kelgley (ed. ), International 
Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, ((Macmillan, 1990), 277. 
10 R. Clutterbuck, Terrorism in an Unstable World. (Routledge, 1994), 78. 
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of these rights by disguised terrorists. " It should be mentioned that the prevention of 
such abuses is one of the most difficult dilemmas that faces many countries in the 
world, especially Western countries, which respect the right of asylum. 
In the light of huge flow of refugees from many parts of the world escaping 
persecution in their countries, Western countries who bear the large number of them 
find it very difficult to distinguish between refugee who, according to Article 1 of the 
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 195 1, which most countries of 
world are members to, is 'any person who .. (2) owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of .. political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and .. owing to such fear is unwilling' to return, and a terrorist who pretends to be a 
refugee. 
For example, in the UK the court applied a rigid test in many cases in order to 
exclude certain persons from the definition of refugee even if such persons had been 
involved in terrorism. Illustrative cases can be R. v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, e-xparte Chahal and T v. Secretary of State for the Home Department. 
In Chahal, the applicant was an Indian national who had been in the UK since 
1971, and who had indefinite leave to remain. In 1990, pursuant to the immigration 
law, the Secretary of State ordered his deportation in the ground that his continued 
presence in the UK would not be conductive to the public good 'for reasons of 
national security and other reasons of a political nature, namely the international fight 
against terrorism'. The applicant then claimed the right of asylum on the ground that 
if he returned to India he was likely to be killed because of his strong religious and 
" Lyon Summit, (Ministerial Conference On Terrorism: Agreement on 25 Measures), July 1996. 
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political beliefs. The Secretary of State denied the claim for asylum, thus the 
applicant sought judicial review of this denial, as well as of the deportation order. 
One issue was whether the applicant was within the scope of Article 33(2) of the 
Geneva Convention. Article 33(l) contains the general prohibition of expulsion or 
return 'refoulement' by a contracting State of refugees within its territory. Article 
33(2), however, provides: 
'The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee 
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of 
the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment 
of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that 
country'. 
For the Court, the major issue was whether Article 33(2) requires the threat to 
life or freedom of the applicant to be balanced against the danger to the security of the 
contracting State and it decided that it did require such balance. It referred to writers 
indicating that under Article 33(2) there may be cases where the danger to a refugee 
outweighs the menace to public security or that in the application of Article 33(2), the 
principle of proportionality operates. The Court in words of the Staughton U, who 
represents the majority opinion said: 
'Despite the literal meaning of article 33, it would seem to me quite wrong that 
some trivial danger to national security should allow expulsion or return in a 
case where there was a present threat to the life of the refugee if that took 
place'. 
However, since the Court found that the Secretary of State had carried out this 
balancing exercise or, at least, that it had not been shown that he had failed to do so, it 
dismissed the appeal. 12 
12 The British Year Book ofInternational Law, (1995), 501-503. 
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In T v. Home Secretary, the appellant was an Algerian national who applied 
for asylum in the UK after being detected as an illegal entrant. The Secretary of State, 
however, refused his request, and a special adjudicator and the Immigration Appeals 
Tribunal rejected subsequent appeals. This further appeal was then taken to the Court 
of Appeal. The special adjudicator accepted that the appellant, a member of the 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), had a well-founded fear of being persecuted if returned 
to Algeria, and therefore prima facie fell within the Geneva Convention's definition 
of a refugee under Article IA. Nevertheless, the special adjudicator and the 
Immigration Appeals Tribunal were of the view that he was excluded from the 
definition under Article IF(b), as there were serious reasons for considering that he 
was involved in an FIS bomb attack on an airport in Algeria, in which ten people were 
killed, and in a raid on an army barracks. The pertinent part of Article IF provides: 
'The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to 
whom there are serious reasons for considering that: .. (b) he was committed a 
serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission 
to that country as a refugee 
The Court of Appeal was of the view that the application of Article IF did not 
require a 'balancing ' test of the kind referred to in Chahal. The Court said that it 
could: 
Find nothing in the Convention which supports the view that, in deciding 
whether a non-political crime is 'serious' and therefore within article IF, the 
Secretary of State or the appeal tribunal is obliged to weigh the threat of 
persecution if asylum be refused against the gravity of the crime. 
In addition, the court did not doubt the seriousness of the crimes committed by 
T, thus satisfying the requirement that the crime committed by the asylum seeker to 
be 'serious' as indicated in Article IF above. However, the other requirement is for 
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the crime to be a non-political crime. The Court in deciding that the crimes in this 
case are non-political relied primarily on English cases dealing with the definition of 
4political offences' in the context of extradition, which was discussed earlier in more 
detail. 
In short, the issue of political or humanitarian asylum is one of the most 
difficult issues the international community, especially Western countries, have to 
face in order to prevent terrorists from abusing such a valuable right to avoid criminal 
liability for the terrorist acts that had committed in the past. 
4.2. TERRORIST FUND RAISING 
Funds for terrorists or terrorist organizations are essential, without sufficient 
funds, terrorists in many cases will not be able to carry out some of their attacks, 
especially those that involve the use of heavy arms or travel and stays in many States. 
Therefore, one of the most important weapons in the war against terrorism is to find a 
mechanism that helps to prevent the flow of money to terrorists, or terrorist 
organizations, or to dry up the sources from which this money comes. Such a move 
must be taken whether such financing is direct or indirect through organizations that 
also have or claim to have charitable, social, or cultural goals, or which are also 
engaged in unlawful activities such as illicit arms trafficking, drugs dealing, and 
racketeering. 13 
To do so, States may: 
- Domestically, each State may where appropriate, monitor and control cash 
transfers and adopt bank disclosure procedures; 
13 Lyon Summit, note 11. 
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- States may intensify information exchange concerning international 
movements of funds sent from one country to persons or to associations in 
another country suspected of carrying out terrorist activities; and 
- Prevent such movements, if necessary, in certain cases without impeding in 
any way the freedom of legitimate capital movement. 14 
Moreover, the international community realized the importance of such a 
measure, i. e., prevention of terrorist fund raising, in the war against terrorism, and 
recognized the gap in the other anti-terrorism convention that did not cover this 
subject. Therefore, the General Assembly of the United Nations on 25'h February 
2000 adopted a new convention and bridged this gap. 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism (2/2000). 
This Convention is structurally based on prior anti-tefforism conventions 
adopted by the UN and its specialized agencies. It includes a requirement that States 
Parties shall criminalize certain conduct, submit for prosecution or extradition persons 
found in their territory suspected of the proscribed offences, and cooperate in the 
investigation and prosecution of the offences. Like its predecessors, this Convention 
does not attempt to define 'terrorism', instead it defines a particular conduct that, 
regardless of its motivation, is condemned internationally and must be prevented and 
punished if it takes place. 
According to Article 2a person commits an offence within the meaning of this 
Convention if 'that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and 
14 Ibid. 
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willfully, provides or collects funds's with the intention that they should be used or in 
the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out: 
(a)- An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of 
the treaties listed in the annex (this includes all the antimterrorism conventions and 
protocols except the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives of 1991 
because this convention neither defines or lists any new proscribed offences); or 
(b)- Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to 
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or 
abstain from doing any act'. (Article 2, Para. 1, Sub-Para. 'a & W) 
However, since not all States are party to the other anti-terrorism conventions 
and protocols referred to in subparagraph (a), Paragraph 2 (a) of the same article 
provides that 'On depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession, a State Party which is not a party to a treaty listed in the annex may declare 
that, in the application of this Convention to the State Party, the treaty shall be 
deemed not to be included in the annex referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraph (ay. 
Paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) mentioned above, may cover many terrorist 
offences since most acts of terrorism involve causing death or serious bodily injury to 
the victims targeted by such acts. However, it is possible other terrorist attacks like 
hijacking or hostage-taking, which may not cause death or any serious bodily injury to 
15 According to Article I of this Convention "fandr means assets of every kind, whether tangible or 
intangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, 
including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited 
to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts and 
letters of credit. 
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the victims, by the act of providing or collecting funds, even with the intention or in 
the knowledge that they are to carry out such attacks, will not be considered a 
proscribed offence under this Convention. This will be the case even if it occurs in a 
State party to this Convention if that State is not party to the relevant anti-terrorism 
convention or protocol and it made a declaration in this regard. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of this Convention may be seriously undermined if many of the States 
parties are not party to the relevant antimterrorism conventions and protocols. 
Moreover, it is possible that a State which is party to this Convention that is 
also party to the anti-terrorism conventions and protocols listed in this Convention 
ceases its membership with any of these treaties. Thus, paragraph 2 (b) addresses this 
possibility and states that if that happens, this State 'may make a declaration as 
provided for in this article with respect to that treaty. 
Furthermore, Article 4 provides that States Parties are obliged to adopt such 
measures as may be necessary: to criminalize, under their domestic laws, these acts 
proscribed under this Convention; and to make these acts punishable by appropriate 
penalties which take into account their grave nature. 
Nonetheless, it is not only natural persons who can commit the proscribed 
offences under this Convention but rather and more often they can be committed by a 
legal entity. Thus, Article 5 provides that each State Party shall, in accordance with 
its domestic legal principles, take the necessary measures to hold liable those legal 
entities located in its territory, or organized under its laws, when a person responsible 
for the management or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an 
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offence prohibited under this Convention. Such liability may be criminal, civil or 
administrative. This may include monetary sanctions. 
With respect to the bases of criminal jurisdiction, this Convertion, like other 
anti-terrorism conventions, provides for both mandatory and discretionary 
jurisdiction. Each State Party is obliged to establish its jurisdiction in the following 
cases: 
- When the offence is committed in the territory of that State; 
When the offence is committed on board a vessel flying the flag of that State 
or an aircraft registered under the laws of that State at the time the offence is 
committed; 
- When a national of that State commits the offence. 
However, a State Party may, subject to its discretion, establish its jurisdiction 
in the following cases: 
- When the offence was directed towards or resulted in the carrying out of an 
offence proscribed under Article 2 (1) (a or b) in the territory of or against a 
national of that State; 
- When the offence was directed towards, or resulted in the carrying out of an 
offence proscribed under Article 2 (1) (a or b) against a State or government 
facility of that State abroad, including diplomatic or consular premises of that 
State; 
- When the offence was directed towards or resulted in the carrying out of an 
offence proscribed under Article 2 (1) (a or b), committed in an attempt to 
compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act; 
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When the offence is committed by a stateless person who has his or her 
habitual residence in the territory of that State; and 
When the offence is committed on board an aircraft which is operated by the 
Government of that State, Article 7, (1) and (2). 
In addition, Article 7 (4) sets out what is considered to be the central 
obligation of this convention as in the other anti-terrorism conventions, that is aut 
dedere autjudicare, i. e., extradite or prosecute. It states that 'each State Party shall 
likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction ... in 
cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite that 
person to any of the States Parties that have established their jurisdiction in 
accordance with paragraphs (1) or (2), as stated above. 
At the moment of writing only thirteen States of the one hundred and nineteen 
States that have initially signed it have ratified this Convention. For this Convention 
to enter into force, it needs at least another nine instruments of ratification and 
accession. 
However, even if this Convention comes into force, there are some difficulties 
that may make this an instrument of little or no effectiveness in combating terrorism. 
The same could be said with regard to the measures mentioned above that can be used 
to control the flow of illegal money in general, and to prevent funds from reaching 
terrorist organizations in particular, which may seem easy at the policy level, but are 
very complicated to implement at the operational level. This is because of the 
following: 
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Firstly, by and large criminals, especially those who have to deal with money, 
have proved to be very intelligent and creative in inventing new ways when dealing 
with money, that have a very high degree of sophistication and complexity which only 
a limited number of law of enforcement agencies with experience and imaginative 
thinking, will be able to figure out. 
For example, in 1977, the US Congress, in order to combat drug dealers who 
handed bags of illegal cash to bank tellers, enacted a statute that included, among 
many things, the 'currency transaction reports' which must be filed by financial 
institutions whenever there has been a deposit or withdrawal of more than $10,000 in 
currency or monetary instruments. 
Nevertheless, since Congress did not expressly prohibit the "structuring" or 
"smurfing7, that is, breaking a 10,000 cash transaction into a series of smaller 
transactions, each below the 10,000 threshold, accordingly, in many courts, many 
drug dealers evaded conviction under that statute. 16 
Moreover, another technique used by criminals, especially those involved in 
money laundering which is also applicable to terrorists, is to avoid dealing with banks 
or any other financial institutions when they need to transfer cash money from one 
country to another. That is to travel with cash because it is difficult to detect and it 
leaves no paper trail behind them. 
'('B. Williams and F. Whitney, Federal Money Laundering: Crimes and Forfeitures, (Lexis Law Pub., 
1999), 8. 
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Secondly, States that are known being banking centres will be reluctant to 
cooperate in this regard. This is because these banks, which act as tax havens, 
17 will 
oppose any requirement that imposes upon them the obligation to disclose the 
information they have, since many of these havens are highly dependent upon their 
banking systems, which is based among many things on the secrecy of cliente 
information, as major sources of finance and employment. Therefore, these States 
will, in order to protect their national self-interest, work against any major changes 
that might negatively affect them. 
The following examples illustrate how the above features are enormously 
profitable making the inspired cooperation from such States complicated. The 
Cayman Islands, with its 35,000 inhabitants, saw its banking assets eventually exceed 
$670 billion. It has become home to 570 banks and trust companies, 2,240 mutual 
funds, 500 captive insurance firms, and 45,000 offshore businesses. Switzerland is 
another example that became very pre-eminent in global asset management, 
controlling up to $2.3 trillion under management, more than half from foreign 
customers. is 
One of the recent efforts that has been made in order to control the flow of the 
illegal money in the globe was the G-7 Summit in July 2000. Three multilateral 
organizations -Financial Stability Forum (FSF), Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)- were 
required to conduct research on rogue banking, money laundering, and tax evasion 
before the summit's next meeting. 
17 p. Williams and E. Savona, The United Nations and Transnational Organized Crime, (1996), 86. 
W. WecbsIer, 'Follow The Money, 80 (4) Foreign Affairs, (July-August 2001), 42. 
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The objective the G-7 sought from these studies was to 'name and shame' 
those nations that had developed under-regulated financial centres and threaten 
appropriate countermeasures if the pressure was not sufficient. 19 An example of such 
countermeasures is the restricting of financial transactions with these nations and 
conditioning the support from the international financial institutions. 
In a survey that asked banking, insurance, and securities supervisors in both 
onshore and offshore centers about offshore laws and supervisory practices, the level 
of resources devoted to supervision and international cooperation, and the degree of 
cooperation. The FSF grouped offshore jurisdictions into three categories, from high 
to low quality: I- high quality category included Dublin (Ireland), Guernsey, Hong 
Kong, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Luxembourg, Singapore, and Switzerland. 2- The 
medium quality included Andorra, Bahrain, Barbados, Bermuda, Gibraltar, Labuan 
(Malaysia), Macau, and Monaco. 3- The low quality groups included Anguilla, 
Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Belize, the British Virgin Islands, the 
Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, the 
Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Nauru, the Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, the Seychelles, Turks 
and Caicos, and Vanuata. For its part, the FATF was responsible for reviewing the 
countries that resisted global efforts to combat money laundering, both offshore and 
onshore. In its concluding report the FATF divided the twenty-nine nations it 
assessed into two groups: fifteen are noncooperative jurisdictions and fourteen are 
with deficiencies. Noncooperative jurisdictions included the Bahamas, the Cayman 
Islands, the Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, the Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, the Philippines, Russia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. 
19 Ibid. at 50. 
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Vincent and the Grenadines. The jurisdictions that the FATF also reviewed were 
Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, 
Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, St. Lucia, and Samoa. 
The OECD, which was responsible for investigating tax evasion, found the following 
jurisdictions to be tax havens: Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the 
Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, the British Virgin Islands, the Cook Islands, 
Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Liberia, 
Liechtenstein, the Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, the 
Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, Samoa, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, the Seyychelles, Tonga, Turks and Caicos, the US Virgin 
Islands, and Vanuatu. 
Looking through this result one may easily see that there are many States that 
are either unable or unwilling to adhere to the international accepted standards of 
supervision, cooperation, and information-sharing which as a result may create a 
potential systemic threat to global financial stability? o 
Furthermore, the globalization and the advances in banking technologies make 
distant countries just a mouse-click away. 21 Therefore, it is easy for terrorist 
organizations that are usually up to date with these developments to transfer any 
money they possess to nations that were once too small, too bereft of natural 
resources, or too physically remote from the rest of the world. In return, these 
countries will be able to make easy money which they could not do in the past. 
20 See ibid at 5 0-5 1. 
21 lbid at 42. 
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In addition, another recent phenomenon that may also contribute to the 
difficulty the international community is facing when trying to control the finance 
around the globe, is the fact that some States have enacted laws involved licensing of 
the so called 'brass plate' banks, which have neither physical presence nor personnel, 
and allowing the creation of anonymous companies and asset-protection trusts, some 
of which can give ownership to whomever happens to be holding the relevant 
document at that moment? 2 
More significantly, not all States are cooperative in preventing terrorist fund 
raising which relies primarily on the national law of these States, thus any 
involvement in terrorist activities by these States, especially States which provide safe 
havens to terrorist organizations, will render such requirements meaningless. 
Also, it has been said that terrorist fund raising might be beneficial for both 
terrorists and safe havens. For instance, in Afghanistan, some argue that the value of 
safe havens has not been lost on terrorists such as Osama bin Laden, who became 
very prominent due not to 'his military exploits but to his ability to raise, manage, and 
move money for Afghan rebels in the 1980s. 23 
Besides, corruption can be another factor that may cause even a cooperative 
country to become an important station in the movement of suspected money. For 
instance, in 1999, the US, which is known for its strict regulations in this regard, had 
witnessed a big scandal that involved the moving, illegally, of $7.5 billion of Russian 
funds through the Bank of New York with the complicity of senior bank officials. 24 
22 Ibid at 43. 
23 Ibid at 45. 
21 Ibid. 
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Moreover, the variety of sources form which terrorist funds can be obtained is, 
also, another problematic element that can be added to the already existing difficulties 
when trying to regulate terrorists' ability in raising funds. It has been reported that 
terrorist groups can draw their finances from the following sources: drinking clubs, 
taxi companies, game machine operations, video piracy, extortion, smuggling, 
commercial fraud, construction industry fraud, misuse of government grants, 
contributions from overseas supporters, charities, cheque and credit card frauds, 
draws, raffles and collections, sales of newspapers and propaganda instruments, social 
events, counterfeiting, illegal animal drugs, armed robbery, and increasingly drug 
dealing. 25 
Finally, even States which want to cooperate to prevent terrorist fund raising 
will find it very difficult. This is because such full cooperation may affect other 
essential rights of their citizens. For example, the right to move one's capital or the 
right to have secret personal bank data might be violated in one way or another when 
implementing such requirements. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that prevention of terrorist fund raising has 
become an international duty imposed by the Security Council on all States, even 
States not parties to the relevant anti-terrorism convention discussed earlier or even 
states not members to the United Nations. Such an obligation came in the aftermath 
of the September 11 attacks on the US. In Resolution 1373 (2001), the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
1. Decides that all States shall: 
(a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts; 
25 R. Bosworth-Davis and G. Saltmarsh, Money Laundering: A Practical Guide to New Legislation, 
(Chapman& Hall, 1994), 35. 
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(b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or 
indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the 
intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are 
to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts; 
(c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic 
resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or 
participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities 
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons 
and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and 
entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons 
and entities; 
(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories 
from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial 
or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of 
persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the 
commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of 
or at the direction of persons. 26 
4.3. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE 27 
Experts and political scientists all agree that any successful strategy to combat 
terrorism must involve exchange of information and intelligence as one of its major 
components. 28 To enhance anti-terrorist capabilities, the competent authorities of 
different countries must strive to establish stability and good communication in 
intelligence exchange systems, particularly between those with common borders. 
26 UNSC Res. 1371(4385th mtg, 28 September 2001), UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001). 
27 Notice that there is a difference between information and intelligence. Using Northam's definitions, 
information is a fact or facts, which come to the notice of the relevant agency. Intelligence, however, is 
the product of the assessment and analysis of the information available. Cited in supra note II at 122. 
28 R. Ward, 'The Multinational investigative Task Force As a Model For Counter Terrorisnf, in R. 
Ward & A. Ezcldin (eds. ), International Responses to Terrorism: New Initiative, (Chicago, 1990), 67. 
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Now the question is, can a State which has some information that may help in 
preventing an imminent terrorist attack, withhold such information from the 
concerned State or States, or must international law require such information to be 
shared with others? 
According to the various multilateral conventions that deal with international 
terrorism, such exchange of information as a means to prevent international terrorism 
is required. One of the early instruments that dealt with this issue was the 1937 
League of Nations' Geneva Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism. It provided that it is a duty of member States to prevent terrorist activities 
and each State is required to have a centralized service in contact with the countrýs 
police and with all other countries' services to bring together all infon-nation to 
facilitate the prevention and punishment of terrorist offences. However, that 
convention was only ratified by India and never came into force. 
Although the Tokyo and Hague Conventions made no mention of such 
provision, the Montreal Convention came up with provisions similar to those of the 
League of Nations' Convention. It requires member States to 'endeavour to take all 
practicable measures for the purpose of preventing the offences [mentioned in Article 
1]... ', Art. 10, (1). It further requires a State Party to 'furnish any relevant information 
in its possession .. ' to any other States if it has a reason to believe that any of the 
terrorist offences listed in the Convention might be committed against that State, 
Art. 12. The Montreal Convention was the first multilateral treaty to become 
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effective, which stresses preventive exchange of infonnation in order to control 
terrorist activities? 9 
After that, all other multilateral conventions that dealt with international 
terrorism followed suit with the Montreal Convention and provided for such 
preventive exchange of information, (e. g., Article 4 of the New York Convention, 
Article 4 of the Hostage Convention, etc. ). 
Furthermore, in 1986 at the Tokyo Economic Summit, Canada, France, Italy, 
Japan, Germany, the UK, the US, and representatives of the European Community 
issued a statement on international terrorism. It called upon nations to take all 
practicable measures to prevent terrorism. Among these measures, 'to intensify the 
exchange of information in the relevant flora on threats emanating from terrorist 
activities and those who sponsor or support them, and on ways to prevent them ...... 
30 
In addition, more recently in 1996 in the Lyon Summit, participants 
emphasised the need for improving information exchange on terrorism, they declared 
that States should: 
I- Facilitate the exchange of information and the transmission of legal requests 
through establishing central authorities so organized as to provide speedy 
coordination of requests, it being understood that those central authorities 
would not be the sole channel for mutual assistance among states. Direct 
exchange of information among competent agencies should be encouraged; 
2- Intensify exchange of basic information concerning persons or organizations 
suspected of terrorist-linked activities, in particular on their structure, their 
29 E. Yearwood, 'Data Bank Control', in M. Bassiouni, (ed. ), Legal Responses to International 
Terrorism, US Procedural Aspects, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 252. 
30 lbid at 255. 
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66 modus operandr', and communications systems in order to prevent terrorist 
actions; 
3- Intensify exchange of operation information, especially as regards: the actions 
and movements of persons or groups suspected of belonging to or being 
connected with terrorist networks - travel documents suspected of being 
forgeries or falsified - traffic in arms, explosive, or sensitive materials - the 
use of communications technologies by terrorist groups - the threat of new 
types of terrorist activities, including those using chemical, biological, or 
nuclear materials and toxic substances. 
4- Find ways of accelerating these exchanges of information and making them 
more direct, while at the same time preserving their confidentiality in 
conformity with the laws and regulations of the state supplying the 
information. 31 
Although the above mentioned statements made by States participating in the 
summits have no force of law as do the international conventions with respect to 
contracting parties, these statements give a clear indication that States should 
exchange information on matters related to terrorism in order to prevent or at least 
limit its occurrence in future. 
It is to be noted that at the international level there is also the International 
Criminal Police Organization, better known as Interpol. Interpol is an international 
organization, established in 1946, dedicated to promoting international cooperation 
between criminal police authorities worldwide as stated in article 2 of its Constitution. 
Article 2 provides that the Interpol is an association of countries for the purpose of 
promoting the 'widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police 
31 Lyon Sununit, note 11. 
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authorities within the limits of laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit 
of the Universal declaration of Human Rights'. 32 
On the contrary to many peoples' misconception, Interpol is not a supra 
national police force, i. e., it does not maintain its own international police force. 
Rather, Interpol strictly respects the sovereignty of its Member States and works 
within the framework of each Member State's existing laws. Each Member operates a 
National Central Bureau, which serves as a point of contact in that State with other 
33 States. 
In the field of cooperation against terrorism, Interpol's role had been restricted 
by Article 3 of its Constitution, which provides 'It is strictly forbidden for the 
Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, 
religious or racial character. Hence, as terrorism always involves political 
implications, Interpol would not be able to participate in any intelligence activity 
aimed at preventing terrorist acts. 
The first case that tested such a restrictive interpretation of Article 3 arose in 
1950, when a group of Czechoslovakian refugees hijacked an airplane and sought 
political asylum in another country. Czechoslovakia, as a Member of Interpol, 
requested that international wanted notices be issued for the hijackers. The notices 
were issued. The US representative, however, protested and claimed that the 
hijacking was purely political and thus any action taken by the organization would be 
32 j. Overton, 'Interpol's Perspective on International Terrorism', in K Ward & A. Ezeldin (eds. ), 
International Responses to Terrorism: New Initiative, (Chicago, 1990), 72. 
33 M. Grutenrath, 'Interpol's Role in the International Law Enforcement', in M. Bassiouni, (ed. ), Legal 
Responses to International Terrorism, US Procedural Aspects, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 373. 
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in contravention of Article 3. In order to express its protest, the US temporarily 
withdrew from Interpojý4 
Since then, Interpol has become handicapped with respect to the issue of 
terrorism. However, in order to avoid this conservative interpretation of Article 3, 
Interpol, in 1984, adopted two resolutions by its General Assembly giving guidance to 
this interpretation. It was resolved that crimes committed against innocent victims or 
against property outside the area of conflict, regardless of their motivations, should 
not be regarded as political; it was also resolved that Article 3 did not debar Members 
from sharing technical information about terrorism, providing that the information did 
not discriminate for solely political purposes. Members were encouraged to exchange 
information relevant for the prevention of terrorism as freely as their national laws 
would allow. 35 
Nonetheless, despite these resolutions and despite the fact that Interpol has 
more than 146 Member States, its role in sharing information that helps in preventing 
terrorist acts from occurring is still of little effect. The reasons for this being so 
follow: 
Firstly, these resolutions are not legally binding, thus States may, when their 
national self-interest warrants, disregard them. Secondly, this large number of 
Member States inevitably includes, as Clutterbuck pointed out, a large number of 
countries 'who would never trust all others with sensitive political or intelligence 
34 Ibid. at 376. 
35 Clutterbuck, note 10 at 119. 
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information, and a smaller number who virtually none of the others would trust at 
all'. 
36 
More importantly, Interpol has some Members who are accused by other 
Members of sponsoring or SUPpOrting international terrorism, therefore exchange of 
information with these countries might be abused in the interests of terrorists. 
Also, distinction should be made between the police/crime role and the 
security service/intelligence role. Interpol clearly fits the terms of police activity. 37 
That means that once a criminal act has occurred, i. e., not before, it would assist in the 
efforts of law enforcement agencies to apprehend the responsible individuals. 
Finally, Interpol is based on the fundamental principle of cooperation, not 
compulsion. Thus each country is free to decide whether to communicate information 
or not as its national laws allows. 38 
36 Ibid. 
37overton, note 32 at 74. 
38 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 5. THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE ABROAD TO 
COUNTER INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
Believing that terrorism is a problem that has become too great to be dealt by 
the peaceful measures discussed earlier in Chapter 4, States, in some cases, resort to 
military actions to counter terrorists in other countries, especially if these countries are 
involved in sponsoring or supporting these terrorists in their attacks on other States. 
As the title above suggests, this chapter will mainly be concerned with the use 
of military force abroad, because in such an extraterritorial use of force there is a clear 
international element involved that should be addressed. Therefore, the use of 
military force as an extension of police civil power within the State to counter 
domestic terrorist threats, will not be dealt with in this chapter. 
In Section I attention will be given to the importance of the obligation that a 
State contemplating the use of military force to exhaust all peaceful means available 
on hand, before conducting any armed action, as is required by international law. 
Section 2 will be concerned with the various justifications presented by States when 
using force abroad, and which of these legal justifications are accepted by 
international law. In Section 3 the discussion will be about the recent use of military 
force by the US against Sudan and Afghanistan as in the subsequent case study of this 
chapter, and the question there will be concerned with the facts and the legal 
justifications which permit the use of that forcible action. Finally, Section 4 will try 
to answer a very important question that is, how effective the use of military force 
abroad actually is in deterring international terrorism. 
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5.1. PEACEFUL RESPONSES FIRST 
Before discussing the various justifications for the use of force abroad by 
States against international terrorism, it must be emphasized here that such a use of 
force is not an ordinary but an extraordinary remedy. Therefore, States must seek 
peaceful responses before recourse to the coercive responses. This is one of the 
fundamental principles of the international community, as laid down in the UN 
Charter and subsequent basic texts. Such a hierarchy of the peaceful responses over 
the coercive responses is articulated in the UN Charter Article 2 (3), which provides 
that 'All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security, and justice are not endangerecr. 
Moreover, Paragraph 4 of the same article states 'All Members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations'. 
Examples of such peaceful means are provided for in Article 33 (1) of the UN 
Charter, which stresses that 'The Parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first of 
all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful 
means of their own choice'. 
This has also been reiterated in, inter alia, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, 
which says, in part, that: 
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'States shall ... seek early and just settlement of their international 
disputes by negotiation, inquiry, ... etc. ... The Parties to a dispute have the 
duty, in the event of failure to rearch a solution by any one of the above 
peaceful means, to continue to seek a settlement of the dispute by other peaceful 
means agreed upon by them'. 
It follows from the above that it is a general rule of international law that 
States must not resort to the use of force unless such a use of force is unavoidable in 
difficult circumstances in accordance with international law. 
This view, according to Antonio Cassese, is by no means universal. He stated 
that although in some cases -for whatever reasons, ideological, political, or military- 
States immediately resorted to a coercive response to terrorist activity, and they 
received no greater admonition from the rest of the world than a verbal condemnation. 
'These deviations' he stressed, however, 'do not detract from the general rule" that 
peaceful remedies must be exhausted first only when such a terrorist attack constitutes 
an armed attack as will be discussed later. 
In addition to such provisions for peaceful responses in the UN Charter and 
some of its subsequent resolutions, another reason can be cited here for the hierarchy 
of peaceful responses over coercive responses, which is related to the source of each 
of them. With respect to the rules governing the use of force, they are mostly found in 
customary international law, though their roots may lie in treaties. By contrast, the 
rules governing the peaceful responses are contained in treaties. This means that the 
latter may have the advantage of being more easily identifiable than the customary 
law on the use of force. However, this also implies one important shortcoming, that 
See, A. Cassese, 'The International CommuniVs Legal Response to Terrorism', in C. Gcarty (ed. ), 
Terrorism, (Dartmouth, 1996), 75. 
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unlike the rules of customary international law, which bind all subjects, the rules of 
treaties only bind those States that have ratified and acceded to them, and even then, 
only on a strictly reciprocal basis. 2 
The third reason for such a hierarchy of peaceful responses is that despite the 
fact that terrorists are "the modern enemies of mankind'3 and every State should 
endeavor to punish them, this, nonetheless, does not entail a licence to use force in 
such way that would involve attacking other States' territory, ships, or aircraft. 
Because if such a licence were given by international law, our world present condition 
of relative anarchy would be at risk of turning into one of absolute anarchyý 
Nevertheless, a State is exempt from this general rule, if that State is under 
ongoing attack. In this case, such a State has the right to response with force in 
accordance with its right of self-defence. Another exception from this general ban on 
the use of force is when the Security Council in accordance with Article 42 of the UN 
Charter authorized such a use of force. 
5.2. LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL USE OF 
MILITARY FORCE IN COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
In justifying the use of military force abroad in the fighting against terrorists or 
their sponsors, States often search for a legally accepted excuse in order to answer the 
pressure from the international community thereafter. Usually States justify their 
coercive actions by any of the following excuses: 
2 North Sea Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Report 1964. 
3 Cassese, note I at 90. 
4 Ibid. 
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5.2.1. Self-Defence 
Article 51 of the UN Charter provides that 'Nothing in the present Charter 
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed 
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way effect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time 
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace 
and security'. 
5.2.1.1. Individual Self-Defence 
Individual self-defence is one of the most ancient and fundamental rights of 
States recognized by international law from time immemorial 5 Hugo Grotius, one of 
the most prominent writers on international law in the Wh century, observed that 
States' right of self-defence rests on the 'fact that nature commits to each his own 
protection'. 6 However, if such a claim of self-defence is an inherent right of every 
State against an armed attack from another State, as Article 51 of the UN Charter 
indicates, is indisputable in international law. Does such a right of self-defence exist 
if a State claims it in the fight against, not a direct armed attack by a State, but against 
violent acts by terrorists? 
The answer of such a question depends on whether this use of self-defence to 
counter terrorism can satisfy the following conditions that permit a legitimate right of 
self-defence: 
5 R. Erickson, Legitimate Use of Military Force Against State Sponsored International Terrorism, (Air 
University Press, 1987), 128. 
6 Ibid. 
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(I)- Armed Attack: 
Although the term "armed attacW' is nowhere defined in the Charter, most 
commentators agree that the direct employment of force by one State against another 
constitutes an armed attack. However, since Article 51 speaks of armed attack in 
general and does not restrict it to direct armed attack, the question here is, can an act 
of terrorism be considered as an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the 
UN Charter, therefore allowing the victimized State to respond, in self-defence, with 
force to such an act? For example, do the terrorist attacks of September II against the 
US7 constitute an armed attack within the context of Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
thus allowing the US to resort to military action against Afghanistan in response to 
such attacks? 
Before start answering this very controversial question, we must keep in mind 
that this area of international law is one of the most unsettled areas and arguments 
may vary from one writer to another. Nonetheless, there are some elements that if 
they are considered will help to find an answer to such a problematic issue. 
The first element is about the magnitude of the attacks of September II when 
compared to actions resulted from the direct employment of force by one State against 
another. Clearly that the attacks of September II were different from all terrorist 
attacks the world has witnessed which are usually sporadic in nature and minor in 
effect. Not only thousands of people were killed by such unprecedented attacks, but 
7 The attacks of September II resulted in the death of more than 3 thousands of people, including 
nationals of more than 30 countries. These attacks consist of three parts: the crashing of two airplanes 
into the World Trade Center in New York, killing thousands of civilians and destroying both buildings; 
the crashing of a third airplane into the Pentagon, Washington D. C., killing more than 400 Defense 
Department personnel; finally the crashing of a fourth airplane in Pennsylvania, killing all the 
passengers on board (about 45 persons). 
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also they caused a huge economic loss, and political damage to the US that not all 
military actions by States could cause. 
Hence, the requirement of gravity of any attack in order to constitute an armed 
attack as stated by the ICJ in Nicaragua case that the attack must 'occur on a 
significant scale 8 is clearly presented in the attacks of September 11. 
Such a seriousness of the attacks against the US caused the Security Council to 
severely condemn the attacks in resolutions 1368 and 1373, and described them as 
threats to international peace and security. Also in these resolutions the Security 
Council reaffirmed the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence. 9 Some 
writers considered this affirmation of the right of self-defence as an implicit 
supposition that the attacks of September II constitute an armed attack. 10 
Nonetheless, many other commentators disagree with such an implication of 
the Resolutions of the Security Council for the following reasons: firstly, the 
reaffirmation of the right of self-defence was provided for in the preamble of both 
Resolutions but not in the operative parts; secondly, the Security Council could have 
stated in an obvious manner that the attacks on the US constitute an armed attack, but 
apparently avoided to do so; finally, in both Resolutions, the Security Council neither 
specified any State, not even the US, as a holder of the right of self-defence, nor 
named any State that the response in self-defence will be taken against. " 
'Military and Paramilitary (Nicaragua v. US), 1986 ICJ Report 14, at 104. 
9 See, UNSC Res. 1368 (2001), 4370'4 rntg, 12 Sep. 2001, UN Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001). See also, 
UNSC Res. 1373 (2001), 4385, h rntg, 28 Sep. 2001, LIN Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001). 
10 G. Gaia, In What Sense Was There An "Affned Attack", at www. ejil. org/fonnn-WTO. 
11 C. Stahn, 'Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001): What They Say and What 
They Do Not Say, at www, ejil. org/forum-WTC. 
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A comparison between these Resolutions and Resolution 661 (1990), in 
which the Council affirmed 'the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, 
in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait in accordance with Article 51 
of the Charter', ' 2 can be used as an example with respect to the last two points. 
On the other hand, the stance taken by the North Atlantic Organization 
(NATO) declared that 'The attack against the US on September II was directed from 
abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty'. 13 Article 5 of Washington Treaty provides: 
'The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe 
or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they 
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each one of them, in exercise of the right of 
individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such actions as it deems necessary, 
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area'. 14 
Another organization that took a similar attitude to the NATO was the 
organization of American States (OAS). On 22 September 2001, the foreign 
ministers of twenty-two States of the Western Hemisphere party to the Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (RIO Treaty) unanimously adopted a resolution in 
which they asserted that: 
'These terrorist attacks against the United States of America are alacks, 
against all American States, and ... in accordance will the relevant provisions of the 
[Rio Treaty] and the principle of continental solidarity, all State Parties to the Rio 
12 UNSC Res. 661 (6 August 1990). 
13 Secretary General Lord Robertson, Statement at NATO Headquarter (2 October 200 1 
<http: www. nato. int/docu/speech/2000/SO I 102a. htni>, (visited I October 2002). 
14 The North Atlantic Treaty, Signed in Washington D. C., (4 April 1949). 
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Treaty shall provide effective reciprocal assistance to address such attacks, and the 
threat of any similar attacks'. 15 
Moreover, reference can be made in this regard to the positions taken by 
many countries of the world. Some States have participated in the US military action 
against Afghanistan (e. g., Great Britain and Australia), while others provided airspace 
flying permission, or provided landing consent (e. g., Pakistan, Uzbekistan, 
Azerbaijan, TaJikistan, and Turkey, etc. ), or provided logistical support (e. g., Japan, 
Germany), or at least provided rhetoric support to such an action undertook by the US 
(the vast majority of the world). All of these positions support the finding that the 
attacks of September 11 were of such gave and serious nature that were 
unprecedented in any other terrorist attack. 
Another element that should be considered here in order to see whether the 
attacks of September II against the US constitute an armed attack is about the 
location of these attacks. Although most writers dispute the lawfulness of armed 
responses to attacks against nationals or interests outside the State using such armed 
forces, they all would have agreed that if such attacks as the ones of September II 
occur in the territory of such a State, it has the right to resort to armed action in self- 
defence. This is consistent with Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter which states that 'All 
Members shall refrain .... from the threat or use of violence against the territorial 
integrity orpolitical independence of any State'. 
The third and final element, that is even more controversial than the previous 
15 Twenty-Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Terrorist Threat to the 
Americas, OAS Doc. RC. 24/Res. 1/01 (21 September 2001), <htt1):! Iwww. oas-orZ! OAS 
Pace/Crisis/K. 24c. ht p. (visited I October 2002). 
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two elements of what constitutes an armed attack in the case of such attacks as the 
ones of September 11, is whether there is in such attacks which were committed by 
terrorist individuals or organizations, a link between these terrorist individuals or 
groups and a State or States has to be established for a legitimate self-defence. 
It may be argued that for the US military action against Afghanistan to be 
lawful, the US has to prove that the terrorist attacks of September II are attributed to 
the Taliban regime which the US attacked, otherwise its action must be considered as 
illegal. Such a supposition that the use of force under Article 51 of the UN Charter 
can be taken only against States is based on the followings: 
First of all, article 51 is an exception from the general prohibition of the use of 
force against States as indicated by Article 2 (4), which speaks of threat or use of 
force against States but not individuals absent such a linkage between States and those 
individuals. 
Secondly, such a requirement of State involvement in the armed attack can be 
inferred from the ICJ decision in the Nicaragua case. It appeared that the ICJ had 
assumed such an involvement of State when it found there seems to be a broad 
agreement that the 'nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting armed 
attacks' covers both 'actions by regular military armed force but also the sending by 
or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups'. 16 
The same implication can be obtained with regard the General Assembly 
definition of aggression, which involves States in all of its types. For example, the 
16 Nicaragua Case, note 8, at 195. 
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General Assembly defines aggression, in part, as including the 'Sending by or on 
behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, which carry out 
acts of armed force against another State of such a gravity as to amount td', inter alia, 
an armed attack conducted by regular forces. 17 
Moreover, the majority of writers are of the opinion that such a State 
involvement is inevitable and that for the use of force in self-defence to be justified, 
acts of private individuals or groups must be imputed to a State in accordance with 
State responsibility as will be discuss later. 
Travalio, for example, observed that the lack of such State involvement means 
that the use of force cannot be based on Article 51 of the UN Charter. He also added 
that coercive action against a State that was not responsible for the prior illegal act 
would mount to an international wrong. This will be the case, he further asserted, 
6even if it true that Article 51 justifies the use of force in self-defence against non- 
State actors, and attack against the non-State actors which violates the territory of the 
State in which they are located must itself be justified under international law. In 
other words, unless as "armed attack" by terrorists can be imputed to the State from 
which the terrorists originate, it is hard to see how the application of Article 51 to 
terrorist attacks advances the argument for the permissibility of military force in 
response'. ' 
Antonio Cassese also concurred with the above view and stressed that 'if ... 
we want to find out whether the use of force is permitted, we must first ascertain 
17 UNGA Res. 3314 (XXM at 14 Dec. 1974. 
18 G. Travalio, 'Intemational Law and The Use of Military Force', 18 Wisconsin International Law 
Journal, (2000), 145. 
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whether there has been an armed attack on the State using force by the State against 
which force is used'. 19 
Having established that State involvement in terrorist attacks is essential in 
order to resort to armed force in a legitimate exercise of the right of self-defence, one 
more question has to be answered as well. That is, what types of State involvement 
that can trigger such a lawful self-defence? 
In other words, when private individuals or groups (aýQaeda), which has no 
translucent relationship with a State (Afghanistan) committed serious terrorist attacks 
(the attacks of September 11) against another State (the US), what sort of criterion 
does international law require in order to impute such attacks of individual terrorists 
toa State against which a legitimate self-defence can be claimed? 
Most commentators are of the view that the answer to the crucial issue lies on 
the facts of whether such a State exercises "effective control" over the activities of 
those individual terrorists or not. 20 
Such a criterion of 'effective or overall contror can be found in the Nicaragua 
case in which the ICJ, though for the benefit of the US at that time, held that the US 
was not responsible for the activities of the Nicaraguan Contras. The Court stated that 
merely financing, organizing and assisting non-State actors (Contras) does not 
'warrant the conclusion that these forces [were] subject to the United States to such an 
'9 A. Cassese, 'Legal Response to Terrorism', 38 International Comparative Law Quarterly, (1995), 
558,597. 
20 H. Duffy, 'Responsibility to September 11: The Framework of International Law, at 
www. interights. org. 
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extent that any acts they committed are imputable to the State. Instead, the Court 
held the US responsible for other activities where was evidence that they were the 
result of direct action on the part of the US military or irregular bands or mercenaries 
acting on behalf of the US, but not in respect to the support given to the Contras. 21 
Another similar criterion has been approved and applied by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadic case. 22 In that case the Trial 
Chamber held that there is a need for more than 'a relationship of great dependency in 
the one side', but rather 'such a relationship of control .. that, on the facts of the 
instant case, the acts of the VRS (Bosnian Serb Force) can be imputed to the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)'. The 
Appeals Chamber endorsed this approach and provided more details. Nonetheless, 
the Tribunal noted that where the 'controlling State' is not the State where the armed 
clashes occur, 'more extensive and compelling evidence is required to show that the 
State is genuinely in control of the units or groups not merely by financing and 
equipping them, but also by generally directing or helping plan their actions'. 23 
The third and the most recent comparable test can be found in the International 
Law Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (Nov. 2001 ). 24 It should be noted that these draft articles, even if they 
are not binding yet, are largely in accord with the criterion adopted by the ICJ and 
21 Nicaragua Case, note 8 at 86-93. 
22 See the Prosecutor v. Tadic (1717-94- 1 -A), Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 15 July 1994, (Tadic Appeal 
Decision). 
23 lbid, Pam. 138. 
24 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Adopted by the 
International Law Commission (53 Scss., November 200 1). 
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ICTY as discussed above, therefore they can be considered as an evidence of the state 
of customary law. 
Among the many articles included in the draft about State responsibility, 
Article 8 is of relevant importance since it regulates the responsibility of a State for 
the activities of individuals similar to those relations with terrorist organizations. 
According to Article 8 'the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be 
considered as act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is 
in fact acting on the instruction of, or under the direction or control of, that State in 
carrying out the conduct' . 
25 
ýp 
Now the question is whether the Taliban regime, who was in control of most 
of the territory of Afghanistan at the time of the attacks of September 11, exercises an 
'effective or overall control' over the activities of al-Qaeda organization which the US 
alleged to be behind the events of September 11, therefore making Afghanistan a 
lawful target of military action in self-defence? It should be noted that any answer to 
this question depends on the factual elements of the relationship between the Taliban 
regime and Osama bin Laden, which were not fully revealed by the US. 
Nonetheless, most of the US official statements in the aftermath of the attacks 
of September II only accused the Taliban of harboring al-Qaeda terrorist organization 
and failing to cooperate with the international community when requested the 
extradition of bin Laden whom the US alleged to masterminded the attacks against it. 
Also, the Security Council, though failed to make an explicit statement with regard to 
Taliban regime in its resolutions 13 68 and 13 73 (200 1) in the wake of September 11, 
23 lbid, Art. 8. 
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had in the past condemned the Taliban and demanded it to 'stop providing sanctuary 
and training for international terrorists and terrorist organizations'. 26 Even more 
importantly, the Taliban regime had never endorsed or supported, at least publicly, the 
attacks of September II against the US even after the latter attacked it. 
Such a Taliban's involvement with al-Qaeda terrorist activities though can be 
considered as a breach of an international duty imposed on all States to 'refrain from 
... acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the 
27 commission of such acts [terrorist acts]'. Furthermore, the Taliban's failure to 
extradite bin Laden or to prosecute him is a violation of the aut dedere autjudicare 
which is considered as the central obligation in all of the anti-terrorism conventions as 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
Nevertheless, none of the above types of involvement imply that the Taliban 
regime has 'effective control' over the activities of al-Qaeda. In other words, if the 
clear American provision of weapons, training, and finance was not considered by the 
ICJ in Nicaragua case as a sufficient base to attribute the activities of the Contras to 
the US, then it is afortiori to say that the mere provision of sanctuary, which is less 
serious that the above provisions, should not be so as well. 
Lastly, as stated by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case, it is impossible to 
conclude 'from the mere fact of control exercised by a State over its territory and 
waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought to have known of any unlawful act 
26 See, Para. 1,2, and 3 of UNSC Res. 1333(2000), 4251'mtg, 19 Dec., 2000, UN Doc. S/RES/1333 
(2000). See also, UNSC Res. 1267 (1999), 4051 " mtg, 15 Oct., 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/ 1267 (1999). 
27 GA Res. 2625, UN GAOR, 25 Ih Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 339, UN Doc. A/8018 (1970). 
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perpetrated therein nor that it should have known the authors'. 28 To state otherwise 
means that the US and Germany should be held responsible since the perpetrators of 
the attacks of September II trained and emanated from their territory. 
(2)- Prior Illegal Act: 
Actions taken in self-defence must be in response to a wrongftil act by the 
other side of the relation that justifies recourse to armed force. 29 Thus, if one State is 
taking action against another because of the latter's illegal act (which constitutes an 
armed attack) the latter is not justified if it has decided to resort to armed force to 
counter the counterattack, because there was no prior illegal act, but there was a legal 
action taken in self-defence by the former. 
However, not all wrongs done to a State will justify the use or threatened use 
of force in self-defence. As indicated by Sir Gerald Fitzmourice, former judge of the 
ICJ, that 'international law now forbids the use of force except as a counter-measure 
to an illegality', nonetheless, he further adds, international law 'by no means permits 
[self-defence] in every case of illegality, but on the contrary, confines it to a very 
limited class.. of illegality only'. 30 
Most commentators are of the agreement that the lawful protection of the 
essential rights may include measures that involve the use of force in self-defence in 
response to acts that violated the territorial integrity or political independence which 
constitute threats to the national security. 
28 Co., rfu Channel Case, 10 Report 1949,34-35. 
29 Erickson, note 5 at 130. 
30 Ibid. at 132. 
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Some other writers argue that protection of human life or the ftutherance of 
human rights should also qualify as essential rights that justify the use of force in self- 
defence. It is to be noted that although the assessment of what constitutes an essential 
right is left to the State contemplating the use of force in self-defence, such a decision 
to use force if made, will be reviewed by the international community. 31 Preservation 
of legal rights or vindication of such rights is not essential rights that justify the use of 
force as will be discussed later. 
In the context of terrorism, the question of what is required for terrorist acts to 
constitute a wrongful armed attack that gives rise to the right to self-defence is subject 
to disagreement. Some argued that for a permissible self-defence, a State might 
respond only to terrorist attacks if they occurred within its own territory? 2 Therefore, 
according to them, the bombing of the West Berlin discotheque, of which the US 
accused Libya, 'could not possibly serve as any justification for the Reagan 
Administration's decision to bomb targets in and near the Libyan cities of Tripoli and 
Benghazi'. 33 
However, other writers contended that for such an act to constitute an illegal 
armed attack, it is not necessary for it to have occurred within the territory of the 
victim State. According to them any violent action, whether in or out of the territory 
of the victim State and whether against one person or many, can justify recourse to the 
use of force in self-defence. For example, any of the following actions might 
31 Ibid. 
32 F. Boyle, 'Military Responses to Tefforisný, 81 American Journal of International Law (1987), 288, 
294. 
33 Ibid. 
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engender a State's right of self-defence: Armed attacks against its territory; hostage 
taking within its territory; and attacks on its nationals abroad. 34 
Between these two arguments there is a moderate opinion, according to which, 
for a military response to terrorist acts to be lawful, those terrorist acts must be on a 
scale equivalent to that of an armed attack, if conducted - directly by a State forces. 
Isolated terrorist attacks, therefore, would not constitute armed attacks justifying the 
use of force. 35 According to the supporters of this moderate view, for terrorist acts, in 
order to constitute an armed attack must be 'a very serious attack either on the 
territory of the injured State or on its agents or citizens while at home or abroad (in 
another State or in international waters or airspace)'. 36 The attack of September II 
against the US is a good of such a grave terrorist act as discussed earlier. Also, the 
bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam is another example of 
such a serious terrorist attack occurring abroad, as will be discussed later. 
(3)- Timely Response: 
Self-defence contains a temporal element and is limited by time. Action taken 
in self-defence must be made near to the time to the actual attack or threat? 7 In other 
words, for self-defence to be permissible, actions taken according to it must constitute 
6'on-the_Spoe'38 responses or at least have a close proximity to the time of the armed 
attack. Otherwise, such actions would qualify as the illegal reprisal or retaliation 
taken after the armed attack had occurred? 9 
34 R. Beck and A. Arend4 "Don't Tread On US": International Law and Forcible Responses to 
Terrorism', 12 (2) Wisconsin International Law Journal (Spring 1994), 197-198. 
35 Ibid at 200. 
36 Cassese, note I at 596. 
37 Erickson, note 5 at 143. 
38 R. Beck and A. Arend, note 34 at 202. 
39 Ibid. 
183 
(4)- Last Resort: 
As has been emphasized earlier in Section 1, resort to armed force supposed 
that all alternatives, peaceful means have been exhausted and resort to armed force as 
unavoidable in a very compelling situation in accordance with international law. This 
condition as well as the previous one (i. e., timely response) constitutes the necessity 
required for responses in self-defence to be justified because if either condition does 
not exist, then neither does the necessity. As stated by the Caroline case, which 
indicated the state of customary international law on the issue of self-defence, the 
required necessity means that resort to armed action must be 'instant, overwhelming, 
and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation' . 
40 Therefore, for the 
US to prove that its armed actions in response to the attacks of September II was 
consistent with this requirement, it must establish that its military action against or 
within Afghanistan were to defend further attacks of a continuing attacks being staged 
against it by al-Qaeda terrorist organization in Afghanistan. 
(5)- Proportionate Response: 
Responses taken in self-defence must be proportionate in two ways: Firstly, 
the response must be proportionate to the prior illegal act of terrorism "tit-for-tat, '. 4 I 
Also, such response must be strictly confined to the removal of the danger posed by 
terrorists, i. e., preventive not retributive ý2 Hence, it would undoubtly be 
disproportionate to invade and occupy large portions of another State territory, or to 
indiscriminately and directly make its cities the object of attack because it provided 
support or sponsorship to international terrorists ý3 
40 B. Carter & P. Trimble, international Law (Little, Brown, and Company, 2 nd . 1995), 1294. 4' R. Beck and A. Arend, note 34 at 206. 
42 Erickson, note 5 at 131. 
43 Ibid. at 146. 
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The latter point is very significant since there is an international obligation 
imposed on all States not to attack civilians in any circumstances. As stated by the 
ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or the Use of Nuclear 
Weapons that 'States must never make civilians the object of attack and consequently 
never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilians and military 
targets, .. 
States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons 
they use'. 44 
Further guidance appears in Article 48 of the First 1977 Protocol of the 
Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflict. It states that 'in order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish 
between civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives 45 
Many observers raised serious concerns over the US military action against 
Afghanistan in response to the events of September 11, that such a response violated 
the requirement of proportionality for a legitimate self-defence. Actions by the US 
that raised these concerns are, for examples, invading and bombarding I. Tge portions 
of the territory of Afghanistan, overthrowing the Taliban regime, attacking power 
plants that supply power to the Afghani people, causing a huge refugee movement to 
the neighboring States, and killing, though the US alleged to be mistakenly, of 
44 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 77ireat or the Use offuclear Weapons, ICJ Report 1996, 
226,257. 
45 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims at International Armed Conflict, concluded 8 June 1977, (entered into force 7 December 
1978). 
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thousands of civilians by throwing bombs from airplane of 30 thousands feet of air 
latitude which in many times missed their targets. 
0 
Nonetheless, some scholars argued that the victim State's responses could be 
proportionate if calculated not only with respect to the immediate preceding unlawful 
terrorist attack but also to an aggregation of all past illegal acts. This approach known 
as "cumulative proportionaliv -A6 presented by Israel to justify its attack on Lebanon 
which took the form of an army invasion, however has been rejected by UN Security 
Council, which had on, many occasions 'formally condemned any attempt to justify 
totality of violence based upon an accumulation of events as an illegal reprisal'. 47 
Besides that, it is to be noted that although self-defence action is usually taken 
against the source of armed attack or threat, it is not disproportionate for a State to 
'retaliate beyond the immediate area of attack, when that state has sufficient reason to 
expect continuation of attacke. 48 
Secondly, the response must be proportionate in terms of the nature and the 
amount of force employed in self-defence . 
49 This corresponded with the "principle of 
, 50 minimalforce' , i. e., the employment of enough, not excessive force, to achieve its 
designated goals or objectives. Thus, any response to an act of terrorism which 
&ernploys a level of violence which is greater than is necessary to counter any 
continuing immediate threat must be viewed as impermissible'. 51 
46 R. Beck and A. Arend, note 34 at 206. 
47 Ibid. 
48 0. Schachter, 'The Right of States to Use Armed Force', 82 Michigan Law Review, (April-May 
1984), 1638. 
49 Erickson, note 5 at 146. 
50 P. Wilkinson, Terrorism and The Liberal States, (Macmillan, 1977), 43. 
51 R. Beck and A. Arend, note 34 at 206. 
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In determining the compliance by States with proportionality, there are many 
factors that can be considered, including: 
- The essential rights threatened; 
- The military force and anticipated resistance of the delinquent State; 
- The scope, nature, amount, and intensity of the force applied by the injured State 
in self-defence. This includes, for example, the scale of weaponry, the size and 
composition of the force, the targets selected, and the extent of collateral civilian 
damage and injury. 52 
(6)- Response Must Be Inunediately Reported to The Security Council and Must 
Cease If The Council Acts Effectively: 
As indicated by Article 51, such measures taken in self-defence must be 
reported immediately to the Security Council and such measures must cease, if the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Self-defence, therefore, is 'an interim mechanism that must be terminated 
when, but only when, the Security Council, takes effective, positive, affirmative 
action. A Security Council veto of proposal measures would result in Security 
Council inaction. Ineffective action or inaction on the part of the Council is not 
sufficient to end a State's right of self-defense'. 53 
5.2.1.2. Collective Self-Defence 
It is expressly indicated by Article 51 that 'Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs.. ', therefore every State has the right for collective self-defence in response to 
52 Erickson, note 5 at 146. 
53 Ibid. at 148-149. 
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terrorist attacks subject to the above discussed conditions. 
Now the question is whether Article 51 permits only the collective exercise of 
individual self-defence (i. e., by States all of which are subject to armed attack), or 
empowers other States which are not subject to any armed attack to support a victim. 
State in the exercise of that State's right of self-defence. 
In answering this question, thee majority of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case took 
the latter view that State's interests need not be directly affected in order to exercise 
collective self-defence, provided the injured State requested such assistanccý' 
Hence, in addition to the early discussed conditions for a legitimate individual 
self-defence, there are two more conditions that must be added here, which relates to 
the right of a third party State to intervene in a dispute in support of another State that 
is the victim of an armed attack. These conditions are: firstly, the assisting State must 
be supporting a victim State engaging in a legitimate self-defence; secondly, the 
assisting State must have been requested for assistance by the victim State. These 
additional requirements can be found in the ICJ rejection of the US' claim of 
collective self-defence in the Nicaragua case because Nicaragua's assistance to the 
Salvadorian rebels, the Court held, did not constitute an arrned attack and there was a 
lack of request from El Salvador to the US for assistance 5' 
5.2.2. Reprisal 
Under customary international law reprisal is one of the lawful means the 
"4 Nicaragua Case, note 8 at 104-105. 
55 lbid at 248-249. 
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injured State has in order to compel the delinquent State to consent to a satisfactory 
settlement of a difference created by the latter's own international wrong. The often- 
cited case, which illustrates the lawful status of reprisal under customary law, is the 
1928 Portuguese-German arbitration decision of the 1914 Naulila incident in 
Portuguese Angola. 56 In October 1914, at a time when Portugal was a neutral 
country in the WWI, a small German party crossed the frontier of Portuguese South- 
West Africa. Owing to a misunderstanding, the Portuguese fired a few shots, which 
killed 3 Germans. Germany immediately sent a punitive force, which invaded 
Portuguese territory, defeated the Portuguese and then withdrew. A native uprising 
followed causing considerable loss to Portugal. The Tribunal, which was established 
under the Versailles Treaty to hear Portugars claim, defined reprisals as follows: 
'Reprisals are acts of self-help by the injured State, acts in retaliation for 
acts contrary to international law on the part of the offending State, which have 
remained unredressed after a demand for amends. In consequence of such 
measures, the observance of this or that rule of international law is temporarily 
suspended, in the relations between the two States. They are limited by 
considerations of humanity and the rules of good faith, applicable in the 
relations between States. They are illegal unless they are based upon a previous 
act contrary to international law. They seek to impose on the offending State 
reparation for the offence, the return to legality and the avoidance of new 
offences'. 57 
Therefore, for a lawful reprisal the Tribunal laid down 3 conditions: 
I)- The target State must be guilty of a prior international delinquency against the 
claimant State; 
56 B. Carter & P. Trimble, note 40. 
57 Ibid. 
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2)- An attempt by the claimant State to obtain redress or reparation by other means 
must be known to have been made, and failed, or to be inappropriate or impossible in 
the circumstances; and 
3)- The claimant State's use of force must be limited to the necessity of the case and 
proportionate to the wrong done by the target State. 
These basic conditions are conunon to both reprisal and self-defence, as has 
been discussed earlier because they both are forms of self-help. 58 However, the great 
difference between reprisals and self-defence lies primarily in the aim or purpose of 
each of them. According to Bowett, self-defence is aiming at the protection of the 
security of the State and its essential rights -in particular the right of territorial 
integrity and political independence- upon which that security depends. Whereas 
reprisals are punitive in character; 'they seek to impose reparation for harm done, or 
to compel the delinquent State to abide by the law in future. But coming after the 
event and when the harm has already been inflicted, reprisals cannot be characterized 
as a means of protection'. 59 
Nevertheless this seemingly simple distinction is not always clear. On one 
hand is the fact that determining the motive or purpose of a State when carrying out 
an armed response is very difficult. On the other hand, such a reprisal, if carried out 
in response to recurring acts of violence, 'may be regarded as being at the same time 
both a form of punishment and the best form of protection for the future, since it may 
act as a deterrent against future acts of violence by the other party'. 60 
58 W. O'Brein, 'Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-defense in Counterterror Operation', 30 Virginia 
Journal ofInternational Law, (Winter 1996), 422. 
59 D. Bowett, 'Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force', 66 American Journal of International 
Law, (1972), 2. 
60 Ibid. 
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However such acceptability of reprisal as a lawful form for the use of force 
subject to the above-discussed conditions has been replaced by a total ban by the UN. 
As noted by Bowett that: 'Few propositions about international law have enjoyed 
more support than the proposition that, under the Charter of the United Nations, the 
use of force by way of reprisals is illegal'. 61 Such a ban is clearly demonstrated by 
Article 2 (3) and 2 (4), which forbid any use of force except as provided for in Article 
51 (or an action authorized by the Security Council). Moreover, the UN Declaration 
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relation and Cooperation 
Among States, stated, in part, that 'States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal 
involving the use of force'. 
Also, the practice of the UN Security Council indicates the repeated 
disapproval by the Security Council of such acts. For examples, I- The Security 
Council condemnation of the 1964 British air attacks on Yemeni positions in 
retaliation of a series of Yemeni attacks on the territory of the South Arabian 
Federation. 62 2- The Security Council condemnation of the Portuguese attacks on the 
village of Samine in Senegal in November and December of 1969, the Security 
Council rejected the Portuguese plea of self-defence and described the attacks as 
illegal reprisals ý3 3- The frequent Security Council condemnations of the Israeli 
reprisals against Lebanon, Syria and Jordan in retaliation to the Palestinian attacks 
against Israel. " 
61 Ibid. at 1. 
62 R. Falk, 'The Beirut Raid and The International Law of Retaliation'. 63 American Journal of 
International Law, (1969), 429. 
63 Ibid. 
64 O'Brein, note 58 at 422-440. Examples of these condemnations are Res. 313,316,332,347, etc. 
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Further policy reasons for why reprisals should be illegal acts are: 
- They are available only to strong over the weak; 
- They allow the victim State to both judge the wrong done against it and to extract 
the reparation for that wrong (ie., judge and adversary at the same time); 
- If allowed, they will sever the relations between States and might cause counter 
reprisals by the other party, thus escalating the use of force between Statesý5 
5.2.3. Protection of One's Own Nationals 
The question now is whether under international law a State has the right to 
use armed force to rescue its nationals in another State from imminent terrorist attack? 
The answer to this question is very contentious. While some writers regard it 
as outside the scope of the lawful self-defence, others consider 'protection of one's 
own nationals as part of the customary right of self-defence under Article 51 and sees 
6 self in self-defence as including the nationals of a State'. 66 As observed by the 
former US Ambassador to the UN William Scranton in his support for the Israeli raid 
at Entebbe in 1976. He stated that: 
'There is a well-established right to use limited force for the protection 
of one's own nationals from an imminent threat of injury or death in a situation 
where the State in which territory they are located either is unwilling or unable 
to protect them. The right, flowing from the right of self-defence, is limited to 
such use of force as is necessary and appropriate to protect threatened nationals 
from injUry'. 67 
65 Erickson, note 5 at 177. 
66 Ibid. at 182. 
6' J. Murphy, State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political, and Economic Dimensions, 
(Mansell, 1989), 89. 
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There were many cases in which many States, especially in the form of 
hostage rescue, had advanced protection of one's own nationals in order to justify the 
use of force. For instance: - The Israelis in 1976 in Entebbe; - The West Germans in 
1972 in Mogadishu; - The Egyptians in 1978 at Larnaca, Cyprus; - The US in the 
Iranian hostage rescue attempt in 1980; and - The Grenada operation in 1983 also by 
the US. 68 
It should be noted that some of these rescue operations mentioned above were 
initiated with the permission of the territorial States, e. g., the West Germany in 1972 
in Mogadishu. Therefore, they cannot be placed in the same context as other cases 
without such permission when discussing their legality. The only two known rescue 
cases that were conducted without the permission of the territorial States were the 
Israelis in 1976 in Entebbe, and the US rescue attempt in 1980 in Tehran. These two 
cases, even if the international community as a whole did not condemn them, though 
there were some condemnations by some regional organizations like the Organization 
of African Unity, which condemned the Israeli action against Uganda, should be 
viewed just as an occasional departure from the general rule of international law that 
prohibits the use of force except in self-defence or upon an authorization from the 
Security Council. 
However, even those who think that protection of one's own nationals is a 
lawful action in accordance with the rules of international law fear that some States, 
as a pretext to intervene in the internal affairs of other States, can abuse such an 
excuse, certain conditions must exist before resorting to force in these cases: 
68 Erickson, note 5 at 183. 
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First of all, it must be conducted for the protection of the rescuing State's own 
nationals. For examples: the Israeli rescue mission in Entebbe was for the purpose of 
releasing the Israeli hostages; and the aborted American attempt in Iran was for the 
purpose of rescuing the American citizens held hostages at the American embassy. 
Otherwise such action will be labeled as humanitarian intervention, which the legality 
of is disputed. 
Secondly, there must be an inability or unwillingness on the part of the 
territorial State to protect them! 9 The Entebbe case was a clear example of such 
unwillingness by Uganda, the territorial State, to cooperate with Israel to secure the 
release of the hostages, as indicated earlier the Ugandan Government was itself 
involved in the hijacking by supporting the hijackers. 
Moreover, there must be an imminent threat of injury or death facing them. 
The Entebbe case is also illustrative in this regard, since there was no doubt as to the 
imminent peril of death of the Israeli captives because the hijackers made specific 
demands and stated that if these demands were not met by a specified date, they will 
start executing the Israeli hostages. 
However, in the aborted US rescue attempt in Tehran the existence of this 
condition was surrounded by doubts because the American hostages, some argued, 
were held for more than six months. Thus, if there were any imminent danger, it 
would have happened. 
69 Note that States do not have an absolute obligation to prevent all kinds of crime that might be 
committed against foreigners on their territories. Common crimes, like murders, robberies, assaults, 
... etc., are indigenous to all societies and affect citizens as well as foreigners. See ibid. 
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Nonetheless, the majority of scholars are of the opinion that the US had the 
right to believe that its citizens held captives in the embassy were under imminent 
danger of losing their lives or suffering serious injury. The US, they argued, cannot 
be blamed of taking such action because the emotional atmosphere in Tehran and the 
public threats that the hostages might be executed were reasonable grounds for such 
apprehension. 70 
Furthermore, the unwillingness or the inability of the Iranian authorities to 
intervene in the situation and release the hostages was another factor that may also 
rationalize the US fear that the hostages were in irnrninent danger and about to face 
harm, if it did not interfere and rescue them. 
In addition, the action must be the last resort. The satisfaction of this 
condition had also been raised with respect to the aborted US attempt in 1980 to 
rescue the hostages in Tehran. Had peaceful means been exhausted or were they still 
available? 
It should be recalled that in response to the crisis, the Security Council had 
adopted a resolution condemning the seizure as illegal and urging immediate release 
of the hostages. The ICJ had issued an Order during the first few weeks of the crisis 
calling for the release of the captives. Moreover, there had been many efforts by 
various intermediaries and a UN Fact-Finding Commission had been established. 
" Schachter, note 48 at 163 1. 
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Iran, notwithstanding, had ignored the Security Council resolution; it refused 
to comply with the Order of the ICJ; all intermediary efforts had not been successful; 
and Iran failed to cooperate with the UN Fact-Finding Commission. 
Nonetheless, the case was still before the ICJ on the merits when the US had 
attempted the rescue mission. Accordingly, one may plausibly say that this implies 
that peaceful means had not been fully exhausted at the time when the US undertook 
the rescue operation. 
In spite of this fact, the Court did not find the US action unlawful on these 
grounds. Instead, the Court 'made a distinction between unlawful action and action 
incompatible with respect for the judicial process. The Court was of the opinion that 
so long as the case was pending, US action should be limited. 971 
More significantly was the fact that the case was pending does not give any 
assurance on the safety of the hostages. 72 Under such circumstances, as discussed 
earlier with respect to the third condition, it is hard, Schachter pointed out, to say that 
the US military action was unnecessary simply because the case was still pending 
before the Court. 'As a matter of principle', he further noted, 'exhaustion of remedies 
cannot be required when the remedies are likely to be futile. The State whose 
nationals are in peril must be given latitude to determine whether a rescue action is 
necessary'. 73 
71 
Erickson, note 5 at 184. 
72 Schachter, note 48 at 163 1. 
73 Ibid. 
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Finally, the action must be proportionate. This condition can be explained in 
the following: 
(a) The action must be strictly confined to the object of protecting nationals 
against injury, i. e., the rescuing State is not allowed to establish law and order 
within the target State, change the foreign government, or punish those 
responsible of ill treatment for one's nationals. 
For example, the US use of force in Grenada in 1983 was justified in part as a 
rescue mission. The US claimed that over one thousand threatened Americans were 
in Grenada. Though many countries did not find that a convincing ground for the 
intervention considering it a pretext for unlawful action and had disputed such claim. 
The UN General Assembly had also condemned the action and considered it as a 
flagrant violation of the UN Charter. Such a resolution had the support of an 
overwhelming majority, including virtually all of the allies and usual supporters of the 
us. 74 
The actions committed by the US after the intervention also supported the 
doubts expressed about the operation as a rescue mission. The fact that the US forces 
acted to expel Cubans and others and remained on the Island to restore 'law and 
order' and a democratic political institution, placed this action in a different light, as 
argued by the others. Justification for these measures would not be found in the legal 
principle of the legitimate use of force for the protection of one's own nationalS. 75 
74 Ibid. at 1632. 
75 Ibid. 
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(b) The action must be a protective and not a punitive one. 
For example, the Entebbe case, though held by many writers as the model case 
of rescue mission, involved a violation of this requirement. After the Israeli airplanes 
liberated the hostages, they destroyed ten Ugandan aircraft and caused considerable 
damage to various parts of the airfield. 76 The argument that such destruction was to 
prevent the pursuit of the rescue planes is not convincing because such a goal could 
have been achieved by other means with minimum damage. For instance, they could 
have destroyed the airfield grounds, therefore make it impossible for aircraft to take 
off or land unless repaired which usually takes a considerable amount of time to do. 
Moreover, Yaakobi, the then Israeli Transportation Minister, stated that the 
primary purpose of this destruction was to 'serve as a penalty upon the Ugandan 
77 
government for involving itself with the hijackers to the degree it had. Thus 
suggesting the punitive motive over the protective one in contravention with this 
condition. 
In addition, this condition implies that if the damage or injury has already been 
inflicted upon the State's nationals and no further attack is expected to follow, then 
this approach is no longer available as an option. 78 
5.2.4. Invitation 
Although intervention in the internal affairs of any State is generally 
prohibited, it may be permitted when consent is obtained from the Host State to 
76 Murphy, note 67 at 84.. 
77 F. Boyle, 'The Entebbe Hostages Crisis', in H. Han (ed. ), Terrorism, Political Violence and World 
Order. (University Press of America, 1984), 569. 
7' Erickson, note 5 at 183-187. 
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another to interfere with the military! 9 Such consent or invitation is a right of every 
State or sovereign and, as a result, will relieve the intervening State from international 
responsibility as long as its activity was in compliance with such consent. 
In the context of terrorism, such an invitation might play a very useful role in 
the fight against terrorism because many States do not have the technological and 
military means to defeat modem terrorists, who are, in many cases, welýequipped, 
especially if sponsored or supported by other States. 80 A good example of such an 
invitation was the 1977 Somalian appeal to the then Federal Republic of Germany to 
rescue the hostages of the hijacked Lufthansa flight in Mogadishu. 81 
Nevertheless, such right of invitation has been subjected to some conditions in 
order to avoid abuses by certain States, which are, for various reasons, inclined to 
intervene in other States in the name of invitation. These conditions are: 
1) Such a request or invitation must be made by a lawful government; 
2) The official who made such a request must have the constitutional 
authority to do so; 
3) Such a request must be freely made without coercion or intimidation of 
whatever kind. 82 
However, despite the listing of these conditions, in some cases it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to discern the satisfaction of these conditions. For 
example, in the Grenada operation of 1983, the US claimed invitation as one of the 
Ibid. at 174. 
Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
"' Ibid. 
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grounds justifying its action. The facts of that case made the dispute of whether these 
conditions necessary for invitation were available or not are worth mentioning. 
Firstly, did Governor-General Paul Scoons possess the constitutional authority to 
make the request? Because Scoons, was not the prime minister but the governor- 
general, an appointee of the queen of England. Secondly, was the request made 
before or after the decision to intervene? Even if it was not, is it sufficient that the 
request was made prior to the actual intervention? Thirdly, what was the nature of 
Scoons's request? Scoons was quoted of saying, 'What I did ask for was not an 
invasion but help from the outside'. 83 
5.3. US AIRATTACK AGAINST SUDAN AND AFGHANISTAN: UNDER 
WHAT CONTEXT? 
On August 20 1998, the US launched simultaneous missile attacks against 
terrorist bases in Afghanistan and an alleged chemical weapons factory in Sudan. 
This was in response to two weeks earlier, a bombing of two US embassies in Nairobi 
and Dar Es Salaam on August 7,1998, which resulted in the death of about 257 
84 people, including 12 Americans and the injury of 5,500. 
Both targets in Afghanistan and Sudan were carefully selected, the US alleged, 
because of their alleged links to Osama bin Laden of whom the US claims to have 
convincing evidence that he or his group have 'played the key role in the embassy 
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania'. 85 
93 Ibid. at 175. 
84 See Bronwen Maddox, US Strikes Back at Terrorists, The Times, 21 August 1998, at 1. 
85 US Bombs Terrorist Facilities in Sudan, Afghanistan, Corpus Christi Caller Times, Tuesday, August 
20,1998, (visited Sept. 24,00), <http: //www. caller. com/breakingnews/strikes/ap I. htm>. 
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In Afghanistan the targets were a compound of six buildings at Khost, near the 
Pakistani border, 86 comprising of training camps and an arsenal of weapons and 
ammunition. These sites were part of what US intelligence reports called "the most 
extensive Sunni Muslim terrorist universily, 87 in the world under the control of Bin 
Laden and his group. The US attacks on this target resulted in an overall destruction 
of its fabrication and the death of 22 people and injury of 30.88 The US believed that 
at the time of the attack there were some terrorist leaders gathering at the targeted site 
and they were planning to carry out further attacks against US's citizens and 
interest. 89 
In Sudan the target was the Al-Shifa plant located in Khartoum, the capital of 
Sudan. US intelligence claimed that the plant was used to produce precursor 
chemicals for the deadly nerve gas VX and that Bin Laden has had an association in 
the past with the Sudanese government, which owns the plant and had some financial 
interest in contributing to this facility. 90 Thus the attack on the plant was an effort by 
the US to reduce Bin Laden's terrorist capability in acquiring chemical weapons and 
other dangerous weapons. The US attack on AI-Shifa plant resulted in the injury of 
at least 10 workers. 91 
However, such US claims in justifying its attacks against those particular 
86 A Pakistani official said that one of the missiles landed on its soil, killing at least 5 people. See, US 
Strikes Signal Tougher Stance Against Terrorism, Corpus Christi Caller Times, Tuesday, August 20, 
1998, (visited Sept. 24,00), <htlp: llwww. caller. com. -breakinLnews. istrikcs! 3121-Llltm>. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 The Times, note 94. 
90 Text of News Briefing Thursday by Defense Secretary William Cohen and Gen. Henry Shelton, 
Corpus Christi Caller Times, Thursday, August 20,1998, (visited Sept. 24,00), 
<http: //www. caller. com/breakingnews/strikes/ap3. htm>. 
9' Corpus Christi Caller Times, note 85. 
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targets, especially the AI-Shifa plant in Sudan, were not easy to prove. The US 
allegations of having "compelling evidence", "solid evidence", and "convincing 
information" have become very controversial either in their factual basis or their legal 
justifications. 
5.3.1. Factual Uncertainty 
The targeted site in Afghanistan, which according to the US provided refuge 
for terrorists, housed the infrastructure for funding international travel, and was used 
to train terrorists in the use of weaponry and in the tactics of international terrorisrr? 2 
under the command of Osama bin Laden was not disputed by any other party except 
the fact that Mullah Mohammed Omar, the supreme leader of the Taliban movement, 
which controls most of the county, cited when he said that such a site as that 'run by 
Mr. Bin Laden had been closed down long before the attacke. 93 
The attacks on AI-Shifa plant, however, had been very controversial and the 
quality of evidence presented by the US on its decision to attack this plant, because of 
its involvement either in producing chemical weapons as alleged by the US or because 
of its link to Osame bin Laden, had been rebuffed and refuted by many observers even 
by some of the US officials themselves. At the beginning the US claimed that the 
plant was a heavily guarded chemical weapons facility and was not involved in any 
medicine production proceSSý4 However, the US a short while after the attacks, 
backed away from this assertion and admitted that at the time of the attacks the 
92 S. Scheideman, 'Standards of Proof in Forcible Responses to Terrorism', 74 (1) Syracuse Law 
Review, (2000), 256. 
93 Julian Borger, US Missile Raid: Sudan Prepares to Make Complaint to the U`N, The Guardian, 21 
August 1998, at 3. 
94 J. Lobel, 'The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and 
Afghanistan', 24 (2) Yale International Law, (Summer 1999), 244. 
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officials were unaware that the plant did in fact produce pharmaceuticals, and that it 
95 
was unguarded. Indeed, the facts later became clear and showed that this plant was 
one of the major pharmaceutical factories in Sudan, which produced 50% of Sudanese 
96 
medicine. 
Moreover, the US alleged, as in the words of the US Secretary of Defence 
97 William Cohen that bin Laden had some financial interests in the AI-Shifa plant. 
Nonetheless, such a claim proved to be mistaken. It turned out that early in 1998, the 
factory was sold to a Sudanese businessman, Salah Idris, who is not known for his 
Islamic sympathies and has no known links to bin Ladený8 These unproved links 
between Idris and bin Laden forced the US Treasury Department on May 4,1999, to 
release Idris's assets that were seized therein. Such a move has been generally viewed 
as an admission that the US is unwilling or unable to produce any kind of evidence 
that would implicate Idris in bin Laden's groups or activities. " 
In addition, in order to prove that the Al-Shifa factory was a chemical 
weapons production facility, the US claimed that a soil sample collected from the 
ground outside the factory was found to contain the chemical EMPTA. According to 
the US officials the only known use for EMPTA is as a precursor ingredient in the 
nerve gas VX. 100 
95 Ibid. 
96 Scheideman, note 92 at 275. 
97 Corpus Christi Caller Times, note 90. 
go Ibrahim, Bright, Bhatia, and Vulliamy, The Missiles, The Bungling Pentagon and The Nerve Gas 
Factory That Never Was, The Observer, 30 August 1998, at 4. 
99 L. Campbell, 'Defending Against Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of the Decision to Strike Sudan and 
Afghanistan', 74 (3) Tulane Law Review, (Feb. 2000), 1090. 
100 Lobel, note 94 at 245. 
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However, such a finding has been called into question for the following 
reasons: 
Firstly, experts argued that the taking of just one soil sample outside the plant 
is contrary to what international standards normally require. 101 They also observed 
that the US techniques in this regard are faulty, because the sample was too small and 
at least three laboratories should have independently tested that sample not only one, 
as was done by the US. 102 
Secondly, experts from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW), which oversees the treaty barring chemical weapons, said that 
EMPTA has a high chemical reactive nature, thus it is unlikely that the EMPTA can 
be found unaltered in a ground sample unless, as the experts explained, 'if somebody 
had emptied a flask and then taken a sample'. 103 
Thirdly, the owner of the AI-Shifa plant and his American lawyers hired a 
team of scientists who conducted three independent tests on samples collected from 
13 different areas around the factory. Not one of these tests revealed any trace of 
EMPTA. 104 
Furthermore, while the US claimed that EMPTA is an immediate chemical 
weapons precursor with no other recognized use, several experts who are familiar 
with EMPTA, either from the OPCW or independent experts, pointed out that 
101 Scheidcman, note 92at 258. 
102 Id., it should be noted also that the US officials refused to make the sample available to a widcr 
body of experts. The Observer note 98. 
"' Lobcl, note 94 at 545. 
104 Sheila MacVicar, Blinded By (Bad) Science? ABCNEWS. Com, Feb. 10,1999, (visited Sept. 24, 
00), <httpJ/abcnews. go. com/onair/DailyNews/wnt9902 I O_sudan. html>. 
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EMPTA could be used for legitimate commercial purposes, including the manufacture 
of fungicides and microbial agents. 105 Experts also added that the chemical structure 
of EMPTA resembles Fonofos, an insecticide on sale in Africa, and that the laboratory 
test could confuse the tWo. 106 
In addition, the American engineer who designed the factory, 107 a British 
engineer who worked there for along time, 108 and several other Jordanian engineers 
who also used to work there, 10' all concurred that the plant had only been for the 
production of medicine and did not have the facilities and equipment to make nerve 
gas. 
Finally, the Sudanese government had called for a UN Security Council fact- 
finding investigation of the US claims. However, the US has successfully blocked 
such efforts, ' 10 and that implies the uncertainty of the US evidence, if evaluated by the 
UN. Moreover, the Sudanese govedment named Iraq where years of inspections 
were used to verify the Iraqi's involvement of such chemical weapons production. "' 
It is obvious from the previous ihctual dispute, especially with respect to the 
sort of evidence presented by the US in its decision to bomb the Al-Shifa factory, that 
there is a real need for an international judicial, or other centralized fact-finding 
mechanism to evaluate such evidence in order prevent some nations from the 
105 The Observer, note 98. 
106 Lobel, note 94 at 545. 
'0' The Observer, note 98. 
VX Gas Clue 'In Factory Soil', The Times, 26 August 1998, at 11. 
The Observer, note 98. 
110 Lobel, note 94 at 53 7. 
111 Scheideman, note 92 at 25 7. 
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unilateral use of force against other nations based on mere suspicions or on 
undisclosed evidence. 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, only some types of relationship between a 
State and terrorists allow the use of force against such a State. Consequently, an 
assessment of the legality of the use of force in response to terrorism must begin with 
an examination of the relationship between the State and terrorists. This assessment 
cannot be properly undertaken unless the evidence of such a relationship is revealed in 
order to subject them for evaluation by the international community. 
What the US did in this case is based on the "trust US,, 112 approach, i. e., error 
is not possible. Such an approach will give the right to any State to attack another 
State based on undisclosed facts not subject to international scrutiny. This will be the 
case, unless someone argues that the US, but not other countries, alone can use this 
approach! 13 
Nonetheless, one might argue that it is unrealistic to subject such evidence, 
upon which the decision to attack is based, for evaluation by a public forum in such a 
multilateral level because this might compromise the intelligence sources from which 
these evidences were obtained and render those sources less valuable in the future. 
In reply to this sensible concern, Lobel, has advanced three arguments which, 
according to him, must compel the conclusion that a State which attacks another State 
in response to terrorist attacks is required to submit such a decision to attack and the 
112 Lobel, note 94 at 553. 
113 Ibid. 
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evidence upon which this decision is based to international review: 
Firstly, the decision to use force is permitted by international law only in 
compelling cases of self-defence when there is an overwhelming necessity. 
Therefore, the unwillingness to subject its factual basis to international review 
suggests that the necessity of such action is uncertain. Hence, the requirement of the 
international review serves to ensure that such a decision is not made 
unconscientiously. 
For instance, the Reagan Administration revealed some evidence to support its 
1986 decision to attack Libya and that included the disclosure of sensitive intelligence 
information, but 'such disclosure was one of the costs of conducting those air strikes. 
International law, Lobel fixther added, 'does impose some costs on a nation that uses 
forces against another - one of these legitimate costs involves the necessity of proving 
its claim to the international community'. 114 
Secondly, while it is true that in some cases the disclosure of such evidence 
may compromise the intelligence sources, it may not in the others. For example, in 
this case the US could have subjected the soil sample it had to independent review; it 
could have permitted access to the lab test to other independent experts and to lab 
technicians who could have evaluated the sample; and it could have permitted a 
multilateral investigation into Mr. Idris's ties and what was being produced at the 
factory. The US could have done all of this without disclosure of any sensitive 
intelligence information. 115 
114 Ibid. at 554. 
115 Ibid. 
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Thirdly and fmally, as mentioned earlier that if every State is allowed to use 
force against another State based on secret information that it is not legally required to 
share, then the fundamental premise of the UN Charter prohibiting the use of force is 
rendered meaningless. Hence, some sort of international review, e. g., fact-finding 
commission, must be required if there is a real need to preserve some meaningful 
legal restraints on the use of force in the figlit against terrorism? 16 
5.3.2. Legal Justifications 
At the moment the most important question to be answered here is whether 
such US attacks against Afghanistan and Sudan can be legally justified based on the 
facts discussed above. In order to justify its attacks, the US stressed, on many 
occasions, the right to self-defence as the legal basis of this act. The US Secretary of 
Defence William Cohen pointed this out, when he said, 'This [action] has been an 
exercise of self-defense against an imminent and continuing terrorist threats'. 117 
Nonetheless, to find out whether such an argument is legally sound, will depend on 
satisfying the three basic conditions of legitimate self-defence, i. e., an armed attack, 
necessity, and proportionality discussed early in Section Two of this chapter. 
A. An Armed Attack 
The first question to be asked here is whether the August 7,1998 embassy 
bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam can be characterized as an armed attack 
against the US? 
116 Ibid. 
117 Corpus Christi Caller Times, note 90. 
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Some commentators have argued that such attack could not constitute an 
armed attack against the US because it was not against US territory. 118 This 
argument, however, as has been discussed earlier in Section 2 has not been accepted 
by some scholars who consider it not requisite for an act to constitute an armed attack, 
to have occurred within the territory of the victim State! 19 According to them, such 
attack can be considered as an armed attack even if happened outside the victim 
State's territory, if such attack has caused a serious injury to this State. 120 Clearly, the 
attack against the US embassies was a serious attack that caused a substantial injury to 
the US and to many other countries like the territorial countries, where the embassies 
situated. Moreover, the attack was carried out against the US embassies, which are 
treated under international law as inviolable property of their home States. 121 
A second part of this question that must follow, is whether, such bombings, 
which the US alleged that had been committed by groups of terrorists masterminded 
by Osama bin Laden, can be attributed or imputed to the targeted States, i. e., Sudan 
and Afghanistan. Without such involvement by Sudan and Afghanistan in bin 
Laden's activities, there would not have been an armed attack committed by these 
countries against the US, which would have permitted the use of force by the US 
against them and allowed the US to attack them with impunity. 
As discussed earlier that not every State involvement and support of terrorist 
activities constitutes an armed attack. Only terrorist acts committed by terrorist 
"a David A Sager, Letter: It Wasn't Self Defence, The Guardian, 24 August 1998, at 17. 
119 Beck and Arend, note 34 at 196-201. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Campbell, note 99 at 1093. 
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individuals or groups who were under 'effective or overall control' of the would-be 
target State. Such a criterion was applied by the ICJ in Nicaragua case and by the 
ICTY in Tadic case and provided for in the ILC Draft articles on States Responsibility 
as discussed earlier in more details. Therefore, only when State exercise effective 
control over the activities of the terrorist individuals or groups, their actions can 
amount to an armed attack committed by that State. Other forms of supports like 
logistical, training, or provision of weapons do not constitute an armed attack as stated 
by the ICJ in Nicaragua Case. Moreover, provision of a safe haven is also a form of 
support, which like other forms of assistance to terrorists does not constitute an armed 
attack committed by the safe haven provider State, which allows the victim State to 
use force in response, though the assisting State in these cases is still responsible 
under international law. 
With respect to Afghanistan and Sudan, the only form of State sponsorship or 
support to bin Laden of which the US accused these States, was the harbouring of bin 
Laden and his terrorist groups, as in the words of President Clinton when he approved 
the strikes. He said 'Countries that persistently host terrorists have no right to be a 
safe haven'. 122 Thus, despite the fact that the bombings of the US embassies 
constitute an anned attack, such an attack cannot be attributed to Sudan and 
Afghanistan in order to authorize the US attack against them as a legitimate act of 
self-defence. Because these States' involvement in bin Laden's activities is only in 
the form of provision of a safe haven, and such involvement and support does not 
amount to an armed attack committed by these countries. 
122 Corpus Christi Caller Time, note 86. 
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Additionally, it should be noted that the mere existence of bin Laden or any of 
his groups either in Afghanistan or Sudan does not imply that these countries have the 
knowledge of their terrorist activities. As conceded by the Corfu Channel Court that 
it is impossible to conclude 'from the mere fact of the control exercised by a State 
over its territory and waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought to have known 
of any unlawful act perpetrated therein nor yet it should have known it authore. 123 
Such knowledge was even more difficult for the US to prove. Nowhere had the US 
claimed that the alleged chemical factory was to assist terrorists and that the Sudanese 
government was aware of such activity. 124 
B. Necessity 
Two aspects of necessity that may independently be regarded here: First is the 
question of whether the US use of force against Sudan and Afghanistan was a 
response to an ongoing attack? Many answered this question in the negative. They 
argued that because the bombings were affected two weeks before the US initiated 
any action, the danger that the action was intended to counter had already subsided 
and no longer posed an immediate threat to the US, therefore the US attack was not 
necessary to repulse or to end an attack. 125 
Nonetheless, an argument was made to the effect that a necessary self-defence 
response may, in some cases, follow the victim State's exhaustion of attempts at 
achieving a peaceful solution, thus suggesting that there must be some time between 
the terrorist attack and the victim State's use of force in response. 126 Records, 
123 Corfu Channel Case, note 28 at 18. 
124 Scheideman, note 92 at 257. 
125 Ibid. at 272-273. 
"6 Cassese, note I at 204. 
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however, show that the US exhausted no such peaceful attempts at any time between 
the time of the embassy bombings and the US use of force. 
Knowing the fact that in 1996 Sudan had deported bin Laden in an agreement 
with the US as asserted by the Sudanese ambassador to the UN El Falih Erwa , 
127 
Sudan also, sincerely or not, condemned the bombings of Nairobi and Dar Es 
Salaam, 128 and more importantly Sudan claimed that two suspects of the bombings 
were in detention therein between the time of the bombings and the US attack. 
129 However the US refused to cooperate and thus Sudan released them after the attack . 
All these facts suggest that a possible peaceful solution might have been possible, 
especially with Sudan, but was never attempted by the US. 
The second and other aspect of necessity, which was strongly argued by the 
US to justify its forcible action, was that such action was undertaken to preempt 
probable future attack. 130 In other words, the US relied on anticipatory self-defence to 
justify its action. According to the US, there "was compelling information" that bin 
Laden's groups were planning additional terrorist attacks against the US and these 
actions (i. e., US strikes) were to counter such imminent attacks. 131 
Although such an argument may be accepted with respect to the action taken 
against sites in Afghanistan because of the fact that during the US strikes, there were 
some terrorist leaders, as alleged by the US, who were meeting to plan further attacks, 
127 The Guardian, note 93. 
128 David Hirst, US Missile Raids: Why Our Drugs Factory? Why Not The Arsenal? The Guardian, 22 
August 1998, at 3. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Scheimeman, note 92 at 273. 
131 Corpus Christi Caller Times, note 85. 
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and so it could be said that the US strikes were necessary to forestall such an 
imminent attack as the terrorists were about to finalize. 132 
On the contrary, such an argument of anticipatory self-defence was extremely 
difficult to be found to justify the attack against the AI-Shifa factory in Sudan, even 
under the assumption that such a factory was involved in chemical weapons 
production as claimed by US, for the following reasons: 
0 
Firstly, it is hard to understand how the attacking of such factory would 
prevent an imminent attack, because if a terrorist attack was truly imminent, terrorists 
should have everything they needed to carry out their attack, and should not have been 
expected to receive any provision from the factory, otherwise the terrorist attack could 
not be considered an imminent attack. 133 
Secondly and similarly, the US alleged that the factory was producing the 
EMPTA, i. e., an ingredient of the VX nerve gas, rather than the actual weapons. Thus 
terrorists would have to expend some additional time and effort to incorporate this 
ingredient into the actual weapons. 134 
Thirdly, reports suggested that the factory was singled out by the US as a 
potential target months before the strikes, and that again negates the argument that 
there was a necessity to forestall an impending attack by terrorists against the US, 
which warranted such strikes. 135 
132 J. Remano, 'Combating Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reviving the Doctrine of a 
State ofNecessity', 87 (4) Georgetown LawJournal (April, 1999), 1042. 
133 Ibid. at 104 1. 
114 Ibid. 3 
135 Ibid. 
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Finally and more importantly, the fact that a factory may possibly pose a 
potential threat to the US someday in the future, under international law, is not 
sufficient to justify the US strikes. For example, in 1981, Israel attacked a partially 
completed nuclear reactor in Iraq with F-16s and completely destroyed the target. 
Israel argued that its attack was a justified self-defence because Iraq was a hostile 
neighbour who opposed Israel's existence, and the reactor could have been used to 
produce weapons that could be launched against Israel. However, the UN Security 
Council labelled the incident as a 'danger to international peace and security' and 
stated that in the absence of a launched attack [or at least an imminent attack as most 
scholars argued], there was no need to destroy the reactor. 136 
Despite the determination by the Security Council that the act was a 'danger to 
international peace and security created by the premeditated Israeli air attack on Iraqi 
nuclear installation .. ' 
137 in accordance with Article 39 of the UN Charter which 
provides that the Security Council 'shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggressiorf and shall, upon this determination, 
'make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be takelf including the use of 
military action against the offending State. 
However, the Security Council against Israel had taken no measures of any 
type. The only obligation imposed on Israel was to compensate Iraq for the material 
damage and loss of life it had caused. Similar resolution was also adopted by the 
General Assembly. 
136 Campbell, note 99 at 1079. 
137 UNSC Res. 487,2288 th Mtg (19-June-1981), II. M (1981), 993. 
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The US itself had supported these resolutions in the condemnation of its 
traditional ally. Mrs. Kirkpatrick, the then US representative in the Security Council 
observed that although one has to recognize that deep hostility existed in the area 
'nonetheless, we believe the means Israel chose to quiet its fears about the purposes of 
Iraq's nuclear programme have hurt, and not helped, the peace and security of the 
area. In my Government's view, diplomatic means available to Israel had not been 
exhausted and the Israeli action has damaged the regional confidence that is essential 
for the peace process to go forward.. 9.138 
This unanimous Security Council condemnation of the Israeli attack, even 
with the support of the US, suggests that the international community wants to 
preclude any open-ended use of anticipatory self-defence that will as a result run 
counter to the main purpose of the UN Charter, which is to maintain international 
peace and security. 
C. Proportionality 
By and large the targeted sites in Afghanistan (i. e., terrorist bases) constituted 
a proper target for attack by the US with a proportionate force to counter such a threat 
as was presented by bin Laden and his groups. Yet, if it transpires that the people 
who were at the attacked sites were not active terrorists 'but merely people who 
sympathized with bin Laden's rhetoric', 139 then those people are noncombatant and 
the validity of the US strikes should be called into question. On the other hand, the 
US attacks on the AI-Shifa medicine factory can never be considered proportionate 
"' I. L. M (1981), 985. 
139 Campbell, note 99 at 1095. 
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because as the facts became clear the factory was a civilian target involved in no 
terrorist activity. 
Furthermore, another reason to describe the US attack on the plant as 
disproportional or indiscriminate is the fact that, although the strike on the AI-Shifa 
factory resulted in the injury of only 10 people and that is relatively small number, 
this attack resulted in the total destruction of the AI-Shifa medicine factory, which 
produced at least 50% of the people's needs of medicines, hence the US attacks have 
put at risk many thousands of people who were not able to get the medicines they 
needed to live. 140 Additionally, even if the assumption that the AI-Shifa factory was a 
chemical factory is accepted, would the attack on a chemical weapons factory located 
in the biggest capital city of Sudan and containing a highly toxic VX nerve gas as 
alleged by the US, constitute a lawful target for the US strikes? 
It can be concluded from the preceding discussions that the US strikes against 
Sudan and Afghanistan, in response to the terrorist embassy bombings has failed to 
satisfy the three basic preconditions for the legitimate exercise of self-defence, 
especially with respect to the target in Sudan. The only description that can apply to 
the US strikes is that these strikes were actually an act of reprisal or retaliation, which 
is prohibited by the contemporary international law as discussed earlier in Section 2. 
More significantly is the fact that in the wake of the strikes, some statements 
by the US officials contradicted such a claim of self-defence and suggested the 
140 Philip Webster, US Owes Britain Evidence On Airstrike Targets, Say Labour MPs, The Times, 25 
August 1998, at 12. 
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retaliatory intent behind these strikes. For instance, the statement by President 
Clinton when he said, 'Today, we have struck back. 141 
Such legally unjustified strikes by the US were condemned by many nations 
(e. g., Russia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, most African countries, most Arab 
countries, and other country members of the Non-aligned Movement). 142 Among 
these condemnations, the Malaysian condemnation was the severest. The then Prime 
Minister, Mahathier, criticized the US strikes by saying, 'If it's a big power, it can 
attack any one. It decides and it executes, making small countries feel if s dangerous 
to live in this world'. 
143 
By contrast, there was some support of the US action by some countries like 
Great Britain, Israel, France, Gennany, Australia, and New Zealand. Also it is worth- 
mentioning that there was no condemnation by the Security Council because Sudan 
did not initiate such action for the understandable reason that it would face the same 
fate as its call for a UN facts investigation brought about, which was consequently 
blocked by the US. 144 
However, comparing the world reaction to this action with the world reaction 
to the 1986 US attack on Libya, one may say that the degree of severity of the former 
is moderate if weighed against the latter. Most commentators agree that this lesser 
opposition by the international community was attributed to the unique circumstances 
14' Bombings-Quotes, Corpus Christi Caller Times, Thursday, August 20,1998, (visited Sept. 24,00), 
<http: //www, caller. com/breakinencws/strikes/aD6, litm>. 
142 Allies Back US Strikes, Though Many Question Their Timing, Corpus Christi Caller Times, Friday, 
August 21,1998, (visited Sept. 24,00), <httn:! /www, caller. com! bretý-inmews/strikes/ar)12. h-tm>. 
143 Ibid. 
1" Ibid. 
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of this case, but does not mean that the international community is willing to expand 
the pennissible, use of force to include similar cases. 
Among the many reasons that had affected the degree of the public protest by 
the international community in this case are the following: 
1) The general distaste for the Sudanese Government coupled with an aversion of 
the international community to directly confront the US. 145 
2) Sudan is a poor country, thus many States had no strong bearing on the 
economic or political situation therein because of the absence of interest. 146 
3) Many governments are hesitant to publicly accuse the US of wrong doing, 
even if they believe that a mistake was made because doing this is equal to 
accusing the US of lying to the international community. 147 
4) Conversely, many States had full confidence in the US intelligence 
information it collected linking Bin Laden with the Sudanese Government. 148 
5) The US had successfully portrayed bin Laden's network as a great danger to 
all nations which as a result may have induced a greater willingness on the 
part of the international community to overlook a questionable claim of self- 
defence. 149 
6) Finally, any direct confrontation between the US and the Security Council 
over this incident is certain to fail, as the US had made clear that a veto might 
be used to block any resolution calls for investigation into the attack. 
"' Lobel, note 94 at 556. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Remano, note 132 at 1043. 
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These factors made the French Foreign Minister, whose goverranent supported 
the attack, say that AmericA allies are willing to condone unilateral attacks in certain 
circumstances but 'you must not get it wrong'. ' 50 
By and large only the US and Israel have used force in response to incidents 
they have described as international terrorism and they have both often justified their 
actions as self-defence. The practice of only two States, in which most other 
countries have not accepted, is unlikely to be sufficient to constitute a new norm of 
international law, 151 which may legitirnize the use of force in such cases as the US 
attack against Sudan. 
Nevertheless, one must acknowledge the reality that until a viable substitute 
appears to deal with terrorist threats in a more effective manner, the use of force, 
which many think as the most effective response to terrorism, can be expected to 
remain as an option to the victim State. To insist otherwise would render a victim 
State powerless to preempt a planned terrorist attack before injury is incurred. ' 52 
5.4. THE EFFICACY OF THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE ABROAD IN 
DETERRING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
The most important issue to be examined here is whether the use of force by 
one State against either terrorist groups or States that support them, will deter either of 
them from resorting to terrorist acts in the future against that particular State? In other 
words, does the use of force in this case, in effect convey a message to terrorists or 
their sponsor States, that they must immediately cease their terrorist activities because 
150 Lobel, note 94 at 556. 
"' Scheideman, note 93 at 274. 
152 Ibid at 25 1. 
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such forcible action against them would cause them to rethink and conclude that the 
costs of committing acts of terrorism are exceeding their benefits? 
Unlike many other scholars, who disputed the effectiveness of such a response 
in deterring terrorism, Prunckun and Mohr are among the few who reached a positive 
outcome with respect to this issue. 153 In their study of the effects of the US raid - 
(Operation El Dorado Canyoný 154 against Libya on 14 April, 1986, Prunckun and 
Mohr concluded that an evaluation of a forty-one-month period centered on the date 
of the raid indicates that there was a decline in the number of terrorist acts committed 
by groups associated with Libya. They also noticed a decrease in the number of all 
acts of terrorism, not only by those sponsored by Libya, committed against US targets 
worldwide. 155 Moreover, although they conceded that in worldwide terrorist attacks 
in general were similar in number both before and after the US raid, they claimed that 
in the post-raid period there was a shift from acts of medium and high severity to acts 
of low severity of violence. 156 
I)- Terrorist Activities of Groups Associated with the Libyan Govenunent: 
Prunckun and Mohr claimed that of the fifteen groups reputed to have been 
supported by Libya, only nine were active during the forty-one-month period of study. 
According to them, these groups, as listed in the table below, were substantially 
inactive in terrorism in the post-raid twenty-and-a-half-month period -(25 after the 
153 H. Prunckun and P. Mohr, 'Military Deterrence of International Terrorism: An Evaluation of 
Ooperation El Dorado Canyon', 37 (100) Peace Research Abstracts (2000). 
1'4 Operation El Dorado Canyon was the code name the US gave to its raid against Libya in April 14, 
1986, which was in retaliation for the alleged direct Libyan role in the West German nightclub 
bombing in which 3 people killed, including two Americans, and 261 were injured, including 79 
Americans. 
155 Prunckun and Mohr, note 153 at 272-274. 
1-56 Ibid. 
220 
raid)- as compared to their activities in the pre-raid twenty-and-a-half-month period - 
(75 before the raid)- with the exception -though not explained- of the Fatah 
Revolutionary Council 
Activity of Libyan-sponsored groups before and after the raid' 57 
Terrorist Groups Activity before the 
raid 
Activity after the 
raid 
RAF 21 1 
Black September 14 2 
Rev. Org. of Soc. Muslims 10 0 
Arab Rev. Brigades 6 0 
PLO 5 2 
Ulrike Meinhof Commando 3 0 
Black June I I 
Arab Rev. Cells 1 2 
Fatah Rev. Council 14 17 
2)- Terrorist Attacks Against the US: 
The study also indicates that there was a noticeable decline in all-terrorist acts 
directed at US citizens or property abroad. This includes not only the acts committed 
by those sponsored by Libya, but by all terrorists and groups that targeted the US. 
The study concludes that there was a dramatic rise in the number of terrorist events 
directly after the raid (18 of the 20 events of April 1986 followed the raid); with the 
April numbers included, there were marginally more acts against US targets after (37) 
than before the raid (33). In spite of that, the number of terrorist events targeted at the 
US dropped off the next month and continued that way until the end of December 
1987. Likewise, the study indicates that, with the exception of the sudden rise of 
events during April 1986, in the months that followed incidents were rarely recorded 
at a frequency at or above the pre-April trend. Even more importantly in the postraid 
"' This table is taken from ibid. at 273. 
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period there were more months that recorded no terrorist activity at all (n--8) than for 
the pre-raid period (n=3). 158 
The apparent reason that might explain such a decline of all terrorist acts 
against the US abroad is the fact that the use the force by the US against Libya made 
other States, which might support terrorist groups of the same type as the ones 
targeted by the US, or terrorist organizations, carefully watch such a demonstrated 
preparedness of the US to retaliate if they decided to engage in such activity in the 
future. Consequently, such a demonstration of force led them to conclude that it 
would better for them not to attack such State. 
3)- Worldwide Terrorism 
Unlike the manifest decline of tefforist attacks against the US as discussed 
above, terrorist events worldwide were of a similar number before and after the raid. 
It shows that the total number of events before the raid (838) is very close to that after 
the raid (87 1). The same result will be obtained if all terrorist acts against the US are 
excluded (805 before and 834 after). 159 
Notwithstanding this a* different picture will emerge if the events were 
classified according to their level of severity. '60 On one hand, the patterns for high- 
severity activities and medium-severity activities both show a clear decline during the 
period after the raid. On the other hand, the patterns for low-severity incidents show 
... Ibid. at 274. 
159 Ibid at 275. 
160 According to Prunckon and Mohr terrorists' favored tactics can be classified in accordance with 
their perceived severity to high (nuclear, armed attack-missiles, exotic pollution, assassination/murder, 
armed attack-other, explosive, barricade, hijacking, car bombing, and letter bombing), medium 
(kidnapping, takeover, -nonaerial, incendiary, suicide car bombing, police shoot-out, sniping at a 
building, and sabotage), and low (arrns smuggling, conspiracy, occupation, threaý hoax, and theft). See 
ibid. at 273. 
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an obvious increase. According to this study high-severity terrorist events show a 
drop of 8.1 percent, from 543 (before) to 499 (after); medium-severity events drop 
21.8 percent, from 151 to 118; and low-severity events grow 43.3 percent, from 144 
to 254.161 The only explanation provided by Prunckin and Mohr to link such a shift to 
less violent acts of terrorism to the US operation against Libya, is the fact that during 
the period of study there was no other major event in the global arena except the US 
raid against Libya. 
Though the result reached by this study cannot be totally rejected, it cannot be 
taken for granted as a conclusive outcome that could be unquestionably applied to all 
uses of force against terrorism for the following reasons: 
Firstly, as conceded by Prunckun and Mohr themselves that the decline of the 
activity of the Libyan-associated groups can be real or illusory. That is, it is not clear 
whether that there was an actual lessening of the violent activities by these groups or 
simply that these groups were less prepared to acknowledge responsibility for acts 
they committed. 162 
Secondly, it is to be noted that in this study most of the Libyan-associated 
groups were Palestinian groups, accordingly there might be other factors, which 
caused the reduction of their activities (e. g., the start of the peace process with Israel). 
In addition to this, the fact that almost all of these Palestinian groups were getting 
support from most of the Arab States (e. g., Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq.... etc). 
Therefore, even if the presumption that the US attack against Libya was an effective 
161 Ibid at 275. 
'62 Ibid. at 276. 
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response that reduced Libya's ability to support or sponsor terrorist groups, it might 
not be the case with respect to the Palestinian groups. 
Moreover, it is not clear whether the decrease of the activity by the Libyan- 
supported terrorist organizations, even if it is fully accepted, was the result of the US 
attack, or the result of other circumstances which existed at that time. For example, in 
1987 Libya was engaged in war with Chad in which it suffered a great military 
defeat. 163 
In addition, this perceived effect of the US raid against Libya, even if it is 
accepted, is only a response with a short-term effect. Just four months after the time 
limit of this study, Libya was accused of causing the destruction of a Pan Am airplane 
over Lockerbie, which, if proved, will contradict the result reached by this study. ' 64 
By and large the majority of scholars are of the opinion that military revenge 
ultimately creates more terroriSM. 165 They argue that attempting to combat terrorism 
through military means alone is a "mission impossible"166 because terrorism is not 
fundamentally a military problem, it is a political, social, and economic probleM. 167 
163 R. Bruce, 'Libyan Terrorism: The Case Against Gaddaft', 261 (1523) Contemporary Review, 
(1992), 296. 
164 It should be noted that in the Lockerbie Case, the US and the UK accused two Libyan officials 
working directly under the command of the Libyan government and this is the most extreme 
manifestation of state sponsored terrorism. Therefore, it might be argued that the US attack against 
Libya was counterproductive action and caused an escalated response by Libya in more direct way. 
See Lobel, note 94 at 555. 
165 J. White, Terrorism: An Introduction, (Wadsworth. Pub., 1998), 248. 
166 S. Gotowicki, 'Confronting Terrorism: New War Forms or Mission Impossible, LXXV11 (3) Military 
Review, (May-June 1997), 6 1. 
167 Ibid. 
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Examples of such military response's ineffectiveness in combating terrorism, 
even with respect to the two most prominent countries in frequent use of military 
force (Israel and the US), are as follows: 
Firstly, the demonstrated failure of the Israeli army -the Middle East's most 
powerful military force- to prevent Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) from 
attacking targets within Israel, or to prevent Hizballah's Katyosha attacks against 
Israeli targets in Lebanon or in Israel; 
Secondly, the inability of the US itself to prevent or deter attacks against its 
citizens or property abroad (e. g., the 1996 bombing of the US airforce housing at 
Khabar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, the bombings of the US embassy in 
Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam in 1998, and more recently the horrific attacks of 
September 11,2001). These attacks reflect the absence of an inevitable aspect of the 
deterrence theory, which is that the attack against Libya should have provided an 
example to other countries or terrorist organizations that the US is willing to use force 
against them, if they conduct terrorist activity against it. 
Some other shortcomings of the responses involving the use of force that 
should be mentioned here, or reiterated if mentioned earlier: 
First of all, military response is the weapon of the strong. It is only an option 
for the powerful States but not the weak. As indicated earlier that in spite of the US 
attack against Libya, the patterns of international terrorism worldwide shows no drop 
in number, this is because there are not many States like the US who can use force 
against terrorism. 
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For example, the US attacked Sudan and Afghanistan, as discussed earlier, 
because they allow various radical groups to organize politically, but would that be 
different from what many other powerful countries are currently doing, including the 
US and the UK? 
Britain gives refuge to large numbers of dissidents from all over the world, 
particularly those from the Middle East, some of whom were accused of being 
terrorists. Even bin Laden's political activities appear to have moved to London 
following his expulsion from Sudan. Complaints have been made by the Israeli, 
Saudi, and French governments, among others, that London has become a safe haven 
for the plotting and directing of terrorist activities abroad. In the wake of the 
November 1997 terrorist murder at Luxor, the Egyptian President accused Britain of 
harbouring the terrorist leaders responsible: 
'Terrorists are present and living in English territory .. where they collect funds 
and plan'. 168 
The US also has hosted some terrorist groups. For example, it has been a 
refuge for many IRA terrorists, and the leader of the political wing of the IRA has 
been invited to the White House to shake hands with President Clinton. Moreover, 
the US had sponsored what, by its own legal definition, amounts to international 
terrorism in Afghanistan and in Central America, and it is presently training and 
arming what many described as terrorists in Sudan. 169 Now can such States 
involvement make them vulnerable to attacks by other States such as Sudan and 
Egypt, the answer is no because they are the stronger power. 
168 S. Gabb, 'Why Has Britain Supported American State Terrorism Against Sudan? Where Is The 
Evidence? An Open Letter To The British Prime Minister' RT Hon Tony Blair MP'. 5 (22) Political 
File, (1998). 
169 Ibid. 
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Secondly, the use of military response often, if not always, poses the danger of 
military overreaction in which innocent civilians become the immediate targets. 170 For 
example, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon in response to the attempted 
assassination of the Israeli ambassador in London by Abu Nidal Group. Such action 
had been described as disproportionate by the measures used because it involved, in 
addition to the invasion of the territory of Lebanon, a massive killing of many of the 
civilian people. 
Moreover, in most cases of terrorist attack, it is extremely difficult for a State 
to use the force directed against terrorists to establish, or determine with certainty, the 
identity of those who have committed these violent acts or the States, which support 
them in committing their attacks . 
171 The US attack against Sudan and Afghanistan is 
illustrative in this regard. 
Furthermore, military response may, in most cases, be unilaterally undertaken 
without the support of important allies, consequently it may cause tension or at least 
strain relations between the forceful State and its allies. 172 
Last but not least, the use of military response by one State against terrorism 
may cause its public to believe in their country's alleged success in defeating 
terrorists. Thus that State may find itself bound to fight terrorists with force when the 
threat emerges next time, even if force is not needed. 
"0 P. Wilkinson, 'The Rule of the Military in Cobatting Terrorism in a Democratic Society', 8 (1) 
Terrorism and Political Violence (Spring 1996), 1. 
171 Ibid. at 7. 
1'2 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 6. KUWAIT'S INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL 
POSITION ON TERRORISM 
Each State has its own perspective on the issue of international terrorism. 
Sometimes other States share this perspective and sometimes it is not. Kuwait has 
faced the issue of terrorism on many occasions and in many organizations of which it 
is a member. 
First, in Section 1, discussion will be about Kuwaif s attitudes in the UN when 
it deals with the issue of international terrorism. Next, in Section 2, since Kuwait is a 
Member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, discussion will be 
concentrated on this organization and its role in the fight against terrorism. Moreover, 
another organization that also will be discussed, in Section 3, is the Arab League, 
because Kuwait is also a Member of this League and shares, to a certain extent, the 
other members' values on the issue of terrorism. Finally, in Section 4, such 
discussion will be narrowed to the Gulf Cooperation Council of which Kuwait is a 
party along with other five countries. 
Kuwait had, as all countries of the world, found itself vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks since the 1968 and continued to be a victim of this phenomenon until recent 
time. However, since it is more appropriate to talk about the national law of Kuwait 
and any other particularities existing therein, e. g., the State Security Court, before 
start talking about terrorist incidents of which the national law and the State Security 
Court as a result had dealt with. Therefore, it is better to defer the discussion about 
Kuwait's own experience of terrorism to the next chapter along with the discussion of 
Kuwait national law. 
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6.1. AS A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
Talking about Kuwait's attitudes in the UN or any of its specialised agencies' 
debates over the adoption of the anti-terrorism conventions discussed earlier in 
Chapter 3 is the same as talking about the attitudes of most developing countries, 
especially those which were known as the Afro-Arabic block, towards the issue of 
terronsm. 
However, before discerning these attitudes, it should be emphasized here that 
during all debates that preceded the adoption of any of the antkerrorism conventions 
no State ever went on record to announce its support for terrorism per se. 
In general, there were two trends among nations with respect to the issue of 
terrorism. One trend, which was represented by most Western States and some other 
States like Israel and South Africa, maintained that terrorism must be suppressed no 
matter what the causes were that gave rise to it. This trend stressed it is not 
permissible for whatever reasons. 
The other trend, which was represented by most of the developing countries 
(Arab, African, and many Asian countries) with the support from the communist 
countries, emphasized that in order to fight terrorism in a more appropriate way, three 
more considerations should be addressed as well. 
Firstly, such an act could not be addressed properly without addressing its 
underlying causes first. An example of such an argument that reflected this position 
was the one proposed by Saudi Arabia as an amendment to the UN Resolution 
34/145, which was initially titled as 'Measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of 
229 
violence which endanger or take human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms' by 
adding the following to this title 'And study of the underlying causes of those forms 
of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and 
despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in 
an attempt to effect radical changes'? Also, the representative of Kuwait pointed out, 
on a similar occasion that 'attention must be paid to the underlying causes of 
2 terrorism'. Consequently according to the supporters of this argument, the only way 
to deal with terrorism was to deal with its underlying causes. 
Secondly, another argument presented by these countries, was that a 
distinction must be clearly established between the use of violence as a criminal 
terrorist act and the use of violence as a legitimate exercise of the right of self 
determination. According to them, those people who are under foreign or alien 
occupation or a colonial or racist power have the right use violence, in whatever 
forms, to achieve their independence. They argued that since most of the national 
liberation groups are generally poorer and less well-armed than those of the 
occupying power, they must be allowed to use the types of force which are available 
to them. In other words, the means they used to achieve their national liberation must 
be measured in the context of the choices of means at their disposal at that time? 
They added, however, that all States are under legal obligations to promote self- 
determination exercised by those peoples as a legitimate justification for the use of 
violence. 
1 UNGA Res. 34/145 (Measures To Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers Or Takes 
Innocent Human Lives Or Jeopardises Fundamental Freedoms, And Study The Underlying Causes Of 
Those Forms Of Terrorism And Acts Of Violence Which Lie In Misery, Frustration, Grievance And 
Despair Which Cause Some People To Sacrifice Human Lives Including Their Own In An Attempt To 
Effect Radical Changes) (1979). 
2 Para 5-9 (UNGAOR, 40'h Sess, C. 6,21' mtg). 
3 J. Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law-A Commentary on the Hostages 
Convention 1979, (Grotius Pub., 1990), 30. 
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An example of such a position was presented by the representative of 
Mauritania when he stated that the UN could not back away from its early 
commitments to peoples struggling for self-determination because the actions of those 
peoples, he maintained, 'were merely the logical and inevitable consequences of 
political situation... in circumstances, such persons could not be blamed for 
committing desperate acts which in themselves were reprehensible; rather the real 
culprits were those who were responsible for causing such desperation. 4 
Thirdly, another argument, which is also related to the above interrelated 
views, is that the real terrorism is that of colonialism and foreign occupation which is 
far more noxious and costly in lives than those violent acts comn-dtted by individuals 
or groups. 5 
In many cases a compromise was reached in order to please these two trends: 
for example; the UN General Assembly's definition of aggression is a good example 
which illustrated such bargaining in issues related to terrorism. Article 3 Paragraph 
(g) of the UNGA Res. 1186 defines aggression, in part, as 'the sending by or on 
behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out 
acts of armed force against another State of such gravity.. 9.6 
As has been discussed earlier in Chapter 5, this form of involvement by one 
State against another constitutes an armed attack against the latter which gives this 
State the right to use force in self-defence against the former State. 
Para 5, UNGA OP, 27'h Sess, C. Gen '202nd mtg'. See also ibid. at 33. 
S. Finger, 'International Terrorism and The UN, in Y. Alexander (ed. ), International Terrorism: 
National, Regional, and Global Perspectives, (Praeger Pub., 1976), 330. 
6 UNGA Res. 1186, Art. 3, Par. (g). 
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However, as a result. of a compromise reached between States to accommodate 
the two trends discussed above, the application of this provision, i. e., Art. 3, Par. (g), 
had been restricted by articles 7 and 8 of the same defitnition, which read: 
'Nothing in this definition, and in particular Article 3, could in any way 
prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom, and independence, as derived 
from the Charter of people forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the 
Declaration, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other 
forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end 
and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the 
Charter'. 7 
Another example, which illustrates these two trends more accurately, was the 
debate over the definition of hostage-taking in the Hostage Committee which was 
established for the purpose of facilitating the drafting of an International Convention 
that deals with the problem of taking hostages as a violent act frequently used by 
terrorists, and how to suppress such an act. This convention was later adopted and 
came to be known as the Hostages Convention of 1979, discussed earlier in Chapter 3. 
In the Hostage Committee the then Federal Republic of Germany proposed 
that without exception 'any person' who seizes or detains and threatens another 
person with death, injury or continued detention in order to compel a third party to do 
or abstain from doing anything, commits the offence of hostage-taking. 8 
However, the dissatisfaction by most of the developing countries with this 
suggested definition because it does not endorse their position, caused them to 
propose numerous changes in order to alter this definition: 
7 Ibid. Art. 7 and 8. 8 Lambert, note 3 at 62. 
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Firstly, it was proposed by Libya that the definition should be redefined to be 
the following: the term 'taking of hostages' is the seizure or detention, not only of a 
person or persons, but also of masses under colonial, racist or foreign domination, in a 
way that threatens him or them with death, or severe injury or deprives them of 
fundamental freedom. 9 
Secondly, many other delegations, representing the same trend as Libya, 
supported the idea that the definition of hostage-taking should be drafted in such a 
way as to limit the prohibition only to the taking of "innocenf' hostages, i. e., those 
connected with colonialism or foreign domination must be considered as "guilly' 
individuals. 10 
Thirdly, they proposed the insertion into the draft convention of a provision 
stating that the term 'taking of hostages' does not include any act 'carried out in the 
process of national liberation against colonial rule, racist and foreign regimes, by 
liberation movements recognized by the UN or regional organizations'. 
Nonetheless, none of these proposals was adopted. 
However, such a hard line as had been taken by Kuwait and other developing 
countries who shared the same trend in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s had lessened in 
the 1990s. Though most of these countries, including Kuwait, are still debating over 
the distinction between terrorism and the use of violence in self-determination. Such 
a debate does not constitute a position that may preclude the adoption of any new 
anti-terrorism convention that does not provide any exception for those who use 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
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violence in furtherance of their right of self-determination. Rather these positions are 
no more than a mere declaration of attitudes. 
A recent example, which supports this supposition, was the UN adoption of 
the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing in 1997. The 
adoption of this convention, as well as the adoption of the resolution upon which this 
Convention is based, was done without even a vote, and there was no debate like the 
ones the international community witnessed in the past. That is what happened, 
despite the fact that this convention nowhere provides for any exception to the use of 
violence in accordance with the right of self-determination. 
The possible reasons behind this change can be one or more of the following: 
First of all, the collapse of the communist regimes, especially the USSR, 
which were known for their support of the developing countries in their argument 
over the issues relating to terrorism and the legitimate right of self-determination. 
Secondly, during the 1960s and early 1970s, some African countries were 
under colonial and foreign occupation and that caused the other newly independent 
African countries to stand with other developing countries, especially Arabic 
countries, in their position supporting the right of self-determination, but now they are 
all independent States. Thus, there is no need to stress an issue that is not relative, at 
least, to the African continent. 
Moreover, to the Arabs the Palestinian problem was the predominant cause 
behind their attitudes. To the Africans the discrimination against black people in 
South Africa was also, along with the factor mentioned above, an important cause 
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shaping their attitudes. Therefore, the tactic of linking these two issues with one 
another was very successful in unifýing their attitudes. However, since the issue of 
racism and discrimination does not, at least at governmental level, exist any more in 
South Africa, the African States lost interest in such issues as those involving the use 
of violence by peoples in self-determination against a racist regime. 
Also, with respect to the Arabic countries, during 1960s, and early 1970s, 
most of these countries were at war with Israel and they did not even recognize its 
existence as a legitimate one. Now, such an attitude has been changed with respect to 
some of these countries, namely Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, Qatar, and 
more recently Mauritania, because most of these countries have entered into treaties 
with Israel obliging themselves not to allow any violent acts, whatever their motives, 
to be emanated from their territory, or to be organized therein, or to support such acts 
by any means. 
In addition, the Palestinians themselves have entered into treaties with Israel 
not to use violence against one another. For example, Article XV of the Washington 
Agreement of 1995 between the PLO and Israel states, 'Both sides shall take all 
measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed 
against each other against individuals falling under the other's authority and against 
their property, and shall take legal measures against offenders!. However, a strict 
observation to such treaties proved to be very difficult. 
Furthermore and even more importantly, is the fact that many Arabic 
countries, especially Egypt and Algeria, have become targets of terrorism in the 
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1990s, and that has made it clear that it is not just Western States that are vulnerable 
to terrorist attacks but that Arabic countries are also vulnerable to such attacks. 
The following example illustrates how Algeria after having suffered from 
terrorism, shifted its focus with respect to the issue of terrorism, from defining it in 
order to differentiate it from people's armed struggle for self-determination and 
determining its underlying causes in order to eradicate them, to the need to eliminate 
terrorism per se. In its reply to the UNGA Res. 48/411 (1994) which sought the views 
of the Member States on terrorism, Algeria stated that States must 'give substance to 
the unequivocal condemnation of all acts of terrorism and the obligations incumbent 
upon them under several resolutions of the General Assembly, States have no need to 
embark upon the academic enterprise of attempting to define terrorism and to 
determine its underlying causes The proper focus for the attention and energy of 
States ... should lead to a concentration on practical measures for eliminating acts of 
terrorism'. 
Finally, with respect to Kuwait, the invasion of the Iraqi army and the 
suffering of the Kuwaiti people that followed caused serious friction in relations 
between Kuwait and the Arabic countries that stood with Kuwait on one side, and Iraq 
and the other Arabic countries that supported Iraq in its invasion of Kuwait on the 
other side. Thus it was not possible in the post-invasion era to coordinate positions in 
issues relating to terrorism between these States because of the hate and mistrust the 
Iraqi aggression had caused among them. 
To Kuwait the concept of terrorism has been reconstructed to include the Iraqi 
aggressive action as the most terrible and heinous crime in history against the Kuwaiti 
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people. On many occasions, Kuwaiti speeches about terrorism were mainly confined 
to crimes committed by Iraq against Kuwait. 
For example, in its speech before the Sixth Committee in the 501h session of 
the UN General Assembly on the question of the measures that must be taken to 
combat terrorism on 6/10/96, Kuwait had accused the Iraqi regime of being a terrorist 
regime and cited the following explanations: 
Its war with Iran for eight years in which the Iraqi regime lost and 
never achieved anything; 
The suffering of the Iraqi people in the North and South for no reason 
other than disagreement with Sadaam's regime; 
The invasion of Kuwait in such a savage and cruel way that was 
unprecedented in modem history; 
The setting on fire of the oil wells which resulted in destroying the 
environment and the depleting of natural resources; and 
Planning and sponsoring the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the 
former American President during his visit to Kuwait. 12 
This change of language on what constitutes terrorism -(note that some of the 
above mentioned actions are terrorist acts, e. g., the plot the assassinate George Bush, 
while others are more than terrorism and more like war crimes, e. g., the invasion of 
Kuwait)- on the view of Kuwait caused Kuwait to be more concerned with this type 
of action by searching for the way to confront it and to overtly expose it to other 
members of the UN rather than to stick to the old argument of the distinction between 
12 Kuwait Word Before The Six Committee In The 50h Session Of The UNGA On The Question Of The 
Measures That Must Be Taken To Combat Terrorism (6/10/1996). 
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terrorism and self-determination which is still, though in a lesser way, recognized by 
Kuwait. 
Another reason that can be added here is that, although the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait caused such a big disagreement between the Arabic States, it has had the 
opposite effect between Kuwait and some Western countries, especially the US, UK, 
and France, which supported and participated in the liberation of Kuwait along with 
some countries. This has caused Kuwait to appreciate its relations with these 
countries and not to take a stand that might not be welcomed by these States, 
especially with respect to such an issue of international concern as terrorism. This 
can also be said with regard to some other Arabic countries which are known for their 
strong relationship with the US, the sole superpower in the modem world. Examples 
of these countries are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. 
Nevertheless, even before the Iraqi invasion and during the domination of the 
trend it inspired, i. e., the second trend, Kuwait recognized the need to fight terrorism 
and had ratified six anti-terrorism conventions and protocols out of the ten that are 
now in force. These include: 
a- Tokyo Convention 1963 
b- Hague Convention 1970 
c- Montreal Convention 1971 
d- Montreal Protocol 1988 
e- Hostages Convention 1979 
f- New York Convention 1973 
Also, the non-signing of the other four conventions and protocols was not the 
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result of its stand on the issue of terrorism along with the other developing countries, 
but rather due to reasons relating to these instruments themselves. 
In answering an inquiry sent by the American Embassy in Kuwait asking for 
the justifications of why Kuwait did not sign the following anti-terrorism instruments: 
(I)- Marking of Plastic Agent Convention 1991 
(2)- Rome Convention and Protocol 1988 
(3)- Nuclear Physical Protection Convention 1979 
A Kuwaiti official answered this question by asserting that with regard to (1) 
and (3), they did not deal directly with terrorism. Accepting this answer may result in 
saying that there in no need to sign and ratify any of the anti-terrorism conventions 
because they did not deal with terrorism in a more direct way, but they dealt with 
some actions favoured by terrorists. Besides, both conventions, especially the 
Nuclear Physical Protection Convention, help in abating the threat terrorists may pose 
by making the possession of such lethal devices more difficult, accordingly restricting 
terrorism in order to prevent it. 
With respect to (2), he stated that these conventions and protocols were agreed 
upon in the aftermath of the Achilli Lauro incident in 1985, and he thinks that such an 
incident will not occur again. Like the previous reasoning, this one can not be 
accepted because the incident of the Achilli Lauro was only an example of the 
possibility of ships to be targeted in the future, and there is no assurance that a similar 
incident will not occur even after the adoption of this convention and protocol, as is 
the case with respect to hijacking. Additionally, the Rome Protocol was adopted 
though there was not any known attack against sea fixed platforms, which this 
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Protocol is mainly concerned with. Rather it was a step ahead in order to prevent 
attacks against them if contemplated by terrorists in the future. Since Kuwait is an oil 
producing country with common use of platforms and artificial islands, which are also 
covered by this Protocol, it should ratify this protocol. However, under the provisions 
of the Rome Protocol a State cannot become party to it unless it has ratified the Rome 
Convention first. 
Another argument that one might raise against becoming a party to these 
Conventions is the fact that the national laws of Kuwait may already cover these 
offences provided for in these conventions and protocols. Response to such an 
argument can be the following; to have an effective national law that regulates such 
crimes, does not supply an assurance that other States have such effective laws. More 
importantly, without such conventions and protocols Kuwait can not make sure that 
those who committed crimes against it and fled to other countries will be extradited or 
prosecuted. 
Furthermore, such a response by the Kuwaiti official, discussed above, would 
not be applicable to the Anti-Bombing Convention which was adopted by the UN in 
1997, because this Convention dealt directly with terrorism by dealing with the most 
favoured action committed by terrorists on a more frequent basis. Still, Kuwait has 
not even signed this Convention despite its apparent importance. 
Last but not least, Kuwait has also recognized the significance of the bilateral 
treaties in combating terrorism with respect to civil aviation and has concluded the 
following treaties with: 
Indonesia 28/3/94 
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Bulgaria 22/3/94 
Qatar 29/11/93 
Portugal 26/11/93 
Lebanon 18/11/93 
Russia 21/10/93 
Unfortunately, it could not be discerned why Kuwait has concluded such 
bilateral treaties only with these countries, but not the others. Had Kuwait initiated 
the discussion of these treaties or it was the others' initiative? Also, it can be noticed 
these all of these treaties are post 1990, the year that caused Kuwait to shift its 
position with respect to many issues and terrorism is one of them as discussed earlier. 
6.2. AS A MEMBER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC 
CONFERENCE. (OIC)13 
As a member of the OIC Kuwait had initiated and supported the adoption of 
the first known resolution that condemned terrorism in the Fifth Islamic Conference 
13 The OIC is an international organization grouping fifty-six States which have decided to pool their 
resources together, combine their efforts and speak with one voice to safeguard the interests and secure 
the progress and well-being of their peoples and of all Muslims in the world. The Organization was 
established in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco, on 25 Sep. 1969 when the first meeting of the leaders of 
the Islamic world was held in the wake of the criminal Zionist attempt to bum down the Blessed Al- 
Aqsa Mosque on 21 Aug. 1969 in the occupied city of Al-Quds. Six months after that historical event, 
i. e., March 1970, the First Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in Jeddah, Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia during which the OIC General Secretariat was established to ensure coordination among 
Member States. Under the Charter, the OIC aims to: 
I- Strengthen: 
a) Islamic solidarity among Member States; 
b) Cooperation in the political, economic, social, cultural and scientific fields; 
c) The struggle of all Muslims people to safeguard their dignity, independence and 
nationals rights. 
2- Coordinate action to: 
a) Safeguard the Holy Paces; 
b) Support the struggle of the Palestinian people and assist them in recovering their 
rights and liberating their occupied territories. 
3- Work to: 
a) Eliminate racial discrimination and all fonns of colonialism; 
b) Create a favourable atmosphere for the promotion of cooperation and understanding 
between Member States and other countries. 
The above is literally taken from the OIC web site at www. oic-un, org. 
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which was hosted by Kuwait in January 1987. That initiative may have come due to 
the fact that during that 1980s Kuwait had experienced many severe terrorist attacks, 
as will be discussed later, as a result of its stand in the First Gulf War, when it had 
supported Iraq against Iran. Thus Kuwait might have wanted the OIC to express its 
condemnation of these acts, especially the fact that Kuwait on many occasions had, 
although indirectly, accused Iran, a Member of the OIC, of being behind these attacks. 
It should be mentioned that shortly before the Islamic delegations started their 
meeting after their arrival in Kuwait, a violent attack took place near one of the 
biggest hotels in Kuwait City, where some of these delegations resided as did some 
news reporters. The attack was committed by pro-Iranian Kuwaitis with the support 
of the Iraqi opposition residing in Iran. The apparent purpose for such an action was 
to attain publicity for their cause by directing the attention of those delegations to the 
suffering of the Iraqi people by the oppressive Sadaam's regime. 
More resolutions were adopted by the OIC that dealt with the issue of 
terrorism. For examples, Res. 53/8-P (IS), 1997, which provides, in part, that the OIC 
is convinced that 'there is an international consensus on combating terrorism in all its 
forms; and eliminating the causes of terrorism which endangers the life and property 
of innocent people, violates the sovereignty of States, and jeopardizes the rights of 
peoples'. 14 
In another paragraph of this resolution, the OIC stated that there is a need for 
'specific and agreed upon international criteria, to enable the international community 
14 OIC Res. 53/8-P (IS) On Convening Of An International Conference Under The Auspices Of The UN 
To Define Terrorism And Distinguish It From Peoples' Struggle For National Liberation (The 8h 
Summit, Dec. 1997). 
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to differentiate clearly between terrorism and peoples' struggle for national 
liberation'. 15 
Therefore, according to this paragraph, as its language clearly suggests, there 
is no clear criteria that distinguishes between terrorism and peoples struggle for self- 
determination, and the OIC recognizes this gap and calls upon the international 
community to bridge it. The OIC should have defined such criteria that it thinks 
should be the one adopted by the international community in this regard, but it never 
did. 
Although the OIC reaffimned the fundamental and legitimate right of the 
people to self-determination, it went on in another paragraph of the same resolution 
by stating that the OIC denounces the 'frantic attempts aimed at obliterating the clear 
distinction -in the previous statement the OIC was looking for one- between terrorism 
and the legitimate struggle of peoples which conforms with the principles of 
international law 16 Once more, the OIC refrained from illustrating this clear 
distinction as it claimed that if it is so clear, there would be no need to agree on 
another one. 
In another resolution, the OIC basically repeated what it had already said and 
added that States have to commit themselves to 'refrain from undertaking, attempting 
or participating in any way in financing, instigating or supporting any acts of 
terrorism, directly or indirectly, also those committing them to take all necessary 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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measures to ensure that their territories are not used as a base for planning, 
organizing, executing, initiating or participating in any terrorist activity. 17 
In addition, the OIC issued Res. 55/8-P (IS), 1997, which was mainly 
concerned with the problem of hijacking. Firstly, it stated that the hijacking of 
aircraft and the anguish caused to innocent passengers is a 'crime as grave as highway 
robbery which is prohibited by the Islamic Shariah in accordance with the text of the 
Holy Quran (Surat AI-Maida /33)'. 18 
Secondly, the OIC noted that the crimes of hijacking aircraft have continued 
'in spite of all international agreements and conventions prohibiting them'. 19 It would 
be interesting if the OIC had explained in this resolution the reasons why such crimes 
persist, despite the adoption of many conventions that dealt with them which most of 
the OIC countries are party to. Is it because these conventions themselves are not 
effective, thus a new effective convention must be agreed upon to deter such crimes? 
Or is it because of the non-compliance of the States Parties to these conventions? 
However, the OIC added another sentence, which might help in better understanding 
what the OIC had in mind. The OIC provided that it calls for 'more severe sanction 
against hijacking'. 20 Nonetheless, though this sentence can help by acknowledging 
that the crimes of hijacking persist because the sanctions that can be taken against 
them are not severe enough, it is not clear whether the OIC is talking about the 
penalty that States prescribed for the crimes of hijacking, or whether it is talking 
about the sanctions that States should take against other States that provide the 
17 OIC Res. 54/8-P (IS), On Follow-Up Of The Code Of Conduct For Combating International 
Terrorism (The gh Summit, Dec. 1997). 
18 01C Res. 55/8-P (IS), The Strengthening Of Islamic Solidarity In Combating Hijacking (The Wh 
Summit, Dec. 1997). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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hijackers with a safe haven after they have committed their crimes, or assist them in 
any way. 
Thirdly, in the last paragraph, the OIC, by way of suggesting that the sanction 
it was concerned about in the previous paragraph is the penalty that must be imposed 
on the offenders, calls upon Member States to take 'all necessary measures to curb 
such crimes and inflict the most severe punishments on the offenders involved in 
21 them, or to hand them over to the other States concerned7 . 
It should be observed that although the OIC equated the crime of hijacking to 
the crime of highway robbery provided for in the Quran, it did not mention that the 
punishment for the latter should be applied, or any other punishment of equal severity. 
Moreover, an important observation here is that nowhere in this resolution did 
the OIC mention the peoples' right to self-determination. This is one of the most 
significant features of the approach of the segmentation of the problem of terrorism, 
by dealing separately with offences commonly committed by terrorists without calling 
it terrorism, in order to avoid the political sensitivity attached to the term of terrorism. 
Despite the importance of these resolutions as declarations of policy that 
Member States should take into account, they are not binding as the treaties and 
conventions are. Thus in order to transfer these mere declarations of policy into legal 
obligations, the OIC adopted the: 
21 Ibid. 
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6.2.1. Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating 
International Terrorism, Adopted in 1 July 1999. (The OIC Convention) 
As was expected from the OIC, it started in the preamble of the Convention by 
uttering that the OIC is conscious of the negative repercussions of all forms of 
terrorism on the image of Islam, and announcing that Islam is innocent of terrorism in 
whatever forms that involve the killing of innocent people, which is forbidden by 
God. Also, it strongly condemns the perpetrators of cruel crimes, who pretend to act 
in the name of Islam or under any other pretext. 
In addition, in the same preamble, the OIC reaffirms 'the legitimacy of the 
right of peoples to struggle against foreign and colonialist and racist regimes by all 
means, (emphasis added) including armed struggle to liberate their territory 
Though the OIC by saying "all means" meant only legal means, therefore terrorism, 
since it is not a legal method, should not be one of these means. As the OIC went on 
saying in another paragraph of the same preamble that the OIC is convinced that 
'terrorism can not be justified in any way, and that it should therefore be 
unambiguously condemned in all its forms and manifestations, and its actions, means, 
and practices, whatever its origin, causes or purposes, including direct or indirect acts 
of States'. Nonetheless, it should be noted that there is a great controversy on the 
question of what constitutes a legitimate armed struggle in self-determination and 
terrorism, especially when latter is used by people who are under foreign occupation. 
In short, neither of them is clearly defined. 
Furthermore, in the same preamble, the OIC recognizes the growing links 
between terrorism and organized crime, including illicit trafficking in arms, narcotics, 
human beings, and money laundering. Although, the OIC did not explain these 
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growing links, this is an unprecedented provision in relation to other multilateral anti- 
terrorism conventions; especially those discussed earlier in Chapter 3, and it might 
help in urging the international community to pay more attention to this growing link, 
and to regulate it in the near future. 
Among the many articles provided for in the OIC Conventions, discussion will 
be limited to those articles of apparent importance because of the subjects they intend 
to cover and the innovative provisions they afford in comparison with other anti- 
terrorism conventions discussed earlier. 
Unlike the other anti-terrorism conventions, which did not attempt to provide a 
comprehensive definition of terrorism, rather definitions of some offences mostly 
favoured by terrorists, this Convention does provide for such a definition of terrorism. 
According to Article 1 (2) of this Convention, terrorism is 'any act of violence or 
threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an 
individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening 
to harm them or imperilling their lives, honour, freedoms, security or rights or 
exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or 
occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international 
facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty 
of independent States'. 
Despite the fact that providing an accepted definition of terrorism, which was 
considered by many scholars as a mission impossible, is an inevitable step in the right 
direction on combating terrorism, this definition however, like the many other 
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proposed definitions, can be criticised as over-inclusive in one sense and under- 
inclusive in another. 
It is over-inclusive because according to it every violent act could be 
considered as a terrorist act, since every violent act will touch in one way or another 
on one or more of the broad targets mentioned in the definition. For example, war 
crimes will be considered as terrorist crimes according to this definition. Although 
some war crimes may overlap with terrorism therefore may be both terrorism and a 
war crime simultaneously. For example, taking an unlawful action by the army of one 
State against the civilian people of another can be both terrorism and a war crime. 
This is one of the features of this definition that it applies to the actions of individuals 
as well as to States without any differentiation. Nonetheless, there are some other 
war crimes that cannot be considered terrorism because of the absence of one or more 
the common features associated with terrorism. These factors are the following: 
firstly, terrorism may involve a threat or use of violence; secondly, seeking to create a 
climate of fear in the public or section thereof; and thirdly, to achieve a political 
objective. Therefore, the invasion of the territory of one State by another State in 
order to annex the former to the invader's territory due to the victim State being rich 
in natural resources, as in the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is more than 
terrorism, since the purpose of the invasion was not to scare the Kuwaiti people but to 
eliminate them. However, some of the acts committed by Iraq during the invasion 
must be considered as terrorism according to the OIC definition, e. g., the firing of the 
Kuwaiti oil wells. 
Also, this definition does not require that the act, in order to be considered 
terrorist act, is committed in ftutherance of a political objective. This character 
248 
distinguishes terrorism from other international crimes, like piracy, which will be 
considered as an act of terrorism according to this definition. 
Conversely, this definition is under-inclusive because it requires that for an act 
to be considered as an act of terrorism it must be carried out to an individual or 
collective criminal plan, thus all violent acts which occur with no such plan, but rather 
as an immediate response to something will be excluded form its scope. 
In paragraph (3) of the same article, the Convention provides a definition for 
terrorist crime, which is 'a crime executed, started or participated in to realize a 
terrorist objective in any of the Contracting States or against its nationals, assets or 
interests or foreign facilities and nationals residing in its territory punishable by its 
internal law'. 
Therefore, it is a terrorist crime to execute, start or participate in an act in 
order to achieve a terrorist goal as defined in the previous paragraph. But what about 
instigating or abetting such a crime? Would this be considered a terrorist crime? 
According to this provision, the answer should be negative. 
Moreover, it is a terrorist crime if it has been committed in any of the 
'Contracting States or against its nationals, assets or interests or foreign facilities and 
nationals residing in its territory so it is a terrorist crime if it was committed to 
realize a terrorist objective in the territory of any Contracting State, thus there is no 
need to add 'or foreign facilities and nationals residing in its territory', because it will 
be considered so, as long as it was committed in its territory. Also, in the English 
version of this Convention, this article used the word "residing", i. e., foreign nationals 
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residing in its territory, whereas in the Arabic version it used the word "existing", i. e., 
foreign nationals existing in its territory. Obviously the word "existing" is more 
extensive than the word "residing", which refers only to those who live therein. For 
instance, those who happened to be in the passenger lounge in the airport, because 
they were flying from one country to another but have to stop in a third country for 
flight connection, are not residing in that country rather existing therein. It should be 
noted that this Convention has been written in Arabic, English, and French and they 
are all of equal authenticity as stated in Article 42. 
Finally, another observation that can be added which relates to the last five 
words of this paragraph, which read, 'punishable by its internal law', i. e., it is a 
terrorist crime, if and only if it is punishable by the national laws of the Contracting 
States. Thus a proper interpretation of this sentence will lead to the conclusion that 
although an act might constitute a terrorist crime according to this Convention's 
definition of terrorism, it will not be considered so if it was not punishable by the 
internal law of the concerned Contracting State. Although in practice it is likely to 
find such crimes are punishable by the internal laws of the Contracting States, one 
cannot be certain that this is always the case as will be discussed later, in the next 
chapter that Kuwait had enacted new laws in order to implement the ICAO anti- 
terrorism conventions and did not do so with respect to other anti-terrorism 
conventions it had ratified, this is because the ICAO conventions had criminalized 
new acts that were not regulated by the already existing Kuwaiti, Criminal Law. Thus 
it is better, in order to avoid ambiguity and uncertainty, to do the opposite, i. e., require 
the crimes to be punishable by the internal laws of the Contracting States if 
constituting terrorist crimes according to this definition. More significantly, it may be 
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considered a terrorist crime in one State party to this Convention, but not in another, 
because it is punishable under the law of the former State but not in the latter. 
Concerned that this Convention does not cover all the aspects of terrorism, the 
drafters added another paragraph to this article, which states that 'crimes stipulated in 
the following conventions are also considered terrorist crimes with the exception of 
those excluded by the legislators of Contracting States or those who have not ratified 
them', Article 1 (4). These conventions include the eleven conventions and protocols 
discussed earlier in Chapter 3, plus the UN Law of the Sea Convention of 1988 and its 
related provisions on piracy at sea. 
The most important thing to be noted here is that most of these anti-terrorism 
conventions do not recognize the right of self-determination as a legitimate cause to 
commit any of the offences they covered, whereas the OIC does not want to call it 
terrorism in the first place. Therefore, no matter what the real cause behind 
committing any offence covered by these conventions is, the Contracting States to the 
OIC Convention must treat it as a terrorist crime as long as they are party to the OIC 
Convention and any of the relevant conventions from the twelve instruments counted 
in this provision. 
Realizing the discrepancy that the Convention appears to cause, especially in 
respect of peoples' right to struggle for self-determination; it provides in the 
subsequent article that 'peoples' struggle including armed struggle against foreign 
occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self- 
determination in accordance with the principle of international law shall not be 
considered a terrorist crime', Art. 2 (a). 
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This is very natural since most of the countries members to the OIC are newly 
independent States and some of them achieved their independence through armed 
struggle with the occupying power. However, what it is not natural is that fact that 
this exception is very broad, i. e., it is not confined, as its language suggests, to the 
place that is under foreign occupation or domination, etc. 
Recognizing that the political offence exception is a serious obstacle that 
shields the extradition of terrorists in many States, the Convention stipulates in 
Paragraph (b) of the same article that 'none of the terrorist crimes mentioned in 
previous articles shall be considered political crimee. Hence, according to this 
provision, an act that constitutes a terrorist crime is an extraditable offence. It must 
not be considered as a political crime regardless of what its objective was or who the 
perpetrator was. Moreover, since, as provided in the previous article, it is also a 
terrorist crime to perpetrate any of the listed offences in the twelve instruments 
articulated in this Convention, whenever the relevant Contracting States are also party 
to the relevant instrument, and since some of these instruments refer to the national 
laws of the States Parties to decide the issue of extradition, whereas most of the 
national laws recognize the political offence exception thus resulting in the non- 
extradition of the alleged terrorist, as a result this provision overturns the referral 
provisions in these instruments with respect to Contracting States on issues covered 
by any of these instruments which they are also party to. 
In addition, the drafters thought that there might be some violent acts that are 
not covered by Article I as terrorist crimes; therefore the perpetrators of these acts 
may enjoy the benefits of being considered as political offenders. In Paragraph (c) of 
this article, it provides that 'in the implementation of the provisions of this 
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Convention the following crimes shall not be considered political crimes even when 
politically motivated: 
I)- Aggression against kings and heads of State of Contracting States or against their 
spouses, their ascendants or descendants; 
2)- Aggression against crown princes or vice-presidents or deputy heads of 
government or ministers in any of the Contracting States; 
3)- Aggression against persons enjoying international immunity including 
ambassadors and diplomats in Contracting States or in countries of accreditation; 
4)- Murder or robbery by force against individuals or authorities or means of transport 
and communication; 
5)- Acts of sabotage and destruction of public properties and properties geared for 
public services, even if belonging to another Contracting State; and 
6)- Crimes of manufacturing, smuggling or possessing arms and ammunition or 
explosives or other materials prepared for committing terrorist crimes', Art. 2 (c). 
In fact, there are many comments about this provision. Firstly, when it speaks 
of "aggression", it does not specify what type of aggression it is concerned with. 
Criticism of the kings or presidents or ministers, even from a mere political point of 
view, constitutes an act of aggression in countries with totalitarian regimes and some 
members of the OIC are known to be of this kind, e. g., the Iraqi regime. Secondly, it 
speaks of aggression against those people without requiring that they must be in 
power, when the aggression occurred. Thirdly, there is no mention of members of the 
parliaments, thus it suggests that attacking parliament members might go unpunished 
because the offender may be considered a political offender and may be given 
political asylum. Fourthly, in clause number 5, it says 'even if belonging to another 
Contracting State', consequently, if it belongs to a third country that is not a 
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Contracting State, the offender might not be extradited because he was considered a 
political offender. Fifth and finally, it is possible that Contracting States will find it 
extremely difficult to stick to all of these provisions and not to grant the alleged 
offender the status of political offender. 
Lastly, in Paragraph (d) of Article 2, the drafters of this Convention were 
aware of the growing links between terrorism and organized crime, like the illegal 
trafficking in drugs and human beings, and the crime of money laundering. Thus they 
pressed to include the Convention with a provision that regulates such links. Hence, 
the Convention stipulates that 'all forms of international crimes, including trafficking 
in narcotics and human beings, and money laundering aimed at financing terrorist 
objectives shall be considered terrorist crimes'. This provision is a very important 
one because a crime like money laundering is not considered such a serious crime in 
some States. Thus by considering it as a terrorist crime if it has links to terrorism, the 
perpetrators of such a crime might face the more severe penalty prescribed for 
terrorists instead of a lesser one of the money laundering offence. 
In Article 3, the drafters were concerned about the measures necessary to 
prevent and combat terrorist crimes and that includes; the obligation not to support 
terrorist acts whether directly or indirectly, the obligation to prevent such crimes from 
occurring by taking preventive measures similar to the ones discussed earlier in 
Chapter 4, the obligation to combat terrorism by, for example, 6arresting perpetrators 
of terrorists crimes and prosecuting them according to the national law or extraditing 
them in accordance with the provisions of this Convention or existing conventions 
between the requesting and requested States', Art. 3 (B)'I'. This provision 
constitutes the central obligation of the anti-tefforism conventions discussed earlier in 
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Chapter 3, thus most of the criticisms mentioned there with respect to the aut dedere 
aut judicare in these conventions will, to a certain extent, be applicable to the 
obligation of this Convention. 
Understanding that exchange of information is an imperative component in 
any strategy to combat terrorism, the Convention in Article 4 requires such 
cooperation. However even more significantly, the Convention requires such 
cooperation in the investigation of such crimes. Contracting States are also required 
to cooperate with one another in improving education on terrorism. Despite the 
importance of such cooperation and assistance, there is no mention of cooperation or 
assistance by providing one another with armed forces or at least police personnel that 
one of them might need in order to combat terrorists who may, in some cases, be 
better armed than the State forces. Algeria, for instance, might be one of the countries 
that desperately need such cooperation or assistance. Furthermore, there is no 
mention of assistance between Contracting States by providing money to a State that 
needs financial help. In order to make the potential targets of terrorism harder to 
attack, or to buy detective devices, more money is needed and some States do not 
have such money. Nonetheless, such an ideal requirement of providing armed forces 
or money is unlikely in any case because States do not want to implicate themselves is 
such a legally binding document. 
Being aware of the importance of extradition as an effective weapon in the 
war against terrorism, the Convention devotes many of its provisions to explaining the 
rules of such a process. For example, Article 5 provides that has been discussed 
earlier by saying that 'Contracting States shall undertake to extradite those indicted or 
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convicted of terrorist crimes, requested for extradition by any of these countries in 
compliance with the rules and conditions stipulated in this Convention'. 
However, what is unprecedented compared to other anti-terrorism conventions 
is Article 6, which started by stating 'extradition shall not be permissible in the 
following cases'. This is not the typical aut dedere aut judicare principle, which 
usually leaves the choice to the requested State that if it does not extradite for any 
reason, it shall submit the case to the competent authority for the purpose of 
prosecution. Whereas in this case the requested State does not have the choice of 
extradition but the obligation, in some cases, to prosecute. 
The article continues articulating the cases in which extradition shall not be 
permissible as the following shows: 
(I)- 'If the crime for which extradition is requested is deemed by the laws enforced in 
the requested Contracting State as one of a political nature and without prejudice to 
the provisions of Article 2, Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Convention for which 
extradition is requested'. 
Thus, if the requested State thought that the crime for which extradition was 
requested was, according to its national law, of a political nature, it will not have the 
choice of extradition any more, ultimately, it will be better for the requested State to 
decide first whether it wants to extradite or not, and if the answer is in the affirmative, 
it should avoid discerning the nature of the crime whether political or not. This will 
be the case in the absence of an effective judicial system which most of these States 
are suffering from. However, by virtue of the last condition which provides that this 
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will not 'prejudice the provisions of Article 2, Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Convention, 
it will be very rare to see any terrorist who can benefit from this exception. 
'If the crime for which extradition is sought relates solely to a dereliction of 
military obligations'. 
It is not comprehensible what the drafters precisely meant by 'dereliction of 
military obligations' and why did they do so since this Convention is mainly 
concerned with terrorism, unless such a dereliction often involves committing a 
terrorist crime, this can be inferred by the words 'relates solely' which suggests that it 
might relate to but not solely. The only explanation of the inclusion of this provision 
is that these States are extremely careful to cover all terrorist crimes. 
(3)- 'If the crime for which extradition is requested, was committed in the territory of 
the requested Contracting State, unless this crime has undermined the interests of the 
requesting Contracting State and its laws stipulate that the perpetrators of those crimes 
shall be prosecuted and punished providing that the requested country has not 
commenced investigation or trial'. 
Therefore, according to this provision when a crime is committed in the 
territory of State A, and the terrorist remains in this State, such a State has the right to 
refuse the request for extradition from State B with respect to the alleged terrorist. 
However, as an exception from this rule, which itself is an exception from the general 
rules of extradition, State B has the right to request the extradition of such a person 
when: 
(i)- the requested person remains in State A; 
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(ii)- his crime has effects by way of undermining the interest of State B; 
(iii)- the relevant law exists; and 
(iv)- State A has not commenced investigation. 
This provision has a very significant relevance for clandestine terrorist 
activities in which State is implicated. For example, if terrorists kidnapped nationals 
of State B while there were in State A, and they did so with the acknowledge or 
acquiescence of the former. In such a case, State B will have the right to request the 
extradition of those terrorists who were not prosecuted by the territorial State which 
was accomplice in their terrorist activities. 
'If the crime has been the subject of a final sentence which has the force of law 
in the requested Contracting State'. 
Therefore, the requested State could, in order to make such a request of 
extradition impermissible in accordance with the Convention and thus avoid being 
blamed, conduct a sham or a summary trial with a final judgment that has the force of 
law in conformity with its national law. 
(5)- 'If the action at the time of the extradition request elapsed or the penalty 
prescribed in a accordance with the law in the Contracting State requesting 
extradition'. 
This is a very important guarantee to the accused as well as to the States 
concerned. For the accused, this will assure him that he will not be a fugitive all his 
life, thus he can, after a certain time, get back to his nonnal life. For the relevant 
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States, either the requesting State, which in this case must do its best to capture the 
accused criminal as soon as possible or he will go unpunished, or the requested State 
which in this case will not be bothered by a request for a person who had committed a 
crime a long time ago (40 or 50 years) and has lived peacefully in the requested State 
and has a family therein. However, the laws in this matter vary from one country to 
another. For example, in Kuwait, 30 years must pass in order for the punishment for a 
crime sentenced by the death penalty to lapse, whereas in other countries such a 
penalty does not lapse ever. Moreover, another question to be asked here is, whether 
the crime which penalty has lapsed in the requesting State, but has not lapsed in the 
requested State, should be prosecuted, and the alleged offender brought to justice? 
(6)- 'Crimes committed outside the territory of the requesting Contracting State by a 
person who was not its national and the law of the requested Contracting State does 
not prosecute such a crime if perpetrated outside its territory by such a person7. 
Unlike the anti-terrorism conventions, which make the mere presence of the 
alleged offender in the territory of any Member States a basis of jurisdiction to 
prosecute him if it decided not to extradite him, this Convention does not do this. 
Hence, in order to prosecute such a person who will neither face any prosecution in 
the requested State in accordance with its internal laws, nor face extradition as this 
provision provides, the States concerned must implement this Convention and amend 
their national laws by making such a terrorist crime subject to prosecution even when 
committed outside their territory by such a person. If they do so, cases under this 
provision will be unlikely to be exempted from extradition. As in the case of Ex parle 
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Pinochet (1999), 22 in which the House of Lords replace its early decision that Senator 
Pinochet was not entitled to immunity to immunity in respect of any of the crimes 
[genocide, terrorism, hostage taking, and torture] alleged against him. In its 
subsequent decision the House of Lords held that (i) the offences alleged in the 
Spanish request were extradition crimes of the purposes of the Extradition Act 1989 
only in so far as they were committed after 29 September 1988, when torture outside 
the United Kingdom became an offence under English law, and (ii) Senator Pinochet 
had no immunity in respect of Extradition crimes committed after 8 December 1988, 
when the instrument ratifying the International Torture Convention was deposited by 
the United Kingdom. 
(7)- 'If pardon was granted and included the perpetrators of these crimes in the 
requesting Contracting State; and 
(8)- If the legal system of the requested State does not permit extraditions of its 
nationals, then it shall be obliged to prosecute whosoever commits a terrorist crime if 
the act is punishable in both States by a freedom restraining sentence for a minimum 
period of one year or more. The nationality of the person requested for extradition 
shall be determined according to the date of the crime taking into account the 
investigation undertaken in this respect by the requesting State', Art. 6. 
The Convention in the last provision recognizes the tradition of some States 
which do not extradite their nationals, however, by adding that the requested State 
'shall be obliged to prosecute whosoever commits a terrorist crime if the act is 
punishable in both States by a freedom restraining sentence for a minimum period of 
22 See R. v. Bow Street Metropolatin (Ex Parte Pinochet), [200011 A. C. 14. For more details on this 
case, see Chapter 3 page 128. 
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one year or more'. The provision suggests that in all of the previous cases the 
requested State is not obliged to prosecute. Moreover, the same can be said with 
regard to the requirement of the dual criminality and minimum period of freedom 
restraining punishment. Thus, if the requested State decided to prosecute in any of the 
previous cases, it would not be required to consider these conditions. Also, this 
provision might be in conflict with the laws of some of the would-be Contracting 
States, e. g., Kuwait, because the Kuwaiti Constitution prohibits the extradition of 
Kuwaiti citizens no matter when they acquired their nationality either before or after 
the date of the crime. 
If as suggested above the appropriate interpretation of the previous provision 
requiring that the crime must, in both (requested and requesting) States, be punishable 
by I year or more of custodial sentence, this implies that in other cases such a 
requirement does not exist. Because some States extradite only those who committed 
a felony not a misdemeanour, and that might cause a difference in practice among 
Contracting States, as a result of their different interpretations on what constitutes 
serious crimes. Therefore, States vary on what constitutes a felony or misdemeanour. 
To avoid such confusion, Article 8 provides that 'for the purpose of extraditing crime 
perpetrators according to this Convention, the domestic legislations of Contracting 
States shall not have any bearing as to their differences with respect to the crime 
being classified as a felony or misdemeanour, nor as to the penalty prescribed for if. 
Another article worthy of note is Article 15 which declares, in part, that 'if 
judicial competence accrues to one of the Contracting States for the prosecution of a 
subject accused of a terrorist crime, this State may request the country which hosts the 
suspect to prosecute him for this crime subject to the host country's consent and 
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providing the crime is punishable in that country by a freedom restraining for at least 
one year or more severe sanction. In such a case the requesting State shall pass all 
investigation documents and evidence related to the crime to the requested State. 
Accordingly, if the host country which this provision is talking about is a 
Contracting State, this means it is not obliged to prosecute in the first place. Such a 
situation is not possible with respect to those who are party to the anti-terrorism 
conventions, because the strict compliance with the principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare provided thereof, means that the State where the accused is present (the host 
country in this case) is obliged to prosecute if no other States have requested his 
extradition, or if such request was refused. Thus under the anti-terrorism conventions, 
the relevant State can, if it wants the accused to be prosecuted in the country where he 
was found, refrain from requesting his extradition. This obligation can also be 
implied from Article 3 (B)(1) of this Convention which requires Contracting States to 
take all the necessary measures to combat terrorism including 'arresting perpetrators 
of terrorist crimes and prosecuting them according to the national law or extraditing 
them in accordance with the provisions of this Convention'. 
Moreover, this provision seems improbable because such an unconnected 
State, especially if this country is not a Contracting State, will prefer to extradite such 
an accused person rather than prosecuting him and bearing the consequences of sich 
action, especially if this person is a member of a powerful terrorist organization. 
In addition, Article 17 Paragraph (2) provides that 'the requesting State shall 
not bring to trial or retrial the accused subject unless the requested State refused 1r) 
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prosecute him'. This means that the requesting State shall not try the accused in 
absentia, unless the requested State refused to prosecute him. 
In Article 28, the Convention realized that the requested State may receive 
many requests for extradition from many States, so then the question would be which 
of these requests has the priority over the others, (note that this problem was not 
addressed by the anti-tefforism conventions discussed earlier). Thus it provides that 
'if the requested State received a number of extradition requests from various 
countries related to the same or diverse acts, this State should decide upon these 
requests bearing in mind the circumstances and in particular the possibility of 
subsequent extradition, date of receiving the requests, degree of the danger of the 
crime and where it was committed. 
Another distinguishing character of this Convention is the non-allowance of 
inserting any reservation of any kind on any of its provisions. Although the right to 
insert a reservation may give incentives to the States concerned to become party to 
this Convention, it in fact, reduces its real effect. 
To this end, Article 41 of the Convention provides that 'it is not permissible 
for any Contracting State to make any reservation, explicitly or implicitly in conflict 
with the provisions of this Convention or deviating from its objectives'. 
In general, although this Convention addressed many issues that were not dealt 
with in previous anti-terrorism conventions, there are, to say the least, three important 
shortcomings of the other anti-terrorism conventions that are not addressed in this 
Convention: Firstly, this Convention did not address the case where one State 
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requests the extradition of the alleged offender but does not intend to prosecute him. 
Secondly, this Convention did not address the substantial differences in sentences 
among Contracting States when deciding to prosecute the alleged offender. Thirdly 
and most importantly is the evident absence of any enforcement mechanism that must 
be taken if any Contracting State fails to live up to the legal obligations it incurred by 
the virtue of this Convention. 
As of I July 2000, only 3 States had signed this Convention and no State had 
ratified it. Therefore, for this Convention to enter into force it must be ratified by at 
least seven States in order for this Convention to come into force. As in the words of 
Article 40 which stipulates, in part, that 'this Convention shall enter into force thirty 
days after the deposit of the seventh instrument of ratification or accession at OIC 
General Secretariat. 
The fact that this organization consists of more than fifty-six members shows 
the importance that this Convention might have if brought into force in combating 
international terrorism, especially if all these States decided to become party to it. 
However, an unpleasant signal by the would-be parties to this Convention can be 
obtained by searching the actions that are taken by some of them. For example, now 
the newspapers are talking about a negotiation of a possible bilateral treaty between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, both being members of the OIC, on issues of security of 
common concern including terroriSM? 3 This implies that either both or one of these 
countries had already intended not to become party to this Convention, otherwise 
there would be no need to address the issue of terrorism since it would have already 
been covered by the OIC Convention, unless the provisions of the treaty they are 
23 Al-Watan News Paper, 16/4/200 1. 
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intending to agree upon are far more advanced than the ones included in this 
Convention or these States believe that the OIC Convention will not come into force. 
6.3. AS A MEMBER OF THE LEAGUE OF THE ARAB STATES24 
No country in the world are immune from terrorist attack, and the Arab 
countries found themselves vulnerable to such acts. Some of the Arab countries have 
suffered from acts of terrorism even more violentý either in scale or gravity, than the 
ones experienced by many other States. For example in Algeria, it has been reported 
that since the start of the cycle of violence in 1992, more than 150 thousand people 
have lost their lives. This is in terms of human life lost, in terms of economic loss, 
due to terrorism, Egypt provides a good example. In a single year, the number of 
tourists visiting Egypt fell from 2918 thousand in 1992-93 to 2359 thousand in 1993- 
94. The number of tourist nights fell from 18,997 in 1992-93 to 13,687 nights in 
1993-94.25 Other countries like Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, 
and Saudi Arabia, all on varying scales, have suffered from terrorism and have 
decided to act within the Arab League to counter this phenomenon. 
There is no need to mention all the resolutions adopted by the Arab League 
condemning terrorism, because they are too many, and because these resolutions, 
despite the fact that they are important in delivering a strong message to the whole 
2' The League of Arab States is a voluntary association of independent countries whose peoples are 
mainly Arabic speaking. Its stated purposes are to strengthen ties among the Member States, 
coordinate their policies, and promote their common interests. It was found in Cairo in 1945 by Egypt, 
Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan (Jordan, as of 1950), and Yemen. Countries that later 
joined are: Algeria (1962), Bahrain (1971), Comoros (1993), Djibouti (1977), Kuwait (1961), Libya 
(1953), Mauritania (1973), Morocco (1958), Oman (1971), Qatar (1971), Somalia (1974), Southern 
Yemen (1967) later united with Yemen and became one member, Sudan (1956), Tunisia (1958), and 
the United Aran Emirates (197 1). 
"A Symposium On Terrorism, A Seminar Organized By The Gulf Centre For Strategic Studies In 
Cairo, 13 (Dr. Ornar Al-Hassan ed., V Dec. 1997). 
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world, including terrorists, that they do not approve of their acts and will not tolerate 
them, do not oblige Member States to act in any way. 
For example, in Res. 4654/1987, the League stressed the need for an 
international conference to be organized under the auspices of the UN in order to 
discuss the issue of terrorism, and to arrive at a clear and legal definition of this 
phenomenon therefore distinguishing it from the national struggle in self- 
determination. 
When the UN General Assembly recognized such a need for an international 
conference to discuss the issue of terrorism, the Arab League adopted a new 
resolution urging the Arab States to respond by forming a committee of 
representatives ftorn these States who have expertise in this field. 
Consequently, a joint definition was prepared and submitted by these experts 
defining terrorism as 'any organized act of violence or threat which poses a state of 
panic through murder, assassination, hostage taking, aircrafts or ship hijacking, 
explosions as well as any other acts that create a state of terror, disorder or 
disturbance aiming at the achievement of political objectives whether underw&en by a 
State or individuals against another State or individuals in circumstances other than 
the legitimate national armed struggle for liberation and independence against all 
forms of foreign control or colonial racial forces etc., particularity the liberation 
movements recognized by regional organizations, the UN and the international 
community whose activities are directed against the military and economic targets of 
the colonization forces or occupier within the occupied territories. The terrorist crime 
shall be deemed as international if the nationalities of the criminals or the victims are 
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different or if the crime is committed on the territory of a third party or represents a 
violation of the rules of the international law, particularly the disturbance of the 
international peace and security, or leads to the worsening the relations between one 
State and another '. 26 
This definition is so comprehensive that even the Arab States did not stick to 
when adopting a new definition of terrorism in the Arab Convention as will be 
discussed later. However, a key sentence can be found in this definition, which, if it 
reflects the real practice of the States, will clarify a lot of confusion existing between 
terrorism and the legitimate use of force in self-determination. That is, it is not 
terrorism if the activities of the recognized liberation movements are directed 'against 
the military and economic targets of the colonization forces or occupier within the 
occupied territories'. Although the terms economic targets are so elastic, it should not 
include civilians. Also, it is terrorism no matter who are the perpetrators or the targets 
if committed outside the occupied territories. 
However, the adoption of these kinds of resolutions was a very important step 
towards the adoption of a legally binding document upon States that became party to 
it. This is exactly what happened in the Arab League, after the adoption of many 
resolutions condemning terrorism, Member States decided to take a step further in 
fighting terrorism by adopting a convention on combating terrorism: 
26 Arab League Res. 4781/AC/89,2/4/88. 
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6.3.1. The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (The Arab 
Convention) 
On April 4,1998, in Tunisia, twenty-two Arabic States, including the 
Palestinian Authority, agreed by consensus and signed the 'first ever common Arab 
Convention on combating terrorism, as one newspaper described itý 7 They all agreed 
and provided in the Convention that it will come into force thirty days after the 
depositing of ratification or accession instruments by the one third of these States, i. e., 
seven States. 
The first thing to be observed about this Convention is the fact that it is 
relatively identical, with only slight differences, in its provisions, to the OIC 
Convention. Consequently, one might ask why the Arab countries, since they are all 
members to the OIC, wasted their time and resources to adopt a convention so similar 
to the one that already been drafted. It should be noted that although the Arab 
Convention appeared officially before the OIC Convention, its early preparation and 
drafts were conducted at the same time with the OIC Convention therefore the Arab 
States could have stopped working on this Convention and waited for the OIC draft 
convention to finish. The answer to this question might be one of four: Firstly, these 
countries may not have intended to be under obligation to other OIC non-Arab 
Members which they do not trust. Secondly, or alternatively they do not trust 
themselves to live up to their obligations in their relations with these States. Thirdly, 
they do not think that the OIC Convention will come into force. Fourthly, the slight 
differences between these conventions might be the reason that caused the Arab 
countries to adopt a new convention. 
' See Al-Watan Newspaper (Thursday 23d April, 1998). 
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Among the few differences between the two conventions that can easily be 
spotted is Article 1, in particular the definition of terrorism and terrorist crime. 
According to Article 1, Paragraph (2) of this Convention, terrorism means'any act or 
threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs for the advancement 
of an individual or collective crin-drial agenda, causing terror among people, causing 
fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or aiming to 
cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to 
occupy or seize them, or aiming to jeopardize a national resource. 
Accordingly, many words were dropped from this Convention that were used 
in the OIC Convention these include 'honour' and 'rights' in addition to the listed 
items that terrorism may imperil. Also, there is no mention in this definition of the 
targeting of 'international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, 
political unity or sovereignty of independent States, which is provided for in the OIC 
Convention. Thus according to this definition, the occupation of a part of a country 
because of its strategic location by a terrorist organization, like the Tamil Tiger which 
is occupying a significant part of the territory of Sri Lanka and launches its attacks 
against the government from there, will be excluded from the coverage of this 
Convention, since it is only in violation of the territorial integrity or political 
independence of the victim State which is not provided for in this Convention, while 
it would be terrorism according to the OIC definition. 
Furthermore, Paragraph (3) of the same article defines terrorist crime as 'any 
offence or attempted offence committed in furtherance of a terrorist objective in any 
of the Contracting States or against their nationals, property or interests, that is 
punishable by their domestic law. The offences stipulated in the following 
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conventions, except where conventions have not been ratified by Contracting Sates cr 
where offences have been excluded by their legislation, shall also be regarded as 
terrorist offences: 
I)- Tokyo Convention 1963 
2)- Hague Convention 1970 
3)- Montreal Convention 1971 
4)- New York Convention 1973 
5)- Hostages Convention 1979 
6)- UN Law of the Sea Convention 1988' 
Therefore, it is not only instigation or abetting, which are not mentioned even 
in the OIC Convention, and are not terrorist crimes here, but participation also, which 
is even more serious, and is not considered as a terrorist crime even though it would 
have been committed to realize a terrorist objective. Moreover, it is a terrorist crime 
to execute or start any crime in order to realize a terrorist objective in any of the 
Contracting States, this will include any attack no matter what the target's nationality 
was as long it was committed in the territory of the concerned Contracting State. 
Additionally, as in the criticism of the similar provisions of the OIC 
Convention, the same can be said here. Providing that a crime, in order to be a 
terrorist crime, to be punishable by the internal law of the Contracting States runs 
counter to the purpose of the adoption of this Convention in the first place, which 
includes, among other things, making terrorism a crime punishable by the internal 
laws of Contracting States, but not the opposite. This problematic provision caused 
Kuwait to suggest that this paragraph should be dropped and substituted by another 
paragraph, which read that the Contracting States are committed to taking the 
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necessary legislative measures to ensure the implementation of the provisions of this 
Convention, in particular, making such acts mentioned above in paragraph (2) as 
crimes and setting up the appropriate penalties? 8 
Moreover, the number of conventions counted in this article is less than those 
counted in the similar article of the OIC Convention, (6 conventions in the Arab 
Convention and 12 conventions in the OIC Convention). It is not clear why they 
excluded the other six anti-terrorism conventions. The reason might be similar to the 
one provided by Kuwait when asked for the reason for not signing some of these 
conventions, that either they did not deal directly with terrorism or they hardly 
covered reoccurring acts. However, such reasoning, if accepted, is not applicable to 
all of these conventions. For example, the Anti-Bombing Convention is dealing 
directly with terrorism and it is dealing with a constantly reoccurring act. 
Another remark about this provision, which can also be said with respect to 
the similar provision of the OIC Convention, is that the listing of these conventions 
and protocols was done in a restrictive way, i. e., whatever convention will be adopted 
in the future will not be among these listed instruments. 
One of the main differences between the Arab Convention and the OIC 
Convention can be found in Article 2 of both. While Article 2 (a) of the OIC 
Convention declares that peoplee struggle for self-determination shall not be 
considered a terrorist crime, Article 2 (a) of the Arab Convention states the same but 
adds 'This provision shall not apply to any act prejudicing the territorial integrity of 
28 Ministry of Justice Memorandum On The Draft Ambic Convention On Combating Terrorism 
(6/2/1996). 
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any Arab State'. (i. e., it will not be considered an act of a legitimate self- 
determination). 
The addition of this concluding sentence came after the Moroccan delegation 
protested a provision identical to the one of the OIC Convention in the early draft of 
the Arab Convention by saying that such an exception is very broad, does not have 
any accurate boundaries, and might result in opening the door for more unneeded 
tensions and strains in relations between Arab countries. The thing that was not said 
by the Moroccans which can explain its concern is the Sahara problem, which 
involves allegations against the Moroccan government of silencing the people of 
Sahara's voice for self-determination. 
The other reason that might be behind the inclusion of this sentence is the fact 
that many Arab States, not only the Moroccan, seem to have concerns about their 
territorial unity because of the fact that in many of these States there are minority 
groups, who if they have the chance to liberate themselves they will instantly. Take 
Iraq for example, in Iraq there are the Kurds in the North and the Shiites in the South 
and both groups are looking for the chance to become independent from Iraq and they 
have used force in order to achieve that. 
Thus to have a provision like the one in the OIC Convention is equal to saying 
that, though indirectly, every minority group can struggle for national liberation and 
may not be considered terrorists even if their acts were directed against the 
Contracting States. However, the Arab States realised this gap and closed it by 
providing that such struggle might be considered as legitimate, if and only if, it had 
not prejudiced the territorial unity of any of the Arab States. 
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Of the same article Paragraph (b) (2) was severely criticised by the Kuwaiti 
National Assembly, by the then President of the Assembly, who said that to state that 
among the crimes which shall not be considered political crimes even when politically 
motivated: '(2)- Aggression against.. ministers in any of the Contracting Statee, is 
very undefined because the word "Aggression" is very elastic with no clear limits. It 
is not clear, he pointed out, whether aggression has to be a material aggression or if a 
verbal one will suffice. 
In addition, neither in Article 2 nor in the preamble did the Arab Convention 
mention the other organized crime, like illegal trafficking in narcotics and human 
beings or money laundering, even if aimed at financing terrorism, as does the OIC 
Convention. 
Furthermore, Article 3 of this Convention provides that 'the Contracting States 
undertake not to organize, finance or commit any terrorist acts or to be accessories 
thereto in any manner whatsoever. In their commitment to the prevention and 
suppression of terrorist offences in accordance with their domestic laws and 
procedures .. ' 
Although the counterpart article of the OIC Convention is basically identical, 
there is a little difference that might have a different impact on Contracting States. In 
the Arab Convention the last clause was to prevent and combat terrorist crimes 'in 
accordance with their domestic laws and procedures', whereas in the OIC Convention 
it says 'in conformity with the provisions of this Convention and their respective 
273 
domestic rules and regulations'. 29 This latter provision is more accurate than the 
previous one because it is more consistent with the purpose of this convention which 
is to deal with terrorism in the way required by the convention, and not to refer only 
to the national law which is, in most cases, inadequate and does not cover all newly 
developed aspects of international terrorism. In some cases national law is in 
compliance with the convention if it implements the provisions of the Convention, but 
since not all States fully implement the Conventions they are party to, and some of 
them if they do, they do it after a very long time and some terrorist crimes may be 
committed between the time of ratifying the convention and the time of 
implementation. 
Also, among the cases in which extradition is not permissible, which are all 
similar to the ones stated in the OIC Convention, is case number (d) which provides 
as in the OIC Convention that extradition shall not be permissible in a case 'if a final 
judgment having the force of resjudicata has been rendered in respect of the offence 
in the requested Contracting State, the Arab Convention adds 'or in a third 
Contracting State', Art. 6 (d). Therefore, if the requested State was willing to extradite 
the requested person to the requesting State, such willingness may be restrained by 
another Contracting State which claims that this crime has been the subject of a final 
sentence with the force of law, and the result will be that the requested person will not 
be extradited to any Contracting States even to the third Contracting State, because 
the first sentence of this article states that extradition shall not be permissible. 
Unlike the OIC Convention which does not require crimes to be extraditable, 
crimes to be punishable in both the requested and requesting States by a custodial 
29 OIC Convention, Art. 3, Para. (4). 
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sentence for a minimum period of I year or more, the Arab Convention provides for 
such a requirement, Art. 8. However, neither conventions provide for the speciality 
principle, i. e., the extradited person shall only be prosecuted for the crime or crimes 
for which he was requested. This is a very important guarantee for such a person, 
because States might abuse extradition rules in order to prosecute individuals for non- 
extraditable offences, if they know that if the request for extradition includes such 
crimes it will be refused. Nonetheless, the speciality principle may be considered as 
part in customary international law as a result of its broad based acceptance by all 
States, which provided for it in many of international instruments they conclude. 
Thus, this principle, one could argue, is not dependent on any treaty and will be 
observed in all cases. 
Finally, in the OIC Convention, Article 42 stipulates that withdrawal from the 
Convention 'shall be effective six months after the date the request is addressed to the 
Secretary General'. Accordingly, it is not certain what the status is of requests that 
were made during this period, i. e., after the request for withdrawal and before the 
lapse of six months. The Arab Convention closed the door, for such unwanted dispute 
triggered provision, and provides that the provisions of this Convention will apply to 
requests that were made before the lapse of this period, Art. 42. 
As in the OIC Convention, this Convention does not include any enforcement 
provisions in case it was violated by any Contracting State. The Minister of the 
Interior of the United Arab Emirates realized such a vital absence and recommended 
that a boycott must take place if any Contracting State fails to live up to its obligations 
under this Convention. He also added, though already included in the first 
recommendation, that a boycott must follow if it was proven that a Contracting State 
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has been involved in sponsoring terrorism against any member by providing weapons, 
sanctuary, funds, or training to any terrorist element? 
o 
It is not clear what kinds of boycott he was suggesting. Contracting States 
adopted no sanctions of any kind, notwithstanding its apparent importance in securing 
compliance with the provisions of this Convention. 
Currently this Convention is in force after many more Arab States have 
ratified it than the threshold requirement of ratification demands. 
31 These are the 
countries who became party to it: Palestine3/6/98, Bahrain 28/6/98, United Arab 
Emirates 9/12/98, Egypt 14/12/98, Saudi Arabia 28/l/99, Algeria 9/3/99, Jordan 
7/4/99, Tunisia 22/4/99, Sudan 24/4/99, Libya 10/6/99, Yemen 9/8/99, and Oman 
25/10/99. 
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6.4. AS A MEMBER OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL. (GCC) 
The GCC is the smallest organization compared with the OIC or the Arab 
League. It consists of six Arabic States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) because of their locations, which overlook on the 
Arabian Gulf. 
30 See Al-Qabas Newspaper, (Thursday 23d April, 1998). 
3' This Convention entered into force on 7/511999. 
32 On May 26,1981, an agreement was signed between the six conservative monarchies of the Gulf 
(Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Aran Emirates, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar) to coordinate their economic, 
political, cultural and security policy, thus creating the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the 
Gulf, better known by its acronym GCC. The Supreme Council is the highest body, made up of the 
Heads of member States, which meets twice a year. The Supreme Council defines the general policy. 
A Conciliation Committee is attached to the Council to serve as a mediator in cases of disagreement 
between members. Decisions of the Conciliation Committee are binding as to interpretation of the 
rules. The Supreme Council, and the GCC as a whole, operate on the unanimity principle. The 
Council of Ministers, made up of Foreign Ministers of the Member States, meets every month. Its 
main tasks are preparing the sessions of the Supreme Council, drafting recommendations and launching 
joint projects. It also supervises the work of the Secretariat General. The only permanent body of the 
GCC is the Secretariat General. There are also specific committees which deal with economic, social 
and cultural cooperation as well as both internal and external security. 
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On many occasions, the GCC condemned terrorism and warned its Members 
against becoming targets of it. By way of encouraging its members to take all 
precautionary measures, the GCC always cites, as examples, three of its Members 
who suffered from terrorism. These countries are: 
Kuwait, which suffered the worst type of terrorism, as the GCC 
described, because of the Iraqi invasion; 
Bahrain, which suffered for more than a year from violence committed 
by some individuals, incited and sponsored by Iran which shared their 
ideological inspirations; and 
Saudi Arabia, which was the victim of two big terrorist attacks in less 
than a year, the Dhahran and Riyadh incidents, in 13/11/1995 and 26/6/1996. 
Believing that the threat to the security of one Member is a threat to all 
members, they all agreed, though in a non-binding decision, to support any Member 
in any action it takes to suppress and counter terrorism and to line up with it until it 
reached the total recovery. 
Although, it was not clear how they were going to support the victimized 
Member, an action was taken by Kuwait which might help in this regard. During the 
era of violence in Bahrain, three Bahrainis were caught in Kuwait and imprisoned for 
three years in relation to terrorist activities they were accused of committing in 
Bahrain. Information is not available on whether those people had been requested for 
extradition by Bahrain or not. 
A recent new development in this field was the participation of the GCC 
Members in the Sharm. AI-Sheikh Peace Makers Summit in Egypt on March 13,1996. 
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Suppression of terrorism was among the declared objectives of that Summit? 3 In a 
statement issued by the Summit, the participants reaffirmed their condemnation of 
terrorism in all its forms and whatever its causes, and whomever its perpetrators. That 
includes, the statement stated, the latest terrorist attacks on Israel. 34 
This was the first time the Gulf countries condemned a violent attack against 
Israel, and it was the first time ever they described such attacks undertaken by the 
Palestinians as terrorist attacks. This however, corresponds to what had been said 
earlier in Section I of this Chapter, that many Arab countries, two of them from the 
Gulf countries, have started diplomatic relations with Israel, and more importantly, 
since the Second Gulf War relations between the Gulf countries and US (the sponsor 
of the Summit) have become very close. Thus the pressure exerted by the US to gain 
their support was not as hard as it has been in the past few decades. 
In an effort to implement the Summit Statement, especially with respect to 
terrorism, a first meeting took place in the American Foreign Ministry in Washington 
DC, between 22-2913/1996, in order to search for effective measures to suppress 
terrorism. 
The GCC participated in the meeting along with experts on combating 
terrorism and diplomats from 27 countries. Among the important things the 
participants agreed upon were the following: 
Terrorism is a crime and there is not any political justification that 
validates the killing of innocent people; 
33 The Gcc General Secretariat's Memorandum On Terrorism. 
3' Ibid. 
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Extradition is an effective weapon in the war against terrorism, thus 
States must enact regulations that facilitate extradition, or at least use the 
existing extradition laws in more consistent way; 
Political asylum laws can be abused by terrorists, therefore these laws 
must be improved to prevent such abuse or to make it more difficult; and 
Fund raising of terrorist organizations is vital to them to carry out their 
activities, hence ways must be found to reduce such fund raising, if it is not 
possible to eliminate. 35 
The fact that the Gulf countries are also members to the OIC and Arab 
League, concluding a new anti-terrorism convention was not of a much concern. 36 
However, from 1981 until 1994, the Gulf countries had tried to agree on a convention 
on security that might cover terrorism as well as many other crimes. Therefore, it will 
be useful to highlight the provisions of some articles of this convention that may in 
one way or another relate to terrorism. 
6.4.1. The GCC Convention On Security Between Member States. (GCC 
Convention) 
In a very broad terms Article I of this Convention provides that States Parties 
are obliged not to harbour those who violated the law or order of any State Party, 
whether they are nationals of any of the Gulf countries or not, or to encourage them to 
continue in their harmful direction against the security of their countries or to supply 
them with arms or money, or to train them in committing violent acts or sabotage. 
Also to suppress their hostile activities towards any of the Gulf countries, and to 
35 Ibid. 
36 Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates are all parties to the Arabic Convention. 
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return them, after taking appropriate measures against them, to their countries, if they 
are nationals of any of the Gulf countries. 
No mention has been made of terrorism in this article explicitly, though it is 
implicitly included therein, because violating law and order of any country could 
include any crime as serious as terrorism or as trivial as pick pocketing. Basically all 
crimes are in violation of the law and order of any of the States concerned. Moreover, 
the law and order of any State is different from the law and order of another State, 
thus the provision might cause different interpretations, each of which corresponds to 
the law and order of each member. 
However, by stating that States Parties are obliged not to provide arms, 
money, or training, it seems that the Gulf countries had terrorism in their mind when 
drafting this article. Another point to be noted about this article is that it obliged 
States Parties to return the alleged offender to their own country, if he was a national 
of any of the Gulf countries. Thus if that person is not a national of any of the Gulf 
countries, the State Party on the territory of which he was found is not obliged to 
return him to any of the Gulf countries even if he violated the law or order of any of 
them. Also, this article states that to return the alleged offender after having taken the 
appropriate measures against him, it is not clear what they mean by appropriate 
measures. In other words, does that include prosecution because, if it does, this article 
is in conflict with the typical aut dedere autjudicare principle, which obliges States 
either to extradite or prosecute, not both as suggested by this article, unless they 
meant returning him after conviction in order the jail sentence in his country. 
280 
Next, in Article 2 of the GCC Convention, it re-emphasised the old concept of 
State sovereignty and the right of every State not to be interfered with its internal 
affairs, however, this time the fear from intervention is not from other States, but from 
individuals. Accordingly, it states that each State Party is obliged to take all 
necessary measures to prevent its nationals, or those who are residing in it, from 
intervening in the internal affairs of any other State Party. 
Yet again a very broad provision, it is not clear whether the mere criticism of 
those people of the conduct of their govenunent would be considered as an act of 
intervention in the local affairs of the State concerned, unless it is covered by the 
wording of Article 3. 
Illustrations of those necessary measures mentioned above are stipulated in 
Article 3 which include: 
A- Non-allowance of the entry, circulation, or export of proclamations or 
publications, or any other similar classifications if they were meant to harm 
the security or safety of any State Party; 
B- Banning of the movement or export of arms, ammunitions, explosives, 
or any of their components unless the competent authority in accordance with 
the law permitted it therein. 
These provisions may open the door for governments to abuse the legitimate 
right of freedom of expression which is, at least, guaranteed by the Kuwaiti 
Constitution. They may also give these governments the right to silence opposition, if 
there is any, because they consider their conduct as harmful to their security. 
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Opposition here includes any one who protests any action taken by a government not 
necessarily restricted to those who oppose the people who constitute that government. 
One more provision that clearly relates to terrorism is the one stated in Article 
28, which regulates extradition between States Parties. According to Article 28 of the 
GCC Convention, extradition is compulsory between State Parties if the request for 
extradition satisfies these two conditions: 
(I)- If those acts attributed to the accused arc, based on their prescription in the law of 
the requesting State, crimes of Huduud, Qasaas, and Taazeer (Islamic set of 
penalties applied in Saudi Arabia) or crimes punishable by a custodial sentence of no 
less than 6 months. The same is required even if the crime was committed outside the 
territory of both the requested and requesting States, as long as the law of the 
requesting State punishes such a crime whether committed in or out of its territory; 
and 
(2)- If the judgement was, in fact, issued by the competent judicial authority in the 
requesting State, whether such a judgment was issued in the presence or in absentia of 
the accused of the crime, to the effect of punishing him The rules of these two 
paragraphs apply also, even if the requested person is a national of the requested 
State. 
Three remarks can be made about this article: Firstly, it does not require dual 
criminality as a prerequisite for extradition to be granted, i. e., the act for which the 
accused person was requested for extradition does not necessarily constitute a crime 
in the requested State, but only being so in the requesting State. For example, if a 
person consumed alcohol, which is a crime according to the Islamic law, applied in 
Saudi Arabia, and fled to United Arab Emirates or Bahrain where such an act is 
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legally permitted, the United Arab Emirates or Bahrain must extradite such a person, 
regardless of his nationality, to Saudi Arabia, provided drinking offence is punished 
by Huduud, Qasaas, or Tazeer, or by a custodial sentence of no less than 6 months. 
The same may be true even if such an act occurred in another country other than the 
requesting State, as long as the law of the requesting State punishes such a crime 
whether committed in or out of its territory. Secondly, the threshold minimum 
penalty (6 months) may seem to be low compared to the more common I year 
minimum as in the Arab Convention, and thus may result in increasing the number 
extraditable offences. Thirdly, providing that the rules of these provisions apply, even 
if the requested person is a national of the requested State, runs counter to the 
Constitution of Kuwait, which forbids the extradition of KuwaitiS. 37 
Consequently, the chance that Kuwait will ratify this Convention is not an 
option. It should be noted that in the old draft of this Convention, there was one more 
provision of this article, which stated that Kuwait shall be exempt from this article 
and the principle of reciprocity will apply between Kuwait and any other State Party. 
However, that provision was dropped, though it was not clear why they dropped it. 
What is clear is that it is difficult for Kuwait to become a member of this Convention 
unless it retains such exemption, or Kuwait amends its constitution, which is a very 
complicated, if not unlikely, option. 
By contrast, Article 30, unlike the previous article, which states the conditions 
under which extradition is mandatory, this article states the cases in which extradition 
is unavailable. These cases are as follows: 
37 Kuwait Constitution, Art. 28. 
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(I)- If the crime is a political crime, and none of the following is considered as a 
political crime: 
a- Crimes of treason, sabotage, terrorism, and crimes of murdering and 
robbery by force whether committed by one or many persons; 
b- Crimes of material aggression against a Head of State of Member 
States or against their ascendants, descendants, or spouses; 
c- Crimes of aggression against crown princes, members of the royal or 
governing family and ministers and those of similar status in the Member 
States; 
d- Military crimes; and 
e- Attempting or starting any of the above mentioned crimes if punishable 
by the law of the requesting State 
(2)- If the crime is committed in the territory of the requested State 
(3)- If the person requested for extradition is diplomatic agent enjoying a diplomatic 
immunity or any other persons enjoying such immunity because of the international 
law or any other treaties or conventions 
(4)- If the requested person has been tried or is under investigation or trial for the 
crime for which he was requested for extradition, whether in the requested State or 
any other State where the crime took place, if the latter is not the requested State. 
Nonetheless, it seems that ambiguity is the main concept the drafters of this 
Convention had agreed upon. Still the international community is crying out for a 
definition of political crimes and more importantly a definition of terrorism. The 
drafters, without specifying these terms, easily included them in this provision either 
as an extraditable offences or non-extraditable ones. An example that explains the 
divergence between States on what constitutes a political crime is the crime of 
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treason, which is considered by many Western countries as a pure political crime, i. e., 
there is no question about its political nature. The GCC Convention, however, does 
not consider this crime as a political one; therefore the perpetrators of such crime can 
be extradited to the requested State Party. 
Moreover, the difference in the description between the types of aggression 
against the first category of protected persons which includes Heads of State, their 
ascendants, descendants, and spouses, and the second category which includes Crown 
Princes, members of the Royal Family, and Ministers, raised the doubt expressed by 
the former president of the Kuwaiti National Assembly that the word "aggression" is 
very unbounded, and may include material aggression as, in the case with respect to 
the first category, and verbal aggression which may not be more than a criticism of 
people of the second category. 
In addition, unlike the OIC and the Arab conventions, which provide that 
extradition is prohibited if the crime occurred in the territory of the requested State, 
unless it undermined the interests of the requesting State. This Convention realized 
that if the crime is committed in the territory of one State, it must undermine its 
interests in some way. Hence, it makes extradition impermissible if the crime for 
which extradition is requested was committed in the territory of the requested State. 
However, such a case is not always of such simplicity. Usually the crime invol%es 
committing many acts in many States. For instance, the crime of terrorism may 
involve planning in one State, buying arms from another, forging of documents in a 
third one, entering illegally in a fourth, receiving money in fifth, committing the crime 
in sixth, and escaping to the seventh. 
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Furthermore, it is expected that the requested State might receive many 
requests from many countries, and then the question will be which of these requests 
has the priority over the other requests. In order to explain this hierarchy, the Article 
33 (a) of the GCC Convention stipulates that if the requested State has received many 
requests for extradition from many States for the same person for the same crime, the 
priority will be to the request from the State whose interests the crime has 
undermined, next to the State in the territory of which the crime took place. 
Regrettably, what was thought to have been overcome by this 
ýonvention in the 
previous article, has appeared in this article. This being that it is too difficult to 
imagine how a crime committed in the territory of one State does not undermine that 
State's interests in any way. 
Moreover, it is possible that these numerous requests from many States are for 
the same person, but for different crimes he allegedly committed. In this situation, the 
priority will, as provided by the second paragraph of this article, be based on the 
circumstances and facts of each crime, including the gravity of the crime, the place 
where it was committed, the date of receiving these requests, Art. 33 (b). 
In contrast with the OIC and Arab conventions, which did not provide for the 
principle of speciality in extradition, i. e., the requested person will be prosecuted in 
the requesting State, if his extradition was granted, only for the crimes for which he 
was requesteý, this Convention recognizes its importance. It states that the person 
shall not be subjected to trial in the requesting State except for the crime for which he 
was requested and its related acts and any other crime he committed after his 
extradition. However, the Convention allows prosecuting him for other crimes not 
mentioned in the extradition request, if he agrees, or if he, after thirty days, was 
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permitted to leave the requesting State, but did not, Art. 37. This last provision as an 
exception to the general rule of speciality may be easily abused. To determine 
whether his consent to be tried for other crimes was free or extracted by force or any 
other means of intimidation is very difficult. The same can be said with respect to the 
second case of this exception, i. e., giving him thirty days to leave but he did not. The 
best solution to bridge such a loophole is to prohibit from prosecution any other 
offences not mentioned in the extradition request, unless he is returned to the 
requested State and a new extradition request is made for these offences. 
In order to make this Convention the major and the sole instrument between 
the Gulf countries on security issues, the drafters in the old draft included a provision 
which peculiarly asserted that this Convention will repeal all the bilateral security 
treaties between States Parties, and in the case of conflict between the rules of this 
Convention and the national rules and laws of any State Party, the priority in 
application shall be given to the rules of this Convention. 38 
This provision is peculiar for two reasons: Firstly, it decides to repeal all the 
bilateral treaties on security between Member States without conditioning the 
existence of conflict between this Convention and the other bilateral treaties. 
Secondly, stating that this Convention will have priority in application over any 
conflicting national law, is equal to stating that this Convention has the superiority 
over the national law of States Parties without knowing the status of the Convention, 
if ratified, as provided by the national law of the would be Member State. For 
example, in Kuwait, the Constitution has superiority over any other source of law 
whether treaties, customs, or legislations. Thus, in the case of conflict between the 
38 Gcc Old Draft Convention, Art. 40. 
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Constitution and this Convention, Kuwait cannot become a member to it in the first 
place. Moreover, according to the Constitution, treaties will have the force of law 
only after being ratified either by the Amir in some cases, or by the National 
Assembly in other cases, which in such cases will be required to issue new laws. 
These different procedures depend on the subject of the treaty, in some cases, though 
few, such ratification by the Amir will suffice. 39 Therefore, to have the status of law 
means that the Convention will supersede any existing law in conflict with it. 
However, it also means that any conflicting law enacted in the future will supersede 
the Convention. 
Nonetheless, the drafters seemed to realize the difficulties this provision may 
raise and decided to drop it and substitute it by a provision which read that this 
Convention shall not prejudice any other bilateral security treaties between States 
Parties. In case of conflict between the provisions of this Convention and the 
provisions of the other bilateral treaty, the relevant States shall, in their bilateral 
relations, apply the provisions which achieve the absolute security cooperation in the 
best possible way, Art. 41. 
In regulating the rules of withdrawal, the Convention in its old draft, in 
unprecedented provision, required that for such a request of withdrawal to be effective 
the Supreme Council of the GCC must, by a majority vote, approve such a request. 
39 Article 70 of the Constitution provides that: 
(1) The Amir concludes treaties by decree and transmits them immediately to the National 
Assembly with the appropriate statement. A treaty has the force of law after it is signed, 
ratified, and published in the Official Gazette; 
(2) However, treaties of peace and alliance; treaties concerning the territory of the State, its 
natural resources or sovereign rights, a public or private rights of citizens; treaties of 
commerce, navigation, and residence; and treaties entailing additional expenditure not 
provided for in the budget, or involving amendment of the laws of Kuwait; shall come into 
force only when made by a law; and 
(3) In no case may treaties include secret provisions contradicting those declared. 
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However, such a requirement was dropped later and the new provision states that this 
request will take effect six months after the date of sending the request to the 
Secretary General. It also adds, as in the Arab Convention, that this Convention will 
apply to those requests that were made before the expiry of this period, Art. 45. 
Currently four States out of six (Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and United 
Arab Emirates) have signed this Convention. The two remaining countries are Qatar 
and Kuwait. The reason declared by Qatar for not signing this Convention is the fact 
that it regulates, among many things, the issue of hot pursuit across the borders of the 
Member States. It allows the pursuing car or boat of any Member State to continue its 
pursuit inside the territory of the neighbouring Member State, if the pursued person 
crossed the borders, until the so called "meeting point", about 20 kilometres deep into 
its territory. Thus, Qatar protested such very advanced regulation of hot pursuit, as its 
borders with the Saudi Arabia are still under dispute. However, recently, Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar have reached an agreement on this matter, so Qatar may sign the 
Convention in the near future. With respect to Kuwait, signing and then ratifying this 
Convention is in conflict with the Constitution, especially with regard to the 
extradition of nationals. Also, the ambiguity of some provisions of this Convention, 
as discussed earlier, may be another reason for Kuwait not signing this treaty because 
if signed, it will be difficult to have ratification from the National Assembly, even if 
Kuwait is exempted from extraditing nationals. 
6.5. CONCLUSION 
As discussed above, from the three anti-terrorism conventions, the GCC 
Convention may, more than the others, constitute a seed for future disagreement 
between its would-be six parties, instead of being a step forward in the cooperation 
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between these States. This could be implied from the broad and imprecise terms this 
Convention includes. For example, terrorism, political crime, and aggression are 
among those unclear terms included in this Convention which remained unclarified, 
thus a different interpretation of these terms is probable. 
Moreover, this Convention included provisions that could be abused by any of 
its parties in order to hunt down any of its opposition figures whenever he happened 
to be in the territory of any of the States Parties. Examples of these provisions are the 
ones that stated that it is not a political crime to commit any act of aggression against 
crown princes, ministers, etc. without specifying what types of aggression it is 
concerned about. 
Also, providing that it is sufficient for extradition to be mandatory if it is about 
a crime that is punishable by at least 6 months of custodial sentence and a judgment 
was in fact issued in that regard only in the requesting States, runs counter to the dual 
criminality principle which is recognized by all similar treaties. Therefore, such a 
provision can be abused by the requesting State to prosecute any person it detests 
despite the fact that his action did not constitute a crime in the requested State. 
With respect to the Arab and OIC Conventions, they, like the other 
multilateral anti-terTorism conventions, have some remarkable features that must be 
mentioned or reiterated if mentioned earlier, but, at the same time, these conventions 
have some apparent shortcomings that might undermine their effectiveness. 
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The features of these conventions are the following: 
Firstly, these conventions, unlike the other multilateral anti-tefforism 
conventions, are eliminative but not enumerative. That is, these conventions dealt 
with terrorism in a comprehensive manner, as is the subject. They included a broad 
definition of terrorism, which is supposed to cover all of its aspects, though this is not 
always true as discussed earlier. Unlike the other multilateral antýterrorism 
conventions which dealt with terrorism in a piecemeal fashion by adopting many 
conventions and treaties each of which dealt with a common offence favored by 
terrorists. The reason why such comprehensive conventions were successfully 
concluded under these organizations but failed when attempted at the UN might be 
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the fact in such organizations the number of States Parties is relatively small if 
compared with the UN, and more importantly, such organizations are always or nearly 
always comprised of members who share common values or common interests. 
Secondly, the conclusion of the conventions, as in the other multilateral antio 
terrorism conventions, will help in establishing unified or at least similar jurisdictions 
among States Parties with respect to terrorism. Because all States Parties are required 
to outlaw such acts proscribed by these conventions, thus a great degree on uniformity 
in legislations is expected. 
Another feature is the fact that these conventions, like the other multilateral 
anti-terrorism conventions, provided for aut deder aut judicare principle as one of 
their central obligations, hence the offender of the proscribed act must be prosecuted 
if not extradited, therefore he should not go unpunished. 
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Finally, both the Arab and OIC Conventions included provisions that obliged 
States Parties not to allow their territory to be used by terrorists in order to launch 
terrorist attacks against other States parties or to provide them with any assistance. 
Instead, they must help one another in preventing such attacks as discussed earlier. 
This obligation is very important, especially after the recent events in Afghanistan. 
What happened to Afghanistan should provide a good example to any State that not 
observing such an obligation will result in becoming a target of military attack by 
those States who suffered because of the non-compliance with such an obligation. 
Nonetheless, these conventions have some noticeable shortcomings that might 
in one way or another undermine their effectiveness in combating terrorism and these 
include the following: 
Firstly, none of these conventions adopted a clear criterion that distinguishes 
terrorism from peoples' armed struggle for self-determination despite the repeated 
recognitions by these conventions of the existing confusion between these two 
concepts. As discussed earlier that none of these conventions have advanced such a 
criteria. On some occasions, developing States, especially the Arab States, stress that 
terrorism and people's armed struggle for self-determination are two distinct acts 
which can be separated from each other. On other occasions, they stress this line of 
distinction is so cloudy that it is very difficult to determine what is terrorism and what 
is not. 
An example of this difficulty can be found in the UNGA Resolution 42/519 
which 'urges all States, unilaterally and in cooperation with other States, as well as 
relevant United Nations organs, to contribute to the progressive elimination of the 
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causes underlying international terrorism and to pay special attention to all situations, 
including colonialism, racism and situations involving mass and flagrant violation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and those involving alien occupation that 
may give rise to international terrorism (emphasis addedy. 40 
Hence, this Resolution implies that these causes might give rise to terrorism, 
whereas Arab States do not want to call it terrorism in the first place. Rather a 
legitimate use of violence in accordance with right of self-determination. Thus it is 
upon these countries to provide what they think a clear distinction between the two 
concepts. 
Secondly, the cases where extradition is not permissible under these 
conventions are very broad and may constitute an open-ended excuse for those who, 
faithlessly, want to preclude this process. An example of such a case is the one stated 
in the Arab Convention, which provides that extradition shall not be permissible, 
when the crime [for which extradition is sought] has been the subject of a final 
sentence which has the force of law not only in the requested Contracting State but 
also in any third Contracting State. 
Moreover, like the other multilateral anti-terrorism conventions, it is not clear 
under either the Arab or OIC Conventions whether the State Party that requested the 
extradition of a person from another State Party is obliged to prosecute that person if 
its request for extradition was granted. Even more importantly, it is not clear whether 
a State which is an accomplice in terrorism can request the extradition of the fugitive 
40 UNGA Res. 42/519 (1987). 
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terrorist, and whether the requesting State can grant such a request without any 
violation of these conventions which are silent in this regard. 
Similarly, neither the Arab nor the OIC Conventions defined what they meant 
by prosecution as the other compulsory option if extradition was not granted for any 
reason. Does it necessarily mean to try the alleged offender and sentence him to 
prison or the death penalty if convicted, or can other procedures also be considered as 
prosecution? 
Furthermore, in relation to the above-mentioned observations, both 
conventions relied on the national laws of States Parties in setting the proper 
punishment of terrorists, and that could result in a substantial difference in sentences 
among States Parties. However, setting a uniform range of penalties might not be 
welcomed by those States and dissuaded them form becoming party to these 
conventions. 
Besides this, many provisions of these conventions are based on the 
assumption that States Parties already have national laws that outlaw the offences 
proscribed under these conventions. This assumption though likely to be found in 
some States, is not always will be so in other States. For example Kuwait, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, had implemented some of the multilateral anti-terrorism 
conventions it had ratified by enacting new statutes that penalized new offences 
under-regulated or not regulated at all in the past. 
Finally, as in the other multilateral antkerrorism conventions, these 
conventions have no effective enforcement provisions that can secure compliance by 
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any State Party that failed to live up the obligations it incurred under these 
conventions. 
Now, the question is whether it would be better for Kuwait to become a party 
to these conventions, i. e., the Arab and OIC Conventions? Or whether those acts of 
terrorism, especially those involved the would-be States Parties, that had been 
committed against Kuwait would be dealt with differently if these conventions were 
in force at that time? 
To answer these questions with certainty is not possible, at least at the 
moment; this is because none of these conventions have been tested yet. Nonetheless, 
there are some considerations, that if taken into account, will suggest an affirmative 
answer to these questions. This includes: 
First of all, to have a written instrument that is legally binding on its parties is 
better than none. Moreover, such an instrument will help in enforcing a new legal 
value with respect to terrorism in the region. This will be so, even though this 
instrument is inflicted with some defects, as long as there are some features that can 
outweigh these defects and that can substantially contribute in the war against 
terrorism. 
For example, most of the terrorist attacks that have been committed against 
Kuwait involved one or more of the would-be States Parties to these conventions, e. g., 
Algeria, Iran, and Iraq, as will be discussed later. Despite the fact that these countries 
if they want to continue sponsoring, supporting, or tolerating terrorism might not be 
restrained from doing so notwithstanding these instruments. As in the case of Libya, 
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who was accused of orchestrating the Lockerbie attack even though it was, at the time 
of the incident, party to all of the relevant multilateral anti-terrorism conventions. 
Nevertheless, the degree of condemnation, the international pressure, and the 
consequences that might follow will be different in each case if such States were 
parties to the relevant anti-terrorism conventions and they intentionally violated them, 
than if these States were not under any legal obligation. 
As will be discussed later, one of the most outrageous cases of terrorism 
committed against Kuwait was the 1988 hijacking of AI-Jabriah airline, which ended 
up in Algeria which, because it was not party to any of the relevant antiaterrorism 
conventions, found itself not obliged to capture the hijackers and extradite them to 
Kuwait or to prosecute them if refused to extradite them, instead Algeria set them 
free. Therefore, if the Arab or the OIC Conventions were in force at that time, one 
would expect Algeria to act differently since no body accused it of being involved in 
the hijacking at all. 
Secondly, even if Kuwait has or claims to have an effective national law in the 
suppression of terrorism, this would not be enough to give any assurance that other 
States in the region have the same effective national laws. Therefore, these 
conventions would, to a certain extent, give surety to Kuwait that those who 
committed terrorist attacks against it and fled to other countries in the region will not 
go unpunished. 
In addition, some of the would-be States Parties to these conventions are not 
parties to all multilateral anti-terrorism conventions. As in the case of Kuwait, which 
is a party only to six of these conventions out of eleven. Hence, the Arab and OIC 
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conventions might be the sole instruments that are legally binding existing between 
some of these States in the combating of terrorism. Nevertheless, these conventions 
are limited in scope, therefore will not be sufficient in countering terrorism. This is 
because terrorism is not confined to one region, but rather one terrorist organization 
spreads out to many countries in many regions. Thus, an international response, 
which can be by the adoption of a multilateral anti-terrorism convention, is vital with 
such a problem. In other words, terrorism is a global problem that needs a global 
response. 
Also, these conventions are the first real attempts of the Arab League and the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference that deal with terrorism in such binding 
instruments. Therefore, they must be given a sufficient amount of time and a high 
number of participation of States Parties in order to test them and conclude new 
instruments in the future if the existing ones prove to be ineffective. 
Last but not least, the number of States in the region who find themselves 
vulnerable to terrorism is increasing as discussed earlier, therefore among the would- 
be States Parties to these conventions, are those States which like Kuwait have 
suffered from terrorism and want to combat it by concluding such conventions. 
Accordingly, these like-minded States would certainly benefit from the existence of 
these conventions in achieving their common purposes of combating terrorism in such 
a cooperative manner. 
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CHAPTER 7. KUWAIT'S NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
TERRORISM 
In this Chapter, unlike the previous one, the discussion will be narrowed to the 
ways Kuwait has dealt with terrorism but from a local point of view. First in Section 
1, the focus will be on the national law of Kuwait and the question there will be how 
Kuwait regulated terrorism in its national law, and how Kuwait implemented the antý 
terrorism conventions it had ratified, if there are any. Secondly, in Section 2, light 
will be thrown on the some of the terrorist events that took place in Kuwait and the 
responses, in general, to such events. 
It should be noted that it was not possible to see how the Kuwaiti national law 
has been interpreted and applied by the national courts. This is because the National 
Security Court, which access to its trials is not allowed, tried all of these cases that 
involved these laws. Therefore, no transcript of these trials could have been obtained. 
7.1. THE NATIONAL LAW 
In general, there are three approaches that criminal laws of States use when 
dealing with terrorism at national level. Firstly, some criminal laws devote sections 
or chapters, or one act or more, to the crime of terrorism and that includes its 
definition, types, penalties, and so on. Examples of this kind of law can be found in 
the UK, US, France, and Egypt. Secondly, some criminal laws do not provide for 
terrorism as a distinct crime from other common crimes, but instead consider such 
common crimes as aggravated assaults when they are committed for terrorist 
objectives. An example of this law is the Algerian Statute 92-3, which provides in 
part, that if a common crime was committed to realize terrorist goals, the penalty will 
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be the following: Death penalty if the crime is punished by life imprisonment; life 
imprisonment if the crime is punished by imprisonment of ten to twenty years; 
imprisonment from ten to twenty years if the crime is punished by imprisonment of 
five to ten years; and the punishment will be doubled with respect to other penalties., 
The third and the most common approach is that some criminal laws do not regulate 
terrorism at all and instead prosecute terrorism under the names of other common 
crimes, e. g., murder, robbery, sabotage, kidnapping, etc. Kuwait is a typical example 
of the third approach. 
Nowhere has the Criminal Law in Kuwait even mentioned the word terrorism 
or terrorist crime. The apparent reason for not doing so might be the difficulties 
Kuwait has experienced at the international level when debating the adoption of any 
anti-terrorism convention, as discussed earlier. 
These are some examples of provisions of the criminal law that cover some 
crimes that can be committed against the national security, which can also be called 
terrorist crimes. Since terrorist organizations are the core upon which terrorists rely 
for recruiting new members, organizing themselves, coordinating their activities, 
planning terrorist crimes, and committing these crimes, most national statutes that aim 
at combating terrorism, outlaw the establishment, administration, membership, 
financing, or participation in any form in such organizations. 
However, unlike the British anti-terrorism law which names such terrorist 
organizations and provides that participation in whatever form in these organizations 
is prohibited and shall be penalized, thus the public can know these proscribed 
1 Algerian Statute 93-3, Art. 1. 
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organizations and refrain from dealing with them, 2 in Kuwait it is very different. In a 
very broad and ambiguous provision Article 30 of the Criminal Law prohibits the 
associations, groups, and organizations that intend to diffuse principles which aim at 
the subversion of the fundamental system by unlawful means, or attacking by force 
the social and economic structures in the country, and those who organize or in%ite to 
membership in these organizations shall be punished by imprisonment for no more 
than fifteen years. Also, imprisonment for no more than ten years will be imposed on 
any person who participates in these organizations if he is aware of the objectives they 
intend to achieve. 3 
Moreover, Article 29 proscribes some actions that may ultimately lead to 
terrorism. It provides that whoever openly instigates, or in a public place or in any 
other place where he can be heard or seen by people, by saying, screaming, writing, 
drawing, depicting, or any other forms of thought expression, to overthrow the 
existing government in Kuwait, and to make such a change by force or any other 
unlawful means, shall be punished by imprisonment of no more than ten years. The 
same penalty shall be applied to anyone who uses by the above means to espouse 
ideologies which aim at the subversion of the fundamental systems in KuwaiO 
Realizing that training to use arms or other explosives can be used to achieve 
subversive objectives, i. e., terrorist goals, but without directly saying so, Article 31 
states that the punishment of imprisonment for no more than fifteen years and no less 
than three years, shall be imposed on anyone who teaches or trains one person or 
more to bear arms or to use ammunition, or instructs him or them in any kind of 
2 British Criminal Justice (rerrorism, and Conspiracy) Act 1998, Chap. 40. 
3 Statute 31/1970, Art. 30. 
4 Ibid. Art. 29. 
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military arts aiming to use him or them to achieve illegitimate objectives. 
Imprisonment of no more than five years shall be imposed on any person who 
received such training and teaching, if he knows that the one who trained or taught 
him aimed at using him to achieve illegitimate objectivesý 
Now the most important questions to be answered here are that since Kuwait 
had ratified six multilateral anti-terrorism conventions and protocols that dealt directly 
with some terrorist offences, did it implement them? And were national statutes 
enacted for this purpose? The answer to these questions is negative with respect to 
some of these conventions, and affirmative with respect to the others. The New York 
and Hostages Conventions were not implemented by Kuwait though they both were 
ratified in 1988. The apparent reason for not implementing them by enacting new 
statutes was the fact that the crimes covered by these conventions were already 
covered by the Criminal Law in Kuwait, but under the name of common crimes. For 
example, hostage taking is kidnapping, assassinating a diplomatic agent is murder, 
and so on. 
On the contrary, the Tokyo, Hague, Montreal Conventions, and Montreal 
Protocol on combating terrorist crimes against civil aviation were all implemented, 
though in one statute enacted in 1994, which will be discussed here in more detail. 
7.1.1. Statute 6/1994 On Crimes Relating To The Safety Of Aircraft And Air 
Navigation 
Consisting of 10 articles, the Statute, as its interpretive memorandum states, 
intends to cover all the crimes listed on the anti-terrorism conventions adopted by the 
5 Ibid. Art. 31. 
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International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which, as the memorandum 
maintains, are not covered by the existing Criminal Law. Therefore, this Statute aims 
at adding new crimes and their penalties to the Criminal Law in order to implement 
the ICAO conventions. 
Article I of the Statute starts with definitions of some of the terms it used 
therein, and these include the following: 
(I)- "Aircraft" is any means used or meant to be used for aviation or navigation in air 
or space; 
(2)- "Inflight", the aircraft is considered in flight at any time from the moment when 
all its external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when any 
such door is opened for disembarkation. In the case of a forced landing, the flight 
shall be deemed to continue to be in flight until the competent authority takes over the 
responsibility for the aircraft and for persons and property on board; 
(3)- "In servic6", the aircraft is considered to be in service from the beginning of the 
pre-flight preparation of the aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew for a specific 
flight until 24 hours after any landing; the period of service shall, in any event, extend 
for the entire period during which the aircraft is in flight as defined in Paragraph (2) 
of this article; and 
(4)- "Air navigation facilities", include the airport and the installations that oversee 
and organize the traffic in the airspace above, and the surrounding lands of these 
installations and those prepared for the waiting of passengers and cars! 
Therefore, the Statute does not differentiate between private aircraft or those 
owned by the govenunent. More significantly, this Statute is wider than the ICAO 
Statute 6/1994, Art. 1. 
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conventions, which apply only to civil aircraft, but not military, customs or police 
aircraft, whereas this Statute, as its definition of what constitutes aircraft suggests, 
may apply to all kinds of aircraft. Also, there is no mention in this article or in the 
rest of this Statute, that the aircraft, against which a violent act may be committed, is 
to be engaged in actual or intended international flight. The reason might be the fact 
that Kuwait does not at the present time, have more than one international airport, 
and so as a result, all flights from and to that airport must be international ones. 
However, domestic flight is possible with respect to military, customs and police 
aircrafts. 
Article 2 of the Statute provides that a punishment of short-term imprisonment 
for no less than seven years will be imposed on any person who intentionally commits 
any of the following acts: 
A)- Performs an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in night if that 
act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; or 
B)- Places on, or causes to be placed on, an aircraft in service, by any means 
whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause 
damage to it, which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is 
likely to endanger its safety in flight; or 
Q- Destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation, if 
any such act is likely to endanger the safety of an aircraft in flight; or 
D)- Communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the 
safety of an aircraft in flight. 7 
Ibid. ArL 2. 
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The first fact to be noticed about this article is that it sets up a penalty for 
committing any of the offences it lists. This is one of the most important elements in 
any law implementing a convention, because without such a punishment the 
convention can never be effective. 
Another observation about the offences this article covers is the fact that they 
are literally taken from Article I of the Montreal Convention. However, one of the 
offences covered by the Montreal Convention was omitted in this Statute. It is 
Paragraph (b) of Article 1, which states that it is an offence to 'destroy an aircraft in 
service or cause damage to such an aircraft which renders it incapable of flight or 
which is likely to endanger its safety in flight'. 8 This provision may include some 
offences that are not covered by the four provisions of Article 2 of the Statute. For 
example, destroying the aircraft in service or causing damage to it not only by a 
device or any other substance placed on it, but by attacking it from the outside with a 
missile, for instance, or by implanting some explosives in its path when taking off or 
landing. Moreover, this article of the Statute is mainly concerned about the aircraft 
while it is in service or in flight, though to be in service includes the period while in 
flight. There is no mention of offences against the aircraft while it is not in service as 
provided for by the Montreal Protocol, which this Statute is also supposed to 
implement. Even more importantly, no mention was made of offences against the 
airport ground personnel. The possible reason for not covering such offences by the 
Statute is the fact that these offences are already covered by Criminal Law, though 
under different names and different penalties. 
8 Montreal Convention, Art. 1, Para. (b). 
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In addition, Article 3 of the Statute provides for another crime against the 
safety of the aircraft and air navigation. It states that a punishment of a short-term 
imprisonment of no less than ten years for any person who unlawfully, by force or 
threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes any aircraft in flight or 
exercises control of that aircraft, or changes its direction. If that was coupled with 
detaining any person and taking them to another destination other than the intended 
one, the penalty of life imprisonment or a fixed term of imprisonment for no less than 
10 years may be imposed! 
This provision is very broad on one hand and very narrow on the other. It is 
very broad because; firstly, it is not like the Hague Convention which requires that the 
act be committed by a person on board the aircraft. Thus any person, regardless of his 
location when he committed this offence does commit such an offence, an example of 
an offence that can be committed by a person who is not on board an aircraft in flight 
is the one who implants a bomb in an aircraft and threatens to explode it by a remote 
control device if his demands are not met. Secondly, unlike the ICAO conventions 
which made no mention of hostage taking as an offence against the aircraft, this 
Statute realizes that hijacking usually involves hostage taking, but considers it as an 
aggravated assault only if it resulted in changing the destination of any of the hijacked 
people. 
On the other hand, this provision is very narrow because; firstly, it requires the 
aircraft to be in flight when the offence is committed. Thus any other offences 
occurring while the aircraft is not in flight will not be covered by it. Secondly, the 
means by which the person can use to seize the aircraft or exercise control over it can 
9 Statute 6/1994, Art. 3. 
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only, according to this article, by force, threat, or any other forms of intimidation. 
Therefore, excluded from the coverage of this article is the seizure or control of the 
aircraft by any other means that do not involve any type of intimidation, such as bluff 
or deceit. 
Nonetheless, since the outcome of committing any of the offences covered by 
the Statute may vary in degree from a catastrophic end such as the total destruction of 
the aircraft, or the murder of the people on board, to a peaceful end by the 
surrendering of the hijackers or intervention by police before any harm is done. 
Consequently, the Statute admits such a variation of results, and provides for different 
penalties that suit the different results. To this end, Article 4 of the Statute stipulates 
that if any crimes mentioned in the previous two articles resulted in injury or hurt to 
any person, or in the destruction of the aircraft or damage caused to it or to any of the 
air navigation facilities, the penalty will be death or life imprisonment. In all events, 
the offender will be obliged to pay the value of the property to which he caused 
damage. The death penalty will be imposed if any of these crimes resulted in the 
death of any person. 10 
It should be noted that the intention to cause such results like injury or death is 
not required by this article, as it was required for committing the offences themselves 
according to articles 2 and 3 of the Statute. Hence, if such injury or death happened 
by accident or mistake, the offender will still be subjected to their respective penalties 
as provided by Article 4 above. 
10 Ibid. Art. 4. 
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States' practices, when implementing the ICAO conventions on setting the 
penalties that they think as "severe penalties" as required by these conventions, vary 
from one country to another. For example, in the Netherlands, the penalty for the 
intentional communication of false information that might endanger the safety of an 
aircraft is imprisonment for no more than four years, whereas in Kuwait it is 
imprisonment for no less than seven years. In Netherlands, hijacking of an aircraft is 
punished by imprisonment for no more than nine years and twelve years if it resulted 
in the death of one or more persons, whereas in Kuwait the penalty could range from 
imprisonment of no less than ten years or the death penalty, if the death of any person 
has occurred as a result of such crimes. Imprisonment of no more than twelve years in 
Denmark, a life sentence in Cyprus, a minimum of twenty years imprisom-nent in 
Israel and a life sentence if death has resulted, life imprisonment in Norway, a 
maximum of four years imprisonment in Sweden and a maximum of ten years if the 
crime was highly dangerous, the death penalty in Algeria for the crime of the mere 
attempt to change the direction of the aircraft by force or threat thereof, or by bluff. 
These different practices show how States differ when implementing even the same 
words "severe penalties". This substantial difference in sentencing is one of the 
serious criticisms of the aut dedere option in the anti-terrorism conventions as 
discussed earlier in Chapter 3. 
In order to force people to help in preventing such crimes from occurring, in 
capturing the alleged perpetrators thereafter, or in collection of all related evidence, 
Article 5 of the Statute sets up a penalty of imprisonment for no more than five years 
and a fine of no more than 5,000 KD or one of these for any person who knows about 
a plan to commit any of these crimes, or knows about their occurrence and abstains 
from reporting it to the competent authority. If he assists the perpetrators to escape by 
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covering for them or evidence of the crime, destroys the latter, or conceals the means 
that were utilized or prepared to be utilized in carrying out the crime or is related to it, 
the same applies. This penalty may be doubled if this action was committed at a time 
of war or at a time when emergency law is declared. " 
The realisation has occurred that one of the best methods to combat such 
terrorist crimes is to offer incentives and guarantees to the criminals themselves in 
order to make them cooperate with the authority. To this end, Article 6 of the Statute 
provides that an exemption from the punishment of the crimes mentioned in this 
Statute will be granted to any of the offenders who takes the initiative and informs the 
competent authority before beginning the execution of the crime, or even after by 
reporting the occurrence of such crime and those who participated in it. However, to 
benefit from this exemption, that initiative must be taken before the competent 
authority has commenced any search or investigation. Even if the person informs 
after the commencement of a search or investigation by the competent authority, he 
will benefit from this offer if his action helps in capturing the offenders or some other 
offenders of similar crimes of similar type and danger. 12 
According to the Kuwaiti Criminal Law Article 83, the Court, if it sees that the 
accused deserves mercy because of the circumstances in which he committed the 
crime, his history, morality, or age, can commute the death penalty to life 
imprisonment or a short-term imprisonment for no less than ten years, or commute 
life imprisonment to a short-term imprisonment for no less than seven years. 13 
" Ibid. Art. 5. 
12 Ibid. Art. 6. 
13 Statute 16/1969, Art. 83. 
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Consequently, because of the possibility that the perpetrators of the terrorist 
crimes covered by the Statute might benefit from such a provision, Article 7 of the 
Statute provides that in exception from Article 83 of the Criminal Law discussed 
above, it is permissible for the court, when applying the penalties articulated in 
Article 4 of the Statute, to commute death penalty only to life imprisonment and the 
latter only to a short-term imprisonment for no less than fifteen years. Also, it will 
not be permissible for the court to waive the sentence from being imposed on the 
offender when convicted or suspend the implementation of such a sentence when 
issued with respect to these crimes. 14 
Moreover, establishing jurisdiction over these crimes in accordance with the 
ICAO conventions is another important factor of the proper implementation of the 
rules of these conventions. Accordingly, the Statute provides in Article 9 that taking 
into account articles 1115 and 12 16 of the Criminal Law, the rules of this Statute will 
apply to the offences provided hereunder in the following cases: 
A)- When the offence is committed against or on board an aircraft registered in the 
State of Kuwait, or an aircraft leased to a lessee who has his principle place of 
business, his permanent residence, in the State of Kuwait; 
B)- When committing such offence caused exposure to danger a registered aircraft or 
a leased one as provided in Paragraph a of this article; 
14 Statute 6/1994, Art. 7. 
15 Article 11 of the Criminal Law provides that the rules of this law will apply to any person 
whomsoever commits in the territory of Kuwait and in any of its annexure a crime prohibited 
hereunder. It will also apply to any person who commits outside the territory of Kuwait an act that 
makes him the original perpetrator or an accomplice in a crime occurred fully or partially in the 
territory of Kuwait. Statute 16/1969, Art. 11. 
16 Article 12 of the criminal law provides that the rules of this law will, also, apply to any Kuwaiti 
national committed outside Kuwait an act punishable by this law as well as by the law of the place 
where the crime was committed in case if he returns to Kuwait without being acquitted by the foreign 
courts. Ibid. Art. 12. 
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Q- When the aircraft against or on board of which the offence is committed lands in 
the territory of Kuwait with the alleged offender still on board; and 
D)- When the victim is a Kuwaiti citizen. 17 
Clearly this provision, along with the provisions referred to in the Criminal 
Law, provides many bases of jurisdiction, even more so than the ones articulated in 
the ICAO conventions. For example, the right to establish jurisdiction when the 
victim is a Kuwaiti citizen has no analogy in these conventions. Therefore, if a 
Kuwaiti citizen happened to be among the passengers of the hijacked or attacked 
aircraft, Kuwait will have the jurisdiction to prosecute the offenders even if this 
Kuwaiti passenger has not been injured or harmed in any way, because just hijacking 
or attacking the aircraft will make all of its passengers and crew victims of such act 
regardless of the consequences. 
Nevertheless, this Statute omits one of the most important bases of jurisdiction 
provided for in the ICAO conventions. That is the obligation to establish jurisdiction 
over the alleged offender whenever he is found in the territory of Kuwait and Kuwait 
does not extradite him. Although, Paragraph (C) covers some aspects of this 
obligation, it does not cover all the aspects. For instance, it does not cover the case 
when the alleged offender, who is not a Kuwaiti national, is found not on the board of 
the victim aircraft when such an aircraft did not land in Kuwait, but in the territory of 
Kuwait some times after the offence. 
Lastly, this Statute does not mention anything about extradition as an 
important obligation provided for in the ICAO conventions, which this Statute is 
17 Statute 6/1994, Art. 9. 
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supposed to fully implement. Not even a reference was made to extradition as 
another option to prosecution when the offender violated this Statute. 
One of the few articles omitted from this discussion is Article 8, which 
articulates that the State Security Court will have the cognisance to try the 
perpetrators of these crimes and those relating to them. 18 It was omitted because it is 
not effective any more, given that just one year after the enactment of this Statute the 
State Security Court was abolished. However, it will be useful to shed some light on 
this Court. 
7.1.2. State Security Court 
This is beside the Martial Court which can be established in time of war or in 
time of emergency when the government declares Martial Law. As provided by the 
Martial Law Statute 22/1967 which states in Article I that it is permissible to declare 
Martial Law whenever the security or public order of the State of Kuwait or any part 
of it is exposed to danger, if an armed aggression occurred or is imminent, or when 
internal disturbance has occurred, etc. 19 This last provision, as the first, may imply the 
right to declare Martial Law in the countering of terrorism if it is on a large scale. 
DecMng Martial Law and the subsequent establishment of the Martial Court is an 
extraordinary option because it involves licence to the government to take some 
exceptional measures which are unavailable to it during other times. Examples of 
such measures are the right to seize and search any person any where at any time, the 
right to impose a curfew on the movement of people, and the right to deport aliens the 
government suspects of causing trouble, etc. So as a result the Constitution restricts 
Ibid. Art. 8. 
Statute 22/1967, Art. 1. 
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such options and requires that a decree of Martial Law be referred to the National 
Assembly within fifteen days following its issue, for a decision on the future of the 
Martial Law. If the proclamation takes place during the period the National Assembly 
is dissolved, it will be referred to the new National Assembly at its first sitting. It also 
provides that Martial Law may not continue unless a decision to that effect is made by 
a majority vote of the members constituting the Assembly. In all cases, the matter is 
referred to the National Assembly in accordance with the forgoing procedures, every 
three months. 20 
Nonetheless, in addition to the Martial Court, which is similar to that which 
most States have, Kuwait used to have the so-called State Security Court with unique 
features, not in the time of war or emergency, but in ordinary circumstances. In 1969, 
Statute 26/1969 on the establishment of the State Security Court was enacted in order 
to face some exceptional circumstances that faced Kuwait at that time? ' The Statute 
provides in its Article I that this Court shall be composed of three civilian judges? 2 
Thus, this Court was not composed of military judges as in the military court or 
martial court. 
Article 2 of the Statute specifies the types of crimes this Court will deal with. 
According to this article, this Court will have the cognisance to try the following: 
(I)- Crimes stated in the Criminal Law from Article 92 to 107.71iis includes crimes 
against the national security in general, and terrorist crimes, though under different 
names, in particular. 
20 Kuwait Constitution, Art. 69. 
21 Just one year before the enactment of this Statute, Kuwait had been a target of violent attacks by a 
group of people, most of them were Kuwaitis. The Arabic people movement in all Arabic countries in 
pursuit of the dream of establishing a united Arabic country inspired them, thus they used violence to 
dramatize their cause. 
22 Statute 26/1969, Art. 1. 
312 
(2)- Crimes of arson whenever any of the means articulated in Article 247 of the 
Criminal Law were used for committing such crimes. This includes the use of 
explosives or dynamite to commit arson. 
(3)- Crimes related to the above. 
(4)- Crimes referred to it by a decision of the Ministry Council? 3 
However, since the judges who are sitting in this Court are the same judges 
sitting in the Criminal Court, and since the crimes it will try are the same crimes that 
used to be tried by the Criminal Court before the establishment of this Court, one 
might properly say why bother? 
The answer to this question can be found in two exclusive features of this 
Court that distinguish it from the Criminal Court: firstly, this Court is obliged by this 
Statute to decide the cases it has jurisdiction over very quickly. For example, 
according to the Statute, the State security prosecutor is obliged to inform the accused 
of the accusation decision and the list of supporting witnesses just ten days before the 
Court convenes in its first session. Secondly and even more importantly, the 
judgment of this Court shall be final and not appealable in any way. This is unlike the 
judgment of the Criminal Court which can be appealed in the two possible courts 
above, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. 
Though deciding cases in a very quick manner is a positive idea because it will 
relieve the concern of the public if they know that such criminals have been punished 
in such a very short time after they committed their crimes, this may also help in 
deterring potential criminals. Also, the cases that this Court is trying will be recent 
23 Ibid. Art. 2. 
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and there will be no fear that some witnesses might forget what they have seen or 
heard. Moreover, such a fast trial will reduce the expenses usually incurred by long 
litigation. 
Conversely, such a fast trial might deprive the accused of the time he needs to 
collect all the related evidence in his interest. Also, some cases are very complicated 
and need extensive time and resources in order to understand them and give them the 
deliberation they deserve. Furthermore, the decision of this Court is final, thus to 
reach it too hastily may make the judgment flawed or unsafe, and therefore defective. 
Nonetheless, after the liberation of Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion, the Court 
was fully loaded with cases involving the accusation of people of the unlawful 
cooperation with the Iraqi forces. Therefore, in order to alleviate the fear that this 
Court might mistakenly decide some cases that will be irreparable, another Statute 
was issued to amend the existing one by making the judgment of this Court 
appealable only to the Supreme Court. 24 
In spite of that amendment, in 1995, i. e., after twenty six years of existence, 
the National Assembly recently realized that the composition of this Court is similar 
to that of the Criminal Court and regretted the prevention of the accused to his 
ordinary judge in order to put him on an equal footing with those who committed 
other crimes not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court, the Assembly issued Statute 
55/1995 to the effect of abolishing this Court. 
24 Law Decree 10/1991, on the amendment of some provisions of the Statute 2611969 on the 
establishment of the State Security Court. 
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Lastly, it is to be noted that this Court has tried all terrorist crimes that had 
been committed against Kuwait, and the penalties this Court imposed on the 
perpetrators of such crimes are the same penalties that can be applied by the Criminal 
Court on other crimes. Nonetheless, as stated earlier access to these trials was not 
permissible. 
7.2. CASES AND RESPONSES 
Like many other countries of the world, Kuwait had, for some time, suffered 
from terrorist attacks. Some of these terrorist attacks were as early as 1968 and some 
of them were as recent as 1993. It is to be noted that it is beyond the scope of this 
section to go through all these attacks; however, some of them will be mentioned. 
Following the maxim that says that the person should, if he is to choose 
between two things, choose the least evil, Kuwait had supported Iraq against Iran 
during the course of the First Gulf War. As result, in the 1980s, during which time 
war was declared, Kuwait had been subjected to what can only be called a wave of 
terrorism from those who supported Iran. 
On December 12,1983,6 bomb attacks occurred in Kuwait City, five people 
were killed and sixty-one wounded. The largest explosion took the form of a suicide 
attack on the US Embassy, where four people were killed and at least fourteen 
wounded when a truck packed with explosives was driven through the Embassy gates 
and exploded in the compound. The blast destroyed a three-story annex and severely 
damaged other nearby buildings; one of the two men in the truck was killed instantly 
while the other was taken to hospital with serious injuries. The five other attacks 
were mounted against the French Embassy, the International Airport (where one man 
315 
was killed), the Electricity and Water Ministry, the Shuaiba Industrial and 
Petrochemical complex on the outskirts of the city, and a residential development 
used principally by US nationals. 
Responsibility for the bombings was claimed by the Aljihad al-Islami 
organization, a militant Shia Moslem group widely seen as having close links with 
Iran. On Dec. 18, the government announced that twenty-three people (most of them 
Iraqi and Lebanese) had been arrested shortly after the explosions and had admitted to 
planning and implementing the attacks. The State Security Court tried them and 
imposed the death penalty on six of them (three were fugitives), life imprisonment on 
seven, fifteen years on three, ten years on one, five years for another, and acquitted 
the other five. 25 
In an attempt to secure the release of those prisoners, a Kuwait airliner (known 
in Kuwait as Kazma) had been hijacked en route to Pakistan from Dubai on Dec. 3, 
1984. Of the 151 passengers on board, two American passengers were killed. The 
airliner was forced to land in the Iranian Capital, Tehran, whcre the Iranian authorities 
had, after unsuccessful negotiations, raided it. Responsibility for the hijacking was 
also claimed by the same organization mentioned above, and their demand for release 
of their friends held in prison in Kuwait was refused by Kuwait. 26 It is to be 
mentioned that nobody knows what happened to the hijackers after the Iranian 
authorities captured them. Iran could claim that it had prosecuted them in accordance 
with the aut dedere autjudicare obligation in the ICAO conventions, even if it did not 
in fact do so, and Kuwait would have no option but to accept this claim, because it 
25 Kecsing's Record of World Events, 32692 (Vol. XXX, Feb. 1984) 26 Keesing, at 33951 (Vol. XXXI, Feb. 1995). 
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could not have verified such a claim. Even if Kuwait did not accept this claim, it 
could not have forced Iran to prosecute the hijackers because there is no enforcement 
mechanism provided for in any of the anti-terrorism conventions. 
On May 25,1985, Kuwait had witnessed, for the first time, a shocking bomb 
attack on the Amiri Motorcade (President's Motorcade). A car-bomb attack was 
mounted on a motorcade containing the Amir and other senior off"icials. Four people 
were killed, including two of the Amir's bodyguards, and the driver of the car used in 
the bombing, which was driven into one of the cars in the procession, exploding on 
impact. The Amir himself escaped with minor cuts. The driver was subsequently 
identified as a pro-Iranian Shia Iraqi citizen and a member ofA Ijihad al-Islaml. 27 
The trial of the five Iraqi nationals charged of the involvement in the 
attempted assassination of the Amir concluded on Nov. 29,1986, one of the 
defendants was sentenced to death; of the remainder, all of whom were being tried in 
absentia, one was sentenced to life imprisonment, and three were acquitted? s 
Two months after the bombing of the Amir Motorcade, Kuwait had also 
witnessed some cruel terrorist attacks, but this time by a different group, the Arab 
Revolutionary Brigade, a Palestinian group based in Iraq. Though Kuwait was allied 
to Iraq at that time, such attacks took place by the group which was, to a certain 
extent, controlled by the Iraqi regime, and no one knows why it committed a crime 
like this, or why it happened to Kuwait at the hands of a supposed ally from Iraq. The 
possible answers might be that Iraq used such a terrorist group in order to extort 
27 Ibid. at 33884 (Vol. XXXII, Sep. 1985). 22 Tbid. at 35545 (Vol. XXX, Nov. 1987). 
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money from Kuwait and the rest of the Gulf countries also, or it was a message of 
strength in case Kuwait thought it might stop its financial support of Iraq. 
These attacks were mounted against two seaside cafds mostly frequented by 
families, in Kuwait City on July 11,1985. Nine people were killed and a further 
eighty-nine wounded. Five Palestinian individuals were accused of the cafd 
bombings; two of them were sentenced to death (one in absentia), while a third was 
jailed for life, and a fourth for three years. One other who had been tried in absentia 
was acquitted. 29 
In June 1986 and January 1987, several terrorist attacks occurred targeting the 
oil cites in Kuwait. Sixteen people were charged with such crimes, six of them were 
sentenced to death (two in absentia), while two defendants were acquitted and the 
remainder received prison terms of between two years and life? o 
On April 5,1988, Kuwait and the whole world witnessed the longest ever 
hijacking in history. The hijackers, reportedly linked with the pro-Iranian Shia 
Moslem groups in Lebanon, took control of a Kuwaiti airliner (known in Kuwait as 
Jabriah) with 97 passengers and 15 crew on a flight from Bangkok (Thailand), and 
held it for fifteen days. Flying from Iran, where the airliner was forced to go at the 
onset of the hijacking. However, after their demands for the release of their friends 
imprisoned in Kuwait, (those prisoners were the same ones they demanded release of 
in the above mentioned hijacking of Kazma), were strongly refused by the Kuwaiti 
government, the flight was then forced to fly to Cyprus, where two Kuwaiti 
29 Ibid. at 35545. 
30 Ibid. at 35546. 
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passengers on board the aircraft were killed, and finally to Algeria. The Algerian 
govenunent eventually negotiated the release of the hostages in a deal which allowed 
the hijackers, who were generally reckoned to be the best equipped, prepared and 
organized group, to escape to an unknown destination? ' 
Following the crisis, the Kuwaiti government was widely praised for its strong 
reftisal to make concessions on the release of the seventeen convicted terrorists of 
1983 bombing attacks in Kuwait. The Algerian government, on the other hand, was 
severely condemned by many countries, including Kuwait, for its role, which resulted 
in the escape of the hijackers. It is to be noted that at that time Algeria was not a 
party to either the Hague or Montreal Conventions, which deal with such cases. 
Hence, such a country was under no obligation to extradite or prosecute the alleged 
offender. Therefore, this said country may become a safe haven for terrorists. Such 
behaviour by the Algerian government was nothing but an indirect policy to further 
terrorism by showing how weak the international order can truly be on occasion. 
Along with the fmn stand that had been taken by the Kuwaiti government 
when involved in negotiations with the terrorists by not giving in to tile terrorists in 
any way, and the harsh sentences imposed by the State Security Court which may 
serve as a deterrent message for potential terrorists if they contemplate any attack 
against Kuwait in the future, Kuwait had also taken some actions to prevent and 
combat terrorism during that period: 
The Civil Defence Corps. announced plans for the establishment in the 
workplace of "security committees" to help combat terrorism. According to 
these plans, every establishment, governmental or private, employing over 
31 Ibid. at 35916 (Vol. XXXIV, May 1998). 
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than fifty personnel would be required to set up a committee of at least five 
people, who would be trained in basic anti-terrorist skills. 32 
Deportation was heavily used by the government at that time against 
some immigrant workers; most of whom were Iranian, who were suspected of 
political agitation. For example, on Nov. 10,1986, the Interior Ministry 
announced that 26,898 people had been deported over the past few years. 33 
However, such action was not taken only against the illegal immigrants, as in 
most countries, but it was taken against legal immigrants also, on the basis of 
mere suspicion. 
The National Assembly also considered accountability for those who 
were responsible for ensuring proper security measures in some important 
sites but failed to do so. For example, the Oil and Industry Minister was 
accused by the National Assembly of failing to ensure the appropriate security 
precautions following the terrorist attacks on the oil installations which caused 
fires in them. 
The establishment of specialized units that deal with terrorism: 
0 Aircraft safety units that conduct inspection of any person 
boarding the aircraft and accompany the aircraft in its fligit; 
0 Explosives suppressing units that have the required technical 
experience to detect bombs, dismantle them and render them harmless; 
0 Diplomats protection units that guard the diplomatic agents in 
Kuwait, prevent and countcr-attack any attack against them; 
0 Documents forgery inspection units that detect forged 
documents and keep records of all stolen and lost Kuwaiti documents. 
32 Ibid. at 36312 (Vol. XXXIV, Nov. 1988). 
33 Ibid. at 35545 (Vol. XXXIII, Nov. 1987). 
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Training, education, and media, which have all been used to raise the 
sense of security among the public, prepare people to fight terrorism, 
emphasise the importance of proper communication between people and 
police to report any information they have on terrorists or their plans, and 
educate people, especially those who work in non-profit organizations, to be 
aware of terrorists and to prevent them from using these organizations in any 
harmful way. 
Conversely, if the foregoing terrorist attacks were the price Kuwait paid 
because of its support to Iraq in its war against Iran, Kuwait had paid the ultimate 
price when it had a slight misunderstanding with Iraq, who invaded it and 
indiscriminately killed the people therein and destroyed their properties. One of the 
indirect results of the invasion was the release of all the convicted terrorists 
imprisoned in Kuwait and some of whom were in death row waiting to be executed. 
Most of these freed terrorists, especially foreigners, had fled Kuwait during the crisis 
and some others, most of them Kuwaitis, had stayed in Kuwait and joined the Kuwaiti 
resistance movement against the Iraqi invaders Because of their expertise in making 
bombs and explosives, the movement had benefited from them and after the liberation 
of Kuwait those who used to be labelled as terrorists became heroes and praised by 
the government, who pardoned some of them thereafter. 
One of the terrorist attacks that was officially attributed to Iraq after the 
liberation of Kuwait was the unsuccessful plot to assassinate the former American 
President George Bush. Details emerged in May 1993 of the Iraqi plot to assassinate 
G. Bush during his visit to Kuwait in mid-April of the same year. Kuwaiti security 
officials arrested sixteen people, including ten Iraqi nationals, supposedly involved in 
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the plot, one of which allegedly confessed to being a colonel in the Iraqi Security 
Service. For its part, the Iraqi government vehemently denied any involvement in the 
alleged plot, while US congressional leaders urged military retaliation against Iraq if 
such involvement was proven ?4 
Six of the accused (five Iraqis and one Kuwaiti) were sentenced to the death 
penalty by the State Security Court on June 4,1994. A further five Iraqis and two 
Kuwaitis were sentenced to prison terms ranging from six months to twelve years. 
On March 20,1995, the Supreme Court upheld the death sentences imposed on two of 
the six, life imprisonment instead of the death penalty on two of them, fifteen years 
imprisonment for the fifth, and five years for the sixth. 35 
It is to be noted that on the June 27,1993, i. e., almost one year before the 
court reached its decision on conviction, the US attacked Iraq in retaliation for this 
Iraqi sponsored plot to attack the former US President. Among the evidence the US 
was alleged to have in order to prove the link between those terrorists and the 
sponsorship of the Iraqi government, was the type of explosives found in the 
possession of the plotters. The US claimed that these explosives matched the ones in 
use by the Iraqi Secret Service. 
7.3. CONCLUSION 
Discussion about the Kuwaiti national law provides a good example of how it - 
is extremely difficult even at the national level to come up to a satisfactory definition 
of terrorism in order to regulate such a crime. As has been discussed earlier that 
34 Ibid. at 39487 (Vol. 36, N. 4). 
33 Ibid. at 40480. 
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nowhere have the words terrorism or terrorist crimes being mentioned in any of the 
statutes discussed previously. 
The reasons why a State, in general, is unwilling to come to a comprehensive 
definition of terrorism even at the national level might be: firstly, the difficulties of 
finding such a satisfactory definition of terrorism. Secondly, the choice of many 
States who, refrain from defining terrorism, to instead prosecute it under the names of 
other common crimes. Thirdly, being afmid that such a comprehensive definition 
might outlaw its own actions in certain situations. Fourthly, it might outlaw some 
actions of groups or movements for whom this State give support. And finally, a 
State may not realize the importance of such a definition. Because no terrorist actions 
have taken place within its boundaries, thus such a State thinks that it does not need 
this definition. 
However, the above cases of terrorism in Kuwait or against Kuwait illustrate 
beyond any doubt that no State is immune from terrorism. If such a State has not 
been subject to any terrorist attacks in the past, it will soon or later. Therefore, not yet 
being a victim of terrorism should not be an excuse for not taking, unilaterally or 
multilaterally, any proactive measures to confront it and among these measures is the 
adoption of bilateral, regional, or multilateral anti-terrorism conventions. Also, as 
stated earlier in Chapter 2 that there is an international duty imposed on all States by 
customary international law to take national measures against terrorism. Such a duty 
has become clear in the post-September 11, when the Security Council in Resolution 
1373 (2001) requests all States to take various measures, some of which were of 
domestic nature, to combat terrorism. 
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Nonetheless, it must be said in the conclusion that for a State, like Kuwait, to 
have an effective national law does not, in many ways, mean that such a State is not in 
need of international cooperation to fight terrorism. This is because of the simple 
reason that in many cases terrorists commit their crimes in one State and escape to 
another, and because terrorist organization are operating in many States at the same 
time, therefore to have an effective national law, which is a positive thing, does not 
guarantee an effective suppression of such terrorists. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
Many issues have been covered by this study, each of which is related to a 
response or action a State or States can take against terrorism. After setting out the 
introduction of this thesis, this study began exploring the concept of terrorism. Some 
of the questions that were answered in that section were: why terrorism needs to be 
defined; is there any definition of terrorism that is accepted by the international 
community and if not, why not? 
In response to the last question, failure to reach a decision is due, at least in 
part, to the difficulties in finding a distinction between terrorism and people's armed 
struggle for self-determination which caused the international community to divide 
into two groups each of which stresses what he thinks is right. In addition to that, 
there are other hidden reasons that prevented States from reaching a broad definition 
of terrorism. Among these is the fact that some States had been attacked by terrorist 
groups or movements, or were about to be, thus these States wanted to subscribe to a 
definition of terrorism that would outlaw the conduct of these terrorist groups or 
movements. Nonetheless, these States are, at the same time, reluctant to subscribe to 
such a definition because of the fear that such a broad definition of terrorism would 
also criminalize their own use of force against these groups and movements. 
Other States, who had not been attacked, also worried that such a broad 
definition of terrorism would outlaw their own conduct in certain situations. For 
example, those who provide support for groups or movements which they believe to 
have the right of self-determination, worry that a definition of terrorism would outlaw 
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their own support of such groups or movements when the latter committed acts 
proscribed by this definition, which these States had agreed to. 
Other questions that were discussed in this part included: what are the causes 
that give rise to the phenomenon of terrorism? And the typologies or classifications 
of terrorism, including the relationship between States and terrorism and why they do 
so, were all explored in that chapter. 
Furthermore, this study set out the first type of response the international 
community took against terrorism. That is, the criminalization of some aspects of 
terrorism via the adoption of numerous multilateral conventions each of which has 
dealt with a specific type of terrorist offence. 
The reason why the international community did not adopt just one 
comprehensive convention that deals with terrorism as one problem was explained in 
the early part of this study, which demonstrated the failure of the international 
community to come to an accepted definition of terrorism. 
Going through these anti-terrorism conventions, one can notice how the 
international community approached terrorism by resorting to a gradual coverage of 
terrorist offences of high international concern by concluding one convention dealing 
with one aspect of that offence, e. g., hijacking, then concluded another convention 
that supplemented the first by covering other aspects of the same terrorist offence and 
so forth. 
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Many writers considered this type of response as a step forward in combating 
terrorism since all these conventions are based on aut dedere aut judicare principle, 
which implies that terrorist offences must not go unpunished. Nonetheless, these 
conventions were afflicted with shortcomings that may, and had in some cases, made 
them devoid of any real effectiveness in deterring terrorism. One of the most 
remarkable shortcomings that must be reiterated here is the absence of any 
enforcement mechanism in any of these anti-terrorism conventions in the case any of 
the States Parties failing to observe their obligations. It is to be said that though it is 
difficult for States to have such an enforcement mechanism at least from a political 
point of view, it is, nonetheless, to be considered as a weakness on part of these 
conventions from a legal point of view. 
Moreover, this study examined the use of the extradition process as an 
effective response to terrorism. However, this study found this process had been 
affected with some exceptions that made it of limited effectiveness in suppressing 
terrorists who committed terrorist offences in one State and fled to another in order to 
elude capture in the victim State. All these exceptions and the judicial and treaty 
practice of States in this regard were included in this study. This study also 
considered the question of what possible outcomes would result from such a failure to 
extradite a suspected terrorist because of these exceptions or because of uncooperative 
requested State was also considered. 
The idea of making terrorism among the crimes that the International Criminal 
Court has jurisdiction over was discussed as one of the responses the international 
community can take against terrorism. Arguments for and against such an idea were 
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explored. This idea was reinforced more clearly after the Lockerbie stalemate in 
which the relevant parties had no faith in thejudicial competence of each other. 
In addition, the question of what States are doing in reality to suppress 
terrorism was addressed by this study. Since practical measures taken against 
terrorism can be both peaceful and coercive, this study devoted one chapter to each of 
these types in order to give each the attention it deserved. 
The following are some of the practical but peaceful measures States can take 
against terrorism: 
Firstly and most importantly, States can destroy terrorism by destroying the 
environment from which terrorism emanates. That is, to eliminate the causes and 
reasons that give rise to terrorism in the first place, rather than dealing with its 
consequences. Examples of these causes can be: social injustice, denial of equal 
participation in the political system, suppression of political expression, poverty, 
frustration, and alien domination or foreign occupation. 
In a very recent lecture, the former president of the US Bill Clinton 
emphasized how poverty could play a contributory role in the rising of the 
contemporary terrorism. He said 'we have seen how abject poverty accelerates 
conflict, how it creates recruits for terrorists and those who incite ethnic and religious 
hatred, how it fuels a violent rejection of the economic and social order on which our 
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future depends'! Therefore, reducing the risk of terrorism, he thinks, can be achieved 
by making the wealthy countries spreading the benefits of their economies to poor 
countries which, as a result, will make more partners and fewer terrorists in the future. 
Secondly, States can take some of the practical measures against terrorism 
such as the strengthening the asylum procedures in order to prevent the abuse of such 
a legitimate right by terrorists. Another important practical measure is to stop terrorist 
fund raising. This problematic step is essential in the war against terrorism as, 
without funds, terrorists in many cases will not be able to operate effectively. Finally, 
another significant element is the enhancement of the exchange of information and 
intelligence between States on terrorists or terrorist organizations. Effective exchange 
of information and intelligence means the terrorists' next move is known to the 
would-be target States. 
By contrast, some States beheve that terrorism is a problem that has become 
too great to be dealt by the peaceful measures mentioned above, thus they resort to 
coercive measures to combat terrorism. However, not all coercive measures have 
been included in this study. The only type that was discussed was the use of military 
force abroad to counter terrorism, as with this type of action there is a clear 
international element that should be addressed. 
However, before discussing this type of action, this study stressed very clearly 
that this type of response must not be resorted to unless it is unavoidable in cases of 
self-defence or upon an authorization from the Security Council. 
1 Bill Clinton, The Struggle for the Soul of the 21' Century, Richard Dimbleby Lecture 2001 (14'h 
Dec., 2001) <httg: //www. bbe. co. uklarts/news-Commentý/dimbl&ylclinton. shtnil>. 
329 
Next, this study discussed the various justifications States presented when they 
used military force abroad and whether any of these justifications validate the use of 
armed force in the context of terrorism. All these justifications were considered 
whether such armed action was taken against individual terrorists operating in the 
territory of another State or against that State because of its purposeful support to 
terrorists attacking the offensive State. Self-defence, reprisal, protection of one's own 
nationals, and invitation were all discussed in this study and the question then was 
which of these excuses legitimized the use of force against terrorism. The 1998 use of 
military force by the US against Sudan and Afghanistan was taken as a case study of 
this chapter. Finally, this chapter answered the question of whether the use of armed 
force against terrorism is an efficient deterrent. 
Subsequently, after analyzing the various responses that had been taken or can 
be taken against terrorism in a more global sense, this study narrowed its focus to be 
more regional, sub-regional, and national. It did so by studying Kuwait's perspective 
on terrorism. 
Discussion of Kuwait's perspective on terrorism was divided into two 
chapters. The first one was concerned with: 
Firstly, Kuwait's attitudes in the UN or any of its specialized agencies when 
debating the adoption of any new anti-terrorism convention. In this regard, this study 
found that Kuwait is more attracted to the second trend, which constitutes a hard line 
in any debate over adopting any new instrument against terrorism unless an exception 
for the use of armed struggle in pursuit of the right to self-determination is provided 
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for. However, the position has, though still publicly proclaimed by Kuwait, been 
lessened in its degree of sternness in the post-Iraqi invasion era. 
Secondly, Kuwait as an Islamic country is a member of the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference. Discussion in this section focussed on what sort of measures 
this regional organization had taken against terrorism. A comparative analysis 
between the regional measures taken by this organization and those of a global nature 
was presented in some places. 
Kuwait is also a member of the Arab League. The question there was, as in 
the above paragraph, has this regional organization taken any action against 
terrorism? If so, what? The study then compared measures taken by this organization 
with measures taken by the Islamic Conference and measures taken by the 
international community. 
This study also discussed another sub-regional organization of which Kuwait 
is a member. This small organization is the Gulf Cooperation Council, which consists 
of just six members, all of which overlook the Arabic Gulf. Similar questions to the 
above were asked. Questions of how effective the measures taken by these regional 
organizations would be in suppressing terrorism and whether Kuwait should become 
party to the anti-terrorism conventions adopted by such organizations were also 
investigated in this chapter. 
The second chapter studied Kuwait's approach to terrorism, but from a local 
perspective. Issues such as what sort of measures, especially in term of law enacted 
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there, Kuwait has taken to counter terrorism, and whether such law implemented the 
anti-terrorism conventions Kuwait had ratified were discussed. Furthermore, the 
discussion was extended to cover some of the terrorist attacks that have been 
committed against Kuwait and measures it took to counter such attacks. 
Now the question that must now be asked is which of the responses discussed 
in this study is more effective than the others? In other words, how should these 
responses be prioritized in combating terrorism? 
It should be reemphasized that the foremost response to terrorism is to 
eliminate its underlying causes. Although terrorism cannot be justified for any 
reason, those reasons must not be ignored and must be eradicated immediately. For 
example, if one is talking about Palestinian terrorism, he/she must not forget what 
caused this wave of violence in that region in the first place. Combating this type of 
violence cannot be effectively done by oppression and excessive use of force, but 
simply by freeing the occupied territories in accordance with the outstanding UN 
resolutions, which have repeatedly called for immediate withdrawal of Israel from the 
Palestinian occupied territories. What makes this the obvious response is the fact that 
Israel has used all the measures at its disposal in order to deter the Palestinians from 
using violence, but has failed to achieve this result. It has used many types of armed 
responses, whether military invasions attacking people in the occupied territories or 
assassination of some of the prominent leaders of the Palestinian movements either 
inside or outside the Palestinian occupied territories by special forces. A total siege of 
the Palestinian population in the occupied territories also failed to prevent the 
Palestinians from infiltrating Israel on a suicide missions. 
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Moreover, Israel's use of force against the Palestinians in response to the calls 
of the extremists in Israel only gives legitimacy to the extremists on the Palestinian 
side. Without such an extreme action by Israel, the extremists on the Palestinian side 
would lose publicity and their propaganda would be worthless, if Israel resorted to 
peaceful responses instead. 
The same can also be said in response to those who claim that refugee camps 
inside or outside the Palestinian occupied territories are the places or seedbeds where 
the new generation of terrorists are coming into existence, thus these camps must be 
destroyed. They are right these camps must be destroyed but not by bombs and 
rockets but by letting these people return to their homes. Hence, eliminating the 
reasons that give rise to terrorism or use of violence must be the first response to 
consider. 
After that comes the importance of the international criminalization of 
terrorism by the adoption of the anti-terrorism conventions. In order to combat 
terrorism more effectively, as many States as possible must outlaw terrorism. 
Although having only one instrument that deals comprehensively with terrorism is 
ideal, what the international community has done so far in adopting many anti- 
terrorism conventions, each of which deals with a specific type of terrorist offence, 
should not be undervalued. 
Unifying or nearly unifying the national laws of States Parties to these anti- 
terrorism conventions is a very significant result of concluding these instruments. 
Thus the international community must do its best to make non-States Parties to these 
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conventions change their positions and become party to these conventions. This can 
be done either by exerting more international pressure on these States in order to push 
them to become party or by linking membership of these anti-terrorisin conventions 
with international trade or any other privileges or features a State Party to these 
conventions will have over the non-State Party. Therefore, the international 
community must provide incentives for States in order to encourage them to become 
parties to these anti-terrorism conventions. 
International criminalization of terrorism will also help in capturing terrorists 
who commit terrorist offences in one State and escape to another. This is because all 
States Parties to these anti-tefforism conventions are obliged, even though they are 
not directly connected with such an offence, to extradite or prosecute the alleged 
offender. This is equal to saying that terrorism is, because of these conventions, 
becoming an international crime and States have a universal jurisdiction over it. 
Therefore, terrorists will not have any place to hide, if all States decided to become 
party to these conventions. 
Of equal significance are three other practical measures that can also result 
from international criminalization of terrorism. These are: 
First, prevention of terrorism funds raising. As terrorism is a crime and States 
are obliged to suppress it and because funding is a prerequisite for terrorists, States 
are obliged to hinder and disrupt any flow of money to terrorists in order to prevent 
them from implementing their terrorist schemes. This preventive measure is very 
important since it is concerned with the infrastructure of the terrorist organization not 
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only the individual terrorists as are many responses. Thus, it aims at destroying such 
infrastructure and will as a result prevent terrorists from operating effectively. 
Another practical measure that is of no less importance in combating terrorism 
is the effective exchange of information and intelligence between States on terrorist 
organizations and groups and their plans. Informing each other of terrorist names, 
networks, financial resources, plans, etc. means that terrorists are exposed to the 
whole world. Therefore, instead of dealing with the consequences of any terrorist 
attack already committed, States can intervene and interrupt such plans before they 
are implemented. Moreover, even if terrorists manage to commit their planned 
offence, effective cooperation in the exchange of information and intelligence 
between States will result in the apprehension of these offenders. 
The third important practical measure is to strengthen the rules of asylum in 
order to prevent terrorists from abusing such a legitimate right. As a result of the 
criminalizing of terrorism, terrorists will not be allowed to benefit in any way from 
the flexible law of asylum, especially in Western countries. Therefore, terrorists who 
commit terrorist offences will be prosecuted in all cases and the question of whether 
to grant them asylum will not be initiated in the first place, if this measure makes it 
clear that terrorists will always be refused. 
Extradition can be effectively used against terrorism if it is properly applied. 
An effective extradition process means there will be no alternative for terrorists who 
commit terrorist offences in one State and flee to another. The idea of vesting the 
International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over terrorism must be stressed here 
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because the various obstacles that hinder extradition from playing its important role in 
the war against terrorism, e. g., political offence exception, humanitarian exception, 
which cannot be mounted against such an international court. Thus, though the role 
of extradition in combating terrorism is presently not very optimal, such a role will be 
of great significance if the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over terrorism 
and States are required to extradite alleged terrorists for international prosecution 
before this court. 
Finally, the last response to terrorism can be the use of military force against 
the sovereignty of another State. This isolationist response is only of short-term 
effectiveness. In the long run such action will generate more violence. Has the 
frequent use of military force by Israel and the US prevented them from being 
attacked so far? Moreover, innocent people are in most cases the victims of such 
action. The reason why the use of armed action has proved ineffective in deterring 
terrorism is because it ignores one of the basic facts about terrorism. That is, 
terrorism is a thought and ideology, thus it must be confronted with thought and 
ideology. 
During discussion of the responses that can be taken against terrorism, it has 
been noticed that some measures or responses are of national or unilateral nature, if 
when they involved actions taken against another State. Some bilateral, regional, and 
international or multilateral measures or actions against terrorism were also analyzed 
in this study. The question must now be which of these levels upon which an action 
against terrorism should be based is more effective or preferable in war against 
terrorism. 
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Firstly, some States claim to have very effective national laws, thus they do 
not sign and ratify some anti-terrorism conventions. For example, the reason Kuwait 
did not sign and ratify some of the anti-terrorism conventions, such as the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, might be, as 
there is no other apparent explanation, because Kuwait already has a national law that 
covers the crimes proscribed by these conventions. 
Having an effective national law is very important in the war against terrorism 
in order to prevent any loophole in such a State that might be exploited by terrorists. 
Furthermore, to try and punish terrorists by such an effective law will set an example 
for others not to do the same. However, this does not mean that such a State does not 
need to cooperate with the international community by becoming a party to the 
multilateral anti-terrorism conventions. This is for the simple reason that for a State, 
such as Kuwait, to have an effective national law does not guarantee in any way that 
other States have the same effective national laws. Moreover, even if these State have 
effective national laws, that does not mean they will cooperate with such a State in 
deterring terrorists who in many cases commit crimes against the jurisdiction of one 
country and run away to another. Therefore, an effective national law will not help in 
capturing these terrorists from abroad and bringing them to justice either in the victim 
State or in the State where they have been captured. 
Secondly, some States resort to unilateral measures or actions against 
terrorism, but this time by taking action against another State believed to be involved 
in terrorist attacks against the formers or at least did not cooperate with these States to 
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prevent these attacks from occurring. An example of unilateral actions discussed in 
this study was the unilateral use of military force against another State. 
Such a unilateral action may be justified in some cases, as in cases of taking 
armed action in self-defence, and may please the victim State as it has responded with 
what it believes to be the most valuable response. However, in many cases such a 
unilateral action by one State against another has failed to suppress terrorism and 
prevent it from recurring. 
Also such an action is an isolationist solution, i. e., it is available only for a few 
powerful countries but not for other States who may want to take action against 
powerful countries, like the US. In addition, such a unilateral action, especially the 
use of military force by one State against another, may cause tension between States 
which may further international conflict instead of achieving the opposite. 
Another approach that has frequently been used by States to confront terrorism 
is a bilateral cooperation between two States by concluding a bilateral treaty. For 
example, Kuwait has signed many bilateral treaties with many States for the 
suppression of terrorism. The US was also reported to have more than one hundred 
bilateral treaties with many States in various areas. 
This approach is considered, from the decision-making point of view, to be the 
simplest and easiest way to cooperate. Also, in such bilateral relations the relevant 
parties are free to set whatever obligations they want upon themselves. Thus this low 
degree of cooperation will be very agreeable to the national sovereignty of these 
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Sates, not like the other multilateral arrangements, especially ones with long-term 
provisions, such States will be bound and the degree of independence will, to a certain 
extent, be limited. 
Moreover, States that share the same political and ideological values will find 
such a bilateral approach a very efficient in the suppression of terrorism. Other 
arrangements with a large context where difference between States is a dominant 
factor will result in a very weak mechanism against terrorism. 
Furthermore, some States prefer bilateral agreements to national law in the 
suppression of terrorism. National law will benefit all States whether democratic or 
authoritarian, whereas in a bilateral agreement the benefits will be confined to those 
who make bilateral agreements, i. e., a like-minded State. Moreover, such a bilateral 
agreement will assure that the interpretation of law by the relevant parties in 
combating terrorism is the same. Therefore, this will avoid the divergence that would 
exist in the absence of this arrangement when one State has interpreted its national 
law in a manner different from the other. 
Nevertheless, despite these features the bilateral agreement is still not the best 
way to counter terrorism. Increasingly third States are becoming involved in most 
terrorist offences. It becomes more difficult to apprehend and prosecute the alleged 
terrorist when more than two States are involved. More significantly, to have a very 
effective network of bilateral agreements between all States around the world (about 
200 States) would require at least 2000 bilateral treaties. This, besides being time 
consuming, would add to the already existing complexity in dealing with terrorism. 
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Regional agreements have also been used in the war against terrorism. As has 
been discussed how the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Arab League 
have concluded anti-terrorism conventions. Since most of those parties to these 
regional organizations have similar political systems and common perceptions of the 
problem, they have overcome some of the basic problems the international 
community as whole is still facing when dealing with terrorism. For example, the 
outstanding dilemma of finding an accepted definition of terrorism has been solved by 
some of these regional agreements, e. g., the OIC and the Arab conventions. Thus 
these agreements will contribute to the war against terrorism, especially the fact that 
some of these regional organizations consist of large number of members, e. g., the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference has fifty-six members. 
However, although these regional agreements are very important for the 
effective countering of terrorism, they are not enough. International or multilateral 
agreements or measures are inevitable. Terrorism is no longer confined to one rcjon, 
instead the same terrorist organization can operate simultaneously in different regions. 
Hence, having an international agreement that deals with terrorism is a vital 
component in any strategy against terrorism. Although having a comprehensive antý 
terrorism convention is ideal, the existing anti-terrorism conventions should not be 
underestimated. Terrorism is becoming a widespread problem that can occur 
anywhere and all States are vulnerable. Consequently, responses to terrorism should 
be the product of an international cooperation between all States. Encouraging and 
urging all States to become party to the existing body of international law designed to 
combat terrorism can also do this. 
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Nonetheless, in the end it must be stated in a very clear terms that none of the 
these measures or legal responses that are meant to curb terrorism will work 
effectively, despite their apparent importance, unless the political circumstances in 
which they are supposed to work are favorable. In other words, these options against 
terrorism will only be theoretical options unless States have the political will to make 
them work. 
There are two problematic cases in which the effectiveness of these measures 
or legal responses to terrorism could be undermined. The first of which is the so- 
called 'Maverick State' which not only takes an extreme position and works outside 
the line of cooperation, but is also unpredictable, therefore dangerous. Such a State is 
unwilling to cooperate with others in the fight against terrorism. Hence, even if the 
international community has adopted some measures against terrorism, these 
measures will be meaningless, or at least of less effect than expected, if there is a 
State or States that work against them in spite of their initial acceptance of such 
measures. 
This will be the case because, as discussed earlier, most of these measures, 
e. g., the obligation to extradite or prosecute, the non-use of territory for terrorist 
activities, and the prevention of terrorist fund raising, rely primarily on the national 
law of these States. Thus any involvement in terrorist activities by these States, 
especially States which provide safe havens to terrorist organizations, will render 
these measures futile. 
341 
The other problematic case that constitutes a serious threat to any effort by the 
international community to fight terrorism in a more efficient manner is the so-called 
'Failed State'. This State is not unwilling to cooperate in the fight against terrorism as 
in the case of the Maverick State; rather it does not have the capability or ability to do 
so. For example, a State in which the political system collapsed as a result of internal 
conflict will not be able, because of this political vacuum, to control certain parts of 
its territory. Therefore its territory may become available for terrorists to base their 
criminal activities in. 
What happened in Afghanistan before the I Vh of September could be cited as 
an example of both cases mentioned above. In Afghanistan, on the one hand there 
was the ruling Taliban who were known for their extreme policies, which as a result 
put them in conflict with many States, especially the neighboring States, and that 
made Afghanistan close to being a Maverick State. On the other hand, the ruling 
Taliban did not control the whole territory of Afghanistan and that resulted in 
Afghanistan's territory becoming a base for terrorists to operate from. Even more 
importantly, some believe that the al-Qa'ida terrorist organization was, to a certain 
extent, controlling the ruling Taliban. In such a case all the measures or legal 
responses adopted by the international community will not work. 
In addition, there are two other factors that may, to a certain extent, 
undermine the effectiveness of some of the anti-terrorism measures in some cases. 
These two factors are self-interest and corruption. 
342 
Firstly, some States may give priority to their self-interest when they are in 
conflict with any of the measures or legal responses adopted by the international 
community against terrorism. As has been discussed earlier in the relevant part of this 
study, that some States which are known for being banking centres will be reluctant to 
cooperate with the other States on some issues relating to the control of terrorist fund 
raising when the requirements of such control are not welcomed by their valued 
clients. 
Secondly, corruption may, even in States that are in full cooperation with other 
States in the fight against terrorism, undermine any of the measures or legal responses 
that had been taken to suppress terrorism. 
Such cases that undermine the international community's efforts to deal with 
terrorism must be solved, especially after the attacks of September 11. These terrible 
terrorist attacks against the US have many implications for terrorism that must be 
mentioned: 
Firstly, it shows that terrorism has shown its face again. More importantly it 
proves that terrorism has not been deterred by the US use of military force against 
those whom the US attacked two years ago and believes are behind this terrorist 
attack. 
Secondly, the targets of this attack, the timing, and the methods employed by 
the terrorists all prove how well organized and coordinated terrorism can be. Thus, 
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this attack must be seen as a warning signal for all States to pay more attention to 
terrorism. 
Moreover, this incident makes it clear that terrorism not only can cause 
enormous fear to people, the most distinguishing character of terrorism, but can also 
cause huge human and economic loss. Therefore, those who underestimate terrorism, 
as in terrorist attacks usually just a few people die, they must rethink terrorism in a 
more serious light. 
Also, the attacking of American targets on American soil by American 
airplanes on internal flights proves that the terrorists who attacked the US, the sole 
superpower in the contemporary world, can attack any other country. That is, 
attacking the US, the most powerful and protected country, will convey a threat to all 
States that they may be next. 
This crisis of September II has proved that there are two main issues that need 
immediate attention from the international community in order to enhance the war 
against terrorism more clearly and avoid any ambiguity that might hamper this 
unprecedented willingness of all States from all over the world to combat terrorism 
and put an end to it. 
Firstly, the international community must now define terrorism more 
comprehensively. If the US really wants all States to cooperate in what the US calls a 
war against terrorism, those States must know exactly what terrorism the US wants 
them to fight. Leading the international community to define terrorism should be 
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easier than leading it into war. This crisis is presenting a unique opportunity for the 
US to persuade other States of its understanding of what constitutes terrorism as this 
crisis has clearly shown that many States are competing with each other to show 
alliance to the US. Sympathy with the US and fear from its retaliation against any 
non-cooperating State have shaped the relationship between the US and the majority 
of States, therefore, the US must use this chance to work with these States and f ind an 
accepted definition of terrorism. 
The second issue that this crisis has also shown is the importance of 
establishing a UN fact-finding and assessment commission in order to evaluate the 
evidence the US alleges to have in order to prevent the use of military force against 
other States based on secret evidences. As discussed earlier in this study only some 
types of relationship between a State and terrorists allow the use of armed force 
against such a State. Hence, an assessment of the legality of the use of armed force in 
response to terrorism must begin with an examination of the relationship between the 
State and terrorism. This assessment cannot be properly undertaken unless evidence 
of such a relationship is revealed for evaluation by the international community. 
Not only has the above-mentioned evidence been withheld by the US, but the 
US has also refrained from sharing the evidence that has implicated bin Laden and his 
group in the attack of I I"' September. When it did so, the little evidence it revealed 
was not convincing at all. At the same time the US is requesting support from all 
States to hunt down the suspected terrorists. In doing so, the US is relying on a 'trust 
us" approach, i. e., error is not possible. Such an approach will set an unwanted 
precedent for all States as it will give any State the right to attack another based on 
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undisclosed evidence which is not subject to any international scrutiny. This will be 
the case, unless the US argues that it is the US but not other countries, which has this 
right. The claim that disclosure of evidence would compromise US intelligence 
sources, although a valid claim, must be outweighed by the need to prevent 
unnecessary war that in all cases will worsen the situation. 
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ANNEX TO RESOLUTION NO: 59126-P- 
CONVENTION 
OF THE ORGANISATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE 
ON 
COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISLA 
The Member States of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, 
Page I of 14 
Pursuant to the tenets of the tolerant Islamic Sharia which reject all forms of violence and terrorism, 
and in particular specially those based on extremism and call for protection of human rights, which 
provisions are parallelled by the principles and rules of international law founded on cooperation 
between peoples for the establishment of peace; 
Abiding by the lofty, moral and religious principles particularly the provisions of the Islamic Sharia 
as well as the human heritage of the Islamic Ummah. 
Adhering to the Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, its objectives and principles 
aimed at creating an appropriate atmosphere to strengthen cooperation and understanding among 
Islamic States as well as relevant OIC resolutions; 
Adhering to the principles of International Law and the United Nations Charter as well as all relevant 
UN resolutions on procedures aimed at eliminating international terrorism, and all other conventions 
and international instruments to which states acceding to this Convention are parties and which call, 
inter alia, for the observance of the sovereignty, stability, territorial integrity, political independence 
and security of states, and non-intervention in their international affairs; 
Proceeding from the rules of the Code of Conduct of the Organization of Islamic Conference for 
Combating International Terrorism; 
Desiring to promote cooperation among them for combating terrorist crimes that threaten the 
security and stability of the Islamic States and endanger their vital interests; 
Being committed to combating all forms and manifestations of terrorism and eliminating its 
objectives and causes which target the lives and properties of people; 
Confirming the legitimacy of the right of peoples to struggle against foreign occupation and 
colonialist and racist regimes by all means, including armed struggle to liberate their territories and 
attain their rights to self-determination and independence in compliance with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations; 
Believing that terrorism constitutes a gross violation of human rights, in particular the right to 
freedom and security, as well as an obstacle to the free functioning of institutions and socio- 
economic development, as it aims at destabilizing States; 
Convinced that terrorism cannot be justified in any way, and that it should therefore be 
unambiguously condemned in all its forms and manifestations, and all its actions, means and 
practices, whatever its origin, causes or purposes, including direct or indirect actions of States; 
Recognizing the growing links between terrorism and organized crime, including illicit trafficking in 
arrns, narcotics, human beings and money laundering; 
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Have agreed to conclude this Convention, calling on all Member States of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference to accede to it. 
PART I 
Definition and General Provisions 
Article 1 
For the purposes of this Convention: 
"Contracting State" or "Contracting Party" means every Member State in the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference that has ratified or adhered to this Convention and deposited its 
instruments of ratification or adherence with the General Secretariat of the Organisation. 
2. "Terrorism" means any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or 
intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of 
terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honour, freedoms, 
security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to 
hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international 
facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of 
independent States. 
3. "Terrorist Crime" means any crime executed, started or participated in to realize a terrorist 
objective in any of the Contracting States or against its nationals, assets or interests or foreign 
facilities and nationals residing in its territory punishable by its internal law. 
4. Crimes stipulated in the following conventions are also considered terrorist crimes with the 
exception of those excluded by the legislations of Contracting States or those who have not 
ratified them: 
a) Convention on "Offences and Other Acts Committed on Board of Aircrafts" (Tokyo, 
14.9.1963). 
b) Convention on "Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft" (The Hague, 
16.12.1970). 
c) Convention on "Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation" 
signed at Montreal on 23.9.1971 and its Protocol (Montreal, 10.12.1984). 
d) Convention on the "Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Persons Enjoying 
International Immunity, Including Diplomatic Agents" (New York, 14.12.1973). 
e) International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (New York, 1979). 
f) The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention of 1988 and its related provisions on 
piracy at sea. 
g) Convention on the "Physical Protection of Nuclear Material" (Vienna, 1979). 
h) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation-Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal, 1988). 
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i) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms 
on the Continental Shelf (Rome, 1988). 
j) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (Rome, 1988). 
k) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (New York, 
1997). 
1) Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the purposes of Detection 
(Montreal, 1991) 
Article 2 
a. Peoples' struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, 
and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance with the principles of 
international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime. 
b. None of the terrorist crimes mentioned in the previous article shall be considered political crimes. 
c. in the implementation of the provisions of this Convention the following crimes shall not be 
considered political crimes even when politically motivated: 
1. Aggression against kings and heads of state of Contracting States or against their spouses, 
their ascendants or descendants. 
2. Aggression against crown princes or vice-presidents or deputy heads of government or 
ministers in any of the Contracting States. 
3. Aggression against persons enjoying international immunity including Ambassadors and 
diplomats in Contracting States or in countries of accreditation. 
4. Murder or robbery by force against individuals or authorities or means of transport and 
communications. 
5. Acts of sabotage and destruction of public properties and properties geared for public 
services, even if belonging to another Contracting State. 
6. Crimes of manufacturing, smuggling or possessing arms and ammunition or explosives or 
other materials prepared for committing terrorist crimes. 
d. All forms of international crimes, including illegal trafficking in narcotics and human beings 
money laundering aimed at financing terrorist objectives shall be considered terrorist crimes. 
PART 11 
Foundations of Islamic Cooperation for Combating Terrorism 
Chapter I 
In the Field of Security 
Division I 
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Measures to Prevent and Combat Terrorist Crimes. 
Article 3 
1. The Contracting States are committed not to execute, initiate or participate in any form in 
organizing or financing or committing or instigating or supporting terrorist acts whether 
directly or indirectly. 
Committed to prevent and combat terrorist crimes in conformity with the provisions of this 
Convention and their respective domestic rules and regulations the contracting States shall see 
to: 
(A) Preventive Measures: 
Barring their territories from being used as an arena for planning, organizing, executing 
terrorist crimes or initiating or participating in these crimes in any form; including 
preventing the infiltration of terrorist elements or their gaining refuge or residence 
therein individually or collectively, or receiving hosting, training, arming, financing or 
extending any facilities to them. 
2. Cooperating and coordinating with the rest of the Contracting States, particularly 
neighbouring countries which suffer from similar or common terrorist crimes. 
3. Developing and strengthening systems relating to detecting transportation, importing, 
exporting stockpiling, and using of weapons, ammunition and explosives as well as 
other means of aggression, killing and destruction in addition to strengthening trans- 
border and custom controls in order to intercept their transfer from one Contracting 
State to another or to other States unless they are intended for specific legitimate 
purposes. 
4. Developing and strengthening systems related to surveillance procedures, securing 
borders, and land, sea and air passages in order to prevent infiltration through them. 
5. Strengthening systems for ensuring the safety and protection of personalities, vital 
installations and means of public transport. 
6. Re-enforcing protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular persons and 
missions; and regional and international organizations accredited in the Contracting 
State in accordance with the conventions and rules of international law which govern 
this subject. 
7. Promoting security intelligence activities and coordinating them with the intelligence 
activities of each Contracting State pursuant to their respective intelligence policies, 
aimed at exposing the objectives of terrorist groups and organisations, thwarting their 
designs and revealing the extent of their danger to security and stability. 
8. Establishing a data base by each Contracting State to collect and analyze data on 
terrorist elements, groups, movements and organizations and monitor developments of 
the phenomenon of terrorism and successful experiences in combating it. Moreover, the 
Contracting State shall update this information and exchange them with competent 
authorities in 
9. other Contracting States within the limits of the laws and regulations in every State. 
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1. Arresting perpetrators of terrorists crimes and prosecuting them according to the 
national law or extraditing them in accordance with the provisions of this Convention or 
existing Conventions between the requesting and requested States. 
2. Ensuring effective protection of persons working in the field of criminal justice as well 
as to witnesses and investigators. 
3. Ensuring effective protection of information sources and witnesses on terrorist crimes. 
4. Extending necessary assistance to victims of terrorism. 
5. Establishing effective cooperation between the concerned organs in the contracting 
States and the citizens for combating terrorism including extending appropriate 
guarantees and appropriate incentives to encourage informing on terrorist acts and 
submitting information to help uncover them and cooperating in arresting the 
perpetrators. 
Division 11 
Areas of Islamic cooperation for preventing and combating terrorist crimes. 
Article 4 
Contracting States shall cooperate among themselves to prevent and combat terrorist crimes in 
accordance with the respective laws and regulations of each State in the following areas: 
First Exchange of Information 't 
I- Contracting States shall undertake to promote exchange of information among them as such 
regarding: 
a. Activities and crimes committed by terrorist groups, their leaders, their elements, their 
headquarters, training, means and sources that provide finance and weapons, types of 
arms, ammunition and explosives utilized as well as other ways and means to attack, kill 
and destroy. 
b. Means of communications and propaganda utilized by terrorist groups, how they act, 
movement of their leaders, their elements and their travel documents. 
2- Contracting States shall expeditiously inform any other Contracting State regarding 
available information about any terrorist crime perpetrated in its territory aimed at 
undermining the interests of that State or its nationals and to state the facts surrounding the 
crime in terms of its circumstances, criminals involved, victims, losses, devices and methods 
utilized to carry out the crime, without prejudicing investigation and inquiry requisites. 
3- Contracting States shall exchange information with the other Parties to combat terrorist 
crimes and to inform the Contracting State or other States of all available information or data 
that could prevent terrorist crimes within its territory or against its nationals or residents or 
interests. 
4- The Contracting States shall provide any other Contracting State with available information 
or data that will: 
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a. Assist in arresting those accused of committing a terrorist crime against the interests of 
that country or being implicated in such acts either by assistance, collusion, instigation, 
or financing. 
b. Contribute to confiscating any arms, weapons, explosives, devices or funds spent or 
meant to be spent to commit a terrorist crime. 
5- The Contracting States undertake to respect the confidentiality of information exchanged 
between them and shall refrain from passing it to any non-Contracting States or other parties 
without prior consent of the source country. 
_Second- 
Investigation 
Each Contracting State pledges to promote cooperation with other contracting states and to extend 
assistance in the field of investigation procedures in terms of arresting escaped suspects or those 
convicted for terrorist crimes in accordance with the laws and regulations of each country. 
Third, Exchange of Expertise 
Contracting States shall cooperate with each other to undertake and exchange studies 
and researches on combating terrorist crimes as well as exchange of expertise in this 
field. 
2. Contracting States shall cooperate within the scope of their capabilities to provide 
available technical assistance for preparing programmes or holding joint training 
sessions with one or more Contracting State if the need arises for personnel required in 
the field of combating terrorism in order to improve their scientific and practical 
potential and upgrade their performance standards. 
Fourth: Education and Information Field 
The Contracting States shall cooperate in: 
1. Promoting information activities and supporting the mass media in order to confront the 
vicious campaign against Islam, by projecting the true image of tolerance of Islam, and 
exposing the designs and 
danger of terrorist groups against the stability and security of Islamic States. 
2. Including the noble human values, which proscribe the practice of terrorism in the 
educational curricula of Contracting States. 
3. Supporting efforts aimed at keeping abreast of the age by introducing an advanced 
Islamic thought based on iitiha by which Islam is distinguished. 
Chapter II 
In the Judicial Field 
Section I 
Extraditing Criminals 
Article 5 
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Contracting States shall undertake to extradite those indicted or convicted of terrorist crimes, 
requested for extradition by any of these countries in compliance with the rules and conditions 
stipulated in this Convention. 
Article 6 
Extradition shall not be permissible in the following cases: 
1. If the Crime for which extradition is requested is deemed by the laws enforced in the 
requested Contracting State as one of a political nature and without prejudice to the 
provisions of Article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Convention for which extradition is 
requested. 
2. If the Crime for which extradition is sought relates solely to a dereliction of military 
obligations. 
3. If the Crime for which extradition is requested, was committed in the territory of the 
requested Contracting State, unless this crime has undermined the interests of the 
requesting Contracting State and its laws stipulate that the perpetrators of those crimes 
shall be prosecuted and punished providing that the requested country has not 
commenced investigation or trial. 
4. If the Crime has been the subject of a final sentence which has the force of law in the 
requested Contracting State. 
5. If the action at the time of the extradition request elapsed or the penalty prescribed in 
accordance with the law in the Contacting State requesting extradition. 
6. Crimes committed outside the territory of the requesting Contracting State by a person 
who was not its national and the law of the requested Contracting State does not 
prosecute such a crime if perpetrated outside its territory by such a person. 
7. If pardon was granted and included the perpetrators of these crimes in the requesting 
Contracting State. 
8. If the legal system of the requested State does not permit extradition of its national, then 
it shall be obliged to prosecute whosoever commits a terrorist crime if the act is 
punishable in both States by a freedom restraining sentence for a minimum period of 
one year or more. The nationality of the person requested for extradition shall be 
determined according to the date of the crime taking into account the investigation 
undertaken in this respect by the requesting State. 
Article 7 
If the person requested for extradition is under investigation or trial for another crime in the 
requested State, his extradition shall be postponed until the investigation is disposed of or the 
trial is over and the punishment implemented. In this case, the requested State shall extradite 
him provisionally for investigation or trial on condition that he shall be returned to it before 
execution of the sentence issued in the requested State. 
Article 8 
For the purpose of extraditing crime perpetrators according to this Convention, the domestic 
legislations of Contracting States shall not have any bearing as to their differences with respect 
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to the crime being classified as a felony or misdemeanor, nor as to the penalty prescribed for 
it. 
Section 11 
Rogatory Commission 
Article 9 
Each Contracting State shall request from any other Contracting State to undertake in its 
territory rogatory action with respect to any judicial procedures concerning an action involving 
a terrorist crime and in particular: 
1. To hear witnesses and testimonies taken as evidence. 
2. To communicate legal documents. 
3. To implement inquiry and detention procedures. 
4. To undertake on the scene inspection and analyse evidence. 
5. To obtain necessary evidence or documents or records or their certified copies. 
Article 10 
Each Contracting State shall implement rogatory commissions related to terrorist crimes and 
may reject the request for implementation with respect to the following cases. 
1. If the crime for which the request is made, is the subject of a charge, investigation 
or trial in the country requested to implement rogatory commission. 
2. If the implementation of the request prejudices the sovereignty or the security or 
public order of the country charged with this mission. 
Article II 
The request for rogatory mission shall be implemented promptly in accordance with the 
provisions of the domestic laws of the requested State and which may postpone its 
implementation until its investigation and prosecution procedures are completed on the same 
subject or until the compelling reasons that called for postponement are removed. In this case 
the requesting State shall be informed of this postponement. 
Article 12 
The request for a rogatory commission related to a terrorist crime shall not be refused on the 
grounds of the rule of transaction confidentiality for banks and financial institutions. And in 
the implementation of the request the rules of the enforcing State are to be followed. 
Article 13 
The procedure, undertaken through rogatory commission in accordance with the provisions of 
this Convention, shall have the same legal effect as if it was brought before the competent 
authority in the State requesting rogatory commission. The results of its implementation shall 
only be utilized within the scope of the rogatory commission. 
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Section 3 
Judicial Cooperation 
Article 14 
Each Contracting State shall extend to the other contracting parties every possible assistance 
as may be necessary for investigation or trial proceedings related to terrorist crimes. 
Article 15 
1. lfjudicial competence accrues to one of the Contracting States for the prosecution of a 
subject accused of a terrorist crime, this State may request the country which hosts the 
suspect to prosecute him for this crime subject to the host country's consent and 
providing the crime is punishable in that country by a freedom restraining sentence for 
at least one year or by a more severe sanction. In such a case the requesting State shall 
pass all investigation documents and evidence related to the crime to the requested State. 
2. Investigation or trial shall be conducted on the grounds of the case or cases brought by 
the requesting State against the accused in accordance with the legal provisions and 
procedures of the country holding the trial. 
Article 16 
The request for trial on the basis of para (1) of the previous article, entails the suspension of 
procedures of prosecution, investigation and trial in the territory of the requesting State except 
those relating to the requisites of cooperation, assistance or rogatory commission sought by the 
State requested to hold the trial procedures. 
Article 17 
Procedures undertaken in either of the two States - the requesting State or the one where 
the trial is held - shall be subject to the law of the country where the procedure is 
executed and which shall have legal preeminence as may be stipulated in its legislation. 
2. The requesting State shall not bring to trial or retrial the accused subject unless the 
requested State refuses to prosecute him. 
3. In all cases the State requested to hold trial shall inform the requesting country of its 
action with respect to the request for trial and shall communicate to it the results of its 
investigations or trial proceedings. 
Article 18 
The State requested to hold trial may undertake all measures and procedures stipulated by its 
legislation regarding the accused both before and after the request for trial is received. 
Section 4 
Seized Assets and Proceeds of the Crime 
Article 19 
If the extradition of a subject is decided, the Contracting State shall hand over to the 
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requesting State the assets and proceeds seized, used or related to the terrorist crime, found in 
the possession of the wanted subject or with a third party. 
Article 20 
The State requested to hand over the assets and proceeds may undertake all necessary 
custodial measures and procedures for the implementation of its obligation. It may also retain 
them provisionally if required for penal action implemented therein or hand them to the 
requesting State on condition that they shall be returned for the same purpose. 
Section 5 
Exchange of Evidence 
Article 21 
A Contracting State shall see to it that the evidence and effects of any terrorist crime 
committed on its territory against another Contracting State are examined by its competent 
organs and may seek assistance to that end from any other Contracting State. Moreover, it 
shall take every necessary step to safeguard the evidence and proof of their legal relevance. It 
may communicate, if requested, the result to the country whose interest were targeted by the 
crime. The State or States which have assisted in this case shall not pass this information to 
others. 
PART III 
Mechanism for Implementing Cooperation 
Chapter I 
Extradition Procedures 
Article 22 
The exchange of extradition requests between Contracting States shall be undertaken directly 
through diplomatic channels or through their Ministries of Justice or their substitute. 
Article 23 
A request for extradition shall be submitted in writing and shall include: 
1. The original or an authenticated copy of the indictment, arrest order or any other 
instruments of identical weight issued in line with the conditions stipulated in the requesting 
State's legislation. 
2. A statement of the acts for which extradition is sought specifying the dates and places, 
where these acts were committed and their legal implications along with reference to the legal 
articles under which they fall as well as a copy of these articles. 
3. Description, in as much detail as possible, of the subject wanted for extradition and any 
other information such as to determine his identity and nationality. 
Article 24 
http: //www. oic-un. org/26icfin/c. html 16/08/23 
Another W97M/Cartman. Poppy Infected Document Page II of 14 
1. The judicial authorities in the requesting State may approach the requested State by any 
channel of written communication and seek the preventive arrest of the wanted subject 
pending the arrival of the extradition request. 
2. In this case the requested State may effect the preventive arrest of the wanted subject. 
However, if the request for extradition is not submitted together with the necessary documents 
listed in the above article, the subject whose extradition is sought may not be detained for 
more than thirty days as of the day of his arrest. 
Article 25 
The requesting State shall send a request together with the documents listed in Article 24 of this 
Convention. If the requested State accepts the request as valid, its competent authorities shall 
implement it in accordance with its legislation and shall promptly notify the requesting State of the 
action undertaken. 
Article 26 
* In all cases stipulated in the two articles above, preventive detention shall not exceed sixty days 
after the date of arrest. 
e Temporary release may be effected during the period stipulated in the previous article and the 
requested State shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the wanted subject does not escape. 
* Release shall not prevent the re-arrest of the subject and his extradition if it was requested after his 
release. 
Article 27 
If the requested State requires additional clarification to ascertain the conditions stipulated in this 
chapter, it shall notify the requesting State thereof and fix a date for provision of such clarifications. 
Article 28 
If the requested State received a number of extradition requests from various countries related to the 
same or diverse acts, this State shall decide upon these requests bearing in mind the circumstances 
and in particular the possibility of subsequent extradition, date of receiving the requests, degree of 
the danger of the crime and where it was committed. 
Chapter II 
Measuresfor Rogatory Commissions 
Article 29 
Rogatory Commission requests must specify the following: 
1. The competent authority that issued the request. 
2. Subject of the request and its reason. 
3. The identity and nationality of the person being the subject of the rogatory commission 
(as may be possible). 
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4. Information on the crime requiring rogatory commission, its legal definition and penalty 
inflicted on its perpetrators along with maximum available information on its 
circumstances in order to ensure the efficient implementation of the rogatory 
commission. 
Article 30 
1. The request for rogatory commission shall be forwarded by the Ministry of Justice in the 
requesting State to the Ministry of Justice in the requested State and returned in the 
same way. 
2. In case of expediency, the request for rogatory commission shall be directly forwarded 
by the judicial authorities in the requesting State to the judicial authorities in the 
requested State. A copy of this rogatory commission shall also be sent at the same time 
to the Ministry of Justice in the requested State. The rogatory commission shall be 
returned together with the papers concerning its implementation in the way stipulated in 
the previous item. 
3. The request for rogatory commission maybe forwarded directly from the judicial 
authorities to the competent authority in the requested country. Answers may be sent 
directly through the said authority. 
Article 31 
Requests for rogatory commission and accompanying documents shall be signed or stamped with the 
seal of a competent authority or that authorized by it. These documents shall be exempted from all 
formal procedures that could be required by the legislation of the requested State. 
Article 32 
if the authority that received the request for rogatory commission was not competent enough to deal 
with it, it shall automatically transfer it to the competent authority in its country. If the request is 
forwarded directly the answer shall reach the requesting State in the same manner. 
Article 33 
Any refusal for rogatory commission shall be explained. 
Chapter III 
Measuresfor Protecting Witnesses and Experts 
Article 34 
If the requesting State deems that the appearance of the witness or expert before its judicial 
authorities is of special importance, reference thereto shall be made in its request. The request or 
summons shall include an approximate statement in terms of compensation, travel expenses, 
accommodation and commitment to make these payments. The requested State shall invite the 
witness or expert and inform the requesting State about his/her reply. 
Article 35 
1. No penalty nor coercive measure may be inflicted upon the witness or expert who does 
not comply with the summons even if the writ provides for such a penalty. 
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2. If the witness or expert arrives voluntarily to the territory of the requesting State, he 
shall be summoned according to the provisions of the internal legislation of this State. 
Article 36 
1. A witness or expert may not be subjected to trial, detained or have his freedom restricted 
in the territory of the requesting State, for acts or court rulings that preceded his 
departure for the requesting State, irrespective of his nationality, as long as his 
appearance before the judicial authorities of the said State is based on a summons. 
2. No witness or expert, whatever his nationality, appearing before the judiciary of the 
State in question on the basis of a summons, may be prosecuted or detained or have his 
freedom restricted in any way on the requesting State's territory for other acts or court 
decisions not mentioned in the summons and predating his departure from the State 
from which he is requested. 
3. The immunity privileges stated in this Article shall become invalid if a witness or expert 
remains on the requesting State's territories for over thirty consecutive days despite his 
ability to return once his presence was no longer requested by the judiciary, or if he 
returns to the requesting State's territories after his departure. 
Article 37 
1. The requesting State shall undertake all necessary measures to ensure the protection of a witness 
or expert from publicity that could endanger him, his family or his property as a result of his 
testimony and in particular: 
a) To ensure confidentiality of the date and place of his arrival as well as the means involved. 
b) To ensure confidentiality of his accommodation, movements and locations where he may be 
found. 
c) To ensure confidentiality of the testimony and information given to the competent judicial 
authorities. 
2. The requesting State shall provide necessary security required by the condition of the witness or 
expert and of his family, and circumstances of the case and types of expected risks. 
Article 38 
1. If the witness or expert who is summoned to the requesting State is imprisoned in the requested 
State, he shall be provisionally transferred to the location of the hearing at which he is to testify 
according to conditions and times determined by the requested State. 
Transfer may be denied: 
a. If the witness or expert refuses. 
b. If his presence is necessary for undertaking criminal procedures in the territory of the 
requested State. 
c. If his transfer would prolong his imprisomment. 
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d. If there are considerations militating against his transfer. 
2. The transferred witness or expert shall remain in detention in the territory of the requesting State 
until he is repatriated to the requested Tate unless the latter requests his release. 
PART IV 
Final Provisions 
Article 39 
This Convention shall be ratified, or adhered to, by the Signatory States and the instruments of 
ratification or accession shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference not exceeding a period of thirty days as of the date of ratification or accession. 
The General Secretariat shall inforin all Member States about any deposition and date of such 
instruments. 
Article 40 
1. This Convention shall enter into force thirty days after the deposit of the seventh instrument of 
ratification or accession at the OIC General Secretariat. 
2. This Convention shall not be applicable to any other Islamic State until it deposits its instruments 
of ratification or accession with the General Secretariat of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference and after a period of thirty days of the date of deposition. 
Article 41 
it is not permissible for any Contracting State to make any reservation, explicitly or implicitly in 
conflict with the provisions of this Convention or deviating from its objectives. 
Article 42 
1. A Contracting State shall not withdraw from this Convention except by a written request to the 
Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 
2. Withdrawal shall be affective six months after the date of sending the request to the Secretary 
General. 
This Convention has been written in English, Arabic and French of equal authenticity, of one 
original deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference which 
shall have it registered at the United Nations Organization, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 102 of its Charter. The General Secretariat shall communicate approved copies thereof to the 
Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 
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partff 
Regional InstrumenLy 
In the name ofA Hah, the Beneficent and Merciful 
16. The Arab Convention on the Suppression 
of Terrorism' 
Signed at Cairo on 22 April 1998 
Entry intoforce in accordance with Article 40 
Depositary: General Secretarial ofthe League ofArab States 
PREAMBLE 
The Arab States signatory hereto, 
DESHUNG to promote mutual cooperation in the suppression of 
terrorist offences, which pose a threat to the security and stability of the 
Arab Nation and endanger its vital interests, 
BEING COMMITTED to the highest moral and religious principles 
and, in particular, to the tenets of the Islamic Sharia, as well as to the 
humanitarian heritage of an Arab Nation that rejects all forms of violence 
and terrorism and advocates the protection of human rights, with which 
precepts the principles of international law conform, based as they are on 
cooperation among peoples in the promotion of peace, 
BEING FURTHER COMMITTED to the Pact of the League of Arab 
States, the Charter of the United Nations and all the other international 
covenants and instruments to which the Contracting States to this 
Convention are parties, 
AFFIRMING the right of peoples to combat foreign occupation 
and aggression by whatever means, including armed struggle, in order to 
liberate their territories and secure their right to self-determination and 
independence and to do so in such a manner as to preserve the territorial 
'Translation from the Arabic original provided by the linited Nations 
Secretariat. 
The Arab Convenlion on the Suppression of rerrorisim 1998 
integrity of each Arab country, the foregoing being in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the 
Organization's resolutions, 
HAVE AGREED to conclude this Convention and to invite any 
Arab State that did not participate in its conclusion to accede hereto. 
PART ONE 
DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article I 
Each of the following terms shall be understood in the light of 
the definition given: 
I Contracting State 
Any member State of the League of Arab States that has ratified 
this Convention and that has deposited its instruments of ratification with 
the General Secretariat of the League. 
2. Terrorism 
Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, 
that occurs for the advancement of an individual or collective criminal 
agenda, causing terror among people, causing fear by harming them, or 
placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or aiming to cause 
damage to the envirotunent or to public or private installations or property 
or to occupy or seize them, or aiming to jeopardize a national resource. 
Terrorist offence 
Any offence or attempted offence committed in furtherance of 
a terrorist objective in any of the Contracting States, or against their 
nationals, property or interests, that is punishable by their domestic law. 
The offences stipulated in the following conventions, except where 
conventions have not been ratified by Contracting States or where 
offences have been excluded by their legislation, shall also be regarded as 
terrorist offences: 
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RESOLUTION NO. 53/8-P (IS) 
ON 
CONVENING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE U. N. TO DEFINE 
TERRORISM AND DISTINGUISH IT FROM PEOPLES'STRUGGLE 
FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION. 
The Eighth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference (Session of Dignity, Dialogue, 
Participation), held in Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, from 9 -11 Shaaban 1418H 
(9-11 December, 1997), 
Committed to the moral and human principles that the O. I. C. Member States believe 
in, and inspired by their sublime and tolerant religion; their heritage and tradition 
which call for the renunciation of all forms of injustice, aggression and acts of 
intolerance; 
Proceeding from the conviction that there is an international consensus on combating 
terrorism in all its forms; eliminating the causes of terrorism directed against the life 
and property of innocent people, the violation of the sovereignty of States, and the 
jeopardizing of the rights of peoples; 
Convinced of the need for drawing clear-cut and agreed upon international criteria, 
enabling the international community to differentiate clearly between terrorism and 
people's struggle for national liberation; 
Affirming the need for Islamic cooperation to take practical measures whereby 
terrorism is effectively fought and checked in the framework of what had been 
underlined in the Code of Conduct for combating international terrorism, approved by 
Resolution 43n-P (is) of the Seventh Islamic Summit; 
Also reaffirming the fundamental and legitimate rights of all peoples living under 
colonial and racist regimes as well as foreign occupation to fighting occupation and to 
self-determination, particularly the struggle of national liberation movements; 
Condemning all terrorist acts, including acts perpetrated by States, either directý or 
indirectly, which spread violence and terror and aim at destabilizing countries and 
communities; 
Denouncing the frantic attempts aimed at obliterating the clear distinction between 
terrorism and the legitimate struggle of peoples which conforms with the principles of 
international law and the provisions of the Charters of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference and the United Nations; 
Having noted the classifications adopted by some sides on the basis of biased 
political considerations in accordance with which some Islamic States are listed 
among the so-called states which sponsor terrorism; 
Recalling U. N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (1960) on granting the right to 
self-determination and independence to colonised countries and peoples, and U. N. 
General Assembly Resolution 42/104, adopted on 7 December 1987; 
Recalling also Resolution 42/7-P(IS) adopted by the Seventh Islamic Summit and 
Resolution 44/24-P adopted by the Twenty-fourth Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers; 
1. Reiterates its support for convening an International Conference under the auspices 
of the United Nations to define terrorism and to distinguish it from the struggle of 
peoples for national liberation. 
2. Commends the efforts made during the Fifty-first Session of the U. N. General 
Assembly regarding the convening of an International Conference to this end. 
3. Invites Member States to stress the need for convening an International Conference 
for defining the meaning of terrorism, and for distinguishing terrorism from the 
struggle of peoples for national liberation. 
4. Requests the Secretary General to follow-up the implementation of this resolution 
and submit a report to the Ninth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference. 
RESOLUTION NO. 54/8-P (IS) 
ON THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE CODE 
OF CONDUCT FOR COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
The Eighth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference (Session of Dignity, Dialogue, 
Participation), held in Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, from 9 -11 Shaaban 1418H 
(9-11 December, 1997), 
Recalling the Makkah Al Mukarramah Declaration of the Third Islamic Summit 
Conference and Resolution No. 44/21-P adopted at the Twenty-first Session of the 
Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Karachi as well as the Resolution 
43n-P (IS) adopted at the Seventh Islamic Summit, which approved the Code of 
Conduct for combating international terrorism; 
Recalling also the U. N. Resolution No. 49/60 relating to the Declaration of principles 
on the fight against international terrorism; 
Affirming the determination to combat the terrorist acts in all their forms and 
manifestations, including those where States are involved directly or indirectly; 
Reiterating the commitment to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations 
and to eliminate the evils and causes of terrorism directed against the life and property 
of innocent people and sovereignty, territorial integrity, stability and security of States 
and to uphold the provisions of the Code of Conduct for combating international 
terrorism, which reaffirm this commitment; 
Emphasizing the importance of international and regional cooperation, especially 
among Member States, including coordination and exchange of information among 
their competent authorities in combating effectively all forms of terrorism; 
Reiterating the call upon Member States to observe the principles of good 
neighbourliness and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the States and to 
prevent the use of their territories by individuals or groups for the commission of 
territoristic acts against other Member States; 
Emphasizing the importance of the establishment of a climate of confidence and 
solidarity among Member States; 
Alarmed by the continuation of terrorist acts and the increasing level of atrocities 
accompanying them specially those targeting foreign tourists recently; 
Conscious of the negative implications of all forms of terrorism on the image of 
Islam; 
1. Declares Islam innocent of all forms of terrorism which causes the murder of 
innocent people whose killing is forbidden by Allah. 
2. Strongly condemns the perpetrators of these atrocities pretending to act in the 
name of Islam or under any other pretext. 
3. Calls upon all states not to grant these terrorists asylum, to take all necessary 
measures and cooperate in bringing them to justice. 
4. Reaffirms that the struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign 
occupation to realize their right of self-determination does not constitute terrorism. 
5. Reaffirms the commitment of Member States to the provisions of the Code of 
Conduct for Combating International Terrorism and inter-alia those relating to their 
commitment to refrain from undertaking, attempting or participating in any way in 
financing, instigating or supporting directly acts of terrorism, and also those urging 
them to strive to take all necessary measures to ensure their territories are not used for 
planning, organizing, executing, initiating or participating in any terrorist acfivity. 
6. Calls upon Member States to strive to enhance their cooperation, in accordance 
with their internal laws and relevant international arrangements and conventions, in 
countering and combating terrorist acts, prosecuting their perpetrators or handing 
them to their respective countries or the state where the act was committed, in 
accordance with their bilateral agreements and arrangements as well as cooperation in 
the fields of exchange of relevant infortnation on terrorists and their activities. 
7. Calls upon Member States to follow-up the Code of Conduct, and to coordinate 
their stands and achieve cooperation in the light of the principles and provisions 
stipulated in the Code of Conduct at all international conferences and fora concerned 
with international terrorism. 
8. Invites Member States' Governmental Experts Group to consider, in their 
forthcoming meeting, ways and means of elaborating a draft convention on combating 
international terrorism on the basis of the principles enshrined in the Code of 
Conduct, to continue its meetings and expedite the achievement of its task and urges 
the Member States to see to the necessary participation of their experts in the 
meetings of the Group. 
9. Requests the Secretary General to continue the dissemination of the Code of 
Conduct and to follow-up the implementation of this resolution in close cooperation 
with Member States and submit a report to the Ninth Session of the Islamic Summit 
Conference. 
RESOLUTION NO. 55/8-P (IS) 
ON THE 
STRENGTHENING OF ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY 
IN COMBATING HIJACKING 
The Eighth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference (Session of Dignity, Dialogue, 
Participation), held in Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran, from 9 -11 Shaaban 1418H 
(9-11 December, 1997), 
Recalling Resolutions 28/12-P, 25/13-P, 22/14-P, 19/15-P, 3/16-P, 35/17-P, 31/18-P, 
40/19-P, 29/20-P, 45/21-P, 44/22-P, 45/23-P and 46/24-P on combating hijacking of 
aircraft adopted by the different Sessions of the Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers; 
Taking into consideration that the hijacking of aircraft and the anguish caused to 
innocent passengers is a crime as grave as highway robbery which is prohibited by the 
Islamic Shariah in accordance with the text of the Holy Quran (Surat AWaida/33); 
Noting that crimes of hijacking aircraft have continued in spite of the signing of all 
international agreements and conventions prohibiting them and calling for the 
imposition of more severe sanctions against hijacking; 
Affirming that acts of violence against innocent passengers in addition to the dread, 
terror and suffering caused to them and to their relatives and their exposure to 
unjustified physical and mental torture are contrary to the provisions of Islamic 
Shariah; 
Having considered the report of the Secretary General on the strengthening of Islamic 
solidarity in combating hijacking; 
Conscious of the need for the full observance of international conventions against 
hijacking; 
1. Condemns all forms of international terrorism including the crime of hijacking 
aircraft and unlawful acts against the safety and security of civil aviation. 
2. Calls on Member States to refuse to yield to the demands of hijackers which 
constitute a form of extortion contrary to the interests of the peoples and countries of 
the OIC and established rules. 
3. Calls upon Member States to take all necessary measures to curb such crimes and 
to inflict the most severe punishments upon offenders involved in them or to hand 
them over to the other States concerned. 
4. Calls upon Member States which have not acceded to the Tokyo Convention 
(1963), the Hague Convention (1970) and the Montreal Convention (1971) on 
penalties for hijacking and guarantees for the security and safety of civil aviation, to 
expedite their ratification of and accession to these Conventions and urges the States 
which have already acceded to these Conventions to strictly and firmly implement 
their provisions. 
5. Calls upon all Member States on whose territories hijacked planes land to exert 
utmost efforts to foil the designs of the hijackers in accordance with international 
rules in this regard and, in cooperation with the country owning the aircraft in 
accordance with the relevant international agreements. 
6. Requests the Member States facing such situations to provide necessary assistance 
to the passengers, the crewmembers, the aircraft and the countries owning them, in 
accordance with the provisions of international agreements. 
7. Requests the Secretary General to follow up the implementation of this resolution 
and to submit a report thereon to the Ninth Session of the Islamic Summit 
Conference. 
APPENDIX B: NATIONAL STATUTES 
- Statute 6/1994 On Crimes Relating to the Safety of Aircraft and Air 
Navigation. 
- Statute 26/1969 On the Establishment of the State Security Court. 
- Law Decree 10/1991 On the Amendment of Some Provisions of Statute 
26/1969 On the Establishment of the State Security Court. 
- Statute 55/1995 On the Abolishing of State Security Court. 
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